Antoine C. Braet’s research while affiliated with Leiden University and other places

The revival of the study of fallacies since Hamblin's modern classic Fallacies (1970) has signified a renewed interest in the history of this field. If we consider Aristotle the founding father, then three classical disciplines may be said to represent the origin of the study of fallacies: logic, dialectic, and rhetoric. Aristotle included in his logical, dialectical, and rhetorical writings a version of his list of fallacies: Prior Analytics 2, 16–21, Sophistical Refutations, and Rhetoric 2.24. With respect to the three classical disciplines, modern fallacy theorists display a greater interest in logic and dialectic. This holds true for both historical research and modern theoretical development, which is clearly more logically and/or dialectically oriented (for example, Hamblin himself, Woods and Walton, and Van Eemeren and Grootendorst: overview in Van Eemeren 2001). This predilection for logic and dialectic is understandable, since rhetoric focuses only in part on argumentation and is basically a popular discipline. In another respect, however, rhetoric would appear to be quite appropriate for the study of fallacies (and for the study of argumentation in general). In logic, where everything centers on the formal relation between premises and conclusion, many aspects of the argumentative situation are disregarded. While in the dialectical approach this is not as apparent, in this case we are still dealing with more or less artificial situations, debate contests without real social relevance. Only the rhetorical approach concentrates on normal argumentation in important social settings. Even if one cannot expect profound learning, rhetoric has the advantage that where argumentation is concerned, it does not tend to abstract a great number of factors. Two major considerations call for the rhetorical approach. First, assuming that further research into this subject will produce sufficiently interesting results, the history of this field can be substantially expanded. Contributions based on the classical rhetorical point of view could be combined with insights from the classical logical and dialectic approaches, both in overviews and in case studies of specific fallacies. And second, the relatively recent modern study of fallacies, historical-rhetorical research is of more than mere historical interest. It can also complement the dominant logical and dialectical approach and, in particular, enrich the detailed studies on specific fallacies, especially "rhetorical" ones. See, for example, the treatment of ad hominem in recent studies. First, writers addressing the origins of the study of fallacies tend to disregard classical rhetoric, preferring to focus on logic and dialectic. For example, in their examination of the roots of the argumentum ad hominen, Nuchelmans (1993) and Chichi (2002) do not discuss the oldest extant rhetorical handbook, the Rhetoric to Alexander, dating from around 340 BC. This represents a lost opportunity, for the book is full of recommendations for speakers on how to respond to various forms of the argumentum ad hominen, in particular the tu quoque variant. Second, in the much-debated modern issue of the existence of acceptable forms of ad hominem (see, for example, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a) the rhetorical perspective emerges as more relevant than the logical or dialectical point of view. The ad hominem is not a matter of logic, whereas this kind of attack appears far more frequently in rhetorical discussions than in dialectical ones. Although the contribution of the classical rhetorical approaches may go beyond mere historical interest, the present article is on the whole historically oriented. Before discussing the actual relevance of classical rhetorical contributions for the study of fallacies, it must first be established whether the expected contributions do indeed appear, and what their scope is. My comments on the relevance of the results for modern research will be reserved for the concluding section. The considerable attention which classical rhetoric gives to refutation (lysis, refutatio) makes the rhetorical handbooks highly interesting for those interested in (the history of) the study of fallacies. The guidelines for refutation are based on—largely implicit—standards of reasonability which closely resemble the norms employed to this day in theories of fallacies. In order to obtain a complete picture of classical views on fallacies and how to expose them, one must examine not only logic and dialectic, but also rhetoric. If we confine ourselves to the earliest—Greek—phase...

In the present article I attribute to the common topic in the Rhetoric a two-fold suggestive function and a guarantee function. These three functions are possible because this type of topic, while often quite abstract, nevertheless contains thought-steering, substantial terms, and formulates a generally empirical or normative endoxon. Assuming that according to Aristotle an enthymeme has at least two premises, it would appear that a common topic is the abstract principle behind the often implicit major premise. This means that the topic may be regarded as the – generalizing – if-then statement in a modern argumentation scheme. Therefore it should be possible to see the enthymemes of Rhetoric 2.23 as a combination of a logical argument form (which can usually be reconstructed as modus ponens) and an argumentation scheme – even though we may not attribute this idea to Aristotle himself.

This article argues that contrary to modern assumptions Hermagoras may not have discussed the epicheireme. And if he did, it is further maintained that he must have treated the epicheireme as an amplifying feature of style, as represented in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, rather than as a syllogistic device, as represented in Cicero's De inventione. Until now scholars have not appreciated that the stylistic view of the epicheireme underlies the discussion of both Ad Herennium and De inventione. They have failed to note that in the latter work Cicero has combined two views of the epicheireme: the original, typically rhetorical, amplifying feature of style, and a secondary argumentative-syllogistic form, which is derived from a philosophical-dialectical source.

The Rhetoric to Alexander (about 340 B.C.) contains a list of proofs (pisteis) and other types of argumentation which may be seen as the oldest surviving typology of argumentation schemes (avant la lettre). In the present article this typology is derived and compared with modern proposals. The conclusion is that the oldest typology is surprisingly similar to the most recent classifications.

Which properties are characteristic of the enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric? There is no consensus on this point. The present discussion centres on three properties. 1. Is there always an implicit premise? (Answer: Above all, a pragmatic level and a logical level must be distinguished.) 2. Do the premises consist by definition of probabilities and signs? (Answer: No.). 3. Are all enthymemes reducible to a syllogistic form? (Answer: The literature pertaining to this question is dominated by a false dilemma: an enthymeme does not have either a topical or a syllogistic structure). In general, Aristotle's approach to the enthymeme in the Rhetoric appears to shift from argumentation theory to logic.

The Rhetoric to Alexander (second half of the fourth century B.C.) is among the oldest contributions to the study of argumentation. From antiquity on, this treatise, which abounds in opportunistic advice, has come under heavy criticism on normative grounds. And yet, as I shall maintain here, it clearly takes into account the requirements of rational argumentation which are still in use today. Moreover, it contains the seeds of a whole series of doctrines found in modern normative argumentation theory. There are reasonable grounds for maintaining that some of these modern doctrines stem indirectly from the tradition to which the Rhetoric to Alexander belongs.