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Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition
Abstract
Developers of NBIC (Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno) technologies face a multitude of obstacles, not the least of which is navigating the public ethics of their applied research. Biotechnologies have received widespread media attention and spawned heated interest in their perceived social implications. Now, in view of the rapidly expanding purview of neuroscience and the growing array of technologic developments capable of affecting or monitoring cognition, the emerging field of neuroethics calls for a consideration of the social and ethical implications of neuroscientific discoveries and trends. To negotiate the complex ethical issues at stake in new and emerging kinds of technologies for improving human cognition, we need to overcome political, disciplinary, and religious sectarianism. We need analytical models that protect values of personhood at the heart of a functional democracy-values that allow, as much as possible, for individual decision-making, despite transformations in our understanding and ability to manipulate cognitive processes. Addressing cognitive enhancement from the legal and ethical notion of "cognitive liberty" provides a powerful tool for assessing and encouraging NBIC developments.
... As can be inferred from their names, in terms of their different objects of protection, these rights are intended to safeguard personal liberties such as autonomy, privacy, integrity, identity, equal opportunities, and nondiscrimination-as long as these liberties are threatened through the brain and mind. Some countries have already included neurorights in their regulatory frameworks in various ways: Chile carried out a constitutional reform, 18 Argentina and Brazil are studying bills,, 1920 Mexico and Spain included them in their digital rights charters,, 2122 and France introduced an article on mental integrity (Article 19.I) in its new bioethics law. 23 At the international level, it is worth highlighting Resolution A/HRC/RES/51/3 of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 24 as well as declarations by the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Latin American Parliament. ...
... In contrast, the right to cognitive liberty has had an important trajectory and academic support for more than twenty years. After Boire's emphasis on "each individual's fundamental right to control his or her own consciousness" [17], Sententia [18] outlined the concept of cognitive liberty as every person's fundamental right to think independently, to use the full spectrum of his or her mind, and to have autonomy over his or her own brain chemistry. Cognitive liberty concerns the ethics and legality of safeguarding one's own thought processes, and by necessity, one's electrochemical brain states. ...
... Cognitive liberty concerns the ethics and legality of safeguarding one's own thought processes, and by necessity, one's electrochemical brain states. The individual, not cor- 18 porate or government interests, should have sole jurisdiction over the control and/or modulation of his or her brain states and mental processes. ...
Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators.
... The other proposed right, the right to cognitive liberty, emerged in the academic debate on cognitive enhancement in the early 2000s and also has a broad scope of protection [27,28]. Bublitz defines it as "the right to alter one's mental states with the help of neuro tools as well as to refuse to do so" [29]. ...
... via portable EEG scanners, 26 does not interfere with neural activity but only measures it and does thus not constitute an influence. 27 Brain reading might therefore rather be a matter of data protection and privacy or freedom of (non)-expression [32,33]. Yet, the ECtHR and the HRC have stressed that freedom of thought, conscience and religion also includes the right not to reveal one's thought, religion or belief. ...
... political [45]. One could argue that the HRC thereby did not discard the criterion of complexity and that thoughts on all matter must nevertheless have a certain quality to fall within the scope 23 27 However, knowing that one's thoughts are being read could lead to the avoidance of certain thoughts, and may thus also constitute an interference. UNGA [40] para 54: speaks about "self-censorship". ...
Progress in neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides unprecedented insights into the human brain. There are increasing possibilities to influence and measure brain activity. These developments raise multifaceted ethical and legal questions. The proponents of neurorights argue in favour of introducing new human rights to protect mental processes and brain data. This article discusses the necessity and advantages of introducing new human rights focusing on the proposed new human right to mental self-determination and the right to freedom of thought as enshrined in Art.18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). I argue that the right to freedom of thought can be coherently interpreted as providing comprehensive protection of mental processes and brain data, thus offering a normative basis regarding the use of neurotechnologies. Besides, I claim that an evolving interpretation of the right to freedom of thought is more convincing than introducing a new human right to mental self-determination.
... The other is that of cognitive liberty (CL), whose origin dates back to the very beginning of this century, when, in a four-part essay published in the Journal of Cognitive Liberties, Boire [27] focused on "each individual's fundamental right to control his or her own consciousness." A few years later, Sententia [28] defined CL as "every person's fundamental right to think independently, to use the full spectrum of his or her mind, and to have autonomy over his or her own brain chemistry. Cognitive liberty concerns the ethics and legality of safeguarding one's own thought processes, and by necessity, one's electrochemical brain states. ...
... In the same article, she also opines that CL "is the necessary substrate for just about every other freedom" [28]. This conception of CL as a prerequisite for other freedoms or rights is also defended by Ienca and Andorno [9]. ...
