Amihai Glazer's research while affiliated with University of California, Irvine and other places

Publications (198)

Chapter
How does aging affect government activities? This chapter empirically analyzes this concern by focusing on public spending, such as public investment. Some studies have confirmed that aging negatively impacts public spending that brings long-term benefits for us. Jäger and Schmidt (2016) show that aging negatively impacts investments of public capi...
Chapter
Investment in education is a public expenditure that provides long-term benefits, such as infrastructure investment. The impact of population aging on education spending theoretically has both positive and negative effects. This chapter analyzes the impact of population aging on education spending using Japanese prefectural data. Unlike infrastruct...
Chapter
Consider individual labor supply and consumption from the life-cycle perspective. Because many of the elderly are retired, they may little directly benefit from state policies that increase wage income. But they may benefit indirectly: lower taxes on labor may consequently increase labor supply and reduce the price of services the elderly buy, for...
Chapter
Many developed countries are facing problems associated with the rapid aging of their populations. If voters’ policy preferences depend on their age and the government’s policy adoption reflects public opinion, the change in demographic composition may affect governmental policies in a region. To retain their political power, ruling parties often r...
Chapter
This chapter focuses on analyzing the effects of aging on corporate tax rates. As seen in Chaps. 2 and 3, population aging increases Japan’s social welfare spending per capita through political processes; on the other hand, it decreases the per capita spending on other areas that result in long-term benefits, such as infrastructure and education in...
Chapter
This book has explored generational conflict, in the context of governmental spending. The problem is more general, as the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted. Should vaccines at first be given only to the elderly, or should eligibility be extended to essential workers and to school teachers, who are usually younger. Lockdowns protect the elderly, bu...
Chapter
The US has a relatively smaller elderly population than Japan: 15% are over 65 years old in the US in 2015, compared to 26% in Japan. But by 2050 the US proportion is expected to reach 22%. If the aged voters do not want to pay taxes for the programs benefiting children or young families, these programs may have smaller budget.
Article
This paper develops a political economy model to study strategic behavior related to the introduction of congestion policies. Our main focus is on tradeable permits, although we also study results under a congestion toll. We first study a two-period model where, in the first period, a majority decides whether or not to introduce a permit system in...
Article
Full-text available
We use new annual data on gasoline taxes and corporate income taxes from U.S. states to analyze whether politicians avoid tax increases in election years. These data contain 3 useful attributes: (1) when state politicians enact tax laws, (2) when state politicians implement tax laws on consumers and firms, and (3) the size of tax changes. Using a p...
Book
This book integrates the economics of aging and insight based on political economy and explores generational conflict in the context of governmental spending. This problem is general, as the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted: lockdowns protect the elderly, but hurt the young. Policies to address global warming impose taxes on the elderly, but would...
Article
A principal aware that an agent exerts little effort will nevertheless fund the agent, because the principal values the output the agent produces. The agent in turn decides how hard to work by anticipating how his behavior affects the budget the principal will give him. Under some conditions, the principal gives the agent large budgets anticipating...
Article
Full-text available
Rent seekers may attempt to limit costly rent seeking. One way is to increase the number of projects, even to universal service. In particular, a legislator may propose a number of projects that exceeds the number of members in the majority (as by too many bus stops, or too many university campuses), thereby inducing each member of the majority to...
Article
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Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an inaccurate agent. The accurate agent who is biased will then...
Article
An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in two separate periods, and two differe...
Article
This paper studies the behavior of the national air traffic control (ATC) centers in the EU as it relates to bargaining between a union and government. We analyze wage formation, the reactions of ATC's to a price-cap, the slow adoption of new technologies, the reluctance to vertically disintegrate, the slow standardization, and the failures of merg...
Article
Consider a principal who allocates a fixed budget among risk-averse agents. Each agent first chooses a policy or project. After observing the outcomes of their choices, the principal allocates a larger budget to the agents who had adopted the policy with the superior outcome. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may have all agents make the same choi...
Article
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Consider spouses who engage in Nash bargaining to allocate resources between them. The person with a higher income when unmarried enjoys a larger share of the joint income, and benefits less from an increase in joint income. This difference can cause spouses who have the same utility functions and the same family incomes to differ in their benefits...
Article
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision maker, a customer, who aims to arrive at a time that minimizes his deviation penalty. If multiple customers arrive...
