Bruce H Price’s research while affiliated with Harvard Medical School and other places

Functional movement disorder is a neuropsychiatric condition that sits at the intersection of neurology and psychiatry. Neurology and psychiatry are unique in the fields of medicine as they represent two distinct specialties for the same organ system. Notably, several early leaders across both fields regarded themselves as “neuropsychiatrists” adopting a viewpoint that saw traditionally conceptualized neurological and psychiatric conditions as part of the same brain-based diagnostic classification system. In the century that has followed, the separation of physical health from mental health has contributed to the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions and a lack of integrated care that has particularly not served well patients with functional movement disorder. In this chapter, we call for going “back to the future” with modifications to embrace an integrated neuropsychiatric perspective based in the biopsychosocial model and the importance of individual differences. The relevance of neurological and psychiatric factors varies patient-to-patient, underscoring that one size does not fit all in the framing of functional movement disorder.KeywordsFunctional movement disorderFunctional neurological disorderNeuropsychiatryNeurologyPsychiatry

A person's everyday language can indicate patterns of thought and emotion predictive of mental illness. Here, we discuss how natural language processing methods can be used to extract indicators of mental health from language to help address long-standing problems in psychiatry, along with the potential hazards of this new technology.

A 62-year-old man with a history of Waldenström’s macroglobulinemia presented with memory loss, personality changes, and odd behavior. One year earlier, he had received diagnoses of attention deficit–hyperactivity disorder, adjustment disorder, and avoidant personality traits. A diagnosis was made.

In Reply Mr Butchart agrees that the interface between the brain and the mind has been neglected by the fields of both neurology and psychiatry.¹ However, he also suggests that our proposal of increased neuroscience training for all trainees in neurology and psychiatry goes too far. We would like to emphasize some key aspects of our Viewpoint that may place this issue in a clearer context.

With the creation of the Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders category of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–Fifth Edition (DSM-5) in 2013, the functional neurological (symptom) disorder diagnostic criteria underwent transformative changes. These included an emphasis on “rule-in” physical examination signs/semiological features guiding diagnosis and the removal of a required proximal psychological stressor to be linked to symptoms. Additionally, the DSM–Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) somatization disorder, somatoform pain disorder and undifferentiated somatoform disorder conditions were eliminated and collapsed into the DSM-5 somatic symptom disorder diagnosis. With somatic symptom disorder, emphasis was placed on a cognitive-behavioral (psychological) formulation as the basis for diagnosis in individuals reporting distressing bodily symptoms such as pain and fatigue; the need for bodily symptoms to be “medically unexplained” was removed, and the overall utility of this diagnostic criteria remains debated. A consequence of the DSM-5 restructuring is that the diagnosis of somatization disorder that encompassed individuals with functional neurological (sensorimotor) symptoms and prominent other bodily symptoms, including pain, was eliminated. This change negatively impacts clinical and research efforts because many patients with functional neurological disorder experience pain, supporting that the DSM-5 would benefit from an integrated diagnosis at this intersection. We seek to revisit this with modifications, particularly since pain (and a DSM-IV somatization disorder comorbidity, more specifically) is associated with poor clinical prognosis in functional neurological disorder. As a first step, we systematically reviewed the DSM-IV somatization disorder literature to detail epidemiologic, healthcare utilization, demographic, diagnostic, medical and psychiatric comorbidity, psychosocial, neurobiological and treatment data. Thereafter, we propose a preliminary revision to DSM-5 allowing for the specifier functional neurological disorder “with prominent pain”. To meet this criteria, core functional neurological symptoms (e.g., limb weakness, gait difficulties, seizures, non-dermatomal sensory loss, and/or blindness) would have “rule-in” signs and pain (> 6 months) impairing social and/or occupational functioning would also be present. Two optional secondary specifiers assist in characterizing individuals with cognitive-behavioral (psychological) features recognized to amplify or perpetuate pain and documenting if there is a pain-related comorbidity. The specifier of “with prominent pain” is etiologically neutral, while secondary specifiers provide additional clarification. We advocate for a similar approach to contextualize fatigue and mixed somatic symptoms in functional neurological disorder. While this preliminary proposal requires prospective data and additional discussion, these revisions offer the potential benefit to readily identify important functional neurological disorder subgroups - resulting in diagnostic, treatment and pathophysiology implications.

The collaboration between neurology and psychiatry, 2 medical specialties that share the same organ, has wavered throughout history. Hippocrates viewed mental disorders as arising from the brain. However, focus during the Middle Ages and later cartesian mind-body dualism separated most disorders of the mind from the province of medicine. The fields converged in the 19th century with the advent of natural sciences and the emergence of neuropathology. Broca, Wernicke, Charcot, Alzheimer, Kraepelin, and Freud were all pioneering physicians who practiced both fields.