In this article, we propose a philosophical exploration on the main problems involved in two neurorights that concern autonomous action, namely free will and cognitive liberty, and sketch a possible solution to these problems by resourcing to a holistic interpretation of human actions. First, we expose the main conceptual and practical issues arising from the neuroright to “free will,” which are far from minor: the term itself is denied by some trends participating in the neurorights debate, the related concept of ultimate control is also disputed, the understanding of free will depends on cultural context, and the exercise of being free to act in several domains may be covered by other regulations. Second, we analyze the historical origin of cognitive liberty, its current status, and its relation with free will. Third, we criticize the concept of decision in mainstream action theory and propose to conceive action as a unified process constituted by three explanatory, non-sequential dimensions: intention, decision, and action realization. Fourth, we discuss two possible cases involving neurotechnologies and suggest ways to interpret them according to a unified framework in which free will and cognitive liberty fall under a single neuroright to personal autonomy. Finally, we outline a recommendation to introduce freedom of thought and personal autonomy as complementary neurorights to protect both the internal and external dimensions of thought and action.
... Desde esta perspectiva, más centrada en el individuo que en la colectividad, se somete a consideración la posibilidad del empleo de este tipo de drogas como una decisión personal que responde a factores sociales y culturales en mayor o menor medida elegidos por el sujeto que las emplea. De esta manera, el uso de drogas para el estilo de vida se asemeja a la cirugía plástica y a otras modificaciones corporales no terapéuticas que son decisión exclusiva de quien se somete a ellas (20,21,22,23,24). Desde esta perspectiva, si bien se reconocen las implicaciones sociales en términos de justicia, seguridad y medicalización de la sociedad, el enfoque recae de manera más directa en el individuo y su estilo de vida, por lo que han surgido quienes desde este análisis pugnan por la revisión de la aplicación de las libertades en la elección de los medios farmacológicos. ...
... Desde esta perspectiva, si bien se reconocen las implicaciones sociales en términos de justicia, seguridad y medicalización de la sociedad, el enfoque recae de manera más directa en el individuo y su estilo de vida, por lo que han surgido quienes desde este análisis pugnan por la revisión de la aplicación de las libertades en la elección de los medios farmacológicos. Por lo que desde la perspectiva de las "drogas del estilo de vida" algunos abogan por el reconocimiento expreso de la libertad cognitiva en la que se incluya, el empleo de estas sustancias para fines personales de los que deseen emplearlas, y el reconocimiento del derecho a rehusarse a utilizarlas (20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27). ...
La presente es una investigación cualitativa que emplea una metodología de revisión de literatura, análisis y análisis fenomenológico. En la actualidad se ha reportado un uso no prescrito, por parte de personas sanas, de medicamentos destinados al tratamiento de padecimientos cognitivos. Dicha ingesta se ha llevado a cabo con fines potenciadores de capacidades cognitivas específicas tales como memoria, concentración y capacidad de reacción. Este empleo no recomendado de fármacos ha sido documentado mediante una serie de investigaciones y encuestas que encuentran una tendencia al alza en el consumo de estas drogas sobre todo en sectores específicos de la población como el universitario en países desarrollados. El carácter potenciador de estas drogas, cuando se consumen por personas sanas lleva a la necesidad de contrastar su uso con el principio bioético de totalidad o “terapéutico”. Por lo que el presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar si el uso de estas sustancias puede o no ser justificado desde una perspectiva bioética a la luz de la interpretación del principio de totalidad.Se concluye que el empleo de potenciadores cognitivos puede ser permitido en personas sin patología específica pero que reporten un bajo rendimiento en determinadas áreas cognitivas o un detrimento en dichas capacidades derivado de la edad avanzada y no de una enfermedad diagnosticada. Lo anterior siempre que se cumplan criterios de seguridad y se lleven a cabo investigaciones serias y continuadas sobre sus beneficios en las poblaciones antes citadas.
... Regulating from the perspective of freedom of thought: ancient rules in future-proof regulation "Regulating from the perspective of the right to freedom of thought is new and complex, but it is crucial to our future as autonomous humans living in democratic societies founded on human rights" Susie Alegre (Alegre 2021a) Old and dusted, the right to freedom of thought has been shadowed by the right to privacy for the past 15 years and now needs new interpretations in the light of the digital evolution. In its digital clothes, freedom of thought is best described in the literature by the concept of "cognitive liberty" (Ienca and Andorno 2017;Bublitz 2013;Sententia 2004). It should be understood as the "conceptual update" (Sententia 2004) of the right to privacy in its self-determination connotation, mixed with interpretations of freedom of thought (Alegre 2021a) already in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Nolan and K. v Russia), and as expressed in international human rights legislation. ...
... In its digital clothes, freedom of thought is best described in the literature by the concept of "cognitive liberty" (Ienca and Andorno 2017;Bublitz 2013;Sententia 2004). It should be understood as the "conceptual update" (Sententia 2004) of the right to privacy in its self-determination connotation, mixed with interpretations of freedom of thought (Alegre 2021a) already in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Nolan and K. v Russia), and as expressed in international human rights legislation. 42 ...
