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Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition
Abstract
Developers of NBIC (Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno) technologies face a multitude of obstacles, not the least of which is navigating the public ethics of their applied research. Biotechnologies have received widespread media attention and spawned heated interest in their perceived social implications. Now, in view of the rapidly expanding purview of neuroscience and the growing array of technologic developments capable of affecting or monitoring cognition, the emerging field of neuroethics calls for a consideration of the social and ethical implications of neuroscientific discoveries and trends. To negotiate the complex ethical issues at stake in new and emerging kinds of technologies for improving human cognition, we need to overcome political, disciplinary, and religious sectarianism. We need analytical models that protect values of personhood at the heart of a functional democracy-values that allow, as much as possible, for individual decision-making, despite transformations in our understanding and ability to manipulate cognitive processes. Addressing cognitive enhancement from the legal and ethical notion of "cognitive liberty" provides a powerful tool for assessing and encouraging NBIC developments.
... The other proposed right, the right to cognitive liberty, emerged in the academic debate on cognitive enhancement in the early 2000s and also has a broad scope of protection [27,28]. Bublitz defines it as "the right to alter one's mental states with the help of neuro tools as well as to refuse to do so" [29]. ...
... via portable EEG scanners, 26 does not interfere with neural activity but only measures it and does thus not constitute an influence. 27 Brain reading might therefore rather be a matter of data protection and privacy or freedom of (non)-expression [32,33]. Yet, the ECtHR and the HRC have stressed that freedom of thought, conscience and religion also includes the right not to reveal one's thought, religion or belief. ...
... political [45]. One could argue that the HRC thereby did not discard the criterion of complexity and that thoughts on all matter must nevertheless have a certain quality to fall within the scope 23 27 However, knowing that one's thoughts are being read could lead to the avoidance of certain thoughts, and may thus also constitute an interference. UNGA [40] para 54: speaks about "self-censorship". ...
Progress in neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides unprecedented insights into the human brain. There are increasing possibilities to influence and measure brain activity. These developments raise multifaceted ethical and legal questions. The proponents of neurorights argue in favour of introducing new human rights to protect mental processes and brain data. This article discusses the necessity and advantages of introducing new human rights focusing on the proposed new human right to mental self-determination and the right to freedom of thought as enshrined in Art.18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). I argue that the right to freedom of thought can be coherently interpreted as providing comprehensive protection of mental processes and brain data, thus offering a normative basis regarding the use of neurotechnologies. Besides, I claim that an evolving interpretation of the right to freedom of thought is more convincing than introducing a new human right to mental self-determination.
... A pioneering step toward neurorights was marked by Boire's (2001) and Sententia's (2004) work on the notion of "cognitive liberty" in the early 2000s. Sententia (2004, p. 227) defined cognitive liberty as "the right and freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought process." ...
... Boire (2001), for instance, developed his reflections on cognitive liberty in a dialog with ongoing debates on the ethics of neuroimaging and mind reading. In a similar fashion, Sententia (2004) developed her definition and normative analysis of cognitive liberty by taking stock of the ongoing neuroethical debate on cognitive enhancement. ...
... This view of the mind as the ultimate locus of personal freedom has been highly influential for the debate on neurorights. For example, Sententia (2004) implicitly referred to this tradition by arguing that "the right and freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is the necessary substrate for just about every other freedom." ...
In recent years, philosophical-legal studies on neuroscience (mainly in the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw) have given increasing prominence to a normative analysis of the ethical-legal challenges in the mind and brain sciences in terms of rights, freedoms, entitlements and associated obligations. This way of analyzing the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience has come to be known as “neurorights.” Neurorights can be defined as the ethical, legal, social, or natural principles of freedom or entitlement related to a person’s cerebral and mental domain; that is, the fundamental normative rules for the protection and preservation of the human brain and mind. Although reflections on neurorights have received ample coverage in the mainstream media and have rapidly become a mainstream topic in the public neuroethics discourse, the frequency of such reflections in the academic literature is still relatively scarce. While the prominence of the neurorights debate in public opinion is crucial to ensure public engagement and democratic participation in deliberative processes on this issue, its relatively sporadic presence in the academic literature poses a risk of semantic-normative ambiguity and conceptual confusion. This risk is exacerbated by the presence of multiple and not always reconcilable terminologies. Several meta-ethical, normative ethical, and legal-philosophical questions need to be solved in order to ensure that neurorights can be used as effective instruments of global neurotechnology governance and be adequately imported into international human rights law. To overcome the shortcomings above, this paper attempts to provide a comprehensive normative-ethical, historical and conceptual analysis of neurorights. In particular, it attempts to (i) reconstruct a history of neurorights and locate these rights in the broader history of idea, (ii) outline a systematic conceptual taxonomy of neurorights, (iii) summarize ongoing policy initiatives related to neurorights, (iv) proactively address some unresolved ethico-legal challenges, and (v) identify priority areas for further academic reflection and policy work in this domain.
... Regulating from the perspective of freedom of thought: ancient rules in future-proof regulation "Regulating from the perspective of the right to freedom of thought is new and complex, but it is crucial to our future as autonomous humans living in democratic societies founded on human rights" Susie Alegre (Alegre 2021a) Old and dusted, the right to freedom of thought has been shadowed by the right to privacy for the past 15 years and now needs new interpretations in the light of the digital evolution. In its digital clothes, freedom of thought is best described in the literature by the concept of "cognitive liberty" (Ienca and Andorno 2017;Bublitz 2013;Sententia 2004). It should be understood as the "conceptual update" (Sententia 2004) of the right to privacy in its self-determination connotation, mixed with interpretations of freedom of thought (Alegre 2021a) already in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Nolan and K. v Russia), and as expressed in international human rights legislation. ...
... In its digital clothes, freedom of thought is best described in the literature by the concept of "cognitive liberty" (Ienca and Andorno 2017;Bublitz 2013;Sententia 2004). It should be understood as the "conceptual update" (Sententia 2004) of the right to privacy in its self-determination connotation, mixed with interpretations of freedom of thought (Alegre 2021a) already in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Nolan and K. v Russia), and as expressed in international human rights legislation. 42 ...
Despite the increasing awareness from academia, civil society and media to the issue of child manipulation online, the current EU regulatory system fails at providing sufficient levels of protection. Given the universality of the issue, there is a need to combine and further these scattered efforts into a unitary, multidisciplinary theory of digital manipulation that identifies causes and effects, systematizes the technical and legal knowledge on manipulative and addictive tactics, and to find effective regulatory mechanisms to fill the legislative gaps. In this paper we discuss manipulative and exploitative strategies in the context of online games for children, suggest a number of possible reasons for the failure of the applicable regulatory system, propose an “upgrade" for the regulatory approach to address these risks from the perspective of freedom of thought, and present and discuss technological approaches that allow for the development of games that verifiably protect the privacy and freedoms of players.
... Freedom of Thought: Ancient Rules in Future-Proof Regulation "Regulating from the perspective of the right to freedom of thought is new and complex, but it is crucial to our future as autonomous humans living in democratic societies founded on human rights" -Susie Alegre [Ale21a] Old and dusted, the right to freedom of thought has been shadowed by the right to privacy for the past 15 years and now needs new interpretations in the light of the digital evolution. In its digital clothes, freedom of thought is best described in the literature by the concept of "cognitive liberty" [IA17,Bub13,Sen04]. It should be understood as the "conceptual update" [Sen04] of the right to privacy in its self-determination connotation, mixed with interpretations of freedom of thought [Ale21a] already in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Nolan and K. v Russia 43 ), and as expressed in international human rights legislation. ...
