Bevan Sewell’s research while affiliated with University of Nottingham and other places

This analysis uses the case of the 1956 American presidential election between Adlai Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower to highlight the ways that an obsession with foreign relations could prove problematic to a campaign. Focusing primarily on Stevenson’s advisors, long-standing problems in the Democrats’ strategy on foreign relations, coupled with the emotional attachments that several key advisors had to the issue, combined to ensure that the Democrats failed to develop an effective foreign policy platform—particularly when running against a president believed to be so successful in that arena. Ultimately, it argues that the Stevenson campaign’s failure to forge an effective position highlights the problematic relationship between domestic policies and foreign relations.

This article focuses on John Foster Dulles's engagement with religion and the role it played in his worldview. In doing so, it argues that his embrace of Christian internationalism should be seen as a part of an intellectual progression shaped by Pragmatist working methods rather than a spiritual reawakening.

In the last two decades, scholars have increasingly looked to understand the way that socially constructed norms and values have influenced the course of international diplomacy. Yet while much work has been produced on areas such as gender, far less has been written on the way that perceptions of illness affected the way that leading policymakers saw themselves, their allies, and their respective roles in the world. This article, by focusing on former US secretary of state John Foster Dulles, looks at the influence that perceptions of illness had on US foreign relations during the 1950s. First, it argues that US perceptions of British and French weakness – as typified by the ill-health being suffered by those nations’ respective leaders – shaped American responses to the diplomatic crisis that erupted over the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Second, it highlights the substantial changes that took place in US policy when first President Eisenhower, and then subsequently Secretary Dulles, were stricken down by severe illness. In doing so it demonstrates how a better understanding of the relationship between illness, emotions and masculinity can help historians to better understand the course of Cold War foreign relations.

This article traces British policy discussions over their position in Latin America between 1959 and 1963. In particular, it looks at the way British officials interacted with the John F. Kennedy administration's flagship Alliance for Progress and examines the reasons behind the gradual support for a more engaged UK policy toward the area. This decision, it argues, came about due to a complex set of reasons that challenge the idea that the Anglo-American relationship determined British policy during the cold war. Both the cold war and Anglo-American relations were important in shaping British thinking, but so, too, were calculations over British economic interests. Indeed, as the article demonstrates, it was the interplay of these three elements that shaped British deliberations.

SparrowJames T., Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, £22.50). Pp. 336. isbn978 0 19 979191 9. - Volume 46 Issue 3 - BEVAN SEWELL

RabeStephen G., John F. Kennedy: World Leader (Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2010, £46.08 cloth, £14.45 paper). Pp. xc+249. isbn978 1 59797 147 8, 978 1 59797 148 5. - Volume 45 Issue 4 - BEVAN SEWELL

This essay examines the way that US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld sought to apply one of the central lessons of the Vietnam War to the George W. Bush administration's War on Terror after 9/11. Following the disastrous withdrawal from Vietnam, Rumsfeld had argued that one of the major lessons to be taken forward was that, in future conflicts, the US needed to ensure that the war was portrayed to the public in a way that would ensure ongoing success. The way to do this, Rumsfeld subsequently averred, was to convey a message of perpetual, unstoppable, but not too rapid, progress; victory was at hand, but it would take some time to achieve. As part of this process, Rumsfeld developed an elaborate narrative based around a keyhole satellite picture of the Korean peninsula at night – one half, that of South Korea, bathed in the light of progress; the other, North Korea, nearly completely dark. This photo, Rumsfeld suggested, told you all you needed to know about the fact that the US would ultimately succeed in the War on Terror. In taking this approach, however, Rumsfeld unwittingly revealed an inherent contradiction that has continued to blight the administration of Barack Obama: that there is a very fine line between progress toward an inevitable endpoint of victory and progress toward a position whereby the US is able to withdraw. For Rumsfeld, progress was toward an endpoint of victory and it was only the change in political context after 2006 that derailed his attempts to set out this message; for Obama, on the other hand, progress has become a prerequisite for getting out of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Assessments of the CIA's role in Latin America during the 1950s have tended to focus predominantly on the twin case studies of Guatemala and Cuba. Consequently, the Agency's role - and, more broadly, that of its head Allen Dulles - has come to be seen as one obsessed with covert action and relatively unimportant in terms of policy discussions. Dulles, in fact, has been portrayed as an unwilling and disinterested participant in policy discussions. The present article will challenge those assertions by suggesting that, by examining Dulles's role in the Eisenhower administration's discussions on Latin America, a different picture emerges - one that paints Dulles as an active and rational participant, and which raises important questions for our understanding of the CIA's role during the Eisenhower era.