Despite the increasing awareness from academia, civil society and media to the issue of child manipulation online, the current EU regulatory system fails at providing sufficient levels of protection. Given the universality of the issue, there is a need to combine and further these scattered efforts into a unitary, multidisciplinary theory of digital manipulation that identifies causes and effects, systematizes the technical and legal knowledge on manipulative and addictive tactics, and to find effective regulatory mechanisms to fill the legislative gaps. In this paper we discuss manipulative and exploitative strategies in the context of online games for children, suggest a number of possible reasons for the failure of the applicable regulatory system, propose an “upgrade" for the regulatory approach to address these risks from the perspective of freedom of thought, and present and discuss technological approaches that allow for the development of games that verifiably protect the privacy and freedoms of players.
... At the turn of this century, Boire (2000) and Sententia (2004) set the stage for the debate on the profound impact of neurotechnology on fundamental and human rights. Their analysis centered on cognitive liberty, an updated version of the right to freedom of thought that can be defined as "every person's fundamental right to think independently, to use the full spectrum of his or her mind, and to have autonomy over his or her own brain chemistry" (Sententia 2004, 223). ...
As is usually the case with other topics addressed by neuroethics, a rigorous analysis of neurorights requires an interdisciplinary approach. In response to this need and in the context of the global expansion of regulatory initiatives on neurorights, we coordinated, under the auspices of the International Center for Neuroscience and Ethics (CINET), an introductory course on neurorights from a neuroscientific perspective. The course, aimed at sixty students from diverse backgrounds (neuroscience, psychology, and law, among others), consisted of a 10-hr training that showed the current approaches and discussions on neurorights and outlined cutting-edge technologies to register, analyze, and manipulate human brain activity from a realistic stance. The course succeeded in discarding some concerns and uncovering others not frequently found in the neurorights discussions. The most pressing issues identified were protecting brain data privacy, combating bias in algorithms used in neurotechnology, and improving informed consent mechanisms for interventions with invasive neuroscientific techniques.
... It is defined as 'the examination of what is right and wrong, good and bad about the treatment of, perfection of, or unwelcome invasion of and worrisome manipulation of the human brain' [5, p. 2]. The term neurorights was coined at the beginning of this century, with pioneering works by Boire and Sententia [6,7] together with the right to 'cognitive freedom,' and its first use by Ienca & Andorno [8]. These authors stated that 'new neuroimaging technologies pose a fundamental ethical and legal and social challenge: determining whether, or under what conditions, it is legitimate to gain access to or to interfere with another person's neural activity' [9]. ...
Neuroimaging technologies such as brain–computer interfaces and neurofeedback have evolved rapidly as new tools for cognitive neuroscience and as potential clinical interventions. However, along with these developments, concern has grown based on the fear of the potential misuse of neurotechnology. In October 2021, Chile became the first country to include neurorights in its Constitution. The present article is divided into two parts. In the first section, we describe the path followed by neurorights that led to its inclusion in the Chilean Constitution, and the neurotechnologies usually involved in neurorights discussions. In the second part, we discuss two potential problems of neurorights. We begin by pointing out some epistemological concerns regarding neurorights, mainly referring to the ambiguity of the concepts used in neurolegislations, the difficult relationship between neuroscience and politics and the weak reasons for urgency in legislating. We then describe the dangers of overprotective laws in medical research, based on the detrimental effect of recent legislation in Chile and the potential risk posed by neurorights to the benefits of neuroscience development. This article aims to engage with the scientific community interested in neurotechnology and neurorights in an interdisciplinary reflection of the potential consequences of neurorights.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Neurofeedback: new territories and neurocognitive mechanisms of endogenous neuromodulation’.
... Sin embargo, no será hasta principios de siglo XXI cuando, de la mano de Boire y Sententia, se comience a elaborar su contenido junto a la noción "libertad cognitiva" (Boire, 2001). Estrechamente relacionada con la libertad de pensamiento, la libertad cognitiva es "el derecho y la libertad de controlar la propia conciencia y el proceso de pensamiento electroquímico" (Sententia, 2004). En 2017, Ienca y Andorno concluyeron que los derechos humanos, tal y como están conceptualizados, no eran suficientes para protegernos frente a la neurotecnología y abogaron por cuatro nuevos derechos (neuroderechos): el derecho a la libertad cognitiva, el derecho a la privacidad mental, el derecho a la integridad mental y el derecho a la continuidad psicológica (Ienca y Andorno, 2017). ...
... Proponents of this right consider it as the fundamental ground and justification of all other liberties by being their neurocognitive substrate, thus resembling and conceptually updating the notion of 'freedom of thought' as the essential justification of other freedoms. [33][34][35] The question arises whether an external resource should be seen as a 'mental constituent', a fundamental part of the realisation base for these mental capacities (EXT). Alternatively, it can be viewed as a necessary but external causal contributor to their functional implementation (INT). ...