... In its digital clothes, freedom of thought is best described in the literature by the concept of "cognitive liberty" [IA17,Bub13,Sen04]. It should be understood as the "conceptual update" [Sen04] of the right to privacy in its self-determination connotation, mixed with interpretations of freedom of thought [Ale21a] already in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Nolan and K. v Russia 43 ), and as expressed in international human rights legislation. 44 Applying the right to freedom of thought to children's rights would not be a new concept. ...
Despite the increasing awareness from academia, civil society and media to the issue of child manipulation online, the current EU regulatory system fails at providing sufficient levels of protection. Given the universality of the issue, there is a need to combine and further these scattered efforts into a unitary, multidisciplinary theory of digital manipulation that identifies causes and effects, systematizes the technical and legal knowledge on manipulative and addictive tactics, and to find effective regulatory mechanisms to fill the legislative gaps. In this paper we discuss manipulative and exploitative strategies in the context of online games for children, suggest a number of possible reasons for the failure of the applicable regulatory system, propose an "upgrade" for the regulatory approach to address these risks from the perspective of freedom of thought, and present and discuss technological approaches that allow for the development of games that verifiably protect the privacy and freedoms of players.
... Los partidarios de la libertad cognitiva sugieren considerarla también como un "derecho humano fundamental", como "un principio jurídico central que guíe la regulación de las neurotecnologías" (Bublitz, 2013, p. 234). La razón de su función fundamental se deriva del hecho de que "el derecho y la libertad de controlar la propia conciencia y los propios procesos electroquímicos de pensamiento son el sustrato necesario para cualquier otra libertad" (Sententia, 2004). De hecho, como argumentó Bublitz, "es difícil articular cualquier concepción de un sujeto jurídico en la que la mente y las capacidades mentales (por ejemplo, actuar a partir de razones o la deliberación) no se encuentren entre sus condiciones constitutivas necesarias" (2013, p. 242). ...
... Como tal, la libertad cognitiva se asemeja a la noción de "libertad de pensamiento" que suele considerarse como la justificación esencial de otras libertades, como la libertad de elección, la libertad de expresión, la libertad de prensa y la libertad religiosa. No es sorprendente que Sententia (2004) presente a la libertad cognitiva como una actualización conceptual de la libertad de pensamiento que HACIA NUEVOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LA ERA DE LA NEUROCIENCIA Y LA NEUROTECNOLOGÍA "tiene en cuenta el poder que tenemos ahora, y tendremos cada vez en mayor medida, de vigilar y manipular la función cognitiva". Algunos estudiosos del derecho como Boire y Sententia han interpretado el derecho a la libertad cognitiva con especial énfasis en la protección de la libertad individual y la autodeterminación respecto del Estado. ...
Los rápidos avances en neurociencia y neurotecnología abren un conjunto de posibilidades sin precedentes en el acceso, colecta, diseminación y manipulación de datos del cerebro humano. Estos desarrollos plantean importantes desafíos a los derechos humanos que deben abordarse para evitar consecuencias no deseadas. Este trabajo evalúa las implicaciones de los diferentes usos de las neurotecnologías en relación a los derechos humanos y sugiere que el marco actual de derechos humanos puede no ser suficiente para responder a estos desafíos emergentes. Después de analizar la relación entre neurociencia y derechos humanos, identificamos cuatro nuevos derechos que pueden ser de gran relevancia en las próximas décadas: el derecho a la libertad cognitiva, el derecho a la privacidad mental, el derecho a la integridad mental y el derecho a la continuidad psicológica.
... A second ethical sticking-point of amphetamines as cognitive enhancers relates to the issue of personal autonomy. As Sententia (2004) argues, every person has the right to think independently, and to have full "autonomy over their brain chemistry." Sententia (2004) also points out that individuals have the sole right to control their "brain states and mental processes" and should not be within the jurisdiction of governments or military agencies to do otherwise. ...
... As Sententia (2004) argues, every person has the right to think independently, and to have full "autonomy over their brain chemistry." Sententia (2004) also points out that individuals have the sole right to control their "brain states and mental processes" and should not be within the jurisdiction of governments or military agencies to do otherwise. Furthermore, a solider has the right to return to society in a state where he or she can contribute to society (Russo 2007). ...
The growing area of military bio-technologies, especially the use of cogniceuticals, raises several ethical concerns for military physicians. These include the role of military physicians in prescribing amphetamines whose long-term effects are largely unknown, and the possible undermining of the ethic of “do no harm,” since amphetamines may diminish a soldier’s moral responsibility. Below, we outline some important questions relating to the ethics of amphetamines and medical military physicians.
... It would seem to follow that, as a fundamental right, cognitive liberty would require strong legal protections for the private use of neuroenhancement (NE) technologies. 2 This view of cognitive liberty as a fundamental right directly challenges a number of contemporary norms. For instance, it seems to imply the need to protect the recreational use of psychotropic drugs, a practice that is currently illegal in many places. ...
... Nevertheless, as our knowledge of brain function is expanding, policy-makers must consider explicitly defining cognitive liberty within positive law in order to lay the foundations for safe and regulated use of NE in the future. 2 Although no court has yet ruled on a cognitive liberty case, there are precedents in other areas of constitutional case law that help us predict how courts might decide on the question of cognitive liberty in the future. Constitutional guarantees of individual rights in Canada and the United States strongly reflect the harm principle, yet the courts have not applied this principle in a consistent or unqualified way. ...
... Para nuestro análisis resulta especialmente relevante la faceta negativa de la libertad cognitiva que comprendería la protección de las personas contra el uso coercitivo y sin consentimiento de neurotecnologías (Bublitz, 2013). En esta dirección, para Sententia (2004), el papel del Estado, el derecho penal, la ciencia y la ética deben limitarse y guiarse por principios que maximicen las oportunidades para que cada individuo se determine por sí mismo. ...
En este artículo se aborda de manera crítica la conveniencia de crear nuevos neuroderechos humanos para enfrentar el uso de las tecnologías de neuropredicción y de detección de mentiras en materia penal. Sobre dicho punto, se argumenta que los neuroderechos podrían ser conceptualmente problemáticos, u ofrecer una protección menor de la que puede extenderse por mejores interpretaciones de los actuales derechos fundamentales y los principios constitucionales del derecho penal. El artículo finaliza formulando una nueva propuesta crítica para limitar definitivamente los usos indignos de la neurotecnología y plantear la abolición del derecho penal; a esta propuesta la hemos denominado “neuroabolicionismo pe-nal”.
... However, it has been argued that the right to cognitive liberty could be seen as an extension or conceptual update of the existing right to freedom of thought (discussed in Sections "The right to mental integrity" and "The right to mental privacy"). 107 According to Farahany, cognitive liberty encompasses the freedom of thought and rumination, the right to self-access and self-alteration, and the freedom to either consent to or refuse changes to our brains and our mental experiences. These concepts make up the "bundle of rights" of cognitive liberty, which translate to human rights to freedom of thought, to selfdetermination, and to mental privacy. ...
The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.
... Toda persona tiene el derecho de autodeterminarse y tener completa "autonomía sobre su química cerebral" Los individuos tienen el único derecho a controlar sus "estados cerebrales y procesos mentales" y no debería estar dentro de la jurisdicción del gobierno hacer algo diferente (Saniotis & Kumaratilake, 2020;Sententia, 2006). ...
Objetivos: explorar los conceptos gubernamentalidad, biopoder y subjetificación, observándolos junto la evolución del discurso neuroexplicativo contemporáneo, y revisar críticamente un gesto legislativo local sobre cannabis, intentando corroborar la coherencia entre este, las neuronarrativas de los padecimientos y los problemas pendientes en salud neurológica y mental. Métodos: ejercicio de reflexión crítica sobre una selección de bibliografía digital. Resultados y conclusiones: cuando la salud mental es un asunto gubernamental, la primera línea es el uso de psicofármacos y estigmatización. La disponibilidad de neuro-saberes permite el ejercicio del poder mediante la aplicación de dispositivos tecnológicos sobre los cerebros (en representación de las personas) y las relaciones entre mentes, personas y cosas como los psicofármacos llamados “drogas”. Una visión crítica de la legislación sobre cannabis en Colombia muestra que esta no parece buscar el beneficio poblacional ni
es coherente con un abordaje integral de la enfermedad neuropsiquiátrica en el país.
