Alkuin Kölliker’s research while affiliated with Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and other places

While investigating varieties of governance arrangements in the contemporary global system, the analytical framework of this volume puts particular emphasis on three institutional dimensions of such arrangements.1 The three dimensions Mathias Koenig-Archibugi has presented in the introduction include the level of publicness, the level of delegation and the level of inclusiveness. This chapter reflects on how variations between different arrangements in these three dimensions can be accounted for. It does so from a theoretical perspective, while drawing on the rich empirical case studies of the previous chapters in order to illustrate the theoretical observations made, as well as their possible limitations.

This article tries to explain national incentives for protecting environmental goods either autonomously or collectively; it explores how globalisation has affected those incentives; and it suggests how national environmental policy might respond so as to ensure its effectiveness. The central argument is that national incentives for environmental protection may to a considerable extent be explained by a combination of the type of environmental good to be protected (in terms of public goods theory) and the effects of environmental protection measures on international competitiveness. Arrangements for protecting environmental goods can be ranked according to their centripetal effects on non-participating countries. Centripetal effects are strongest in the case of club goods (1), followed by private goods (2), public goods (3), and common pool resources (4). The centripetal effects resulting from the type of environmental good can be further reinforced by competitive advantages resulting from environmental protection measures; they can be weakened by competitive disadvantages; or they can remain unchanged due to competitive neutrality. The combination of four types of environmental goods and three types of competitive effects (positive, negative, neutral) results in twelve possible cases, with differing national incentives for autonomous and collective environmental protection. Given specific assumptions, these twelve cases can be ranked with regard to the severity of collective action problems they involve. The article includes a short empirical illustration for each case. It also analyses how globalisation (in the form of increasing trade) and some of its driving forces (in the form of free trade agreements) influence national incentives and legal possibilities for environmental protection. This article concludes with a brief discussion of four options for (re-)expanding the action space for national environmental policies under the condition of economic globalisation.

Einer der Eckpfeiler der Europäischen Gemeinschaften nach deren Gründung in den fünfziger Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts war das Prinzip gleicher Rechte und Pflichten für alle Mitgliedsländer. Da kollektives Handeln nach diesem rigiden Grundsatz die Teilnahme aller EG-Mitglieder voraussetzte, stellten sich gewisse Trittbrettfahrer-Probleme erst gar nicht. Neben diesem Vorteil machten sich aber auch Nachteile spürbar. So brachte dieses Prinzip auch das Risiko der Stagnation auf dem kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner aller Mitgliedsländer mit sich. Dies wurde insbesondere nach der ersten Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft in den siebziger Jahren zum Problem.

This contribution develops a theory of the impact of differentiation on integration and unity among EU member states and discusses empirical evidence from four policy areas. According to the theory, the centripetal effects of closer co-operation among willing EU members on initially unwilling non-participants are strongly influenced by the character of the respective policy area in terms of public goods theory. The eventual participation of initially reluctant member states, which leads to the re-establisment of long run unity despite short run differentiation, is most likely in policy areas involving excludable network effects, and most unlikely in areas dealing with common pool resource problems (the four remaining types of goods ranking in between these two extremes). The theoretical conclusions are supported by empirical evidence from four EU-related policies: the successful three show strong characteristics of excludable network goods (EMU, Schengen and the Dublin Convention), while the one which has proved extraordinarily difficult so far involves a common pool resource problem (tax harmonisation).