Article
Full-text available
An incumbent who can shift the cost of action to a successor may choose to avoid incurring the cost of an action the incumbent favors, resulting in delay. The delay will be longer the closer the preferences of officials to each other, the higher the fixed cost of action, and the higher the discount rate. Incumbents with moderate preferences have a...
Article
Loss aversion can affect support and opposition to Pigovian taxes to reduce externalities. This paper studies road pricing with reference-dependent preferences, modeled by a linear gain-loss utility function. Given this specification, we find that the socially optimal road toll is smaller than the optimal toll in the absence of reference dependence...
Article
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from some due date and no delay costs. The jobs sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision maker, a customer, who aims to arrive at a time that minimizes his deviation penalty. If multiple customers arrive...
Article
Full-text available
In a courtship game, wasteful conspicuous spending may provide information about some components of a suitor’s income. But conspicuous spending may be costly not only for the potential husband but also for the woman: it reduces the wealth of the man she may marry. In the optimal contractual arrangement, the bride’s cost moderates the threshold valu...
Working Paper
Full-text available
An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in each of two periods, that each of two...
Article
Full-text available
A signal may be more effective the greater the number of people who use the same signal, thereby creating a network externality and potentially generating multiple equilibria. A subsidy to the signal can increase efficiency, and the signalers may benefit from the subsidy even if they pay taxes to finance it. But people who benefit from the signal m...
Article
This article explores behaviour that is the opposite of that usually considered in analyses of the private provision of a public good. The charity (or NGO), rather than aiming to maximize provision of the public good financed by contributions, maximizes profits. The model describes an equilibrium with many people contributing, and where the provisi...
Article
This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of...
Conference Paper
Consider a principal (say a central government) which allocates a fixed budget among multiple agents (say local governments). Each agent chooses a policy or technology. After observing the success or failure of each agent, the principal allocates a larger share of the budget to agents who succeeded than to those who failed. Under these conditions,...
Article
A firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders, such as workers. This article studies the behavior of such a firm, showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage. The fir...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
This paper studies the behavior of the air traffic control (ATC) centers in the EU. We investigate the functioning of the European ATC sector with a union bargaining model. In this model, working conditions are the outcome of a bargaining game between the public air traffic agency and the unions of air traffic controllers. We use this framework to...
Article
An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods than in others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent’s reputation if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations can explai...
Article
An examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty U.S. states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short-sighted. Turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income. In particular, turnover increases capital expenditure and income t...
Article
Using a simple adverse selection model, we characterize equilibrium when the rich chase the poor. If communities are established by competitive entrepreneurs, the equilibrium exists, is unique, and is efficient. It involves either complete separation, or complete pooling. Different income groups may rank these qualitative outcomes differently. We s...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Consider a principal who sets a budget that the agent allocates among different services. Because the preferences of the agent may differ from those of the principal, the budget the principal sets can be lower or higher than in the first-best solution. When the principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences, the agent may choose an allocation...
Article
An official whose experience increases over time may overweight old information when making decisions. If the state of nature changes over time, the official’s performance eventually worsens with experience. Though a new official may initially perform worse than his predecessor, maximizing average performance requires that officials are regularly r...
Article
A worker's productivity may increase if he imitates another worker he believes had performed well. The benefits of imitation can lead a firm to adopt up-or-out rules, and to pay senior workers more than junior workers, though observed differences in productivity are small.
Article
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who...
Article
We consider sequential competition among sellers, with different consumers desiring the good at different times. Each consumer has the option of buying from a later seller. Each seller recognizes that future sellers are potential competitors. We find that if sellers do not know the previous history of sales, then an equilibrium price is nec-essaril...
Article
Innovation can be encouraged by grants of a patent monopoly, subsidies to innovative activities, and prizes to innovators. This paper examines a fourth mechanism---a firm engaged in R&D has private information about whether it succeeded or failed to innovate. It can profit from this private information by buying or selling an asset whose price will...
Article
This paper addresses the puzzle of why redistributive legislation, which benefits a small minority, may pass with overwhelming majorities. It models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support h...
Article
An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may induce that person to exert little effort to increase his income. Such behavior generates a Good Samaritan Dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrict reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce...
Article
If government offers a prize to fi rms, each may likely lobby to be the beneficiary. The heavy lobbying may signal to government that the prize is too large, inducing government to cancel the policy.
