Andrew Westbrook’s research while affiliated with Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey and other places

Exerting cognitive control is known to carry a subjective effort cost and people are generally biased to avoid it. Recent theorizing suggests that the cost of cognitive effort serves as a motivational signal to bias people away from excessive focusing and towards more cognitive flexibility. We asked whether the effort cost of stable distractor resistance is higher than that of non-selective flexible updating of working memory representations. We tested this prediction by using (1) a delayed response paradigm in which we manipulate demands for distractor resistance and flexible updating, as well as (2) a subsequent cognitive effort discounting paradigm that allows us to quantify subjective effort costs. We demonstrate, in two different samples (28 and 62 participants) that participants discount tasks both high in distractor resistance and flexible updating when comparing with taking a break. As predicted, when directly contrasting distractor resistance and non-selective flexible updating the subjective cost of performing a task requiring distractor resistance is higher than that requiring flexible updating.

Effortful tasks are generally experienced as costly, but the value of work varies greatly across individuals and populations. While most mental health conditions are characterized by amotivation and effort avoidance, individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) persistently engage in effortful behaviors that most people find unrewarding (food restriction, excessive exercise). Current models of AN differentially attribute such extreme weight-control behavior to altered reward responding and exaggerated cognitive control. In a novel test of these theoretical accounts, we employed an established cognitive effort discounting paradigm in combination with fMRI in young acutely underweight female patients with AN (n = 48) and age-matched healthy controls (HC; n = 48). Contrary to the hypothesis that individuals with AN would experience cognitive effort (operationalized as N-back task performance) as less costly than HC participants, groups did not differ in the subjective value (SV) of discounted rewards or in SV-related activation of brain regions involved in reward valuation. Rather, all group differences in both behavior (superior N-back performance in AN and associated effort ratings) and fMRI activation (increased SV-related frontoparietal activation during decision-making in AN even for easier choices) were more indicative of increased control. These findings suggest that while effort discounting may be relatively intact in AN, effort investment is high both when performing demanding tasks and during effort-based decision-making; highlighting cognitive overcontrol as an important therapeutic target. Future research should establish whether exaggerated control during effort-based decision-making persists after weight-recovery and explore learning the value of effort in AN with tasks involving disorder-relevant effort demands and rewards.

People who take on challenges and persevere longer are more likely to succeed in life. But individuals often avoid exerting effort, and there is limited experimental research investigating whether we can learn to value effort. We developed a paradigm to test the hypothesis that people can learn to value effort and will seek effortful challenges if directly incentivized to do so. We also dissociate the effects of rewarding people for choosing effortful challenges and performing well. The results provide limited evidence that rewarding effort increased people’s willingness to choose harder tasks when rewards were no longer offered (near transfer). There was also mixed evidence that rewarding effort increased willingness to choose harder tasks in another unrelated and unrewarded task (far transfer). These heterogeneous results highlight the need for further research to understand when this paradigm may be the most effective for increasing and generalizing the value of effort.

Associations can be learned incrementally, via reinforcement learning (RL), or stored instantly in working memory (WM). While WM is fast, it is also capacity-limited and effortful. Striatal dopamine may promote RL plasticity, and WM, by facilitating updating and effort exertion. Yet, prior studies have failed to distinguish between dopamine's effects on RL versus WM. N = 100 participants completed a paradigm isolating these systems in a double-blind study measuring dopamine synthesis with [18F]-FDOPA imaging and manipulating dopamine with methylphenidate and sulpiride. Learning is enhanced among high synthesis capacity individuals and by methylphenidate, but impaired by sulpiride. Methylphenidate also blunts effort cost learning. Computational modeling reveals that individuals with high dopamine synthesis rely more on WM, while methylphenidate boosts their RL rates. The D2 antagonist sulpiride reduces accuracy due to diminished WM involvement and faster WM decay. We conclude that dopamine enhances both slow RL, and fast WM, by promoting plasticity and reducing effort sensitivity. These results also highlight the need to control for dopamine's effects on WM when testing its effects on RL.

Measuring individual differences in cognitive effort can be elusive as effort is a function of motivation and ability. We report six studies (N = 663) investigating the relationship of Need for Cognition and working memory capacity with three cognitive effort measures: demand avoidance in the Demand Selection Task, effort discounting measured as the indifference point in the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm, and rational reasoning score with items from the heuristic and bias literature. We measured perceived mental effort with the NASA task load index. The three tasks were not correlated with each other (all r’s < .1, all p’s > .1). Need for Cognition was positively associated with effort discounting (r = .168, p < .001) and rational reasoning (r = .176, p < .001), but not demand avoidance (r = .085, p = .186). Working memory capacity was related to effort discounting (r = .185, p = .004). Higher perceived effort was related to poorer rational reasoning. Our data indicate that two of the tasks are related to Need for Cognition but are also influenced by a participant’s working memory capacity. We discuss whether any of the tasks measure cognitive effort.

