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Typography and color: Effects of salience and fluency on conscious recollective experience
Abstract
Within one experiment the central assumptions of the distinctiveness/fluency account of recollective experience were tested and contrasted with predictions of processing theory. To manipulate perceptual salience, the typography of words was varied. Effects of conceptual salience were induced by a variation of word color. In the study phase participants generated different word or object images according to presented words. To manipulate perceptual and conceptual fluency one test group underwent a priming procedure in the test phase, consisting of a recognition test, whereby some primes were identical to the target words typographically or by color and others were not. Additionally, all participants were asked to make judgments of recollective experience (remember, know, guess) after the old/new decisions. The results of the data analyses confirm the distinctiveness/fluency account. Words written in an unusual typography or color were judged significantly more often as "remembered" than normal words. The priming procedure uncovered some effects of fluency on reaction times: old/new decisions took less time if prime and target words were perceptually or conceptually identical.
... Über eine Manipulation der perzeptuellen Prozessgeschwindigkeit wollte Rajaram (1993) (Wehr & Wippich, 2004). Rajaram und Geraci (2000) ...
... Entgegen der angenommenen Beziehung von Erinnerungsbewusstsein und Prozessen beobachtete Rajaram (1996) (Rajaram, 1996). Rajaram, 1998;Wehr & Wippich, 2004). ...
... Der (Dweck et al., 1995, Dweck & Legget, 1988Levy & Dweck, 1999 Qualitativ differenzierte Inhaltsanalysen wurden auch schon mit dem MCQ und dem AMQ (Rubin et al., 2003) Rajaram, 1996;Wehr & Wippich, 2004 Blaxton & Theodore, 1997;Inamori, 2003). So präsentierten Blaxton und Theodore (1997) ...
Die Gedächtnispsychologie beschäftigt sich seit geraumer Zeit mit der Erfassung von Bewusstseinszuständen, die Erinnerungen begleiten (Remember/Know Paradigma). Bewusstsein bei sozialer Informationsverarbeitung wurde bisher jedoch kaum thematisiert. Untersucht wurde der Effekt kategorialer Salienz auf das subjektive Erleben von Erinnerungen an Personeneigenschaften, die in verschiedenen Abstufungen mit dem Altersstereotyp kongruent waren (konsistent, inkonsistent, neutral). Die inzidentelle Enkodierung der Eigenschaften erfolgte mittels einer Beurteilungsaufgabe, bei der entweder die Typizität (hohe kategoriale Salienz) oder die Konkretheit des Wortmaterials (niedrige kategoriale Salienz) zu beurteilen war. Es konnten Einflüsse auf das Erinnerungsbewusstsein durch die Salienz der Altersinformation, des Aufmerksamkeitsfokus sowie durch dispositionale Voreingenommenheiten (implizite Personentheorien, Verarbeitungsstile) nachgewiesen werden. Nur bei hoher kategorialer Salienz des Altersstereotyps (Experiment 1) zeigten sich Unterschiede im Erinnerungsbewusstsein. Überdies legt die Untersuchung nahe, dass die stereotypgeleiteten Erinnerungen nach den Prinzipien der Figur/Hintergrund Trennung im Bewusstsein konstruiert werden und der subjektiven Evaluation des Experimentalkontextes eine vermittelnde Rolle zufällt. So ergaben sich die Bewusstseinszustände in Abhängigkeit der Wortgruppierungen (Experiment 2) sowie der Aufmerksamkeitslage während der Enkodierung (Beurteilung der Typizität vs. Untypizität; Experiment 3). Eindrückliche Unterstützung für die Figur/Hintergrund Hypothese konnte in Experiment 4 durch eine perzeptuelle Aufgabe gewonnen werden. Hier sollten die Eigenschaften schnellstmöglich in einem Wortsuchrätsel identifiziert werden. Hohe kategoriale Salienz erleichterte das Auffinden kongruenter Wörter. Sowohl im Rekognitions- als auch im Cued Recall-Test veränderte das aktivierte Stereotyp primär die Remember-Raten. Die Ergebnisse haben damit nicht nur für den Bereich der Personenwahrnehmung neue Erkenntnisse geliefert, sondern auch das psychologische Verständnis von Bewusstsein erweitert. Im Einzelnen erfuhren der Prozessansatz als auch der Distinctiveness/Fluency-Ansatz Bestätigung. Neu konnte ein attributionaler Ansatz formuliert werden, der die subjektive Evaluation des Experimentalkontextes hervorhebt. Hierbei werden unterschiedliche Informationen aus dem experimentellen Geschehen (z.B. spezifische Kognitionen oder das Empfinden von Abrufleichtigkeit) im Sinne einer Heuristik instrumentalisiert, d.h. für die Beurteilung des Alt/Neu-Status und des Bewusstseinszustands eingesetzt. Mit Hilfe von Inhaltsanalysen konnten erstmalig entsprechende Mediatorvariablen identifiziert werden, die den Salienzeffekt auf das Bewusstsein vermitteln (Experiment 3).