... Sententia defines 'cognitive liberty' in terms of "…the right and freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought process." ( [17], p. 227) Ienca ([13], p4) goes on to discuss the freedom of thought in terms of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." This is further shown to be an unconditional right, with reference to commentary by the United Nations Human rights Committee who say of the UDHR that it: ...
This paper argues that calls for neurorights propose an overcomplicated approach. It does this through analysis of ‘rights’ using the influential framework provided by Wesley Hohfeld, whose analytic jurisprudence is still well regarded in its clarificatory approach to discussions of rights. Having disentangled some unclarities in talk about rights, the paper proposes the idea of ‘novel human rights’ is not appropriate for what is deemed worth protecting in terms of mental integrity and cognitive liberty. That is best thought of in terms of Hohfeld’s account of ‘right’ as privilege . It goes on to argue that as privileges, legal protections are not well suited to these cases. As such, they cannot be ‘novel human rights’. Instead, protections for mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best accounted for in terms of familiar and established rational and discursive norms. Mental integrity is best thought of as evaluable in terms of familiar rational norms, and cognitive freedom is constrained by appraisals of sense-making. Concerns about how neurotechnologies might pose particular challenges to mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best protected through careful use of existing legislation on data protection, not novel rights, as it is via data that risks to integrity and liberty are manifested.
... However, there are some scholars who are well aware from the danger of neurocapitalism and insisting about the legal framework for preserving the rights of human beings. Sententia (2004), explained the meaning of cognitive liberty which she refers as a consent of human to enhance his cognitive ability, she explained both sides of the new modern technology aim to enhance human ability or to do such therapeutic cures but in her conclusion one of two points was that people should not allow the new technology to change their mind until we find the clear benefits of emerging aims. ...
This paper aims to present a holistic view of neurocapitalism in the post pandemic world: the understanding that how capitalism has transformed with the structure of economy and has reached to a new evolutionary form of neurocapitalism. This is how the modern technology is connected with the structure of capitalism. This paper is the result of analysis based on multiple studies reviewed by researcher in economics, psychology and sociology. Furthermore, this research demonstrates that how cognitive decision-making affecting profit and capital creation is shaped by the non-localized, simultaneous and intensely hi-tech connected economic activity. In short author of this paper conclude that neurocapitalism is nothing but creating capitalistic advantage by the consumption of human brain activity at the speed of light. Keywords: Capitalism, Emergence, Neurocapitalism, Phases of Capitalism, Technology and Neurocapitalism, Cognitive Decision Making’s
... Linked to the concept of sovereignty over one's "cognitive heritage," cognitive liberty would consist of a right similar to the one of inviolability of the brain from the state or from third parties. Nevertheless, it includes the freedom to agree to direct interventions, appropriate to enhance one's cognitive structure 3 (Sententia 2004). ...
... Linked to the concept of sovereignty over one's "cognitive heritage," cognitive liberty would consist of a right similar to the one of inviolability of the brain from the state or from third parties. Nevertheless, it includes the freedom to agree to direct interventions, appropriate to enhance one's cognitive structure 3 (Sententia 2004). ...
Neurotechnologies—neuroimaging, brain stimulation, neuroprosthetics, brain-computer interfaces, optogenetics—are fairly new, but they are likely to progress rapidly and become increasingly widespread. These technologies are being developed primarily for medical purposes; however, applications in other fields are already under way. Intervening in brain functioning can have major implications for our free will and our autonomy. However, the effects are not unequivocal. Some techniques and some of their uses may increase our freedom, while other techniques and other uses may limit it. In this chapter, I propose an operationalised definition of free will and autonomy that is functional for the following discussion. Second, I briefly present some neurotechnologies and their current and future uses. Finally, I focus on the ethical, social and individual welfare evaluation of some neurotechnologies and their possible uses with regard to free will and autonomy.KeywordsControlNeurostimulationOptogeneticsMemoryPolitics
... Linked to the concept of sovereignty over one's "cognitive heritage," cognitive liberty would consist of a right similar to the one of inviolability of the brain from the state or from third parties. Nevertheless, it includes the freedom to agree to direct interventions, appropriate to enhance one's cognitive structure 3 (Sententia 2004). ...
Current advances in neurotechnology are allowing the gradual decoding of neural information at the basis of a number of conscious mental states with unprecedented level of accuracy. Such developments, it is suggested, might give scientists the possibility to ‘read minds’, opening the debate about how to protect mental privacy, that is, the control that subjects have over the access to their own neural data and all relevant information about their mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing such data. In this chapter, we oppose those that deny the urgent need for a current discussion of this issue, offering some arguments to motivate and inform the debate. Finally, we examine some of the problems contained in the organic approach to mental privacy, namely, the idea that neural data should be protected by the laws for organ transplantation and donation.KeywordsMental privacyNeuroprotectionNeurotechnologiesNeurorights
... Surprisingly, the set of neurorights does not include the rights that seem most promising and perhaps most urgently needed, i.e., a right to mental integrity complementing the legal protection of the person (e.g.,[21,41,56]); or a right to freedom of thought or Cognitive Liberty as discussed by legal scholars for some time (e.g.,[57][58][59][60][61][62]). ...
This paper analyses recent calls for so called “neurorights”, suggested novel human rights whose adoption is allegedly required because of advances in neuroscience, exemplified by a proposal of the Neurorights Initiative. Advances in neuroscience and technology are indeed impressive and pose a range of challenges for the law, and some novel applications give grounds for human rights concerns. But whether addressing these concerns requires adopting novel human rights, and whether the proposed neurorights are suitable candidates, are a different matter. This paper argues that the proposed rights, as individuals and a class, should not be adopted and lobbying on their behalf should stop. The proposal tends to promote rights inflationism, is tainted by neuroexceptionalism and neuroessentialism, and lacks grounding in relevant scholarship. None of the proposed individual rights passes quality criteria debated in the field. While understandable from a moral perspective, the proposal is fundamentally flawed from a legal perspective. Rather than conjuring up novel human rights, existing rights should be further developed in face of changing societal circumstances and technological possibilities.
... Vol. 48, 2021, 105-139, ISSN: 0210-4857, E-ISSN: 2660-9509 técnica se basa en que es sabido que al mentir se producen perturbaciones emocionales vehiculadas fisiológicamente (Gazzaniga, 2005). Su utilización en juicios o en el reconocimiento de sospechosos es una potencial herramienta no exenta de limitaciones técnico-conceptuales (como ya se ha dicho, correlacionar estados emocionales con otros estados mentales actuales o disposicionales), bioéticas (la violación de la "privacidad mental" y la "libertad cognitiva" [Farah, 2005, Sententia, 2004) y legales (el quebranto de los "neuroderechos [Ienca y Andorno, 2017]). ...
La innovación en inteligencia artificial se encuentra en la vanguardia científico-tecnológica y muchas de sus aplicaciones presentan ya una alta interactividad humana. Dado que somos seres emocionales, y que esta cualidad psicobiológica es clave para nuestro posicionamiento en el mundo, parece necesario realizar una profunda reflexión sobre el espectro afectivo de la díada humano-máquina. El presente ensayo utiliza el término “emocionalidad artificial” como concepto holístico capaz de abordar este análisis desde una triple perspectiva: la de las ciencias cognitivas y de la computación, la de la neurociencia y la psicología y la de la filosofía teórica y práctica. Partiendo de la descripción de las emociones naturales, en este estudio se discute sobre la posibilidad técnica y conceptual y sobre las consecuencias bio-psico-sociales de una inteligencia artificial con capacidad de reconocimiento, simulación, manipulación y vivencia emocional. Tras dicho análisis se concluye que las dos primeras capacidades son ya en cierto modo posibles y deseables, mientras que las dos últimas se enfrentan a dificultades tecno-científicas, ontológicas, gnoseológicas y neuroéticas discutidas ampliamente por el transhumanismo.
