Audrey L. Comstock’s research while affiliated with Arizona State University and other places

Did states misuse international legal emergency provisions during the COVID-19 pandemic to justify human rights abuse or did they follow international human rights law? Many governments restricted citizens’ freedom of movement, association, and assembly during the crisis, raising questions about states’ commitments to international human rights law. Some states used derogations to communicate temporary suspension of international legal provisions in a proportional and non-discriminatory manner, while others did not. We explore the dynamics of democratic backsliding and derogation use during the pandemic. We find that backsliding states were more likely to issue human rights treaty derogations. These derogations had mitigating effects once issued. Backsliding states that issued derogations were more likely to communicate restrictions and were less likely to issue abusive and discriminatory policy during the pandemic. Derogations helped temper abuse in states not experiencing backsliding. However, derogations did not always protect against abuse and media transparency in backsliding states. These results lend support to the use of flexibility mechanisms in international law and find that most states did not use emergency derogations to heighten human rights violations. The study contributes to the understanding of how international legal measures may help mitigate elements of democratic backsliding during times of crisis.

This research note asks whether states issuing pandemic-era human rights treaty derogations implemented emergency provisions as intended or used them to abuse human rights during a time of crisis. In an effort to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries declared states of emergency and derogated (temporarily suspended) from their international human rights treaty obligations. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy PanDem dataset and the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, we find that states that derogated from their international human rights obligations imposed emergency measures that were temporary and did not violate non-derogable rights. On the other hand, states that did not derogate were more likely impose discriminatory measures, enact emergency measures without time limits and violate non-derogable rights. Our results support the role that flexibility mechanisms such as derogations play in international law and show that states are being sincere about their intentions and not, generally, using these mechanisms to cover abusive behavior.

Abstracts A growing subset of peacekeeping literature focuses on explaining peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of civilians within postconflict protection. However, what happens after the abuse has received limited attention. Most of the time, peacekeepers do not receive any type of punishment following abuse allegations. What explains why peacekeepers are punished for abuse allegations? I argue that the presence of child victims increases the chances that peacekeepers are punished. Two mechanisms are highlighted through which the presence of child victims increases the chance of punishment: (i) the increased moral and legal obligation of UN member states to protect children and (ii) the increased shaming and media focus on child victims, which heightens public focus. The empirical analyses of UN and Troop-Contributing Country punishment actions between 2007 and 2017 provide robust support for the argument that the presence of child victims increases peacekeeper punishment. This research builds on studies of SEA, peacekeeping dynamics, and victimhood.

Can commitment to international human rights law promote human rights when the commitment is not yet legally binding? I argue that treaty signature can be used by non-governmental organizations and other rights actors to mobilize around rights standards and hold states accountable in the lead up to binding treaty ratification. Using the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW) as a case, I argue that CEDAW signature can have a positive impact on women’s rights. I find overall support for the argument that, following signature, states are significantly and positively associated with higher women’s rights. The findings hold across numerous robustness checks. Using an illustrative case of CEDAW signature and mobilization in the United States, I demonstrate that activists drew on the treaty following signature in the absence of ratification. The argument and results contribute to the study of international law and women’s rights mobilization, highlighting the importance of signature commitment as a tool for advancing women’s rights in advance of treaty ratification.

Despite decades of success, abuse has pervaded UN peacekeeping. This article argues that there has been a combination of incremental, conditional, and tenuous accountability for UN peacekeeping personnel accused of perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse against civilians. This article argues that the relationship with accountability has been shaped by the reliance on troop-contributing countries to supply peacekeepers. This has limited the ability and desire of the UN to institute full accountability for peacekeeper actions. Looking at examples and trends of abuse and punishment, the article demonstrates that there has been a push-pull relationship of accountability between the media and nongovernmental organization reporting on one side and UN reliance on troop-contributing countries and institutional reluctance on the other side.

Although authoritarian regimes often repress the rights of women, many autocrats have committed to international treaties protecting women’s human rights. Scholars have typically overlooked this engagement, focusing instead on autocrats’ commitment (and violation) of treaties protecting civil, political, and physical integrity rights. Yet existing explanations for autocrats’ ratification of these treaties—such as appeasing domestic opposition groups—do not necessarily apply to women’s rights (von Stein 2013). As authoritarian international law is increasingly viewed as an important area of study (Ginsburg 2020), scholars should explore how authoritarian regimes navigate participation regarding women’s rights issues, including their engagement with the main women’s rights treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). After taking a closer look at how autocracies shape, commit, and challenge women’s rights internationally, we suggest several research directions to build this area of study.

In 2017, to address the increasingly visible and prevalent occurrence of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of civilians under their protection, the UN Secretary-General created a Voluntary Compact on state behaviour. As of 2020, 103 states signed the agreement. Building on the robust literatures of human rights law, sexual abuse, and conflict, I examine whether signing the Voluntary Compact has any relationship with the levels of reported abuse, punishing accused SEA perpetrators, and funding victim relief efforts. Through quantitative analysis of annual reports of reports of SEA and punishment actions from the UN Conduct in Field Missions unit 2007–2019, I find that Troop Contributing Countries that signed were more likely to issue national-level punishments in cases of severe abuse and to contribute to victim funding. However, there is not a clear finding of any reduction of reported abuse following signature. I conclude by discussing the Voluntary Compact as a mixed-success story for soft international law so far. Given its lack of teeth, this finding is important as the UN and other international organisations continue to prevent and punish peacekeeper SEA and use nonbinding international law.