May 2009
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76 Reads
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24 Citations
Criminal Justice Ethics
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May 2009
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76 Reads
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24 Citations
Criminal Justice Ethics
January 2008
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39 Reads
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7 Citations
Criminal Justice Ethics
October 2007
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254 Reads
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28 Citations
The ethical-legal debate over the limits and minimum standards that closed-circuit television surveillance must respect is receiving greater attention in our time. In this context, the latent conflict between freedom and security must be resolved using solid argumentation in order to face the different cases in which a legitimate use of such means of surveillance may be justified. Along these lines, Andrew von Hirsch undertakes this difficult task by analyzing the problem starting with the situational prevention of crime and the use of recorded images in the prosecution and investigation of offences already perpetrated.
June 2007
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4 Reads
Criminal Law Forum
December 2002
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548 Reads
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16 Citations
The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice
This article analyses Roger Hood’s 1992 study of race and sentencing, which found evidence of possible racial discrimination in certain Crown Courts. Examining recent criticisms of the validity of these findings, it is suggested that an adequate threshold of significance was used in the study; that the exclusion of certain status variables did not invalidate the study’s findings; and that the choice of which sentencing variables to control for is ultimately a normative matter. Next, the article considers what steps – other than alleviating discrimination – would be needed to reduce racial imbalance in the prisons. It is argued that little is likely to be gained by seeking to make ‘social adversity’ a basis for sentencing mitigation; and that policies before the sentencing stage would need to be altered instead – for example, those relating to drug-law enforcement.
September 2002
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171 Reads
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35 Citations
Legal Theory
This paper explores the Offence Principle. It discusses whether two constraints, additional to the criteria stated in conventional analysis, ought to be met before the Offense Principle can be satisfied: (i) that offensive conduct must be a wrong, and (ii) that the conduct must also lead to harm. The nature of the Harm Principle, and its relationship to the Offense Principle, are also considered. The paper suggests that, even if all cases in which offense should be criminalized also involve harm, nonetheless there may be good reasons to retain a separate Offense Principle.
May 2001
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19 Reads
The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice
April 2001
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142 Reads
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13 Citations
Punishment and Society
Although an extensive theoretical literature has developed on proportionality and desert as it relates to the sentencing of adult offenders, there has been less discussion of desert theory as it concerns the disposition of juvenile offenders. The present article addresses this latter topic. It is suggested that `deserved' punishments for juveniles should be scaled well below those applicable to adults, for three kinds of reasons: (1) juveniles' lesser culpability, (2) punishments' greater `bite' when applied to adolescents, and (3) a principle of greater `tolerance' in the application of penal censure to juveniles. The article argues that these three kinds of reasons must rest not just on factual claims regarding juveniles' lesser self-mastery or greater sensitivity to punishment, but must depend on different, age-related normative expectations for judging the behaviour of young persons. It is suggested that the present topic - of the criteria for proportionate punishment of juveniles - should be treated as analytically distinct from the question of whether a separate juvenile court should be retained or abolished.
January 2000
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344 Reads
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14 Citations
King's law journal: KLJ
This article focuses on the ethical issues concerning the Offence Principle. Its aim is not to elucidate existing English law but, rather, to supply principles that might help guide a reconsideration of such law in this country and elsewhere.
January 1999
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4 Reads
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8 Citations
... Akin to restorative justice, a key principle of responsive regulation is active listening, through structured dialogue that gives voice to stakeholders; settles agreed outcomes and how to monitor them; builds commitment by helping actors find their own motivation to improve; communicates firm resolve to stick with a problem until it is fixed (RRP2). In the context of the 2011 Vancouver riot, not only did we fail to actively listen and learn from those most affected-victims, offenders, community and professionals-the courts regressed to precedence sentencing that precedes a number of significant reforms made to the Criminal Code in 1996, with the intention of reducing reliance upon custody in sentencing (Daubney & Parry, 1999;Roberts & von Hirsch, 1999). Included among these reforms are the addition to the Code of a statement codifying the many purposes and principles of sentencing (section 718), and of provisions that encour age the use of community sanctions in place of custody wherever offenders possess strong prospects for rehabilitation and are not deemed to be at risk to the public (section 717; section 742). ...
January 1999
... I believe there is indeed a normatively significant difference between direct and indirect paternalism, which would call for much more detailed reasoning than I can provide in this essay. There is very little that has been written so far on the topic of indirect paternalism [but see especially von Hirsch (2008) and Simester and von Hirsch (2011, 166 ff.)]. It seems that one can be an adamant anti-paternalist yet allow for indirect paternalism. ...
January 2008
Criminal Justice Ethics
... Thus, according to this particular line of thought, corporal punishment must effectively be dealt away with, in the interest of humanity. In line with the foregoing, Von Hirsh (1996) proposes reduced punishments for children who come into conflict with the law for the reason that children have a 'less degree of culpability'. According to von Hirsh (Ibid), this line of thinking is based on the cognitive claim that children have less capacity to assess and appreciate the harmful consequences of their criminal actions, and this is even more pronounced in children when they reach adolescent stage, where they 'tend to be less able to postpone gratification, to control feelings of anger and to resist peer pressure' (von Hirsh, 1996). ...
April 2001
Punishment and Society
... P. 273-275. 18 von Hirsch, "The Offence Principle in Criminal Law: Affront to Sensibility or Wrongdoing?" P. 78-80. ...
January 2000
King's law journal: KLJ
... First, the offence embodies the criminalisation of remote harms and consequently seems complicated to fit neatly within the harm principle. This would generate overcriminalisation, as argued by Simester and Von Hirsch (2009). As discussed earlier, the offence under section 130JB is a precursor or preparatory offence. ...
May 2009
Criminal Justice Ethics
... Elements of Behavior Criminal acts are about the prohibition of doing, therefore the act or behavior must be mentioned in the matter (Simester & Von Hirsch, 2002). Behavior is the absolute mental element of a criminal act. ...
September 2002
Legal Theory
... For instance, there are strong reasons to believe that the decisions made by human judges may sometimes be biased. Many studies have established that black and brown people are treated more harshly in the US and in other countries (von Hirsch and Roberts, 1997;Clair & Winter, 2017;Veiga et al., 2023). Moreover, there are many studies that have supported the conclusion that sentencing decisions may also be skewed in other ways than by racial biases. ...
December 2002
The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice
... The negotiation therefore involves understanding which and to what extent both the state and a perpetrator are threatening vital interest(s). For example, privacy can be perceived as consisting of different levels where the more personal or intimate the information, the greater the expectation of privacy ( Marx 2004 , 234;Von Hirsch 2000 ). Therefore, there must be a greater threat to someone's other vital interests to justify the privacy intervention. ...
October 2007