... Another type of intrinsic cue explored by researchers is how distinctive font styles impact participants' perceptions of text fluency (i.e., how easily information is processed; Oppenheimer, 2008) and actual performance. Of the studies examining font style manipulations, only one to our knowledge - Wehr and Wippich (2004) attempted to collect metacognitive judgments. They found that words presented in distinctive font styles were rated by participants as more memorable than less-distinctive styles, as measured by remember/know/guess judgments collected during the recognition test. ...
... Based on prior research examining the role of font size and fluency, and theories regarding the influence of intrinsic cues on participants' JOLs (e.g., Koriat, 1997), we expected that items presented in large font would be given higher JOLs than items in small font (Kornell et al., 2011;McDonough & Gallo, 2012;Mueller et al., 2014;Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Similarly, we expected that items presented in the bold font style would be given higher JOLs than either italic or regular fonts if participants perceive bold text as more fluent than the other two font styles (Diemand-Yauman et al., 2011;Wehr & Wippich, 2004). The use of a full factorial design allowed us to examine our expectation that the font size and font style manipulations would interact such that participants' JOLs were expected to be higher for regular and italic fonts presented in large fonts than in small fonts. ...
... Given prior research, we did not expect to see any differences in recall performance as a function of font size (Kornell et al., 2011;Mueller et al., 2014;Rhodes & Castel, 2008), but expected the different font styles might yield different levels of recall if the regular or italic styles were perceived as less fluent than the bold font style, thereby encouraging deeper processing of these items (Diemand-Yauman et al., 2011;Wehr & Wippich, 2004). We predicted that the font size and font style manipulations might interact to influence recall, such that recall was expected to potentially be the highest for small font items presented in regular text, if this combination yielded greater disfluency than stimuli presented in other font size and font style combinations. ...
We examined how font sizes (18pt., 48 pt.) and font styles (regular, italic, bold) influenced younger and older adults' judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall. In Experiment 1 younger adults gave higher JOLs and obtained higher recall than older adults. However, JOLs and recall varied for both age groups as a function of font size and font style manipulations despite a tendency for both groups to predict higher recall for items in large and in regular and italic styles than for small and bold fonts and achieve higher recall for regular than italic or bold items. No age differences were found in relative accuracy, with near-perfect calibration in absolute accuracy for younger and older adults. Experiment 2 presented a description of Experiment 1 and asked participants to predict recall for the various font size/style combinations. Younger and older adults predicted higher recall for large than small font items, regardless of font style, and higher recall for bold than regular or italic styles, regardless of font size. Memory predictions did not align across experiments, suggesting that memory beliefs combine with processing fluency to affect JOLs and recall.
... These studies have examined various aspects of text presentation, including font size [29,106], height [51], highlighting [48], font color [8,75], typeface change [53], font weight [86,98], appending emojis [55,69], upper case [7], underlining [103], bold or italic [7,86], transparency [63], text spacing [65] , syllables [91], removal of text [101], dynamic positioning [45,71]. In addition, research in cognitive psychology has investigated how font size and other typographic elements influence text perception [14,58,109]. ...
In today's globalized world, there are increasing opportunities for individuals to communicate using a common non-native language (lingua franca). Non-native speakers often have opportunities to listen to foreign languages, but may not comprehend them as fully as native speakers do. To aid real-time comprehension, live transcription of subtitles is frequently used in everyday life (e.g., during Zoom conversations, watching YouTube videos, or on social networking sites). However, simultaneously reading subtitles while listening can increase cognitive load. In this study, we propose Dynamik, a system that reduces cognitive load during reading by decreasing the size of less important words and enlarging important ones, thereby enhancing sentence contrast. Our results indicate that Dynamik can reduce certain aspects of cognitive load, specifically, participants' perceived performance and effort among individuals with low proficiency in English, as well as enhance the users' sense of comprehension, especially among people with low English ability. We further discuss our methods' applicability to other languages and potential improvements and further research directions.