Article
Full-text available
A winning coalition which sets policy cannot always ensure that members of the coalition will be the ones getting benefits. Different jurisdictions (including members of the winning coalition) may then engage in costly rent seeking. Maximizing the welfare of the winning coalition may therefore require providing services to jurisdictions which are n...
Article
This paper applies the career-concerns model of policy-making to a political economy of fiscal federalism and examines the effect of decentralization on policy-makers' effort incentives and its relative efficiency over centralization. In the single-task case, decentralization induces larger effort than centralization owing to the effect of focus an...
Article
A person engaged in search may be uncertain whether the good or job he seeks is still available. Some people may therefore search when the job or good is unavailable; others may stop searching too early. A seller or employer who wants individuals to search should therefore periodically announce that the position or good is still available. The prof...
Article
Gasoline taxes are the most important tax on car use. The question naturally arises as to what tax would be adopted by a government that responds to the preferences of the public. To address that issue, we begin with the standard Downsian model, where policy is determined by the median voter. This model predicts that as long as the median voter is...
Article
Full-text available
A firm whose profits increase when outsiders believe that it pays high wages may induce its workers to over-consume goods that signal high compensation. One implication is that firms may lobby for government subsidies when they offer fringe benefits with high signaling value, such as company cars, to their employees. We show that under plausible co...
Article
Full-text available
Gasoline taxes are the most important tax on car use. The question naturally arises as to what tax would be adopted by a government that responds to the preferences of the public. To address that issue, we begin with the standard Downsian model, where policy is determined by the median voter. This model predicts that as long as the median voter is...
Article
This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilib...
Article
International treaties allow a minister in one country to learn about the beliefs held by a minister in another country, so allowing each to make better decisions. When the net benefits of environmental policy are uncertain, a country which participates in negotiating an environmental treaty, or which supports strong environmental action, thereby p...
Article
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When...
Article
Consider a firm which pays a (credit-constrained) worker for his effort over two periods. The more the firm pays in one period, the wealthier is the worker in the following period, and so the more he must then be paid for a given effort. We describe the profit-maximising contract under these conditions, showing how this wealth-ratchet effect can ra...
Article
Full-text available
This paper applies two recently developed trading algorithms to a water quality trading (WQT) market located in the Cub River sub-basin of Utah; a market that includes both point and nonpoint sources. The algorithms account for three complications that naturally arise in WQT markets: (1) combinatorial matching of traders, (2) trader heterogeneity,...
Article
College education is not only an investment; for many people it also generates consumption benefits. If these benefits are normal goods, then the rich attend college at higher rates than the poor. Furthermore, the marginal poor student is smarter than the marginal rich student. Colleges aiming to attract smart students may therefore charge lower tu...
Article
Consider a rent-seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent-seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that coll...
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Full-text available
IIn contrast to symmetric oligopolies, high-tech markets often exhibit asymmetric market structures. Leadership may be temporary but has substantial value. We explain such asymmetry by an R&D race at two levels in advancing industries. There is rivalry in developing technological breakthroughs in terms of advanced mother technologies. And there is...
Article
We examine how diversification of projects assigned to an agency can enhance efficiency by informing a principal of the agency’s quality. Projects that appear inefficient in isolation may be justified when assigned to the same agency. Assigning different tasks to different special purpose governments, though allowing for technical efficiency in the...
Article
This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different wages, may alleviate the hold-up problem in firm-specifi...
Article
Given the difficulty of monitoring, and even more so of enforcing, International Environmental Agreements, it is surprising that they are signed and implemented. This paper offers a theoretical model, which addresses this issue. The focus is on informational and coordination problems. A country which is unsure about the benefits of environmental po...
Article
This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. To affect a firm's ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care, increasing the disciplinary power of consumer boycotts. In the firm's choice between ethical and un...
Article
Full-text available
This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm's ethical behavior, moral consume...
Article
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls for higher pay and/or a softer effort requirement. Moreo...
Article
This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under four different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where a supermajority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; a dictator model, where the chairman has absolute pow...
Article
A policy is often more effective the more confident are economic agents that the current leader (or principal) will adopt the policy. This paper considers uncertainty about the principal's type, interpreted as uncertainty about the probability that he would adopt a project or policy. We show how a principal who highly values the project can signal...
