Abby Innes’s research while affiliated with London School of Economics and Political Science and other places

What is this page?


This page lists works of an author who doesn't have a ResearchGate profile or hasn't added the works to their profile yet. It is automatically generated from public (personal) data to further our legitimate goal of comprehensive and accurate scientific recordkeeping. If you are this author and want this page removed, please let us know.

Publications (1)


The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe
  • Article

January 2014

·

1,020 Reads

·

237 Citations

JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies

Abby Innes

This article demonstrates that most new EU Member States experience serious problems of state capture. It argues that central European states cluster around two dominant modes of party competition. In the first, predominantly ideologically committed elites (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Estonia) established relatively ‘electoral professional’ party competitions, only to face deepening fiscal constraints on mainstream ideological competition. Following the collapse of the social democratic left, both Hungary and Poland experienced attempts to reassert political monopoly, i.e., ‘party state capture’. In the second group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia), more entrepreneurial political elites established ‘brokerage’ party systems, in which public policy remains a side-product of an essentially economic competition. All five states show high levels of ‘corporate state capture’ in which public power is exercised primarily for private gain. These findings contest the more optimistic expectations of the institutionalist literature on state-building and democratic consolidation.

Citations (1)


... Such activities may include the use of offices (Hajnal & Boda 2021), public media (Bennett & Kneuer 2023;Surowiec & Štětka 2020), public finance (Schering 2021) or state-owned enterprises (Piątek 2023, Sękowski 2024. It differs from the traditionally discussed state capture (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann 2003;O'Dwyer 2004;Grzymała-Busse 2007;Innes 2014) in that the appropriators and beneficiaries of the political rent are not business interest groups but politicians in power. This phenomenon is politically significant because it makes elections unequal by giving increased electoral chances to the party remaining in power (Bodnar 2020). ...

Reference:

Party state capture and democratic backsliding. The case of state-owned enterprises in Poland
The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe
  • Citing Article
  • January 2014

JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies