Alexander L. Brown’s research while affiliated with Texas A&M University and other places

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Publications (41)


Social‐benefits stigma and subsequent competitiveness
  • Article

April 2025

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2 Reads

Economic Inquiry

Natalia I. Valdez Gonzalez

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Alexander L. Brown

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We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore how benefit‐eligibility stigma drives subsequent decisions to enter competition. We induce a stigma associated with a low‐status benefit and then introduce “plausible deniability” to reduce this stigma by expanding benefit eligibility to a middle‐status group. When newly‐eligible individuals qualify for the benefit, their rate of entry into a subsequent and unrelated tournament is reduced by 17–20 percentage points compared to the treatment in which they do not qualify. A potential interpretation of our results would suggest expanding for certain government assistance programs may produce unintended consequences for the newly eligible.



Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion

June 2024

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185 Reads

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50 Citations

Journal of Economic Literature

Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale, interdisciplinary meta-analysis to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported from 1992 to 2017. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates that the mean loss aversion coefficient is 1.955 with a 95 percent probability that the true value falls in the interval [1.820, 2.102]. We record several observable characteristics of the study designs. Few characteristics are substantially correlated with differences in the mean estimates. (JEL D81, D91)



Aggregate and individual effects of information in a coordination (traffic) game

April 2023

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4 Reads

Economic Inquiry

Using an existing coordination (traffic) experiment, we investigate information's effect on traffic congestion when subjects already have a history of past play. In contrast to previous studies, our interventions neither alter aggregate nor individual payoffs. A second study isolates individual‐subject response to information using a fixed distribution of past subjects. We find information alters subject play: subjects switch roads more often and receive higher payoffs conditional on switching roads. Because switching reduces payoffs unconditionally, information does not generally improve payoffs overall. Only subjects that receive information upon starting the game appear to increase their payoffs due to the information treatment.





Figure 1. Study area in Dallas.
Figure 2. Traffic experiment set-up.
Figure 4. (a) Payoffs versus #period for lane choice decisions made by traveler ID 17, (b) payoffs versus #period for lane choice decisions made by traveler ID 12, and (c) payoffs versus #period for lane choice decisions made by traveler ID 68.
Session-Type-Based Hypothesis Testing of Independent Variables
Testing of Independent Variables (Students)

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Using Behavioral Economics to Identify Potential Managed Lane Users
  • Article
  • Full-text available

March 2022

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137 Reads

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1 Citation

Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board

Priced managed lanes (MLs) offer travelers an option to choose to pay a toll to travel on the MLs for a generally faster, more reliable travel than on the adjacent, toll-free general-purpose lanes (GPLs). Recent research has shown that many travelers on freeways with MLs choose the same lane type every trip regardless of travel time savings and toll rate. In this paper, a classic experimental economics traffic game was replicated and re-examined to model traveler choice by classifying travelers as “choosers” (people who frequently choose between MLs and GPLs) and “non-choosers” (people who use only one type of lane). This traffic experiment was then augmented with a travel survey to find the individual differences (psychological traits), trip-related variables, and socio-demographic variables that help differentiate travelers into the above two categories. Based on the traffic experiment and travel survey, it was found that: (1) the experiment could identify real life choosers and (2) many more travelers indicate that they are choosers in a survey than in actual travel. Features that are related to the choosing behavior were the time taken by the subject to answer a survey section and time used to verify their answers before submitting. Participants who spent more time on those things tended to be choosers. Travelers who were direct responders in the experiment tended to be choosers. Other factors that differentiated choosers from non-choosers were trip duration, familiarity with the ML facilities, and education level.

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Breaking-up should not be hard to do! Designing contracts to avoid wars of attrition

February 2022

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7 Reads

European Economic Review

The partnership dissolution literature has almost entirely focused on the properties of exit mechanisms in isolation taking other features of the break-up process as given. We consider a simple, two-stage model of the dissolution process where both the decision to dissolve and the roles the partners play in the exit mechanism are endogenously determined according to a “triggering rule.” We find certain pairings of triggering rules and exit mechanisms can lead to a war of attrition which inefficiently prolongs the dissolution process. However, since these theoretical predictions require sophisticated reasoning and backward induction, it is unclear whether the theory has any empirical validity. We therefore conduct a laboratory experiment to explore this question. Treatments are selected to test the main predictions of the model using combinations of exit mechanisms and triggering rules commonly seen in practice. The experimental results are largely supportive of the underlying theoretical predictions.


Citations (28)


... Gender also plays a role; women are often found to be more risk-averse and less confident investors than men (Olsen & Cox, 2001;Deo & Sundar, 2015). Educational attainment is linked to a greater ability to mitigate biases like mental accounting and loss aversion (Silva et al., 2023;Brown et al., 2024). Similarly, income levels can influence how individuals approach risk and status quo bias, with higher income often associated with better access to information and resources, potentially reducing resistance to change (Godefroid et al., 2023). ...