... These studies have examined various aspects of text presentation, including font size [29,106], height [51], highlighting [48], font color [8,75], typeface change [53], font weight [86,98], appending emojis [55,69], upper case [7], underlining [103], bold or italic [7,86], transparency [63], text spacing [65] , syllables [91], removal of text [101], dynamic positioning [45,71]. In addition, research in cognitive psychology has investigated how font size and other typographic elements influence text perception [14,58,109]. ...
... Besides the ability to convey a message, Wehr & Wippich looked into a more specific aspect that is how a typography design is remembered and found that the physical aspect of typography has a positive impact to the mind [10]. Gabriele [11] and Zramdini & Ingold [12] studied the physical aspect of typography and found that it has an impact to the mind, which is also agreed by Rojas & Roast [13]. ...
Typography is proven able to give an impact to the mind and psychology. Even though there are many studies on typography conducted, there are not many studies conducted in the context of graphics design to see how the physical aspect of typography helps in memorizing a logo. Thus, this paper examines the physical aspect of typography and its relationship with how a person memorizes a logo. From the results, it shows there are significant positive relationships between physical aspects of typography and how a person memorizes a logo.
... Besides the ability to convey a message, Wehr & Wippich looked into a more specific aspect that is how a typography design is remembered and found that the physical aspect of typography has a positive impact to the mind [10]. Gabriele [11] and Zramdini & Ingold [12] studied the physical aspect of typography and found that it has an impact to the mind, which is also agreed by Rojas & Roast [13]. ...
Nowadays, use of a second language (L2) has taken a central role in daily activities. There are numerous contexts in which people have to process information, acquire new knowledge, or make decisions via a second language. For example, in academia and higher education, English is commonly used as the language of instruction and communication even though English might not be students’ native or first language (L1) and they might not be proficient in it. Such students may face different challenges when studying and learning in L2 relative to contexts in which they study and learn in their L1, and this may affect their metamemory strategies. However, little is yet known about whether metamemory processes undergo significant changes when learning is carried out in L2. The aim of the present study was to investigate the possible consequences on learning derived from studying materials in L2 and, more specifically, to explore whether the interplay between monitoring and control (metamemory processes) changes as a function of the language involved. In three experiments, we explored whether font type (Experiment 1), concreteness (Experiment 2), and relatedness (Experiment 3) affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance in both L1 and L2. JOLs are considered the result of metacognitive strategies involved in the monitoring of learning and have been reported to vary with the difficulty of the material. The results of this study showed that people were able to monitor their learning in both L1 and L2, even though they judged L2 learning as more difficult than L1. Interestingly, self-perceived difficulty did not hinder learning, and people recognized L2 materials as well or better than L1 materials. We suggest that this might be an example of a desirable difficulty for memory.
Judgments of learning (JOL) are often used to assess memory monitoring at encoding. Participants study a cue-target word pair (e.g., mouse-cheese) and are asked to rate the probability of correctly recalling the target in the presence of the cue at test (e.g., mouse -?). Prior research has shown that JOL accuracy is sensitive to perceptual cues. These cues can produce metamemory illusions in which JOLs overestimate memory, such as the font-size effect (Rhodes & Castel, 2008), which occurs when participants inflate JOLs for pairs presented in large versus small fonts without a concomitant increase to recall. The present study further tests the font-size effect and examines whether other perceptual manipulations can affect the correspondence between JOLs and recall. Experiments 1A and 1B were designed to replicate the font-size effect and test whether the effect extended to highlighted pairs that were related or unrelated in the same study list. Experiment 2A and 2B examined font size and highlighting effects on JOLs using only unrelated pairs. Finally, Experiment 3 tested whether Sans Forgetica—a perceptually disfluent font designed to improve memory—would result in inflated JOLs and/or recall. Large fonts similarly increased both JOLs and recall relative to small fonts, highlights had no effect on JOLs or recall, and Sans Forgetica font yielded a memory cost (though no effect on JOLs). Collectively, perceptually fluent and disfluent study pairs do not appear to inflate JOLs relative to subsequent recall.
