Ali Alfoneh’s scientific contributions

Addressing students at the Haqqani Theological Seminary in Qom on May 22, 2011, Suleimani declared that the social revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa "provide our revolution with the greatest opportunities." He continued, "Today, Iran's victory or defeat no longer takes place in Mehran and Khorramshahr. Our bound-aries have expanded and we must witness victory in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. This is the fruit of the Islamic revolution." 2 Suleimani's statements confirm earlier press reports that the Islamic Republic has actively supported its ally Syria in deadly crackdowns on protesters and, more specifically, charges that Suleimani's Quds Force has been exploiting the Arab Spring in Tehran's favor. 3 This is also why, on May 18, Obama imposed sanctions not only against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and six senior aides, but also Suleimani, who is identified as "the conduit for Iranian material support" to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate. 4 Despite Suleimani's prominence, little is known about him personally; he remains something of an enigma. This Outlook addresses this problem by analyzing open-source Persian-language materials to help provide some insight into Suleimani's leadership style, his military career, and his recent ideological rhetoric in support of exporting the Iranian revolution. These sources include This is the third in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about Qassem Suleimani. 1 On May 18, President Barack Obama imposed sanctions against Major General Qassem Suleimani, chief of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), who is identified as "the conduit for Iranian material support" to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate. To counter Suleimani and the Quds Force, US strategists need to understand his history of overconfident behavior and military successes. A survey of the open-source literature pertaining to Suleimani reveals a man who became a successful general without much formal training. Though a shrewd tactical leader, Suleimani is not a strategist. Ali Alfoneh (ali.alfoneh@aei.org) is a resident fellow at AEI.

Operation Enduring Freedom—the war in Afghanistan—is now the longest war in American history. U.S. casualties are increasing, and public support for the war is in decline. But the United States is not alone in the sandbox. The State Department and Pentagon expend much effort getting NATO members to commit troops and adopt rules of engagement that can contribute to the U.S. mission. Beyond the international coalition, Pakistan, China, and Iran are all actively involved in Afghanistan. These countries sometimes act at cross purposes to U.S. goals. U.S. officials, for example, frequently express concern over Iranian arms shipments to the Taliban. "Iran is covertly supplying arms to Afghan insurgents while publicly posing as supportive of the Afghan government," said Dennis Blair, director of national intelligence, to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 1 While U.S. military and intelligence focus on Iranian hard power, they seldom discuss Iranian soft-power efforts in Afghanistan, which are largely coordinated by the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee. The Imam Khomeini Relief Committee is the most prominent among several Iranian state-sponsored organizations operating in Afghanistan. Its ostensible goal is to provide humanitarian aid to poor communities. How-ever, with about thirty-five thousand Afghans This is the first in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks documenting Iran's growing influence in Afghanistan. As the United States targets the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran is using soft-power tactics to combat U.S. influence and win over the minds of the people. This Outlook examines the activities of the Imam Khomeini Relief Commit-tee, a charitable organization that aims to promote Iran's ideological and political goals in Afghanistan. Since the early 1990s, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee's Afghanistan arm has been expanding its budget and reaching more and more Afghans, which poses a growing threat to U.S. interests. To succeed in Afghanistan, the United States must focus not only on the hard power of the military, but also on a comprehensive soft-power strategy. Key points in this Outlook: • The Imam Khomeini Relief Committee is part of Iran's larger goal of using soft power to gain influence in Afghanistan and throughout the region. An ostensible charity, it actively promotes Iran's ideologi-cal and political goals in Afghanistan. In particular, it promotes Shiism and incites anti-American sentiment. • The charity and its assets are under the control of Iran's supreme leader. It receives government funding, donations from private individuals both inside and out-side Iran, and religious taxes, and it engages in fundraising activities outside Iran. • To combat this threat, the United States must add soft-power strategies to its military tactics in the Afghanistan war. on its payroll 2 and tens of thousands of indirect benefi-ciaries, Iran's largest charity aims to advance Tehran's ideological and political ends in Afghanistan, promote Shiism, and incite anti-American sentiment.

Not a single week passes in the Iranian and international presses without mention of Major General Qassem Suleimani, Islamic Revolution-ary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) com-mander. Suleimani and the IRGC QF can be linked to events ranging from suppression of the prodemocracy movement in Syria to the emer-gence of revolutionary movements in the Middle East and North Africa. 2 Despite press coverage, little is known about the activities of Suleimani and the clandestine force under his command. However, a close survey of Persian open-source materials provides us with the names of several key individuals who shed light into the otherwise dark and secretive world of the QF. This Middle Eastern Outlook, the fifth in a series about the IRGC QF, discusses one such individual: Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi, senior adviser to Suleimani and a veteran of IRGC QF Base Ramezan. This is the fifth in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about the IRGC QF. 1 Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) personifies the new generation of IRGC commanders whose careers at Base Ramezan during the 1980s war between Iran and Iraq qualified them to direct QF operations after the 2003 US-led invasion of the country. As Masjedi's generation is being promoted to advisory positions in Tehran, a new generation of field operatives is emerging. Those seeking to predict who will direct the IRGC QF in the future should therefore look to this nascent generation of field operatives. Ali Alfoneh (ali.alfoneh@aei.org) is a resident fellow at AEI.

This is the second in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about Qassem Suleimani. 1 On January 24, 2011, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei promoted Qassem Suleimani, chief of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), to major general, the highest rank in the IRGC since the end of the Iran/Iraq war in 1988. 2 As discussed in the first Outlook in this series, Suleimani's rise to prominence in the IRGC has been gradual rather than meteoric. His personal and professional background and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in the late 1990s helped advance his career. However, Suleimani's network matters, too. This Outlook identifies members of Suleimani's network within and outside the IRGC. It also argues that fluctuations in their careers could serve as indicators of Suleimani's authority in the Islamic Republic. Ali Alfoneh (ali.alfoneh@aei.org) is a resident fellow at AEI.