... This progress has resulted in a broad spectrum of clinical applications for the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and care of people with neurological and psychiatric disorders. Due to the pace of such progress, authors have called this "the neurotechnology revolution" (Scott, 2013). Furthermore, the reduction in hardware costs and the increase in the size of the neurotechnology market, have recently favoured the spillover of neurotechnological applications into various extra-clinical areas of human activity. ...
Neurotechnologies are emerging technologies that establish a connection pathway to the human brain through which human neuronal activity can be recorded and/or altered. These technologies open novel opportunities for exploring, influencing, or intercommunicating with the human brain. Medical neurotechnologies offer the potential to help people with neurological or psychiatric conditions such as Parkinson’s disease, dementia, stroke, and major depressive disorder. Non-medical neurotechnology systems provide new tools and methods to monitor and modulate brain activity in healthy subjects and to interact with digital devices. Intervening effectively and safely in the human brain through neurotechnology is a scientific frontier that must be reached for the good of humanity. At the same time, however, it raises major ethical and legal challenges. Neuroethics and neurolaw are the two main areas of scholarship that address, respectively, the ethical and legal issues raised by our ever-improving ability to intervene in the brain through neurotechnology.
In the past decade, philosophical-legal studies in the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw have given increasing prominence to a normative analysis of the ethical- legal challenges in the mind and brain sciences in terms of rights, freedoms, entitlements, and associated obligations. This way of analyzing the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience has come to be known as “neurorights”. Neurorights can be defined as the ethical, legal, social, or natural principles of freedom or entitlement related to a person’s cerebral and mental domain; that is, the fundamental normative rules for the protection and preservation of the human brain and mind. In their most popular version, neurorights have been defined as an emerging category of human rights designed to protect the brain-mind sphere of the person.
Reflections on neurorights have received ample coverage in the mainstream media and have become a mainstream topic in the public neuroethics discourse. Further, they are rapidly becoming an emerging regulatory tool of international politics. Yet, several meta-ethical, normative-ethical, legal-philosophical and practical challenges need to be solved to ensure that neurorights can be used as effective instruments of global neurotechnology governance and be adequately imported into international human rights law. To overcome these challenges, this report attempts to provide a comprehensive normative-ethical, historical and conceptual analysis of neurorights. In particular, the objective of this report is fivefold as it attempts to (i) provide an overview of current and likely future biomedical neurotechnologies; (ii) reconstruct a history of neurorights and situate these rights in the broader history of ideas; (iii) summarize ongoing policy initiatives related to neurorights in the present international policy landscape; (iv) proactively address some unresolved ethical-legal challenges; and (v) identify priority areas for further academic reflection and policy work in this domain.
The findings of this report suggest that neurorights reflect fundamental human interests that are deeply rooted in the history of ideas. These rights introduce normative specifications related to the protection of the person’s cerebral and mental domain that are not merely repetitive of existing human rights frameworks, but add a new, fundamental level of normative protection. This corroborates the view that human beings generally enjoy a set of rights against certain kinds of interferences in their brains and minds, including those interferences involved in the misuse of neurotechnologies. In addition to protecting against the misuse of neurotechnology, the neurorights spectrum also contains moral and legal provisions aimed at ensuring that neuroscientific and neurotechnological progress is used to empower people and improve human well-being (positive rights). To a large extent, the findings of this report also corroborate the normatively stronger thesis that the fundamental rights and freedoms relating to the human brain and mind should be seen as the fundamental substrate of all other rights and freedoms.
This overview indicates that there is not yet complete consensus regarding the conceptual-normative boundaries and terminology of neurorights. Divergences exist in relation to how these rights are interpreted, named, and conceptually articulated. Nonetheless, some degree of convergence is emerging around three main families of neurorights. First and foremost, the need for specific provisions on the protection of private brain-related information seems to share a high degree of acceptance and recognition. The right to mental privacy appears to be the candidate best equipped conceptually to take on this role. Second, the right to mental integrity appears to have the highest degree of legal entrenchment. While there are some variations in the interpretation of this right, there is full theoretical consensus about the need to protect the person from psychological harm and mental interference. Third, a variety of neurorights candidates have been proposed to preserve and promote the freedom of the human mind and thereby prevent external manipulation. These include evolutionary interpretations of the right to freedom of thought, the right to cognitive liberty, and the right to personal identity.
On the other side of the coin, positive rights such as promoting justice and equality— e.g., through ensuring egalitarian access to neurotechnology for biomedical use and promoting patient welfare on the basis of the ethical principle of beneficence—have so far occupied a secondary role in the neurorights debate.
Introducing neurorights into the human rights framework may require adding new protocols to existing instruments or even stipulating new entirely devoted to neuroethics and neurolaw. In either case, some fundamental problems such as rights inflation and to provide an adequate normative justification for multilateral instruments ethical, meta-ethical, and legal issues must be addressed in order to overcome neurorights. These include introducing justificatory tests for the introduction of neurorights, clarifying the relationship between moral and legal neurorights and harmonizing neurorights with existing normative instruments.
The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo
Convention) offers an ideal platform and normative substrate for the protection and
promotion of neurorights. Given its focus on prohibiting the misuse of innovations in
biomedicine, protecting the dignity and identity of all human beings, and guaranteeing
respect for their integrity and fundamental freedoms, the Convention is well placed for
either enshrining neurorights through ad hoc protocols or for serving as a basis for
future instruments.
Understanding, treating, and augmenting the human brain and mind is one of the great
scientific challenges of our age. Achieving these goals in a way that preserves justice,
safeguards fundamental rights and human dignity is the corresponding task of ethics
and law. Neurorights will likely be a useful tool to accomplish this task.
... El derecho a la libertad cognitiva: sería el principio que garantiza el derecho a alterar los estados mentales propios mediante el uso de la neurotecnología (y, también, el negarse a hacerlo). Sententia (2004) aboga abiertamente por dicha "libertad cognitiva" como norma (neuro)moral inquebrantable, lo cual también es defendido desde nuestro país por la bioética Lydia Feito (2015Feito ( , p. 1311, al expresar que este derecho consiste en "la libertad de tener el control soberano sobre la propia conciencia". Estos postulados deberían ampliarse para reconocer, también, la protección del libre albedrío, el cual es susceptible de ser manipulado mediante el uso de la neurotecnología. ...
Las aplicaciones biomédicas de la neurociencia se dividen en aquellas que emplean técnicas evaluativas y las que usan métodos intervencionistas. Debido al alcance biopsicosocial de estas tecnologías, el debate filosófico y bioético parece ineludible. Así, desde la filosofía de la mente aparecen dos grandes núcleos de reflexión: los problemas conceptuales sobre la lectura, control y transferencia mental, y las dificultades ontológicas relacionadas con la identidad del “Homo cíborg”. Por otro lado, la bioética se ha interesado por dos temas fundamentales: la diferencia entre tratamiento y mejora neuronal, y la aplicación de los principios bioéticos clásicos a la neuromejora. En este sentido, se propone a la neuroética aplicada como área normativa desde la que evaluar el uso de la neurotecnología.