Reference:

Behavioral Biases in Islamic Retail Investing: The Moderating Role of Demographics
Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion
  • Citing Article
  • June 2024

Journal of Economic Literature

... As for the participants in the various studies cited, most focused on public transport users. In this case, frequent public transport users tended to continue using the same mode of transport during the pandemic (Burris et al., 2023;Downey et al., 2022;Esmailpour et al., 2022). When studies include private vehicle users, their perception of public transport quality tends to be lower compared to that of public transport users (Ismael et al., 2023). ...

Factors influencing traveler use of transit before, during, and after the COVID-19 pandemic
  • Citing Article
  • January 2023

Journal of Public Transportation

... Li (2020) models agents who avoid partial information. Falk and Zimmermann (2016) run an experiment where subjects usually prefer information sooner depending on context, and Brown, Gui, and Je (2022) and Nielsen (2020) conduct experiments to test demand for non-instrumental information. In a related theoretical contribution, Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2021) introduce the concept of random lotteries to model agents who prefer non-instrumental information. ...

Preferences for the Resolution of Risk and Ambiguity

SSRN Electronic Journal

... After scrutinising the responses and discarding incomplete responses, 170 valid responses were used for the study. Previous studies used survey data of similar sample sizes (103-133 responses) for their studies (Ashraf et al., 2022;Sam et al., 2018;Yuen et al., 2018). Although the sample size is small, it is deemed reasonable for use in regression and machine learning analysis based on the rule of thumb in statistics (Wilson Van Voorhis and Morgan, 2007). ...

Using Behavioral Economics to Identify Potential Managed Lane Users

Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board

... As the safe option had a lower expected value ($2.00), it would be rational to bet on every trial. However, given the known risk-averse preferences of human agents in such settings [28,29], we anticipated that participants would bet less frequently than would be rational according to this strategy. ...

Meta-Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss-Aversion
  • Citing Article
  • January 2021

SSRN Electronic Journal

... While the experimental estimates of λ are typically in the range 1.8-2.3 (see [34] for a recent meta-analysis) and α is typically estimated to be in the neighborhood of 0.9, Table 2 reports the optimal asset allocation for a much wider range of parameters. This allows us to examine the robustness of the results to the parameter values, and to address the issue of possible heterogeneity among PT investors (as the parameter estimates are only population averages). ...

Meta-Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss-Aversion
  • Citing Preprint
  • December 2020

... Two important mechanisms, shown in previous research on gift-exchange experiments, are trust and positive reciprocity: Principals offer wages above Nash-equilibrium wages (under money maximization; see Section 2), and agents respond with effort levels that increase in the wage offered ('gift exchange' e.g., Fehr et al., 1993Fehr et al., , 1997Hannan, Kagel & Moser, 2002; see also Cooper & Kagel, 2016). Agents may also be motivated by negative reciprocity -that is, a willingness to punish principals if the OC is unfavorable for the agent (see and also the large literature on rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum games (e.g., Güth & Kocher, 2014;Lin et al., 2020). Negative reciprocity may result in rejecting the contract or in choosing minimal effort after the contract has been accepted. ...

Evidence of general economic principles of bargaining and trade from 2,000 classroom experiments

Nature Human Behaviour

... Inexperienced participants present a tendency to bid below the Nash equilibrium which leads to underbidding, whereas experience is associated with decreased tendencies to overbid, which suggests that there is a learning curve (Stephenson and Brown, 2021). The Cobb-Douglas utility function has been applied by (Tan and Liu, 2022) to illustrates how bidders' preferences between winning probabilities and profit maximization influence their decisions, potentially leading to strategic overbidding or underbidding. ...

Playing the field in all-pay auctions
  • Citing Article
  • August 2020

Experimental Economics

... however, while existing literature extensively explores the determinants and implications of investment efficiency (e.g. hovakimian, 2011;lovallo et al., 2020;Zhao, 2021), there remains a notable gap in understanding its direct consequences on innovation, especially within the context of multi-business firms. Multi-business firms, also referred to as diversified firms or conglomerates, are organizations that operate in multiple industries or business segments simultaneously. ...

Resource re‐allocation capabilities in internal capital markets: The value of overcoming inertia

... Market experiments conducted mid twentieth century (Chamberlin, 1948;Smith, 1962) established the stability, efficiency, and robustness of markets for perishable goods under notably the double-auction market institution (Smith, 1962). These laboratory results are now well-known (reviewed, e.g., in Plott, 1982;Smith, 1982;Smith & Williams, 1990), have been replicated many times around the world (Lin et al., 2020), and motivated a few neoclassical models of price equilibration in double-auction markets (Wilson, 1987;Friedman, 1991;Cason & Friedman, 1996;S. Gjerstad & Dickhaut, 1998;Anufriev et al., 2013;Asparouhova et al., 2020). ...

General Economic Principles of Bargaining and Trade: Evidence From 2,000 Classroom Experiments
  • Citing Article
  • September 2018

SSRN Electronic Journal