Bart Wesselink’s scientific contributions

As Europe is not on track in meeting its 2020 energy savings target, there has been quite some debate to make the energy savings target binding instead of indicative. Although the final draft text of the Energy Efficiency Directive left the option of a binding target explicitly open for the period beyond 2014, this statement has watered down in the adopted Directive: If still not on track mid-2014, the European Commission will propose “further measures.” In this paper, we argue that a binding energy savings target could be the first EU legal initiative to look beyond 2020 serving as a beacon for other policies such as for renewables and greenhouse gases that need redefinition after 2020. We therefore explore four possible design options of a binding savings target and assess their feasibility. We conclude that a binding target at Member State level (opposed to an EU-wide target like for the EU Emission Trading System (ETS)) is the most feasible. A binding target at Member State level would ensure political accountability and commitment to deliver results while providing flexibility to choose and apply the most suitable tools to achieve the target. It could provide a framework to guide ambitious and coherent implementation of EU energy efficiency policies, as well as the strengthening of national policies. Furthermore, binding targets at Member State level will make Member States take an ambitious position in Brussels when new energy or CO2 performance standards for appliances and transport modes are to be set. A Member State binding target applied to end-users (excluding ETS companies) is a design option that covers the vast majority of the cost-effective energy savings potential, maintains the flexibility for ETS companies, and supports the most cost-effective achievement of a greater share of renewables.

This paper considers which design of a binding energy savings target for the EU is the most feasible to both make it work and to ensure it can be evaluated in an efficient and transparent manner. We look at four possible design options. We conclude that a binding target at Member State level applied to end-users is the most feasible. Such design option covers the vast majority of the cost-effective energy savings potential, maintains the flexibility for companies in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and supports the most cost-effective achievement of a greater share of renewables. To allow for adequate evaluation, such binding end-use target should be defined in absolute energy terms (an “energy consumption cap”), which means that the energy use which remains is measured, rather than estimating the savings. We propose to express the target in (adjusted) final energy terms to avoid a disconnection between the target (when alternatively expressed in primary energy) and the energy statistics of endusers being also expressed in final energy. Such disconnection would unnecessarily make the job of the future evaluator more difficult. Insight into the potential contributions to the target of different energy carriers (fuels, electricity, district heat) and sectors (transport, residential, services, industry) would steer the evaluation of the energy efficiency policies that (are intended) to support target achievement and allow (if needed) for effective strengthening of existing policy instruments or adding new ones to the package.

Europe's 2020 greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target consists of two sub-targets: one for the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) sectors and one for the non-ETS sectors. The non-ETS target covers CO2 emissions in buildings, transport and non-ETS industry and non-CO2 GHG emissions. The non-ETS target is known as Europe's Effort Sharing Decision. This article discusses the GDP per capita method the European Commission has applied in setting Member State specific targets for the non-ETS ("the effort sharing") and shows that it results in an imbalanced reduction effort among the Member States. It turns out that the principal mechanism of the GDP per capita method (low-GDP countries get room to catch up with high-GDP countries by allowing them to increase emissions) is obscured by the non-CO2 GHGs, the baseline projections of which are highly policy-induced and not correlated with the growth of GDP per capita. We propose an alternative method that (1) corrects for the policy-induced decrease of non-CO2 GHG emissions and (2) is based on energy savings potentials. This approach could be used in future target setting for non-ETS sectors - including in the case that the overarching EU-wide target would be strengthened - and would provide a direct support to Europe's energy savings ambitions and policies.

In the past five years, the European Union (EU) has considerably strengthened its climate and renewable energy policies. The EU’s three ‘20 %’ targets for 2020 on greenhouse gases (GHGs), renewables and energy savings are implemented through a remarkable package of regulatory EU policies: • the EU Emissions Trading Scheme;1 • the Renewables Directive;2 • regulations for cars;3 and • regulations for appliances.4 Moreover, the recently revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive5 will provide an important framework for increased energy saving in the built environment in the EU’s 27 Member States.

The impact of EU energy savings policy must triple to achieve the bloc’s 2020 energy savings goal. But such efforts could get a much better foundation if European leaders set a binding energy consumption target, rather than the current indicative savings target. The evidence for such conclusion is provided in our recent study, which forms part of the European Climate Foundation’s “2050 Roadmap” (www.energysavings 2020.eu).