... We prefer to reserve the term 'right to mental integrity' to refer to a right against mental interference since this parallels what we think is the dominant use of the term 'right to bodily integrity'. For other authors who use the term 'right to cognitive liberty' to refer to (something close to) what we call the right to mental integrity, seeSententia (2004),Bublitz (2013), and Bublitz(2015). ...
Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity.
... In view of the advances in digital and neuroscientific technologies, enabling to access, alter, and manipulate mental states, scholars have been debating the case for introducing novel fundamental rights over the mind, such as rights to cognitive liberty, mental integrity, and mental self-determination (Boire 2001;Sententia 2004;Bublitz and Merkel 2014;Ienca and Andorno 2017;Lavazza 2018;Bublitz 2020a). At the same time, others have argued that such rights, protecting from interferences with the mind, are already enshrined in existing human rights law, mainly in the right to mental integrity and the right to freedom of thought (Michalowski 2020;. ...
Extended Reality (XR) systems, such as Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR), provide a digital simulation either of a complete environment, or of particular objects within the real world. Today, XR is used in a wide variety of settings, including gaming, design, engineering, and the military. In addition, XR has been introduced into psychology, cogni-tive sciences and biomedicine for both basic research as well as diagnosing or treating neurological and psychiatric disorders. In the context of XR, the simulated 'reality' can be controlled and people may safely learn to cope with their feelings and behavior. XR also enables to simulate environments that cannot easily be accessed or created otherwise. Therefore, Extended Reality systems are thought to be a promising tool in the resocializa-tion of criminal offenders, more specifically for purposes of risk assessment and treatment of forensic patients. Employing XR in forensic settings raises ethical and legal intricacies which are not raised in case of most other healthcare applications. Whereas a variety of nor-mative issues of XR have been discussed in the context of medicine and consumer usage, the debate on XR in forensic settings is, as yet, straggling. By discussing two general arguments in favor of employing XR in criminal justice, and two arguments calling for caution in this regard, the present paper aims to broaden the current ethical and legal debate on XR applications to their use in the resocialization of criminal offenders, mainly focusing on forensic patients.
... Mental integrity is also perceived as one of the most basic human rights (Lavazza, 2018). Thus, the importance of the freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is cardinal (Sententia, 2006). The right to mental integrity is protected by the third article of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency. ...
Purpose: the present paper aims to explore the origins of neuromarketing, its current position, technologies and major limitations, as well as to discuss its possible future development.
Design/methodology/approach: this is a theoretical article. For its purposes an in-depth literature review has been conducted. Additionally, in order to shed light on challenges faced by researchers using neuromarketing tools, the currently available knowledge has been synthesized.
Findings: the study has shown that neuromarketing technologies provide invaluable information on the subconscious mental processes influencing the customer’s behaviour. However, despite their considerable scientific potential, they pose potential threats regarding their unauthorised use. Hence, the research emphasises the need to maintain particularly high standards and to protect people against inappropriate and unethical use of neuromarketing strategies .
Originality/value: the paper can be used by theoreticians and practitioners of neuroeconomics who want to deepen their knowledge of research and tools used in neuromarketing. It presents the most frequently used technologies as well as the opportunities and threats related to their use in an in-depth and innovative way.
... The implantation of nanomedical cognitive "boosters," the establishment of neural interfaces with AI, and uploading the contents of the human brain/mind into AI-driven avatars, or ultradynamic post-and transhuman entities, are surely considered the stuff of science fiction today. However, these far-flung possibilities have been under intense scrutiny by researchers and ethicists around the world for a number of years [141][142][143][144][145][146][147][148]. Their realization would rely heavily on acquired and implemented (AI-facilitated) expertise involving sophisticated nanomaterials, nanotechnological processes, and nanomedicine toward the development of robust and highly efficient nanomedical neural implants. ...
... As mentioned by researchers, "What are the implications for mental autonomy when wearable computers become wet-wired to our own minds and memory is augmented by a high-speed wireless connection to the Web?". Hence there is a need for brain privacy and cognitive liberty [10]. ...
... Where mental privacy is threatened, cognitive liberty may suffer. 'Cognitive liberty' includes the idea that one ought to be free from brain manipulation in order to think one's own thoughts (Sententia 2006). This concept often arises in the context of neuro-interventions in terms of law or psychiatry, or neuroenhancement (Boire 2001). ...
Brain reading technologies are rapidly being developed in a number of neuroscience fields. These technologies can record, process, and decode neural signals. This has been described as ‘mind reading technology’ in some instances, especially in popular media. Should the public at large, be concerned about this kind of technology? Can it really read minds? Concerns about mind-reading might include the thought that, in having one’s mind open to view, the possibility for free deliberation, and for self-conception, are eroded where one isn’t at liberty to privately mull things over. Themes including privacy, cognitive liberty, and self-conception and expression appear to be areas of vital ethical concern. Overall, this article explores whether brain reading technologies are really mind reading technologies. If they are, ethical ways to deal with them must be developed. If they are not, researchers and technology developers need to find ways to describe them more accurately, in order to dispel unwarranted concerns and address appropriately those that are warranted.
... Според Sententia (2004) когнитивната слобода како сложен концепт што опфаќа повеќе заемно поврзани принципи е основно човеково право да размислува независно, да го искористи целиот когнитивен капацитет, и да располага со целосна автономија врз хемиските процеси во мозокот. Кога се спроведуваат истражувања за да се разбере мозочното функционирање, покрај примената на невронаучни техники се прави и интелектуално опсервирање на мозокот, а со тоа се наметнува и потребата од проширување на човековите права за да се опфати заштитата на податоците и на приватноста на невронската активност, а исто така да се обезбеди и поголема претпазливост во чувањето на податоците во дигиталните екосистеми. ...
This research aims to conceptualize cognitive liberty and the psychedelic humanities by examining their constitutive elements. The importance of this study lies in the fact that it is widespread to talk about psychedelic science nowadays, but there is a significant gap in the research. For instance, the role and importance of the humanities need to be acknowledged. Regarding cognitive liberty, this research considers that people have the right to use or refrain from using emerging neurotechnologies and psychedelics. People's freedom of choice vis-à-vis these technologies must be protected, in particular with regard to coercive and non-consensual uses. Firstly, an analysis will be carried out of the constitutive elements of cognitive liberty, especially within the context of a philosophical approach. Secondly, this research will address some arguments for the philosophical uses of psychedelics. Finally, this paper will discuss the scope and significance of psychedelic humanities as a vein of research. Cognitive liberty is a crucial concept for the psychedelic humanities, likely to broaden our understanding of consciousness studies and reflect on ethical and social issues related to scientific research. Cognitive liberty is an update of freedom of thought according to the challenges of the 21st century. In addition, this paper will highlight the possible philosophical uses of psychedelic substances to broaden the research scope since, at present, the ritual and therapeutic uses of psychedelics have the most significant legitimacy. Recognition of philosophical uses demonstrates that learning from non-clinical uses of psychedelics is possible. The psychedelic humanities represent an underexplored avenue of research that can contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between science and culture.
The main subject of this paper is an overview of legal regulations on neurotechnology. The purpose of the analysis is also to define threats posed by the development of neurotechnology, to present proposals of laws and regulations that would counteract these threats, referred to as ‘neurolaws’, which have already been formulated in science, to review and analyse national regulatory solutions adopted in recent years (Chile) and international standards (OECD). The study is also an attempt at encouraging debate about the advancement in neurotechnology and the validity of the laws in view of this innovation.