Examined the effect of level of processing on awareness in recognition memory, in 3 experiments. In yes/no and 2-alternative forced-choice recognition tests, 64 young adults in UK reported 1 of 3 states of awareness when selecting each target: Remembering, knowing, or guessing. In Exps 1 and 2, Ss produced associates of the target words and recalled them after varying intervals of time. In Exp 3, the level of processing manipulation was replaced by a generate/read manipulation. In Exps 1 and 2, level of processing influenced remember responses but not know responses. In Exp 3, generating vs reading similarly influenced remember but not know responses. In each experiment, when Ss reported that they were guessing they showed no ability to discriminate targets from lures. Results show that remember/know findings generalize from yes/no to 2-alternative forced-choice recognition and that knowing is dissociable from guessing. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Describes laboratory and clinical attempts to relate different memory systems (procedural, semantic, and episodic) to corresponding varieties of consciousness (anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic). The case of a young adult male amnesic patient is described. The S suffered a closed head injury that left him without autonoetic consciousness. This deficit is manifested in his amnesia for personal events and his impaired awareness of subjective time. Two simple experiments investigated recall and recognition by a total of 89 normal undergraduates to further examine autonoetic consciousness as the necessary correlate of episodic memory. Results show that the distinction between knowing and remembering previous occurrences of events is meaningful to people, that people can make corresponding judgments about their memory performance, and that these judgments vary systematically with the conditions under which retrieved information takes place. (French abstract) (71 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Subjects hearing a list of associates to a nonpresented lure word later often claim to have heard the lure (Deese, 1959; Roediger
& McDermott, 1995). To examine the characteristics of such false memories, subjects completed a memory characteristics questionnaire
(MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) or made remember/know (RK; Gardiner & Java, 1993) judgments for previously heard
theme associates and nonpresented lures. MCQ ratings indicated that false memories for lures had less auditory detail and
less remembered feelings and reactions than memories for presented words. In addition, rates of false recognition for lures
were significantly lower than rates of correct recognition when items from various themes were intermixed instead of blocked
at acquisition and subjects made MCQ ratings instead of RK judgments. This demonstrates that false memories can be affected
both by how they are acquired and by how extensively they are examined at retrieval.
Recognition memory for previously novel melodies was tested in three experiments in which subjects usedremember andknow responses to report experiences of recollection, or of familiarity in the absence of recollection, for each melody they recognized.
Some of the melodies were taken from Polish folk songs and presented vocally, but without the words. Others were taken from
obscure pieces of classical music, presented as single-line melodies. Prior to the test, the melodies were repeated for varying
numbers of study trials. Repetition of the Polish melodies increased both remember and know responses, while repetition of
classical melodies increased remember but not know responses. When subjects were instructed to report guesses, guess responses
were inversely related to remember and know responses and there were more guesses to lures than to targets. These findings
establish that remembering and knowing are fully independent functionally and, by the same token, they provide further evidence
against the idea that response exclusivity causes increases in remembering to force decreases in knowing. The findings also
suggest that simultaneous increases in remembering and knowing occurred because the Polish melodies came from a genre for
which the subjects had relatively little previous experience.
Subjects in Experiment i studied a list of words under varying presentation conditions (visual or auditory) and in two typographies
within the visual condition (typed or hand printed) and then received a word-fragment completion test (e.g., —YS—E—Y
formystery) in which the test cues also varied in typography. The main findings were that (1) priming occurred for all study items,
relative to nonstudied items, but greater priming occurred for visual than for auditory presentation, and (2) performance
in the visual conditions was better when typographies matched between study and test than when the typographies mismatched,
but only for words studied in hand-printed form. These findings were generally replicated when the test was delayed 1 week,
although priming declined across this retention interval (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3 subjects studied words that were
either in focus or blurred and showed greater priming when test fragments were presented in the same manner as at study. Priming
in the word-fragment completion task depends on matching surface characteristics of items between study and test and exemplifies
the requirement of performing similar mental operations at study and test for maximizing performance (transfer-appropriate
processing).