In research involving patients with implantable brain–computer interfaces (BCIs), there is a regulatory gap concerning post-trial responsibilities and duties of sponsors and investigators towards implanted patients. In this article, we analyse the case of patient R, who underwent non-voluntary explantation of an implanted BCI, causing a discontinuation in her sense of agency and self. To clarify the post-trial duties and responsibilities involved in this case, we first define the ontological status of the BCI using both externalist (EXT) and internalist (INT) theories of cognition. We then give particular focus to the theories of extended and embedded cognition, hence considering the BCI either as a constitutive component of the patient’s mind or as a causal supporter of her brain-based cognitive capacities. We argue that patient R can legitimately be considered both as an embedded and extended cognitive agent. Then, we analyse whether the non-voluntary explantation violated patient R’s (neuro)rights to cognitive liberty, mental integrity, psychological continuity and mental privacy. We analyse whether and how different mental ontologies may imply morally relevant differences in interpreting these prima facie neurorights violations and the correlational duties of sponsors and investigators. We conclude that both mental ontologies support the identification of emerging neurorights of the patient and give rise to post-trial obligations of sponsors and investigators to provide for continuous technical maintenance of implanted BCIs that play a significant role in patients’ agency and sense of self. However, we suggest that externalist mental ontologies better capture patient R’s self-conception and support the identification of a more granular form of mental harm and associated neurorights violation, thus eliciting stricter post-trial obligations.
... Here the idea is not that neurotechnological applications should be rejected per se, but rather that their wide range of potential applications might give rise to a number of unforeseen practical and ethical problems. Motivated by this issue, interdisciplinary communities have started to discuss different regulatory strategies through which interests such as agency, privacy, and liberty might be protected from misuses and abuses of invasive and non-invasive neurotechnological devices [17,24,37,38,[41][42][43][44][45]. In this context, the NET-formerly known as Columbia University's MorningSide Group-suggested that neurotechnological developments are revolutionizing the way in which neurological conditions are treated, however, at the same time: '[neuro]technology could also exacerbate social inequalities and offer corporations, hackers, governments or anyone else new ways to exploit and manipulate people' [38], p. 160). ...
The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off.
... This may cause prospective users of BCIs to consciously change their inner life and limit the scope of their thoughts due to fear of exposure, which will necessarily impact their personality, sense of identity, cognitive capabilities, intelligence, creativeness, and fantasies [58]. Based on these anticipated technological intrusions, the concept of freedom of thought has been promoted by legal scholars as a further expansion of the idea of congnitive liberty, which was defined by Sententia as the "freedom of thought" to control, monitor, and manipulate our own cognitive functions [59]. Although this right aims to protect people from undesired influences and more specifically from interference by the state and third parties, it also entails the right to alter one's mental states with the help of neuro tools as well as to refuse to do so [60]. ...
Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are compelling technologies that allow for bidirectional communication and control between the human brain and the outside world (via a computer) by exchanging brain activity data. Although being admired for their clinical promises, they raise novel ethical and legal issues. Legal debates centre around patient autonomy, equity, data protection and security, dehumanization, machine learning-based decision-making limitations, and the influence of BCIs on human rights—and whether we need new rights to protect our neuro data and mental privacy or not. This chapter will reconsider existing rights and weigh up the argument for sui generis rights.
... Para Sententia (2004), la libertad cognitiva es un derecho estrechamente relacionado con la libertad de pensamiento. De alguna manera es la adaptación de este derecho a las circunstancias del siglo XXI, una respuesta necesaria al poder de manipular el cerebro; así, la libertad cognitiva es para el derecho, y la libertad de controlar la propia conciencia y el proceso de pensamiento electroquímico. ...
El neoconstitucionalismo es una corriente teórica que enfatiza la importancia de la Constitución como fuente fundamental del ordenamiento jurídico; por otro lado, los neuroderechos se refieren al conjunto de derechos relacionados con el cerebro, la mente y la neurociencia. Aunque ambos conceptos tienen implicaciones en el ámbito jurídico y constitucional, el neoconstitucionalismo se centra en la protección de los derechos fundamentales y la interpretación de la Constitución, mientras que los neuroderechos se enfocan en los derechos relacionados con el cerebro y la neurociencia; por ello, esta investigación pretende un acercamiento teórico sobre los nuevos desafíos del Neoconstitucionalismo frente a los Neuroderechos, con el fin de comprender la importancia de estos conceptos dentro del constitucionalismo moderno.
... La noción de libertad cognitiva fue acuñada propuesta por Wrye Sententia en 2004, quien la justificó sobre la base de que "el derecho y la libertad de controlar la propia conciencia y los propios procesos electroquímicos de pensamiento son el sustrato necesario para cualquier otra libertad" (Sententia, 2004). En efecto, puede decirse que la autodeterminación cognitiva de las personas es fundamental en un sistema democrático, ya que es una condición sine qua non para el ejercicio, sino de todos, al menos de la mayoría de los derechos y libertades. ...
El presente Informe fue preparado por encargo de la UNESCO (Oficina para América Latina y el Caribe). En primer lugar destaca el notable desarrollo neurocientífico que ha tenido lugar en los últimos años en varios países latinoamericanos, tanto en actividades clínicas como de investigación. Al abordar la perspectiva de derechos humanos en relación con las neurotecnologías, el informe identifica cuatro derechos que están llamados a jugar un rol central en la materia: la privacidad mental, la integridad mental, la identidad personal y la libertad cognitiva. El documento presenta a continuación las diversas propuestas de regulación de la materia por parte de distintos organismos internacionales y regionales latinoamericanos, así como a nivel de los órganos legislativos de países de la región, enfatizando el liderazgo de la UNESCO, que puede ser una fuerza motriz en materia de neurotecnología dentro del sistema de las Naciones Unidas, gracias a su mandato único y su experiencia en bioética y ética de la ciencia y la tecnología.