Cyberbiosecurity is an emerging field that brings together diverse professionals, including biologists, computer scientists, anti-terrorism experts, and policy makers to research the growing intersection between cybersecurity and the biosciences. Cyberneurosecurity is the nascent subfield that is particularly focused on the issues related to neuroscience and cybersecurity. Internet-enabled Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs) like the futuristic Neuralink Link devices (Neuralink, 2023) which is expected to be on the market within a decade create numerous ethical and policy issues that are one of the chief concerns of cyberneurosecurity.These issues can relate to (1) privacy and misappropriation resulting from the interception of neural signals that could disclose behaviors and inclinations; (2) the inoperability of associated devices like prosthetics that could result from the obfuscation or manipulation of neural signals; (3) the potential physical and cognitive and existential harms that result from receiving hacked signals in the brain and/or the hijacking of neural signals sent from the brain for medical purposes; or (4) self-hacking by the user themselves for their own putative benefits.These and others are issues that cyberneurosecurity must engage. In response to these concerns, researchers need to devise standards, policies, and best practices to prevent malicious hackers from manipulating the technology. Practitioners need to develop tools to stress-test and assess the cyber-readiness of various BCIs, especially the increasing number of healthcare devices that employ AI that could obscure or magnify harmful hacks due in part to the lack of transparency and explainability of AI systems (Zhang et al., Ann Transl Med 8(11):712, 2020, Olsen et al., J Neural Eng 18(4):046053, 2021, Aggarwal and Chugh, Arch Comput Methods Eng 29:3001–20, 2022). BCI manufacturers need to ultimately implement industry-wide standards to protect the privacy, security, and safety of their users, and governments may need to develop regulatory oversight to promote these and other aspects of cyberneurosecurity.KeywordsCyberbiosecurityCyberneurosecurityNeurorightsNeurohypeBrain–computer interfaces (BCI)
Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology is a promising and rapidly advancing research area. It was initially developed in the context of early government-sponsored futuristic research in biocybernetics and human–machine interaction in the United States (US) [1]. This inspired Jacques Vidal to suggest providing a direct link between the inductive mental processes used in solving problems and the symbol-manipulating, deductive capabilities of computers, and to coin the term “Brain-Computer Interface” in his seminal paper published in 1973 [2]. Recent developments in BCI technology, based on animal and human studies, allow for the restoration and potential augmentation of faculties of perception and physical movement, and even the transfer of information between brains. Brain activity can be interpreted through both invasive and noninvasive monitoring devices, allowing for novel, therapeutic solutions for individuals with disabilities and for other non-medical applications. However, a number of ethical and policy issues have been identified in context of the use of BCI technology, with the potential for near-future advancements in the technology to raise unique new ethical and policy questions that society has never grappled with before [3, 4]. Once again, the US is leading in the field with many commercial enterprises exploring different realistic and futuristic applications of BCI technology. For instance, a US company named Synchron recently received FDA approval to proceed with first-in-human trials of its endovascularly implanted BCI device [5].
The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to "mental privacy." In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are-at least for now-no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity" theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts-healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.
Neurotechnologies necessitate new thinking on human rights.
Nöroteknoloji alanında son yıllarda yaşanan büyük gelişmeler, insan beynindeki verilere erişme, bu verileri toplama ve işleme konusunda önemli olanaklar sunmaktadır. Özellikle fonksiyonel manyetik rezonans tekniği gibi beyin görüntüleme tekniklerinin kullanımıyla, insan beynine herhangi bir müdahalede bulunmaksızın beyin aktivitelerinin görüntülenmesi ve kaydedilmesi mümkün hale gelmiştir. Günümüzde, beyin görüntüleme tekniklerinin, kişilerin düşünce ve tutumları hakkında bilgi edinmenin yanında, klinik amaçlarla kullanımı da son derece yaygındır. Bununla birlikte, nöroteknolojinin kullanımı, kişilerin davranışlarında istenmeyen değişikliklere ve mental zararlara yol açarak, temel hak ve özgürlüklerine yönelik tehdit yaratma potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Özellikle ABD’de ortaya çıkan nöro-pazarlama ve nöro-reklamcılık gibi sektörlerin, kişilerin tercihlerinin yönlendirilmesi gibi ticari amaçlarla nöroteknolojik yöntemleri kullanması buna örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışmada, öncelikle nöroteknoloji ve insan hakları arasındaki ilişki ortaya konulmaya çalışılmakta ve halihazırdaki hakların, nöroteknoloji alanındaki gelişmelere yanıt vermek bakımından yeterli olmayabileceğinden hareketle, son yıllarda tartışılmaya başlanan bilişsel özgürlük kavramı ile Lenca ve Andorno’nun “nöro-haklar” adı altında öne sürdüğü, “mental gizlilik hakkı”, “mental bütünlük hakkı” ve “psikolojik devamlılık hakkı” tartışılmaktadır.
Social marketing has done a lot, so far, to improve communication towards its audience in order to increase consumers’ (but simply citizens’) welfare and promote the consumeristic doctrine. Not by chance, the use of social marketing principles and techniques has been applied by some scholars also to an effective implementation of public health interventions; but in order to have an effective public health marketing communication, there is need of effective Public Service Announcements: public social campaigns useful in attracting, retaining and engaging people, and able to generate behavioral changes by stimulating interpersonal communication and word-of-mouth. In this frame, neuro-marketing can be useful in building effective PSAs—whose aim is sustaining social marketing—since it allows to understand the customers’ innermost and unconscious insights with a scientific reliability. In the last years, the emergence of neuroscience applied to marketing and economics has revolutionized the way of thinking to the customers’ insights, creating thus new languages and new challenges for the communicators and the policy makers. The present contribution aims to be a review of the state-of-the-art of the consumer neuroscience inter-discipline applied to the concerns typical of the consumerism, and tries to answer the question: is this niche methodology destined to be the next main one in the consumer and consumeristic research? What are the challenges and the difficulties to overcome in this sense?
As humanity improves its use of technologies that can replace parts of a biological organism with ones containing mechanical or electronic components, it raises important legal and political issues. For example, the successful implantation of devices in human bodies could lead to the emergence of new cognitive and motor abilities, thereby resulting in the creation of a new class of people. Undoubtedly, this new class of people with extraordinary abilities would require a legal and governmental response. However, the question that arises is what legal rights might be given to these people, considering that they are more similar to machines than to men or women. The following legal aspects are of the utmost importance: the legal rights and responsibilities of cyborgs; the regulation of access to neuroprosthetic devices by third parties; and the limitation of the illegal use of the damaging capabilities of cyborgs. This article examines a number of laws and regulations from various jurisdictions in the United States, the European Union, South Korea and China that apply to cyborg technologies, with a particular focus on a legal doctrine that applies to neuroprostheses.
This article examines soldier performance optimisation, enhancement, and augmentation across the three dimensions of physical performance, cognitive performance, and socio-cultural understanding. Optimisation refers to combatants attaining their maximum biological potential. Enhancement refers to combatants achieving a level of performance beyond their biological potential through drugs, surgical procedures, or even gene editing. Augmentation refers to a blending of organic and biomechatronic body parts such as electronic or mechanical implants, prosthetics, and brain–machine interfaces. This article identifies that soldier optimisation is a necessity to protect individual combatants and to give them the ability to make legal and morally justifiable decisions in battle. While enhancement and augmentation of military personnel can lead to accelerated and more destructive warfare, it can also be argued that there is an ethical and moral responsibility to provide combatants the best opportunity for survivability, and that better functioning, less fatigued, and better informed military personnel can make better decisions in battle. There is also a moral responsibility of the state for the combatants themselves, and short-term military success must be balanced against the short- and long-term health and wellbeing of the personnel. This article concludes that it is both the intent and the degree that decide the acceptability.
Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill-treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.
Humans tend to identify the uniqueness of our brains as the cornerstone of human distinction from other animals (Chapman & Huffman, 2019). Our species has pondered what makes us us at least throughout recorded history. However, recent decades witnessed a quantum leap in capacity for real time empirical observation of living brains. At the same time, rigorous, organized, and collaborative analysis of scientific and clinical observations of human beings across the spectrum of human neurodiversity flourished (Ramachandran, 2012). Examining our brains in action allows for fascinating insights into humanity’s favorite subject; humanity itself. It also creates a profound and unprecedented responsibility for stewardship of our species alongside careful management of our impacts on environments.
