Andrew Schrank’s research while affiliated with Brown University and other places

The domestic bases of trans‐governmental regulatory networks are controversial. While rational choice accounts expect insecure regulators to join larger networks that promise to bolster and justify their authority back home, public interest accounts expect independent regulators to join smaller networks populated by like‐minded and informative peers. Are regulatory networks more likely to attract self‐aggrandizing servants of insecure agencies or public‐spirited representatives of their independent counterparts? What are the implications for network size and orientation? I address these questions by examining the regulators who administer labour and employment law in Latin America and find that, in keeping with the public interest account, they are more likely to go abroad when they are independent bureaucrats than when they are vulnerable to political pressure, and less likely to join larger networks of powerful allies than to teach and learn from their Iberian and Latin American peers. The results suggest that trans‐governmental networks rest on Weberian foundations – themselves mediated by linguistic, cultural, and historical factors – that contribute to the reproduction of a multipolar regulatory world.

The Latin American model of vocational education has been widely portrayed as a homegrown success story, particularly by scholars and stakeholders who are aware of the region’s skill deficits, wary of alien solutions, and suspicious of institutional transfers more generally. Is the Latin American model really homegrown? I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to trace the model’s mores and methods not to the New World but to Central Europe and go on to identify three different transmission paths in the 20th century: imitation by Latin Americans of German origin, descent, and/or training in the run-up to World War II; propagation by West German attachés and advisors in an effort to rehabilitate their country’s image in the wake of the war; and adaptation by local employers and policymakers—who received additional support from Germany—at the turn of the last century. The results suggest that institutional importation is less a discrete event or outcome to be avoided than an ongoing process that, first, entails translation, adaptation, and at times obfuscation by importers as well as exporters; and, second, is facilitated by immigrants, their descendants, and diplomats in transnational contact zones.

What drives the private sector’s attitude toward the public sector? We address the question by regressing survey data on the perceived burden of government regulation on objective data on the nature, cost, and administration of the regulation of entry in different political and economic contexts. The results suggest that businesspeople perceive democratic, regulatory, and left-of-center governments to be inefficient, net of objective conditions, and tax havens to be well-governed despite—or perhaps due to—their lack of transparency. Our findings contribute to both the sociology of knowledge and political sociology by demonstrating that indicators of public sector performance that are derived from surveys of businesspeople and used by donors and investors are not only biased against liberal democracies that try to regulate and/or tax the private sector but—insofar as they influence the flow of public and private resources—a threat to regulation and redistribution in the twenty-first century.

Cambridge Core - Latin American Studies - The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Latin America - edited by Daniel M. Brinks

Workers in the United States have lost their voice (or influence) in Washington and the workplace. Industrial unions are ill-suited to the postindustrial economy, and alternative organs of representation and influence (i.e., “alt-labor”) are trapped in a vicious circle of vulnerability and volatility that limits their likely growth. As a result of this, power is increasingly skewed toward employers and their political allies, who add to labor’s difficulties by eliminating and evading remaining labor protections. The federal government could help to restore a balance of power between workers and employers by establishing and enforcing a robust wage floor: (1) a $15 an hour minimum wage, (2) a nationwide hotline for workers who believe that their rights had been violated (“911 for workers”), and (3) a database that would allow regulatory agencies and worker organizations to rationalize and coordinate labor and employment law efforts. Doing so would produce a positive feedback loop so workers regain their voice on the job and in politics.

There is more agreement on the need for advisory services to help small and midsized manufacturers keep up with the latest managerial techniques and technologies than there is on the optimal design of those services. This study reconfigures and reanalyzes administrative data from the American Manufacturing Extension Partnership, and draws on extensive interviews with “street-level bureaucrats” at Manufacturing Extension Partnership centers, to identify and compare variation in centers’ approaches to service delivery. Centers and clients who rely on third-party providers tend to have more rather than less enduring ties, suggesting that it’s direct delivery, rather than brokerage, that is associated with one-shot deals. There is evidence also that projects generate the most impact when they help “get the relationships right” and mitigate network failures.

n spite of the evident importance of professionals and the professions in the Global South, the sociological literature on the subject is almost entirely confined to the developed market economies. In turn, the North American literature on development has not filled the vacuum – as it has largely ignored the pro- fessions for the better part of the last half century. In this introduction, we offer a brief intellectual history of these two sub- disciplines and critically appraise this mutual neglect - of professionals in the sociology of development, and of the Global South in studies of professions. We then offer four realms of investigation where we believe the marriage of these two spheres of knowledge would be particularly useful: the relations between professionals and the state, the politicized nature of professions, the fragmentation of professions, and the transnationalized nature of professions. KEYWORDS professionals, professions, development, Global South

A substantial body of literature holds that industrial policies work best when their beneficiaries are subject to demanding performance standards. By conditioning access to their low-cost loans and lucrative markets on foreign sales and local content, for example, East Asian officials forced their manufacturers to improve quality, cut costs, and develop linkages to allied industries – that generated jobs and foreign exchange revenues of their own – in the so-called miracle years. But the politics of performance standards are themselves unclear. Why are they more common in some countries than others? Are they more likely to be imposed by autocratic than democratic regimes? And, if so, why? I address these questions by examining cross-national data on export and local content requirements in the auto industry in 1980; find that they all but presupposed autocracy in labour-surplus – but not labour-scarce – countries; explore the interactions of political regimes, productive assets, and performance standards in South Korea in particular; and discuss their theoretical and methodological implications. The results not only imply that efforts to build new comparative advantages over the long run by means of performance standards that put existing comparative advantages at risk in the short run are unlikely to succeed in labour-surplus democracies but, in so doing, speak to the merits of ‘middle-N’ methods and typologies that try to reconcile the at times competing goals of generality and historical detail in cross-national research.

What explains the differential growth rates that foster international income inequality? The leading sociological answers have taken conflicting positions on the assumptions of self-interest and diminishing returns that are taken for granted in the neoclassical literature. While modernization theorists traced the periphery's inability to take advantage of diminishing returns in the core to “traditional” values that allegedly militated against savings, investment, and growth, and thus denied the universality of self-interest, their neo-Marxist successors traced underdevelopment less to the values of the poor than to the “cumulative” advantages of the rich, and thus denied the inevitability of diminishing returns. The result is a two-front assault that suffers from a serious coordination problem, and I therefore take issue with both the neoclassical accounts and their critics by, first, calling the validity of their assumptions—self-interest and diminishing returns—into question and, second, defending an alternative approach that treats the subordination of self-interest to norms of fairness, trust, and cooperation in the short run as the sine qua non of increasing returns and growth over the long run. The research challenge, therefore, is to unearth the roots of collaborative social norms in particular historical contexts—a challenge that will prove more tractable if development sociologists not only abandon the assumptions of self-interest and diminishing returns but embrace the tools and insights of the new economic sociology.