Reports experiments designed to explore the relationship between the more aware autobiographical form of memory that is measured by a recognition memory test and the less aware form of memory that is expressed in perceptual learning. Ss were 247 undergraduates. Variables such as the level of processing of words during study influenced recognition memory, but not subsequent perceptual recognition. In contrast, variables such as the number and the spacing of repetitions produced parallel effects on perceptual recognition and recognition memory. It is suggested that there are 2 bases for recognition memory. If an item is readily perceived so that it seems to "jump out" from the page, the S is likely to judge that it has been seen in the experimental situation. The 2nd basis for recognition memory involves elaboration of a word's study context and depends on such factors as level of processing during study--factors not important for perceptual recognition of isolated words. Effects of study on perceptual recognition appear to be totally due to memory for physical or graphemic information. Results are also relevant to theories of perceptual learning. Effects of study on perceptual recognition partly depend on the same variables as do effects on more standard memory tests. (59 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
We report an event-related potential (ERP) experiment of human recognition memory that explored the relation between conscious awareness and electrophysiological activity of the brain. We recorded ERPs from healthy adults while they made "remember" and "know" recognition judgments about previously seen words. These two kinds of judgments reflect "autonoetic" and "noetic" awareness, respectively. The ERP effects differed between the two kinds of awareness while they were similar for "true" and "false" recognition. Noetic awareness was associated with a temporoparietal positivity in the N400 range (325-600 ms) and a late (600-1,000 ms) frontocentral negativity, whereas autonoetic awareness was associated with a widespread, late, bifrontal and left parietotemporal (600-1000 ms) positivity. In the very late (1,300-1, 900 ms) time window, a right frontal positivity was observed for both remember and know judgments of both true and false targets. These results provide physiological evidence for two types of conscious awareness in episodic memory retrieval.
Components of recollective experience were investigated in 4 experiments in which participants studied either similarities or differences among faces (relational vs. distinctive processing). Subsequently, when recognizing a face, participants indicated whether their decision was based on explicit recollection (remembering) or assessment of familiarity (knowing). Type of encoding interacted with judgments of recollective experience, so that the incidence of "remember" responses was higher following distinctive encoding than following relational encoding, whereas the opposite pattern of results was obtained for "know" responses. Furthermore, recognition of appearance-changed faces was based on feelings of familiarity, rather than on explicit recollection. The results support the dual-component notion of recognition but are inconsistent with the idea that dissociations between remembering and knowing merely reflect differences in conceptual and perceptual processing.
First-year psychology students took multiple-choice examinations following each of 4 lecture courses and 3 laboratory research methods courses. One lecture course was later retested. Students indicated state of memory awareness accompanying each answer: recollective experience (remember), "just know" (know), feeling of familiarity (familiarity), or guess. On the lecture courses, higher performing students differed from other students because they had more remember responses. On research methods, higher performing students differed because they knew more, and in the delayed retest, higher performing students differed because they now knew rather than remembered more. These findings demonstrate a shift from remembering to knowing, dependent upon level attained, type of course, and retention interval, and suggest an underlying shift in knowledge representation from episodic to semantic memory. The authors discuss theoretical and educational implications of the findings.
Research shows that Remember and Know judgments are effective measures of recollective experience. This article shows that Know responses can be selectively affected by fluency of processing that is created using a conceptual manipulation. In a recognition test, studied and nonstudied words were preceded by semantically related or unrelated primes. Participants gave significantly more Know judgments to items with related primes than unrelated primes but Remember responses were unaffected. Know responses are discussed in terms of familiarity assumed to arise from fluency of processing which, in turn, may be created through various sources including conceptual processes.
Three experiments were conducted to examine age-related differences in colour memory. In Experiment 1, preschool age and elementary school age children were given a conceptual test of implicit colour memory (a colour-choice task). They were presented with the names or achromatic versions of previously studied coloured line drawings and asked to select an appropriate colour. Significant priming could be demonstrated: The children chose the previously seen colours more often than was expected by chance. Equivalent priming was found for both versions (pictorial and verbal) suggesting that colour priming may be conceptually mediated. Moreover, colour priming proved to be age invariant. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding by using a wider age group (preschool, elementary school, and young adults) and by giving a perceptual implicit task (picture identification) in addition to a verbal colour-choice task. Colour did not affect priming in the perceptual task. Whereas priming showed no developmental change, age-related improvements were observed on an explicit colour memory task that differed only in the test instructions from the implicit colour-choice task (Experiments 2 and 3). Taken together, the results suggest that implicit colour memory may be mediated by conceptual processes that are age invariant.