... We may even be witnessing the beginnings of a mutation in ontology (Rose, 2016), for example in treating cognitive freedom as the reformulation of the right to freedom in its multiple dimensions (Ligthart, 2020). Behind it is the rationale that al-gorithms are able to manipulate our preferences for marketing purposes, which affects our privacy (Nissenbaum, 1998;Véliz, 2021), our cognitive freedom (Sententia, 2004), and our mental integrity (Lavazza, 2018). The need for regulation is thus not based on a potential danger, but on a disruption of what we expect artificial intelligence to do (Zuboff, 2015). ...
Background
Recently, the academic world has established a series of reconfigurations of emerging human rights, in order to safeguard the mental integrity of people exposed to neurotechnologies. The recommendations of different stakeholders and a literature review support regulation of these technologies. There are different proposals for regulation, some in soft law and others in objective law. The type of regulation chosen can have repercussions on clinical practice, research, and public policy. The constitutional enactment of neurorights in Chile has been criticized in the academic fields of neuroethics and law as having potential negative effects on mental health research.
Objective
To analyze in light of the available literature whether the construction of neurorights could create ethical conflicts in the field of mental health, or if it could offer protection against the disruptive use of various neurotechnologies.
Method
This analysis included a narrative review of studies included in the PsycInfo, Springer, JSTOR, Medline, Scopus, PubMed, CINALH, and Web of Science databases, without restrictions on language or year of publication.
Results
The enactment of neurorights as hard law is found not to be detrimental to the field of mental health.
Discussion and conclusion
This article argues that the regulation of neurorights does not threaten the framework of an ecosystem that uses neurotechnologies. On the contrary, such regulation offers protections to people within the complex system of neurotechnologies.
... There is a substantial body of work from descriptive and moral philosophy on concepts such as "influence" [116], "manipulation" [86], "mental interference" [42], "nudging" [102], "choice architecture" [106], "persuasion" [19], "cognitive liberty" [107], "mental integrity" [42], "mental self-determination" [24], freedom of thought [71], and preference change [29]. The definition of each of these terms, and the situations in which the phenomena they describe can be considered ethical, are all contested. ...
Agents often exert influence when interacting with humans and non-human agents. However, the ethical status of such influence is often unclear. In this paper, we present the SHAPE framework, which lists reasons why influence may be unethical. We draw on literature from descriptive and moral philosophy and connect it to machine learning to help guide ethical considerations when developing algorithms with potential influence. Lastly, we explore mechanisms for governing algorithmic systems that influence people, inspired by mechanisms used in journalism, human subject research, and advertising.
... More recently Lavazza and Giorgi described mental integrity as the ability to instantiate and realise one's mental or brain states without interference, with right to it protecting us from such interference [8]. It is in that regard closely linked to the concept of cognitive liberty, which has been described as the "right and freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought processes" and for one "to have autonomy over his or her brain chemistry" [9]. Boire similarly talks of the right to control one's own consciousness, and to direct one's own mental processes [10]. ...
The concept of mental integrity is currently a significant topic in discussions concerning the regulation of neurotechnologies. Technologies such as deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces are believed to pose a unique threat to mental integrity, and some authors have advocated for a legal right to protect it. Despite this, there remains uncertainty about what mental integrity entails and why it is important. Various interpretations of the concept have been proposed, but the literature on the subject is inconclusive. Here we consider a number of possible interpretations and argue that the most plausible one concerns neurotechnologies that bypass one’s reasoning capacities, and do so specifically in ways that reliably lead to alienation from one’s mental states. This narrows the scope of what constitutes a threat to mental integrity and offers a more precise role for the concept to play in the ethical evaluation of neurotechnologies.
... The last of these has particular relevance to psychedelics, especially since CCLE maintains that "governments should not criminally prohibit cognitive enhancement or the experience of any mental state." While cognitive liberty maintains affinities with arguments against the governmental intervention of women's autonomy over their own bodies, critical drug theorists, legal scholars, and others have rallied around the legal basis for cognitive liberty and its protection of consciousness experimentation (Boire 2001;Ruiz-Sierra 2003;Bublitz 2013;Sententia 2004;Walsh 2013;Shuster and Cappelletti 2015;Walsh 2016 ...
... The new possible right is identified as the right to cognitive sovereignty, the right to cognitive liberty or, in a formulation that reflects the abovementioned evolution of the right to privacy in the right to informational self-determination, the right to mental self-determination (Council, 2019, p. 34 and Appendix B). Sententia (2004Sententia ( , 2013 conceptualized this right under the name of cognitive liberty. Sententia and Boire defined cognitive liberty as "the right of each individual to think independently and autonomously, to use the full power of his or her mind, and to engage in multiple modes of thought." ...