Article
A person may vote for a candidate to please citizens who prefer the same candidate, and to anger citizens who dislike the candidate. Such behavior is consistent with high turnout (though any one vote is unlikely to be decisive), with strategic voting, and with candidates adopting divergent positions.
Article
We consider, in this paper, the allocation of pollution quotas as a mechanism design problem. The first objective of pollution quotas is to reduce pollution, but raising revenue is an additional goal when taxation is distortionary. As there is a conflict between allocative efficiency and distributional concerns, rent extraction matters. We show tha...
Article
When the automobile was developed near the beginning of the last century, it was the relatively new fuel gasoline, not the familiar ethanol that became the fuel of choice. We examine the intersections of the early development of the automobile and the petroleum industry and consider the state of the agriculture sector during the same period. Throug...
Article
We consider cities which can increase the income of landowners or of capital owners by improving the quality of public services. The improvement can come from innovation or from imitation. We find that when cities aim to benefit landowners, too many cities innovate; but too few cities innovate when the city aims to benefit capital owners. Redistrib...
Article
We consider how the demand for esteem shapes behavior in the labor market. When individuals care about what other people think of them, especially fearing bad evaluations, they may prefer jobs that hide information about their qualities. We see how such a motive can contribute to explanations of wage stickiness, high-powered incentives, search, up-...
Article
Earmarking is a form of bundling in which government adopts a tax policy while specifying the uses of the revenue. This paper explores how bundling can enhance efficiency: it can inform the public of the quality of a program proposed, or of the quality of the agency that will be responsible for designing and implementing the program.We show that po...
Article
Trade policies which aid a domestic industry also increase the domestic price of the traded good. Consumers who heavily consume the protected good may find that this price rise reduces the marginal utility of income. The lower marginal utility of income may in turn reduce political pressures to redistribute income to such consumers. Taxpayers oppos...
Article
Top decision-makers (such as the U.S. President) often serve short terms, but make decisions with consequences long after they are gone. (Appointments of judges or of Federal Reserve Board members are two examples.) When a leader can choose his effort on an appointment, the organization’s performance may increase when the minimum term for an appoin...
Article
We consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general revenues. We des...
Article
The paper examines consolidation episodes in the EU since 1970 with a view to shedding light on the factors that determine the success or failure of fiscal adjustment. Compared to the existing literature on successful fiscal consolidations we add a number of new dimensions. Two deserve particular attention. Firstly, we explore a broader set of pote...
Article
Consider two types of residents, who prefer two different values of a policy. A current majority in some city, seeking to increase the probability that it will set policy in the following period, may adopt current policies that are particularly unattractive to the minority, leading some members of the minority to emigrate. Such behavior can lead to...
Article
Full-text available
Many mechanisms (such as auctions) efficiently allocate a good to the firm which most highly values it. But sometimes the owner of the asset or good may wish to transfer it only if it is not too valuable to potential buyers. The allocation problem becomes especially difficult when the potential buyers have private information about the asset’s valu...
Article
We consider duopolists innovating and producing a good subject to network externalities. If successful in R&D, a firm sells both the old product and the new one. The new product increases the utility of its user; it also generates a higher network externality than does the old product. A firm which fails to innovate nevertheless profits from the su...
Article
Consider an elected politician who wants to identify politically savvy people who could offer him good advice. Since the incumbent won an election, people who supported him are probably better attuned to the political winds than are people who did not. The official should therefore listen to people who had supported him. For similar reasons, he may...
Article
No one can quarrel with the requirement that the budget plan should be designed to maximize social welfare… Musgrave and Peacock (1958, ix) At first sight it might be argued that anyone who set himself up as a judge and wished to establish standards for the distribution of expenditure or amounts of revenue different from those approved by Parliamen...
Article
Members of political parties may influence each other. For example, a liberal in a party of moderates may moderate his views. At the same time, the moderates in the party may become more liberal. Voters in a district who favor such effects may care about the ideology of officeholders in other districts. They may therefore prefer a candidate who aff...
Article
Residents both enjoy the policies adopted in their cities, and choose those policies. If some people can better evaluate policies than can others, then the most perceptive people will be the most willing to move to the city with better policies, thereby making that city more likely to adopt good policies in the future. Such migration can cause aggl...
Article
We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who work in a team. The public observes the organization’s performance, but not the separate contribution of the leader or of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and...