Introduction: Persistent genital arousal (PGAD) is a syndrome of unprovoked sexual arousal/orgasm of uncertain cause primarily reported in female patients. Most patients are referred for mental-health treatment, but as research suggests associations with neurological symptoms and conditions, there is need to analyze cases comprehensively evaluated by neurologists. Methods: The IRB waived consent requirements for this retrospective university-hospital study. We extracted and analyzed neurological symptoms, test, and treatment results from all qualifying participants' records and recontacted some for details. Results: All 10 participants were female; their PGAD symptoms began between ages 11 to 70 years. Two patterns emerged: 80% reported daily out-of-context sexual arousal episodes (≤30/day) that usually included orgasm and 40% reported lesser, often longer-lasting, nonorgasmic arousals. Most also had symptoms consistent with sacral neuropathy-70% had urologic complaints and 60% had neuropathic perineal or buttock pain. In 90% of patients, diagnostic testing identified anatomically appropriate and plausibly causal neurological lesions. Sacral dorsal-root Tarlov cysts were most common (in 4), then sensory polyneuropathy (2). One had spina bifida occulta and another drug-withdrawal effect as apparently causal; lumbosacral disc herniation was suspected in another. Neurological treatments cured or significantly improved PGAD symptoms in 4/5 patients, including 2 cures. Conclusions: Although limited by small size and referral bias to neurologists, this series strengthens associations with Tarlov cysts and sensory polyneuropathy and suggests new ones. We hypothesize that many cases of PGAD are caused by unprovoked firing of C-fibers in the regional special sensory neurons that subserve sexual arousal. Some PGAD symptoms may share pathophysiologic mechanisms with neuropathic pain and itch.

Important advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging have revolutionized our understanding of the human brain. Many of these advances provide new evidence regarding compensable injuries that have been used to support changes in legal policy. For example, we now know that regions of the brain involved in decision making continue to develop into the mid-20s, and this information weighs heavily in determining that execution or automatic sentence of life without the possibility of parole for someone younger than 18 years old, at the time of the crime, violates the 8th Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.” The probative value of other testimony regarding neuroimaging, however, is less clear, particularly for mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI), also known as concussion. There is nonetheless some evidence that new imaging technologies, most notably diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), may be useful in detecting mTBI. More specifically, DTI is sensitive to detecting diffuse axonal brain injuries in white matter, the most common brain injury in mTBI. DTI is, in fact, the most promising technique available today for such injuries and it is beginning to be used clinically, although it remains largely within the purview of research. Its probative value is also not clear as it may be both prejudicial and misleading given that standardization is not yet established for use in either the clinic or the courtroom, and thus it may be premature for use in either. There are also concerns with the methods and analyses that have been used to provide quantitative evidence in legal cases. It is within this context that we provide a commentary on the use of neuroimaging in the courtroom, most particularly DTI, and the admissibility of evidence, as well as the definition and role of expert testimony. While there is a great deal of evidence demonstrating cognitive impairments in attention, processing speed, memory, and concentration from neuropsychological testing following mTBI, we focus here on the more recent introduction of DTI imaging in the courtroom. We also review definitions of mTBI followed by admissibility standards for scientific evidence in the courtroom, including Daubert criteria and two subsequent cases that comprise the so-called Daubert trilogy rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony. This is followed by a brief review of neuroimaging techniques available today, the latter with an emphasis on DTI and its application to mTBI. We then review some of the court rulings on the use of DTI. We end by highlighting the importance of neuroimaging in providing a new window on the brain, while cautioning against the premature use of new advances in imaging in the courtroom before standards are established in the clinical arena, which are informed by research. We also discuss further what is needed to reach a tipping point where such advances will provide important and meaningful data with respect to their probative value.

Neurology and psychiatry share common historical origins and rely on similar tools to study brain disorders. Yet the practical integration of medical and scientific approaches across these clinical neurosciences remains elusive. Although much has been written about the need to incorporate emerging systems-level, cellular-molecular, and genetic-epigenetic advances into a science of mind for psychiatric disorders, less attention has been given to applying clinical neuroscience principles to conceptualize neurologic conditions with an integrated neurobio-psycho-social approach. In this perspective article, the authors briefly outline the historically interwoven and complicated relationship between neurology and psychiatry. Through a series of vignettes, the authors then illustrate how some traditional psychiatric conditions are being reconceptualized in part as disorders of neurodevelopment and awareness. They emphasize the intersection of neurology and psychiatry by highlighting conditions that cut across traditional diagnostic boundaries. The authors argue that the divide between neurology and psychiatry can be narrowed by moving from lesion-based toward circuit-based understandings of neuropsychiatric disorders, from unidirectional toward bidirectional models of brain-behavior relationships, from exclusive reliance on categorical diagnoses toward transdiagnostic dimensional perspectives, and from silo-based research and treatments toward interdisciplinary approaches. The time is ripe for neurologists and psychiatrists to implement an integrated clinical neuroscience approach to the assessment and management of brain disorders. The subspecialty of behavioral neurology & neuropsychiatry is poised to lead the next generation of clinicians to merge brain science with psychological and social-cultural factors. These efforts will catalyze translational research, revitalize training programs, and advance the development of impactful patient-centered treatments.