Artificial Intelligence, unperceived, can acquire the user's data, find connections not visible by a human being, profile the users, and aim at persuading them, resulting in Persuasive Technology (PT). During the persuasive process, PT can use manipulation, finding and using routes to affect System 1, the primordial brain of individuals, in the absence of their awareness, undermining their decision-making processes. Multiple international and European bodies recognized that AI systems could use manipulation at an unprecedented degree via second-generation dark patterns such as the hypernudge and that computational manipulation constitutes a risk for autonomy and different, overlapping, fundamental rights such as privacy, informational self-determination and freedom of thought. However, there is a lack of shared ideas regarding which fundamental rights are violated by computational manipulation and which fundamental rights can protect individuals against it. The right to be let alone and the right to hold and express a thought differ from the right to create a thought, being in control of the decision-making process and free from cognitive interferences operated by computational manipulation. Therefore, this paper argues in favor of recognizing a newly emerged fundamental right, the right to mental self-determination, tailored to the unprecedented abilities of AI-driven manipulative technologies.
... Para nuestro análisis resulta especialmente relevante la faceta negativa de la libertad cognitiva que comprendería la protección de las personas contra el uso coercitivo y sin consentimiento de neurotecnologías (Bublitz, 2013). En esta dirección, para Sententia (2004), el papel del Estado, el derecho penal, la ciencia y la ética deben limitarse y guiarse por principios que maximicen las oportunidades para que cada individuo se determine por sí mismo. ...
En este artículo se aborda de manera crítica la conveniencia de crear nuevos neuroderechos humanos para enfrentar el uso de las tecnologías de neuropredicción y de detección de mentiras en materia penal. Sobre dicho punto, se argumenta que los neuroderechos podrían ser conceptualmente problemáticos, u ofrecer una protección menor de la que puede extenderse por mejores interpretaciones de los actuales derechos fundamentales y los principios constitucionales del derecho penal. El artículo finaliza formulando una nueva propuesta crítica para limitar definitivamente los usos indignos de la neurotecnología y plantear la abolición del derecho penal; a esta propuesta la hemos denominado “neuroabolicionismo pe-nal”.
... However, it has been argued that the right to cognitive liberty could be seen as an extension or conceptual update of the existing right to freedom of thought (discussed in Sections "The right to mental integrity" and "The right to mental privacy"). 107 According to Farahany, cognitive liberty encompasses the freedom of thought and rumination, the right to self-access and self-alteration, and the freedom to either consent to or refuse changes to our brains and our mental experiences. These concepts make up the "bundle of rights" of cognitive liberty, which translate to human rights to freedom of thought, to selfdetermination, and to mental privacy. ...
The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.
... In the early 2000s an important step toward neurorights was work on the notion of "cognitive liberty" (Boire 2001;Sententia 2004). 4 Almost a decade later Farahany (2012a) and Bublitz (2013) expanded the rights-based view of cognitive liberty. ...
The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to "mental privacy." In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are-at least for now-no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity" theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts-healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.
... Toda persona tiene el derecho de autodeterminarse y tener completa "autonomía sobre su química cerebral" Los individuos tienen el único derecho a controlar sus "estados cerebrales y procesos mentales" y no debería estar dentro de la jurisdicción del gobierno hacer algo diferente (Saniotis & Kumaratilake, 2020;Sententia, 2006). ...
Objetivos: explorar los conceptos gubernamentalidad, biopoder y subjetificación, observándolos junto la evolución del discurso neuroexplicativo contemporáneo, y revisar críticamente un gesto legislativo local sobre cannabis, intentando corroborar la coherencia entre este, las neuronarrativas de los padecimientos y los problemas pendientes en salud neurológica y mental. Métodos: ejercicio de reflexión crítica sobre una selección de bibliografía digital. Resultados y conclusiones: cuando la salud mental es un asunto gubernamental, la primera línea es el uso de psicofármacos y estigmatización. La disponibilidad de neuro-saberes permite el ejercicio del poder mediante la aplicación de dispositivos tecnológicos sobre los cerebros (en representación de las personas) y las relaciones entre mentes, personas y cosas como los psicofármacos llamados “drogas”. Una visión crítica de la legislación sobre cannabis en Colombia muestra que esta no parece buscar el beneficio poblacional ni
es coherente con un abordaje integral de la enfermedad neuropsiquiátrica en el país.
... Sententia defines 'cognitive liberty' in terms of "…the right and freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought process." ( [17], p. 227) Ienca ([13], p4) goes on to discuss the freedom of thought in terms of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." This is further shown to be an unconditional right, with reference to commentary by the United Nations Human rights Committee who say of the UDHR that it: ...