Background and objectives: Depression impairs working memory (WM). And, while many studies have documented impairment in WM during depression remission, those using the N-back task did not find differences between individuals with remitted depression and healthy controls. One reason for these findings may be that certain depression phenotypes, such as the childhood-onset form, which is likely to be associated with persistent WM problems, are underrepresented or unevenly represented in the studies. Because childhood-onset depression (COD) affects individuals while cognitive development is still ongoing, it is more likely to have lasting detrimental effects, as evidenced in residual memory impairment, than depression that onsets later in life. Further, it is unclear if depression episodes have cumulative effects on WM when measured via the N-back. Methods: We examined the effects of depression on WM performance (response time, accuracy, signal detection d') and subjective experience (difficulty, mental effort required) during a four-level N-back task among 112 adults with COD (42 currently depressed; 70 remitted depressed) and 80 never-depressed controls. Results: Compared to never-depressed controls, there was minimal evidence of impaired WM performance among participants with remitted or current depression; the groups also reported overall similar subjective experiences during the N-back. Notably, number of lifetime depressive episodes had a detrimental cumulative effect on response accuracy and d'. Limitations: WM was assessed only in regard to verbal memory. The sample size of currently depressed cases was smaller than that of the other groups. Conclusions: WM remains largely intact among adults with remitted COD, but increased number of depression episodes worsens WM performance.

To understand human behaviour, it is crucial to reveal the mechanisms by which we learn and decide about effort costs and benefits in an uncertain world. Whereas the mechanisms for reward learning are well-understood, the mechanisms for effort cost learning, and especially mental effort, remain elusive. Initially, we hypothesized that cost learning follows temporal-difference learning such that brains update expected costs when informed about upcoming effort levels. However, fMRI data revealed neural correlates of a cost-prediction error of mental effort during task execution and not in response to an effort cue about upcoming effort demands. These results imply that expected costs are updated during actual effort exertion, implying that the adaptive learning of mental effort cost does not follow traditional temporal-difference learning. This study contributes to the understanding of the neural mechanism underlying unwillingness to work, suggesting that humans learn mental effort costs only when they experience effort exertion.

Suicide attempts (SA) are increasing in the United States, especially in veterans. Discovering individual cognitive features of the subset of suicide ideators who attempt suicide is critical. Cognitive theories attribute SA to facile schema-based negative interpretations of environmental events. Over-general autobiographical memory and facile solutions in problem solving tasks in SA survivors suggest that aversion to expending cognitive effort may be a neurobehavioral marker of SA risk. In veterans receiving care for mood disorder, we compared cognitive effort discounting and evidence-gathering in a beads task between veterans with (SAHx+; n = 26) versus without (SAHx-; n = 22) a history of SA. Groups did not differ in depressed mood or in a proxy metric of premorbid intelligence. Compared to SAHx- participants, SAHx+ participants self-reported significantly more severe cognitive problems in most domains, and also eschewed choice to earn higher monetary reward if earning it required a slightly increased working memory (WM) demand relative to an easy WM task. There was no group difference, however, in extent of evidence-gathering before declaring a conclusion in a beads task. These preliminary data suggest that aversion to expenditure of cognitive effort, potentially as a component of cognitive difficulties, may be a marker for SA risk.

Psychostimulants such as methylphenidate are widely used for their cognitive enhancing effects, but there is large variability in the direction and extent of these effects. We tested the hypothesis that methylphenidate enhances or impairs reward/punishment-based reversal learning depending on baseline striatal dopamine levels and corticostriatal gating of reward/punishment-related representations in stimulus-specific sensory cortex. Young healthy adults (N = 100) were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging during a reward/punishment reversal learning task, after intake of methylphenidate or the selective D2/3-receptor antagonist sulpiride. Striatal dopamine synthesis capacity was indexed with [¹⁸F]DOPA positron emission tomography. Methylphenidate improved and sulpiride decreased overall accuracy and response speed. Both drugs boosted reward versus punishment learning signals to a greater degree in participants with higher dopamine synthesis capacity. By contrast, striatal and stimulus-specific sensory surprise signals were boosted in participants with lower dopamine synthesis. These results unravel the mechanisms by which methylphenidate gates both attention and reward learning.