Neurosciences study the relations between the human brain and human behaviour. Recent developments of these sciences are granting us an increasing possibility to control, or influence, mental processes. In this chapter, I analyse how this possibility is becoming a concrete ability to control socially undesirable behaviour, which is the reason why I choose to investigate the relationship between Neurosciences and the Law. Firstly, with this in mind, I show the new role of the neuroscientists in Courts. Secondly, I analyse new neuro-paradigms in public debates about the structure of Society and the Law. Moreover, I study the so-called reductive neurolaw, which is the gradual replacement of traditional sources of law with new neuro-scientific standards. Finally, I provide a definition of Cognitive Liberty (a new form of safeguard) able to be collected in a “Declaration of Human Neuro-rights”. Indeed, Cognitive Liberty may be used as a new conceptual tool, in order to protect personal human rights against reductive neuro-paradigms.KeywordsNeurocivilizationReductive neurolawCognitive libertyHuman rights
In this chapter, I reflect on the right to mental integrity from an ethics perspective. Against the background of some conceptual considerations, I discuss the chances and limitations of a right to mental integrity. The right to mental integrity stresses a person’s right to control their brain states. It is often conceived primarily as a negative right to protect against unauthorized brain interventions. While this certainly emphasizes a very important aspect, I argue that the right to mental integrity would benefit considerably from reflections on what is specific about the right to mental integrity, compared to, for example, the right to bodily integrity or the notion of informed consent. That’s why after introducing and discussing the right to mental integrity, the notion of “mental integrity,” and the concept of informed consent, I sketch implications of neurotechnologies on privacy, agency, individual characteristics, identity, authenticity, and autonomy. Then, I highlight some implications of the right to mental integrity in the context of neurotechnologies.KeywordsMental integrityNeurotechnologiesInformed consentAutonomyPrivacy
Freedom of thought is one of the core international human rights, enshrined in Art. 18 of the Universal Declaration and almost all subsequent instruments. It enjoys an exceptionally strong level of protection and cannot be limited. However, it does not play a role in legal practice as its contents and contours remain vague. This chapter discusses the sparse case law and suggests crucial elements for future constructions of the right. In particular, it identifies five explananda that theories of freedom of thought need to address, examines the scope of the right as well as tensions between different conceptions of freedom of thought, and proposes an interpretation of the right with a rationalist tone and special emphasis on freedom of belief. It aslo develops a test for, and a taxonomy of, interferences and suggests narrow exceptions to the unconditional protection.
This chapter looks at how an American constitutional jurisprudence of freedom of thought might both be a component of, and shape the future development of, existing constitutional rights such as the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and “due process” rights against intrusion into bodily liberty. It also looks at how courts have developed a general template for these constitutional rights and considers how an independent right to freedom of thought or “cognitive liberty” might fit such a template—with a core where the right provides close to absolute protection against certain state interference with thinking and a periphery where the state is given more flexibility, for example, in regulating our use of thought-enhancing technology.
In this chapter, I focus on defining freedom of thought and conscience (Section “New Threats to Freedom of Thought and Conscience”) and the new neuroscientific technologies and devices apt to read our mind/brain (Sect. “Neuroscience Crossing the Final Frontier”). In Sect. “New Technologies that Influence Cognitive Processes and Mental Contents”, I explain how digital technologies and devices can influence cognitive processes and mental contents. When exposed to similar stimuli, the “common brain” of human beings may end up becoming very similar among individuals. In this sense, digital technology might be not as neutral as it looks. In Sect. “The Need for and Right to Cognitive Freedom”, I provide a definition of mental integrity and argue why there is a need for a right to cognitive freedom. In Sect. “Using Technology as a Defence Against Technology Itself”, I maintain that we should defend mental integrity by incorporating functional limitations into devices capable of interfering with it.
fMRI neurofeedback is becoming an increasingly potent tool for modifying human brain activity and function, and interest in its applications is growing. This technique allows researchers to better study the causal relationship between brain and behavior and also has potential for personalized interventions to enhance cognition or mitigate clinical impairments. However, it is difficult to predict the full impact of fMRI neurofeedback training on an individual participant (both positive and negative) given our limited knowledge regarding the safety and efficacy of its use, and regarding the persistence and reversibility of its effects. This raises several ethical concerns. These ethical issues demand even more attention for studies where substantial information is withheld from participants as that can impair their ability to accurately assess the risks and potential benefits for themselves. In addition, as fMRI neurofeedback is translated into more portable and widely accessible modalities the potential for broad social influence arises. The potential ethical concerns associated with this possibility should be proactively communicated to the public to allow development of protective frameworks. Given the complex ethical issues associated with this technology, further consideration and discussion is needed in the fMRI neurofeedback research community.
Entry on "Neuroenhancement" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
URL = https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/neuroenhancement/v-1
This chapter discusses the emerging debate regarding the relationship between the concept of Cognitive Liberty and Human Rights. For this reason, after briefly presenting some issues related to the development of recent neurotechnology, the different types of definitions of the concept of cognitive liberty, that have been recently proposed, are illustrated. Starting from these last, this chapter aims to analyze how, the whole relationship between human rights and Cognitive Liberty can change depending on the legislative strategy that one prefers to undertake.
Deep fakes have rapidly emerged as one of the most ominous concerns within modern society. The ability to easily and cheaply generate convincing images, audio, and video via artificial intelligence will have repercussions within politics, privacy, law, security, and broadly across all of society. In light of the widespread apprehension, numerous technological efforts aim to develop tools to distinguish between reliable audio/video and the fakes. These tools and strategies will be particularly effective for consumers when their guard is naturally up, for example during election cycles. However, recent research suggests that not only can deep fakes create credible representations of reality, but they can also be employed to create false memories. Memory malleability research has been around for some time, but it relied on doctored photographs or text to generate fraudulent recollections. These recollected but fake memories take advantage of our cognitive miserliness that favors selecting those recalled memories that evoke our preferred weltanschauung. Even responsible consumers can be duped when false but belief-consistent memories, implanted when we are least vigilant can, like a Trojan horse, be later elicited at crucial dates to confirm our pre-determined biases and influence us to accomplish nefarious goals. This paper seeks to understand the process of how such memories are created, and, based on that, proposing ethical and legal guidelines for the legitimate use of fake technologies.
This article combines methodologies and explorations from the fields of anthropology and applied ethics in order to examine the ethical assumptions underlying the illegal status of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers (PCEs) such as Adderall and other prescription stimulants often used to improve concentration, motivation, and alertness. We begin by presenting empirical data from ethnographic fieldwork conducted among university students, professors, and police officers in New York City. The data show that the students are not concerned with the illegality of PCEs, and while some students experience pressures related to performing well, they do not feel pressured into using PCEs. The empirical material furthermore reveals that the practices of the authorities in relation to PCE use are relaxed and do not always reflect the law. We then present a detailed ethical analysis of a certain type of argument in favor of the prohibition of PCEs, which has received little careful analysis in the bioethical literature. Our analysis, drawing on the philosopher Robert Nozick’s specification of coercion and the sociologist N. A. Fitz’s understanding of social pressure, shows that legalization of PCEs would not necessarily involve or bring about direct coercion; nor would it bring about morally problematic forms of coercion or social pressure. While the article shows that prohibition might not make a difference to uses of pharmaceuticals for enhancement, it also questions whether the gray zones between practices of the authorities and the actual law might in some ways be understood as coercive.