This paper argues that calls for neurorights propose an overcomplicated approach. It does this through analysis of ‘rights’ using the influential framework provided by Wesley Hohfeld, whose analytic jurisprudence is still well regarded in its clarificatory approach to discussions of rights. Having disentangled some unclarities in talk about rights, the paper proposes the idea of ‘novel human rights’ is not appropriate for what is deemed worth protecting in terms of mental integrity and cognitive liberty. That is best thought of in terms of Hohfeld’s account of ‘right’ as privilege . It goes on to argue that as privileges, legal protections are not well suited to these cases. As such, they cannot be ‘novel human rights’. Instead, protections for mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best accounted for in terms of familiar and established rational and discursive norms. Mental integrity is best thought of as evaluable in terms of familiar rational norms, and cognitive freedom is constrained by appraisals of sense-making. Concerns about how neurotechnologies might pose particular challenges to mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best protected through careful use of existing legislation on data protection, not novel rights, as it is via data that risks to integrity and liberty are manifested.
... In fact, there are questions related to the fact that Libertarian Paternalism and the related nudging also supported by neuromarketing measurements could be not consistent with a concept of democracy, in which people would like to be in the condition to choose freely what they want. It must be underlined as in the general debate the concept of the "cognitive liberty" is used to defend the rights to have information privacy (Sententia, 2004), linked to the fundamental rights of the individual (Bublitz, 2014). ...
Social marketing has done a lot, so far, to improve communication towards its audience in order to increase consumers’ (but simply citizens’) welfare and promote the consumeristic doctrine. Not by chance, the use of social marketing principles and techniques has been applied by some scholars also to an effective implementation of public health interventions; but in order to have an effective public health marketing communication, there is need of effective Public Service Announcements: public social campaigns useful in attracting, retaining and engaging people, and able to generate behavioral changes by stimulating interpersonal communication and word-of-mouth. In this frame, neuro-marketing can be useful in building effective PSAs—whose aim is sustaining social marketing—since it allows to understand the customers’ innermost and unconscious insights with a scientific reliability. In the last years, the emergence of neuroscience applied to marketing and economics has revolutionized the way of thinking to the customers’ insights, creating thus new languages and new challenges for the communicators and the policy makers. The present contribution aims to be a review of the state-of-the-art of the consumer neuroscience inter-discipline applied to the concerns typical of the consumerism, and tries to answer the question: is this niche methodology destined to be the next main one in the consumer and consumeristic research? What are the challenges and the difficulties to overcome in this sense?
... However, there are some scholars who are well aware from the danger of neurocapitalism and insisting about the legal framework for preserving the rights of human beings. Sententia (2004), explained the meaning of cognitive liberty which she refers as a consent of human to enhance his cognitive ability, she explained both sides of the new modern technology aim to enhance human ability or to do such therapeutic cures but in her conclusion one of two points was that people should not allow the new technology to change their mind until we find the clear benefits of emerging aims. ...
This paper aims to present a holistic view of neurocapitalism in the post pandemic world: the understanding that how capitalism has transformed with the structure of economy and has reached to a new evolutionary form of neurocapitalism. This is how the modern technology is connected with the structure of capitalism. This paper is the result of analysis based on multiple studies reviewed by researcher in economics, psychology and sociology. Furthermore, this research demonstrates that how cognitive decision-making affecting profit and capital creation is shaped by the non-localized, simultaneous and intensely hi-tech connected economic activity. In short author of this paper conclude that neurocapitalism is nothing but creating capitalistic advantage by the consumption of human brain activity at the speed of light. Keywords: Capitalism, Emergence, Neurocapitalism, Phases of Capitalism, Technology and Neurocapitalism, Cognitive Decision Making’s
The integration of neuromarketing in digital marketing introduces new insights into consumer behavior by combining neuroscience and marketing principles. However, this approach requires a comprehensive understanding of ethical limitations and the responsible management of consumer data. Attie et al. (2021) state that the ethical issues raised regarding neuromarketing and AI are like the ones raised regarding advertising and marketing in general. The primary ethical challenge lies in direct access to consumers’ cognitive processes, which can intrude on personal privacy and involve the handling of sensitive information. This raises crucial ethical issues, such as privacy protection, potential misuse of data, and the need for transparency within both neuromarketing and digital marketing contexts. This article provides a bibliographic review of empirical studies on these ethical concerns, drawing from impactful scientific journals indexed in the Web of Science (WoS) database. The objective is to propose specific ethical guidelines that can serve as a code of ethics, establishing a framework for ethical conduct in neuromarketing applications within digital marketing.
The way in which neurotechnology interferes with the human mind by enabling reverse inferences of mental states and alterations of mental processes, is a source of significant concern. Both human rights scholars and international and regional human rights institutions are actively examining which human rights safeguards are needed to address these concerns and protect the human mind. Central to this exploration is the question of how human rights law should formally establish these safeguards: through the introduction of neurorights as new stand-alone human rights, or by deriving neurorights form existing rights? This article seeks to contrast arguments in favour and against both strategies, to inform a substantiated choice for the preferable option. To this end, the article will first outline the origins of the neurorights debate. Subsequently, it will elaborate on the two identified approaches to establishing neurorights. Thereafter, both approaches will be assessed on their merits, focussing on the general criteria of ‘need’ and ‘feasibility’. Based on this evaluation, the article identifies the Derivation Approach as the preferable path forward. The need for new, stand-alone rights is insufficiently established, whereas deriving neurorights from existing rights provides clearer and more coherent safeguards, and encounters fewer political challenges.
