January 2023
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1 Citation
SSRN Electronic Journal
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January 2023
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1 Citation
SSRN Electronic Journal
June 2021
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2 Reads
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5 Citations
The Journal of Legal Studies
April 2021
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51 Reads
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9 Citations
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
Do donors seek out potentially adverse information about organizations making fundraising appeals? Do they react when it is readily available? Do they draw negative inferences when critical information is not available? To answer these questions, we consider previously unexamined large-scale natural experiments involving U.S. charitable organizations—tax-exempt organizations that file Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990. Using standard difference-in-differences designs, we find that donors penalize organizations with high fundraising costs when there is mandatory disclosure or involuntary disclosure by a third-party reporter. Organizations with lower fundraising costs fundraise more successfully in the presence of these disclosures. The contrast with donors’ behavior when such information is not available suggests that donors do not draw correct inferences when potentially consequential information is not disclosed. Disclose-on-request requirements, in contrast, apparently do not have any significant impact on donors’ or organizations’ behavior. We then sketch implications for the regulation of donations to charities and their modern cousins, such as crowdfunding and social enterprise organizations.
November 2020
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13 Reads
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2 Citations
American Law and Economics Association
This article presents the first empirical examination of giving to §501(c)(4) organizations, which have recently become important players in U.S. politics. Unlike gifts to charity, donations to a 501(c)(4) are not legally deductible. Yet, gifts to c(4) organizations are highly elastic to the after-tax price of charitable giving. At the lower end of the observed tax price range, c(4) giving falls with tax price, consistent with the hypothesis that giving to c(3) and c(4) organizations are substitutes. Over the top quarter of the distribution of tax price, however, gifts to c(4) organizations are negatively correlated with the after-tax price of giving to charity. That is, donors appear to respond as though the deduction subsidized their gift to a c(4). Donor responses to benefits for which they are not eligible may reflect the low salience of legal limitations or deliberate overclaiming. These results imply subsidies for charity can crowd out or in donations to c(4) organizations, with potential implications for U.S. politics. I cannot observe whether donors claim tax deductions for ineligible gifts, so the net results for the Treasury are unclear.
January 2020
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1 Citation
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2020
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28 Reads
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2 Citations
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2019
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5 Reads
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3 Citations
January 2019
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14 Reads
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2 Citations
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2019
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7 Reads
SSRN Electronic Journal
December 2018
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1 Read
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2 Citations
... Most regulators have left resolution of these recent informational challenges to the private sector to solve (Reiser & Dean, 2017). For example, in Delaware, a leading U.S. jurisdiction for development of corporate law, social enterprise firms may, but need not, offer the public any information about their performance or decision processes on metrics unrelated to profit (Galle, 2019). Likewise, approaches to crowdfunding regulation for the most part allow platform operators to decide for themselves what information fundraisers must provide (Cascino et al., 2019;Kim & Park, 2019). ...
January 2019
... First, the nondistribution constraint prevents nonprofits from raising funds through the sale of equity shares. Nonprofits are often said to have no owners, or rather to have "attenuated ownership" ( Steinberg and Galle 2018 ). Although controlling persons can determine how a nonprofit's assets are to be used, they are prohibited from personally (excessively) benefiting from the sale, acquisition, or use of a charity's assets. ...
December 2018
... Optimal enforcement theory suggests that multiple enforcement instruments can be desirable when the target population has heterogeneous sensitivity to each instrument (Slemrod and Gillitzer 2013), and this can hold even for transferless instruments in some cases (Galle and Mungan 2021). ...
Reference:
Essays in Public Finance and Taxation
June 2021
The Journal of Legal Studies
... Numerous empirical studies in the United States and in other countries provide evidence of donor aversion to fundraising costs. Barber, Farwell, and Galle (2022) conducted large-scale natural experiments involving US IRS Form 990 data and argued that donors penalize organizations with high fundraising costs. When there is mandatory disclosure by a third-party reporter, nonprofits with low fundraising costs fundraise more successfully when the disclosures exist. ...
April 2021
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
... For instance, evidence regarding the alteration of specific firm policies indicates that such actions can have important effects, albeit differentially for under-or overperforming firms (Zhang 2016). Interestingly, recent evidence regarding crowdfunding platform interventions indicates that interventions aimed at increasing the level of mandatory information disclosed within campaigns, such as those enacted by Kickstarter, can result in a reduced level of support from potential backers as a result of such regulations (Barber, Farwell, and Galle 2020;Kim et al. 2019). Based upon these perspectives, we examine how specific policy changes with regards to the types of content allowed in Kickstarter campaigns resulted in important alterations in the use and effectiveness of specific forms of rhetorical language, as well as in the likelihood of campaign success and the potential penalty that campaigns might face for having an extended duration that they are available on the platform. ...
January 2020
SSRN Electronic Journal
... Second, discussion about whether there is 'too much' delay typically lacks a normative point of reference (other than sporadic references to agency costssee, e.g. Galle 2021). Typically the reference point is the payout rate or flow rate of private foundations. ...
January 2020
SSRN Electronic Journal
... Apart from watchdog websites, other forms of external governance mechanisms might have an effect on donations. Galle (2017) xxi documents that, for foundations, the possibility for donors to sue "wayward managers of nonprofits" (Galle, 2017, p. 413) increases donations by between 5.5 and 14.7%, depending on the specification used. Moreover, this goes together with a reduction of administrative overhead, at least giving the impression that governance costs are externalized. ...
Reference:
Business Practices in Nonprofit Funding
August 2017
The Journal of Law and Economics
... If newly disclosed fundraising ratios reduce the marginal returns to fundraising, disclosure would put pressure on the organizational bottom line. Organizations under financial pressure tend to engage in more fundraising, not less (Andreoni & Payne, 2011;Galle, 2017). ...
May 2017
Public Finance Review
... The enforcement regime is therefore considered an important factor affecting compliance (i.e., impacting the estimated benefits of compliance) and it should therefore not come as a surprise that much regulatory enforcement relies on a deterrent approach that is inspired by the belief that increasing enforcement will positively affect compliance (Winter & May, 2001). Prior research (see e.g., Short & Toffel, 2008;Parker & Lehman Nielsen, 2011;Galle, 2017) generally confirms a positive relationship between enforcement intensity and compliance with regulation. Results further indicate that it is the probability of detection, rather than the severity of the sanction, that positively affects compliance (see e.g., Parker & Lehman Nielsen, 2011;Galle, 2017). ...
April 2017
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
... 16 See Hotelling (1929). 17 The symbol that we use to indicate a case is the first letter of the Greek translation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, strictly speaking, there is a forth 'predatory pricing situation' where one of the firms prices so low that it captures the entire market. ...
Reference:
Anti-Consumerism: Stick or Carrot?
March 2014
Texas Law Review