Bernard Sinclair-Desgagn�’s scientific contributions

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Publications (6)


Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing
  • Article

March 2018

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29 Reads

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8 Citations

Journal of Law Economics and Organization

B. Sinclair-Desgagn

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Sandrine Spaeter

This paper seeks to characterize incentive compensation in a static principal-agent moral hazard setting in which both the principal and the agent are prudent (or downside risk averse). We show that optimal incentive pay should then be "approximately concave" in performance, the approximation being closer the more downside risk averse the principal is compared with the agent. Limiting the agent's liability would improve the approximation, but taxing the principal would make it coarser. The notion of an approximately concave function we introduce here to describe optimal contracts is relatively recent in mathematics; it is intuitive and translates into concrete empirical implications, notably for the composition of incentive pay packages. We also clarify which measure of prudence- A mong the various ones proposed in the literature-is relevant to investigate the tradeoff between downside risk sharing and incentives.


Auditing policies and information

January 2004

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25 Reads

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1 Citation

This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.


The Integrated Product Policy and the Innovation Process: An Overview

January 2003

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19 Reads

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4 Citations

The first part of this report presents the main debates concerning a proposal for establishing an Integrated Product Policy (IPP) in Europe. It shows the importance of applying a systemic approach in order to minimize the negative environmental impacts of products throughout their life cycle and how this policy differs from the traditional ways of dealing with this question. It presents a framework in which governments, local authorities, businesses and non-governmental organisations interact to adopt green product policies and to promote a greener demand. The main instruments necessary to put forward such a strategy are introduced and discussed. The second part of the report concentrates on a central issue of the IPP, namely the process of innovation as a key determinant in the greening of markets. This second section intends to (1) identify the specificities of innovation in an environmental context in order to acknowledge the need for a holistic and coordinated policy and (2) to present some limits of the IPP in its conceptual approach. Dans un premier temps, cette �tude pr�sente les grandes discussions entourant la mise en place d'une Politique Int�gr�e de Produits (PIP) en Europe. Elle insiste sur l'importance d'adopter une approche syst�mique afin de minimiser les impacts environnementaux dommageables des produits, et ce tout au long de leur cycle de vie. L'�tude pr�cise par ailleurs le caract�re singulier de la PIP dans le traitement qu'elle apporte � la r�duction des pr�judices environnementaux. Le cadre dans lequel les gouvernements, les autorit�s locales et les organisations interagissent, afin de mettre en place cette politique encourageant une offre et une demande plus 'vertes', sera alors pr�sent�. La derni�re partie de la section s'attache enfin � introduire et � discuter les instruments n�cessaires � la construction et � l'implantation de cette strat�gie Dans un second temps, cette �tude s'int�resse � l'examen d'un a


Figure 1 : Le schéma classique d'inspection___________________________________ 5 Figure 2 : Schéma d'inspection déclenchée par un indicateur de performance ________ 6 Figure 3 : Responsabilité des différents groupes dans un contexte de réglementation environnementale (Source : adapté de Jweeping Er., Kunreuther H. et Rosenthal L., 1998) _____________________________________________________________ 9 Figure 4 : Exemple de lettre de sélection d'une installation pour une inspection______ 31 Figure 5 : Check-list et recommandations destinée à l'installation ________________ 34 Figure 6 : Le système d'inspection européen _________________________________ 53 Figure 7 : Classification des installations classées en France _____________________ 59 Figure 8 : Circulaire du 12 juillet 2000 : les établissements prioritaires_____________ 64 Figure 9 : Activités annuelles de la DRIRE, année 1999 ________________________ 67 Figure 10 : Nombre d'installations versus nombre d'inspecteurs__________________ 68
Figure 2 : Schéma d'inspection déclenchée par un indicateur de performance
Figure 3 : Responsabilité des différents groupes dans un contexte de réglementation
Figure 4 : Exemple de lettre de sélection d'une installation pour une inspection
Figure 5 : Check-list et recommandations destinée à l'installation (Documents fournis par Mikal Shabazz)

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L'Inspection des installations dangereuses; les expériences aux États-Unis et en France
  • Article
  • Full-text available

January 2003

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249 Reads

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2 Citations

As a new regulation comes into effect, a program of inspection must be set up to guarantee that the requirements are completed by the subjected facilities. Then the facilities must make the necessary corrective actions within reasonable times. Various questions arise when we evoke the subject of inspection, namely, who will carry out the inspections, at which frequency the facilities will be inspected, on which criteria? First of all, we describe general notions of the inspection of dangerous facilities. We highlight how inspection can be characterized by two elements: its probability and its actors. That comes to determine the design of an inspection, that is to say when the inspection must be conducted and the type of inspection selected (independent auditors, responsible care?). From an economic point of view, the threat of inspection must be credible so that the installations could see incentives to be in compliance with the regulation. Inspection is generally carried out by the government who sets up the regulation. We have highlighted some economic incentives in order that the most facilities are in compliance and that the costs of control for the government are not too high. In a second part, we study the American experience of inspection of the dangerous installations. After a short follow-up of the American "Risk Program Management" (RMP) regulation, we study the administrative responsibilities of the various actor implicated: the federal government (EPA in coordination with OSHA), independent third parties, insurers and facilities themselves. It is necessary to make a difference between a compliance audit, which is conducted by the facility, and an inspection, which is carried out by members of the government and can generate sanctions for the facilities. Thus, we detailed these two forms of control and we illustrated each of them with concrete examples drawn from meetings in the United States. Moreover, being given the impossibility for

