Barbu Revencu’s research while affiliated with Central European University and other places

A series of experiments conducted in Central Europe (Hungary, Austria) and East Asia (Japan) probed whether 5- to 10-year-old children (n = 436, 213 female) and adults (n = 71, 43 female; all data collected between July 2020 and May 2023) would infer traits and choose partners accordingly, in a novel touchscreen game. The participants observed third-party actions and interactions of animated agents whose behavior varied in prosociality and skill, and subsequently selected whom to play with in potentially cooperative endeavors. Overall, the results indicate (1) that trait inference may not naturally follow from action understanding but relies on learning and experimental task framing, and (2) that by 7 years of age, children begin to capitalize on such inferences in partner choice.

Instrumental helping is one of the paradigmatic “prosocial” behaviors featured in developmental research on sociomoral reasoning, but not much is known about how children recognize instances of helping behaviors or understand the term ‘help’. Here, we examined whether young children represent helping as a second-order goal and take it to mean increasing the utility of another agent. In Study 1, we tested whether 12-month-old infants would expect an agent who previously helped to perform an action that reduced the Helpee’s action cost. We found that while infants expected agents to act individually efficiently (Experiment 1C), they did not expect the agent to choose the action that maximally reduced the Helpee’s cost compared to an action that reduced the cost less (Experiment 1A) or not at all (Experiment 1B). In Study 2, we examined whether three-year-old preschoolers (1) maximize a Helpee’s cost reduction when prompted to help in a first-person task, and (2) identify in a third-party context which of two agents, performing superficially similar behaviors with varying effects on the Helpee’s action options, actually helped. Contrary to our predictions, preschoolers did not help in a way that maximally reduced the Helpee’s cost in (1). In (2), however, they indicated that the agent who reduced the Helpee’s action cost was the one who helped. Taken together, these results support the proposal that, at least by preschool age, children possess a second-order utility-based concept of helping, but that they may not exhibit efficiency when choosing their own helping actions.

Nonlinguistic external representations, such as diagrams, animations, or puppet shows, involve local relations between a perceptually available object (a symbol) and an entity that is relevant in the current communicative context (a discourse referent). By analyzing the empirical evidence on early pretend play, I argue that object substitution pretense can be fully accounted for if it is conceived of as a subspecies of external representation. This implies that the capacity to interpret objects as symbols emerges early and reliably in human ontogeny. I discuss several accounts of pretend play and related phenomena and argue that the current proposal provides a better and more general account of early symbolic understanding than alternative views.

Spelke's book defends two hypotheses about human cognition. First, humans and other species are endowed with core knowledge systems—innate computational structures that use abstract concepts to represent various aspects of the environment. Second, humans, and only humans, acquire natural languages, whose syntax and compositional semantics allow them to construct new concepts by combining the outputs of core systems. We endorse the first hypothesis but doubt that language acquisition alone explains the productivity of human cognition. In particular, we argue against the claim that infants use aspects of language to develop a new conception of other people.

Young learners would seem to face a daunting challenge in selecting to what they should attend, a problem that may have been exacerbated in human infants by changes in carrying practices during human evolution. A novel theory proposes that human infant cognition has an altercentric bias whereby early in life, infants prioritize encoding events that are the targets of others' attention. We tested for this bias by asking whether, when the infant and an observing agent have a conflicting perspective on an object's location, the co-witnessed location is better remembered. We found that 8- but not 12-month-olds expected the object to be at the location where the agent had seen it. These findings suggest that in the first year of life, infants may prioritize the encoding of events to which others attend, even though it may sometimes result in memory errors. However, the disappearance of this bias by 12 months suggests that altercentricism is a feature of very early cognition. We propose that it facilitates learning at a unique stage in the life history when motoric immaturity limits infants' interaction with the environment; at this stage, observing others could maximally leverage the information selection process.

Are photographs of objects presented on a screen in an experimental context treated as the objects themselves or are they interpreted as symbols standing for objects? We addressed this question by investigating the size Stroop effect—the finding that people take longer to judge the relative size of two pictures when the real-world size of the depicted objects is incongruent with their display size. In Experiment 1, we replicated the size Stroop effect with new stimuli pairs (e.g., a zebra and a watermelon). In Experiment 2, we replaced the large objects in Experiment 1 with small toy objects that usually stand for them (e.g., a toy zebra), and found that the Stroop effect was driven by what the toys stood for, not by the toys themselves. In Experiment 3, we showed that the association between an image of a toy and the object the toy typically stands for is not automatic: when toys were pitted against the objects they typically represent (e.g., a toy zebra vs. a zebra), images of toys were interpreted as representations of small objects, unlike in Experiment 2. We argue that participants interpret images as discourse-bound symbols and automatically compute what the images stand for in the discourse context of the experimental situation.

Human infants would seem to face a daunting challenge in selecting what they should attend, encode and remember. We investigated whether early in life, infants might use others’ attention as an exploitable source of information filtering, by prioritizing the encoding of events that are co-witnessed with someone else over events witnessed alone. In a series of studies (n=255), we show that infants who can otherwise remember an object’s location, misremembered the object where another agent had seen it, even if infants themselves had subsequently seen the object move somewhere else. With further exploratory analyses, we also found that infants’ attention to the agent rather than the object seems to drive their memory for the object’s location. This series points to an initial encoding bias that likely facilitates information selection but which can, under some circumstances, lead to predictable memory errors.

Humans routinely monitor social interactions to learn about the relational make-up of their groups and select social partners. It is unclear however whether social interactions primarily invite inferences about the dispositions of the participants involved or about underlying social relations. In the present study we tested which of these two inferences children and adults draw when observing interactions based on dominance. Children expected dominants to prevail over previous subordinates but did not generalize this expectation to interactions with novel agents, whereas adults did. These results suggest that children interpreted dominance as specific to a particular social relation, whereas adults interpreted it as a stable, target-invariant trait. This asymmetry supports the proposal that children may first interpret social interactions through a relational stance, and only later in development apprehend them through the lenses of trait attribution.

Humans rely extensively on external representations such as drawings, maps, and animations. While animations are widely used in infancy research, little is known about how infants interpret them. In this study, we asked whether 19-month-olds take what they see on a screen to be happening here and now, or whether they think that on-screen events are decoupled from the immediate environment. In Experiments 1–3, we found that infants did not expect a falling animated ball to end up in boxes below the screen, even though they could track the ball (i) when the ball was real or (ii) when the boxes were also part of the animation. In Experiment 4, we tested whether infants think of screens as spatially bounded physical containers that do not allow objects to pass through. When two location cues were pitted against each other, infants individuated the protagonist of an animation by its virtual location (the animation to which it belonged), not by its physical location (the screen on which the animation was presented). Thus, 19-month-olds reject animation-reality crossovers but accept the depiction of the same animated environment on multiple screens. These results are consistent with the possibility that 19-month-olds interpret animations as external representations.