Anne L. Dalle Ave’s research while affiliated with Georgetown University and other places

In 2023, the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) organized a workshop to identify research gap areas in organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). We present the findings of the DCDD ethics working group. Heart DCDD, as all DCDD, may disrupt optimal end‐of‐life care. Irrespective of organ donation, research opportunities include identifying which processes of withdrawal of life‐sustaining therapy offer optimum patient comfort, how best to ensure patient comfort at the end of life, and how to better understand patients' preferences for end‐of‐life care. Whether heart DCDD breaches the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) depends on its interpretation, the validity and rationale of the determination of death, and the DCDD protocol used. Further research could clarify the interpretation of the DDR, the concept and determination of death, the time the cessation of brain function ensures that the patient is beyond neuro‐cognitive harm, the implications of thoracoabdominal normothermic regional perfusion on the determination of death and on brain functions, and the type of consent and level of information required for different DCDD techniques.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) provides that "an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." We show that the UDDA contains two conflicting interpretations of the phrase "cessation of functions." By one interpretation, what matters for the determination of death is the cessation of spontaneous functions only, regardless of their generation by artificial means. By the other, what matters is the cessation of both spontaneous and artificially supported functions. Because each UDDA criterion uses a different interpretation, the law is conceptually inconsistent. A single consistent interpretation would lead to the conclusion that conscious individuals whose respiratory and circulatory functions are artificially supported are actually dead, or that individuals whose brain is entirely and irreversibly destroyed may be alive. We explore solutions to mitigate the inconsistency.

Most hospitalized patients die following a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment and/or focus on comfort care. Since "Do not kill" is a general ethical norm, many healthcare professionals (HCPs) are uncertain or troubled by such decisions. We propose an ethical framework to help clinicians to understand better their own ethical perspectives about four end-of-life practices: lethal injections, the withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies, the withholding of life-sustaining therapies, and the injection of sedatives and/or analgesics for comfort care. This framework identifies three broad ethical perspectives that may permit HCPs to examine their own attitudes and intentions. According to moral perspective A (absolutist), it is never morally permissible to be causally involved in the occurrence of death. According to moral perspective B (agential), it may be morally permissible to be causally involved in the occurrence of death, if HCPs do not have the intention to terminate the patient's life and if, among other conditions, they ensure respect for the person. Three of the four end-of-life practices, but not lethal injection, may be morally permitted. According to moral perspective C (consequentialist), all four end-of-life practices may be morally permissible if, among other conditions, respect for persons is ensured, even if one intends to hasten the dying process. This structured ethical framework may help to mitigate moral distress among HCPs by helping them to understand better their own fundamental ethical perspectives, as well as those of their patients and colleagues.

Laura Specker Sullivan (2022) makes a fairly compelling case for the value of the perspectives of Buddhist practitioners in neuroethics. In this study, Tibetan Buddhist monks have been asked, among other things, whether consciousness, in brain-injured patients in a minimally conscious state, entails a duty to preserve life. In our view, some of the participants’ responses could be used to inform the bioethical debate on death determination.