[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: There is a historical puzzle about phenomenology in the XXth century (about phenomenology as typically a philosophy of the XXthcentury): that is to say, its relation to language. It looks as if phenomenology had to sway between two alternate positions, which
bear no compromise: either the language is nothing, or it is everything. On the one side, you find this characteristic suspicion with which the traditional phenomenologist very commonly looks at
Analytic philosophy as something that he takes to be ‘merely linguistic’. On the other side, you find this ‘linguistic mirage’
that Thomas Pavel denounced appropriately, which is taken to be the distinctive feature of a certain stage of Continental
thought, that is to say structuralism, but in which a certain phenomenology was certainly involved as well. The result of
that is at least an enigma: how a thought which was originally supposed to be ‘not linguistic’ as such, and is still very
commonly perceived that way and opposed to alleged more linguistic perspectives in philosophy, might so easily suffer such
a change of sign and be turned into a possible absolutization of a linguistic point of view (in that fetishism of die Sprache, to which the later Heidegger’s philosophy, or, in another sense, hermeneutics in general definitely seem to stick)? Some
people might be content with seeing a break in that — for instance a break between Heidegger and Husserl, or between the later
and the earlier Heidegger. Personally I am not so sure that there is any break — a revision certainly, but that is another
problem. There is some logic in that. This logic is just that of the ignorance of the reality of language. The same kind of philosophy can be in turn proclaimed either non-linguistic or ‘absolutely’ linguistic and, in both cases,
just do the same, that is to say: jump over the reality of language, conceiving of no other alternatives for language itself than either the subordination (to something that, as such, is not linguistic) or the hypostatization (as some kind of absolute principle standing by itself).
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Despite its permanent tension between forms and intuitions, Husserl's thought has many structural features. These are shared with the german mathe- matics of the 1920s and the 1930s - also known as the school of moderne Algebra, that would give rise later to Bourbaki and the theory of mathematical structures. However, whereas mathematical structures are known to produce a very rigid con- ception of knowledge, phenomenology is characterized by its emphasis on the dynamics of thinking and of intuition. We advocate that the modern theory of categories provides phenomenology with a conception of mathematics that suits its deep insights on the dynamical features of the process of knowledge. Un siècle après les travaux décisifs de Husserl, il y a lieu de s'étonner de l'obscurité qui régne sur son rapport avec les mathématiques. Que la phénoménologie soit d'abord l'invention d'un mathématicien, et que son développement soit profondément marqué par un style mathématique, au delà de l'intérêt privilégié du philosophe, à l'origine, pour les questions relevant proprio sensu de l'épistémologie des mathématiques, il n'y a pas lieu d'en douter. Mais dès qu'il s'agit de savoir de quelles mathématiques il s'agit, dans cet intérêt toujours manifesté par lui pour cette science dont il venait, et à quel type de position philosophique il est arrivé par rapport à elles, les choses paraissent beaucoup moins claires.