[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Game theory has played an important role in security decisions. Recent work using Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991] to model security domains has been particularly influential [Basilico et al. 2009; Kiekintveld et al. 2009; Paruchuri et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2009]. In a Stackelberg game, a leader (in this case the defender) acts first and commits to a randomized security policy. The follower (attacker) optimizes its reward considering the strategy chosen by the leader. These games are well-suited to representing the problem security forces face in allocating limited resources, such as officers, canine units, and checkpoints. In particular, the fact that the attacker is able to observe the policy reflects the way real terrorist organizations plan attacks using extensive surveillance and long planning cycles.
Full-text · Article · Dec 2009 · ACM SIGecom Exchanges