Article
Analyses of campaign contributions usually follow the Downsian model to suppose that candidates seek contributions to win elections. This paper takes the opposite approach, by assuming that each candidate aims to maximize the contributions he collects. A citizen contributes to a candidate with the aim of increasing that candidate’s chances of winni...
Article
Suppose that beyond valuing the goods he consumes, a person also values freedom, which increases with the number of different bundles he can afford. We show that citizens may therefore favor proportional taxes over lump-sum taxes, progressive taxes over proportional taxes, quantity rationing over price increases, and fixed fees allowing unlimited u...
Book
This new seventh edition of the book offers extensive discussion of information, uncertainty, and game theory. It contains over a hundred examples illustrating the applicability of economic analysis not only to mainline economic topics but also issues in politics, history, biology, the family, and many other areas. These discussions generally descr...
Article
Though congestion tolls can increase social welfare, the public often opposes them. One explanation for the opposition is that a road user views a congestion toll as punishment for the damage he causes others. Since a user suffers from congestion, he believes that he has already suffered some punishment and therefore it is unfair or unjust to impos...

Citations

... Another promising avenue is to use tradable mobility permits that are grandfathered to peak drivers. In this case one avoids additional taxes and one can more easily compensate existing drivers (De Borger et al., 2022). ...
... Even power calculations, which are typically thought of as being only useful for experiments, can be 10 As of this writing, we are aware of only four pre-analysis plans used in observational studies that seek to answer new research questions (i.e., not replications). These are Neumark (2001), Chang et al. (2020a), Neumark and Yen (2020) and Michler et al. (2020). Monogan III (2013) provides an example from political science. ...
... This game-theoretic trend has only intensified over the years, as is evidenced by perusing the specialty MPE journals, such as Public Choice (see Bolle and Otto, 2021), Rationality and Society (see Bertolai and Scorzafave, 2020), Journal of Theoretical Politics (see Pond, 2021), and Economics and Politics (see Terai, and Glazer, 2021), among others. Political economy themes using game theory are also suffused in the flagship journals across the social sciences. ...
... For example, if hospitality is a function of CC, the practice of buying wine may merely replicate the west, by providing status for the buyer. As we were based in China, we had some understanding as to how 'conspicuous gifting' and hospitality have resonance in China (Bronsert et al. 2017). In addition to more recent western values of materialism, traditional values such as guanxi ('relationships'), mianzi ('face') and renqing ('human sentiments') (Yao 1988) may serve as justification for CC epitomized in hospitality. ...
... The introduction of changes in the design of transport aircraft should contribute to the effective solution of the tasks of maintaining a high level of safety of aircraft, as well as ensuring the safety of air transport at all its stages [34]. Ensuring the permanent technical serviceability of aircraft in the conditions of making certain technological changes to the design is the responsibility of the representatives of the maintenance service, who, by the nature of their activity, decide on the issues of monitoring the current condition of aircraft and their serviceability. ...
... 1 See Reinganum (1981a,b) and Park and Smith (2005) for timing games with unobservable actions, which is equivalent to allowing firms to precommit to their respective strategies. See, also, Glazer et al. (2018) for a timing game in a slightly different context. ...
... Road pricing is, for many economists, the most efficient tool to reduce congestion and polluting gas emissions to their efficiency level. Users generally oppose the implementation of road pricing schemes because they see it as an additional tax [14]. Issues related to road pricing are the cost of collecting fares and controlling for the adherence of road users. ...
... The model is based on the intra-household resource allocation and uses a Nash bargaining solution [Cohen and Glazer, 2017] under the assumption that an additional hour of electricity at the margin of electricity deficiency has significant effects on the socio-economic outcomes of women in the household where the modelled household consists of a wife and husband. Following gender disparity in relative bargaining power and the unequal time spent by women in the house [Duflo, 2012, Kabeer, 1999, we assume that household electrification disproportionately benefits women, and that the path to increased household welfare is largely through the wife [Duflo, 2012, Mayoux andAnand, 1995]. ...
... The analysis below builds on Terai and Glazer (2015) in considering how reputation affects budgetary allocations made by a principal. Unlike that paper, however, the concern here is on the principal's actions rather than of the agents, including how the principal will allocate a fixed budget over two periods, and on whether the principal benefits from hiding his preferences. ...