The notion of stratification has played an important role in linguistics and evolutionary studies for some time, but its role in cognitive science has not yet been well articulated and identified. What is meant by stratification? What is the role and value of stratification in the contemporary study of cognition and consciousness? This collective volume speaks to these questions. The twelve articles in the book cover a range of relevant issues including (a) the vertical dimension and modularity of visual processing, search and attention, (b) the stratification of encoding and retrieval processes in memory, (c) the hierarchical nature of conscious and unconscious components of memory, and (d) the levels of awareness and varieties of conscious experience. The volume presents stimulating and self-contained articles for researchers and students of experimental psychology and neuroscience, and is suitable for an advanced university course. (Series B)
Discusses recent developments in one popular though controversial approach to studying consciousness in relation to memory. The approach is an experiential one (introduced by E. Tulving, 1985) with distinction between remember and know responses (subjective reports of the kinds of experiences that occur during memory retrieval). According to Tulving's theory, these 2 kinds of experiences reflect 2 kinds of consciousness which reflect distinct episodic and semantic memory systems. Topics discussed include remember and know responses, guessing, and just knowing. The authors concentrate on knowing and discuss the implications of partitioning know responses to allow reports of guesses and of just knowing. The author's primary goal is to briefly review some of this new evidence and to discuss its theoretical implications. The authors first review and discuss evidence with respect to the guess response category and then evidence with respect to the just know response category. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two experiments were conducted to examine the hypothesis that recollective experience is influenced by the manipulation of
salient or distinctive dimensions of the encoded stimuli (Rajaram, 1996). In Experiment 1, the conceptual dimension of the
to-be-remembered homographs (bank) was manipulated by requiring subjects to encode the dominant (money-BANK) or the nondominant (river-BANK) meanings. In Experiment 2, the perceptual dimension was manipulated by presenting orthographically distinctive (subpoena) or orthographically common (sailboat) words. An advantage for conceptually salient (dominant meaning) items and perceptually distinctive (orthographically distinctive)
items was selectively observed inremember responses. These results support the hypothesis that processing of distinctive or salient attributes boosts the recollective
component of explicit memory.
The functional relationship between recognition memory and conscious awareness was examined in two experiments in which subjects
indicated when recognizing a word whether or not they could consciously recollect its prior occurrence in the study list.
Both levels of processing and generation effects were found to occur only for recognition accompanied by conscious recollection.
Recognition in the absence of conscious recollection, although less likely, was generally reliable and uninfluenced by encoding
conditions. These results are consistent with dual-process theories of recognition, which assume that recognition and priming
in implicit memory have a common component. And they strengthen the case for making a functional distinction between episodic
memory and other memory systems.
The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave "remember" judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and "know" judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for "remember" judgments, and were reversed for "know" judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recognition and "know" judgments but not for "remember" judgments. The data obtained for confidence judgments using the same design (Experiment 4) indicated that "remember"/"know" judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.
The influence of color as a surface feature versus its influence as stored knowledge in object recognition was assessed. Participants decided whether a briefly presented and masked picture matched a test name. For pictures and words referring to similarly shaped objects, semantic color similarity (SCS) was present when picture and word shared the same prototypical color (e.g., purple apple followed by cherry). Perceptual color similarity (PCS) was present when the surface color of the picture matched the prototypical color of the named object (e.g., purple apple followed by blueberry). Response interference was primarily due to SCS, despite the fact that participants based similarity ratings on PCS. When uncolored objects were used, SCS interference still occurred, implying that the influence of SCS did not depend on the presence of surface color. The results indicate that, relative to surface color, stored color knowledge was more influential in object recognition.
In 3 experiments, the effects of perceptual manipulations on recollective experience were tested. In Experiment 1, a picture-superiority effect was obtained for overall recognition and Remember judgements in a picture recognition task. In Experiment 2, size changes of pictorial stimuli across study and test reduced recognition memory and Remember judgements. In Experiment 3, deleterious effects of changes in left-right orientation of pictorial stimuli across study and test were obtained for Remember judgements. An alternate framework that emphasizes a distinctiveness-fluency processing distinction is proposed to account for these findings because they cannot easily be accommodated within the existing account of differences in conceptual and perceptual processing for the 2 categories of recollective experience: Remembering and Knowing, respectively (J. M. Gardiner, 1988; S. Rajaram, 1993).
Four experiments were conducted to examine the nature of recollective experience across different explicit memory tests. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the proportion of retrieved items that were given Remember responses were equivalent across free recall, category cued recall, category plus letter cued recall, and recognition memory tests unlike the result reported by Tulving [Can. Psychol. 26 (1985) 1]. Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that Remember judgments are influenced by both conceptual and perceptual variables not only in the recognition task but in other explicit memory tasks as well. Taken together, the empirical evidence from this study demonstrates that explicit memory performance is accompanied by different states of awareness not only in recognition but also across other memory tasks including free recall.
Remembering and knowing The Oxford handbook of memory
- J M Gardiner
- A Klavehn
Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and knowing. In E. Tulving, F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 229–244). New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press.
The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 229?244)
- J M Gardiner
- A Richardson-Klavehn