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Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis

January 2002

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9 Reads

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1 Citation

Time and value are related concepts that influence human behaviour. Although classical topics in human thinking throughout the ages, few environmental economic non-market valuation studies have attempted to link the two concepts. Economists have estimated non-market environmental values in monetary terms for over 30 years. This history of valuation provides an opportunity to compare value estimates and how valuation techniques have changed over time. This research aims to compare value estimates of benefits of a protected natural area. In 1978, Nadgee Nature Reserve on the far south coast of New South Wales was the focus of the first application of the contingent valuation method in Australia. This research aims to replicate that study using both the original 1978 contingent valuation method questionnaire and sampling technique, as well as state of the art non-market valuation tools. This replication will provide insights into the extent and direction of changes in environmental values over time. It will also highlight the impact on value estimates of methodological evolution. These insights will help make allocating resources more efficient.


Le leadership en 3C : Capacités, conduite, circonstances

January 2002

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103 Reads

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3 Citations

Dans le contexte de la Nouvelle �conomie, le r�le du leader est beaucoup moins de diriger des ex�cutants que de mobiliser leur connaissance et leur intelligence. Par cons�quent, il est pr�f�rable pour les leaders d'adopter un point de vue r�solument �clectique sur l'ensemble des th�ories du leadership en appliquant ce qui appara�t �tre le meilleur et le plus pertinent parmi ces derni�res. Voil� ce que recommandent deux chercheurs du CIRANO, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagn� (HEC Montr�al) et Ann-Ren� Blais (Minist�re de la d�fense), dans un rapport bourgogne intitul� � Le Leadership en 3C : Capacit�s, conduite, circonstances �. Dans ce rapport, les auteurs font ressortir la nuance existant entre manager et leader, le premier faisant r�gner l'ordre et la coh�rence alors que le deuxi�me se manifeste dans le changement. Le pouvoir quant � lui est un pilier important du leadership alors que le propre du leader est de savoir utiliser les cinq assises du pouvoir : l'attente d'une r�compense, la contrainte et la crainte, la l�gitimit�, le respect et l'exp�rience et la comp�tence. Afin d'appuyer leurs recommandations et de saisir la notion de leadership, Blais et Sinclair-Desgagn� passent en revue trois th�ories compl�mentaires. Dans la premi�re th�orie, les �tudes cherchent � identifier les traits de caract�re ou les capacit�s du leader. Selon cette th�orie, le succ�s d'un leader est attribuable � des traits de caract�re tels que l'originalit�, l'aptitude � faire face au stress et l'initiative dans les relations sociales. Un survol des r�sultats de cette approche est disponible dans les ouvrages de R.M Stodgill effectu�s entre 1948 et 1974. Populaire de 1940 � 1970 et en vogue pendant la derni�re d�cennie, la th�orie de la conduite s'int�resse non seulement � la personnalit� du leader mais aussi � ce qu'il fait et comment il agit. Les r�sultats d'une recherche de l'Universit� d'Ohio dans laquelle des subalter

Citations (3)


... Nous présentons d'abord un modèle de référence, dans lequel les deux parties peuvent avoir des préférences différentes en matière de risque, et sont parfaitement conscients de l'impact de la deuxième tâche de l'Agent sur la distribution de la performance. Contrairement à Sinclair-Desgagne (1999); Chaigneau et al. (2017) et Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) qui déterminent la rémunération optimale de l'Agent quand il a une seule tâche, nous attribuons deux tâches à l'Agent. Dans un deuxième temps, nous présentons notre "modèle à potentielle inconscience", où l'Agent n'est pas forcément conscient de l'impact de sa seconde tâche sur la distribution de la performance finale. ...

Reference:

Risk assessment of not achieving energy performance after renovation : cognitive biases, information asymmetries and optimal incentives
Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing
  • Citing Article
  • March 2018

Journal of Law Economics and Organization

... In 2018, the inspection of classified installations had around 1,300 DREAL inspectors to control 25,000 establishments subject to authorization, including 1,312 Seveso establishments (upper and lower tier). According to Marcellis-Warin et al., 2003, about 10-15 % of DREAL inspectors would only deal with Seveso establishments, i.e. about 150 inspectors for 1,312 sites. The order of magnitude of the ratio would therefore beöne inspector for 9 Seveso sites. ...

L'Inspection des installations dangereuses; les expériences aux États-Unis et en France