Background:
Evidence of an inverse relationship between central serotonergic (serotonin [5-hydroxytryptamine]) system function and impulsive aggressive behavior has been accumulating for more than 2 decades. If so, pharmacological enhancement of serotonin activity should be expected to reduce impulsive aggressive behavior in subjects in whom this behavior is prominent.Methods:
A double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of the selective serotonin-uptake inhibitor fluoxetine hydrochloride was conducted in 40 nonmajor-depressed, nonbipolar or schizophrenic, DSM-III-R personality—disordered individuals with current histories of impulsive aggressive behavior and irritability. Measures included the Overt Aggression Scale—Modified for Outpatients, Clinical Global Impression Rating of Improvement, and several secondary measures of aggression, depression, and anxiety.Results:
Fluoxetine, but not placebo, treatment resulted in a sustained reduction in scores on the lrritability and Aggression subscales of the Overt Aggression Scale—Modified for Outpatients that was first apparent during months 2 and 3 of treatment, respectively. Fluoxetine was superior to placebo in the proportion of "responders" on the Clinical Global Impression Rating of Improvement: first at the end of month 1, and then finally demonstrating a sustained drug-placebo difference from the end of month 2 through the end of month 3 of treatment. These results were not influenced by secondary measures of depression, anxiety, or alcohol use.Conclusion:
Fluoxetine treatment has an antiaggressive effect on impulsive aggressive individuals with DSM-III-R personality disorder.
Clinical data and uncontrolled observations have suggested that fluoxetine is helpful in some patients with borderline personality disorder. This article describes the results of a 13-week double-blind study of volunteer subjects with mild to moderately severe borderline personality disorder. Thirteen fluoxetine recipients and nine placebo recipients received treatment. Pretreatment and posttreatment measures were obtained for global mood and functioning, anger, and depression. The most striking finding from this study was a clinically and statistically significant decrease in anger among the fluoxetine recipients. This decrease was independent of changes in depression. These data support previous observations that fluoxetine may reduce anger in patients with borderline personality disorder. The number of subjects in this study was small, the placebo responsiveness was high, and the clinical characteristics of the patients were in the mild to moderate range of severity. The data cannot be extrapolated to more severely ill borderline patients, but further study of fluoxetine and other selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors is indicated in this population.
The reported inverse relationship between indices of central serotonin (5-HT) function and indices of impulsive aggression in human subjects suggests the possibility that enhancement of 5-HT activity will reduce impulsive aggressive behavior. Although evidence for this hypothesis is emerging, the relationship between baseline central 5-HT system function and antiaggressive responses to treatment with 5-HT agents has not yet been examined in human subjects.
In this pilot study, we examined the relationship between: a) pretreatment prolactin responses to d-fenfluramine (PRL[d-FEN]) challenge; and b) antiaggressive responses to 12 weeks of treatment with either fluoxetine or placebo in 15 impulsively aggressive personality disordered subjects as observed in a 12-week, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial.
Among all subjects there were positive correlations between the pretreatment PRL[d-FEN] response and the percent improvement in Overt Aggression Scale-Modified scores for "Aggression" and "Irritability." These correlations were present in the fluoxetine (n = 10), but not in the placebo (n = 5), treated subjects.
These data suggest the possibility that the antiaggressive response to fluoxetine is directly, rather than inversely, dependent on the responsiveness of central 5-HT synapses in the brain of impulsive aggressive personality disordered subjects.
To test the hypothesis that traits of aggression and impulsivity correlate negatively with central serotonergic system function in a nonpatient population, a standard fenfluramine challenge (for assessment of serotonergic responsivity) and behavioral measurements germane to aggression/impulsivity were administered to a community-derived sample of 119 men and women. In men, peak prolactin responses to fenfluramine correlated significantly with an interview-assessed life history of aggression (r = -.40, p < .002), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (r = -.30, p < .03), and traits of Conscientiousness (r = +.30, p < .03), Neuroticism (r = -.31, p < .02) and Angry Hostility (r = -.35, p < .01) on the NEO-Personality Inventory. No significant relationships were observed across all women, although subanalyses restricted to postmenopausal subjects (in whom ovarian influences on prolactin secretion may be mitigated because of diminished estrogen) showed a pattern of behavioral associations somewhat similar to that seen in men. By extending documented relationships between an index of central serotonergic system function and traits of aggression and impulsivity to a more normative range of population variability than is represented in prior literature, this study supports speculation that these associations reflect a basic neurobehavioral dimension of individual differences.
To provide a clinically useful analysis of the relationship between selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), in particular fluoxetine and violent or suicidal behaviour.
All published papers on Medline and other databases linking serotonin, SSRIs and aggression were reviewed.
A small proportion of patients treated with SSRIs may become akathisic and others may show increases in anxiety in the initial phase of treatment, but no increased susceptibility to aggression or suicidality can be connected with fluoxetine or any other SSRI. In fact SSRI treatment may reduce aggression, probably due to positive effects on the serotonergic dysfunction that is implicated in aggressive behaviour directed towards oneself or others.
In the absence of convincing evidence to link SSRIs causally to violence and suicide, the recent lay media reports are potentially dangerous, unnecessarily increasing the concerns of depressed patients who are prescribed antidepressants.
TheGuilty Knowledge Test (GKT) has been used extensively to model deception. An association between the brain evoked response potentials and lying on the GKT suggests that deception may be associated with changes in other measures of brain activity such as regional blood flow that could be anatomically localized with event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Blood oxygenation level-dependent fMRI contrasts between deceptive and truthful responses were measured with a 4 Tesla scanner in 18 participants performing the GKT and analyzed using statistical parametric mapping. Increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the superior frontal gyrus (SFG), and the left premotor, motor, and anterior parietal cortex was specifically associated with deceptive responses. The results indicate that: (a) cognitive differences between deception and truth have neural correlates detectable by fMRI, (b) inhibition of the truthful response may be a basic component of intentional deception, and (c) ACC and SFG are components of the basic neural circuitry for deception.
The role of serotonin in human aggression and impulsivity was evaluated by administering paroxetine or placebo for 3 weeks and comparing the effects on laboratory measures of aggression and impulsivity among male subjects with a history of conduct disorder.
Twelve male subjects with a history of criminal behavior participated in experimental sessions, which measured aggressive and impulsive responses. Six subjects were assigned to placebo treatment and six subjects to placebo and paroxetine treatment. Aggression was measured using the point subtraction aggression paradigm (PSAP), which provides subjects with an aggressive and monetary reinforced response options. Impulsive responses were measured using a paradigm that gives subjects choices between small rewards after short delays versus larger rewards after longer delays.
Chronic administration of paroxetine (20 mg/day) for 21 days produced significant decreases in impulsive responses. Decreases in aggressive responses were evident only at the end of paroxetine treatment. Decreases in impulsive and aggressive responses could not be attributed to a non-specific sedative action because monetary reinforced responses were not decreased as has been observed following CNS sedation.
Inhibition of serotonin reuptake by paroxetine is the possible mechanism for reductions in aggressive and impulsive responses. These results support other data linking serotonin function and aggression and impulsivity.
There is growing public awareness of the ethical issues raised by progress in many areas of neuroscience. This commentary reviews the issues, which are triaged in terms of their novelty and their imminence, with an exploration of the relevant ethical principles in each case.
To advance awareness of ethical issues in the neurosciences1, 2, 3, we studied historical and emerging trends in neuroimaging, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as a model. Functional MRI has had a significant impact on the neurosciences in the past decade given its wide availability, unprecedented coupling of spatial resolution and safety, and application to a broad range of normative and clinical neurobehavioral phenomena4. Over time, the terrain of fMRI studies has expanded from examination of basic sensorimotor and cognitive processes to topics that more directly relate to human motivation, reasoning and social attitudes. Here we provide empirical validation of these trends and explore what issues they portend for the future.
Brain fingerprinting: databodies to databrains
- Sententia