Background The neurorights initiative has been postulated as a way of ensuring the protection of individuals from the advances of neurotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI). With the advancement of neurotechnology, the human nervous system may be altered, modified, intervened with, or otherwise controlled. However, how do neurorights safeguard legal interests when an individual consciously chooses to modify their experiences using neurotechnology? Neurorights—the protection of cognitive liberty, psychological continuity, free will, personal identity, and mental privacy—are challenged when individuals opt for ‘artificial memories’, implanted experiences, etc., disrupting their natural cognitive dimensions. The present article examines these complex dilemmas through a legal and ethical lens. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of a ‘neuroduty’ to preserve identity, a moral obligation that stands in stark contrast to the individual’s right to self-determination. In the same way that neurorights protect us from external interference in our nervous system, is it possible to think of a neuroduty to preserve our identity? This article explores the tensions between neurorights, neuroduty, and the potential misuse of neurotechnology. Methods First, we explore these dilemmas, investigating the often-blurred lines between neurotechnology, neurorights, and personal autonomy. Secondly, we focus into the concept of voluntary alterations of one’s own brain, assessing the wider implications such actions could have on both individual and societal levels, in the light of the concept of neuroduty to preserve personal identity. Also, we examine the potential repercussions on personal identity and interpersonal relations. Finally, we advocate for a reassessment and potential reformulation of existing neurorights frameworks to account for the personal autonomy to use advancing neuroscientific capabilities. Results Our examination reveals a complex interplay between neurorights and neuroduty to preserve personal autonomy. Conclusions This analysis will provide valuable insights for stakeholders, policymakers, and society at large, guiding the responsible integration of neurotechnology into our lives.
Objective : to present the results of a systematic review of research on the impact of neurotechnology on legal concepts and regulatory frameworks, addressing ethical and social issues related to the protection of individual rights, privacy and mental autonomy.
Methods : The systematic literature review was based on the methodology proposed by a renowned British scholar, a professor emerita of computer science at Keele University Barbara Kitchenham, chosen for its flexibility and effectiveness in obtaining results for publication. Thorough searches were carried out with the search terms “neurotechnology”, “personal data”, “mental privacy”, “neuro-rights”, “neurotechnological interventions”, and “neurotechnological discrimination” on both English and Spanish sites, using search engines like Google Scholar and Redib as well as databases including Scielo, Dialnet, Redalyc, Lilacs, Scopus, Medline, and Pubmed. The focus of this research is bibliometric data and its design is non-experimental with a cross-sectional and descriptive, using content analysis based on PRISMA model.
Results : the study emphasizes the need to establish clear ethical principles to protect individual rights and promote responsible use of neurotechnologies; a number of problems of mental autonomy were identified, such as improper handling of information, lack of legal security guarantees, violation of rights and freedoms in the medical sphere. The author shows the need to adapt the existing regulatory legal framework to address the ethical and social problems arising from the new neurotechnologies. It is noted that a broad study of neurotechnology issues will contribute to the protection of human rights.
Scientific novelty: an expanded understanding of the five neurorights within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is proposed; neurorights are viewed as a new category of rights aimed at protecting mental integrity against the misuse of neurotechnologies. The author justifies the adoption of such technocratic principles as personal identity, free will, mental privacy, equal access and protection against bias.
Practical significance: the obtained results are relevant for understanding modern legal concepts related to neurorights and for adapting the existing normative legal acts to solve ethical and social problems arising from the emergence of new technologies, protection of human neurorights and liability for their violation. The study of these issues is key for provision of further responsible development and use of neurotechnologies.
AI acting with empathy towards others. The theory framework outlined here suggested operational roles at the meso level, where empathy towards others is a critical feature of caring about the impacts one might have on others in a team or organizational setting. However, the framework did not directly address the issue of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) arising in a generative-AI social learning agent that is simultaneously self-learning while acting as a participant observer on a team.
Los neuroderechos constituyen una innovadora propuesta para crear nuevos derechos humanos que regulen el exacerbado avance de las neurotecnologías. No obstante, el contenido conceptual y la pertinencia legal de estos derechos son objeto de amplio debate actualmente. En este trabajo, tras ofrecer un panorama de las respuestas que los neuroderechos proporcionan al avance neurotecnológico, nos centraremos en el análisis conceptual de la libertad cognitiva, considerada como un prerrequisito para el resto de neuroderechos. El análisis se basará en las dimensiones negativa y positiva de este derecho. En el primer caso, la libertad cognitiva se relaciona estrechamente con la propuesta de un neuroderecho al libre albedrío. En el segundo caso, se relaciona con el acceso a las neurotecnologías de mejora cognitiva.
As the science and technology of the brain and mind develop, so do the ways in which brains and minds may be surveilled and manipulated. Some cognitive libertarians worry that these developments undermine cognitive liberty or “freedom of thought.” I argue that protecting an individual’s cognitive liberty undermines others’ ability to use their own cognitive liberty. Given that the threatening devices and processes are not relevantly different from ordinary and frequent intrusions upon one’s brain and mind, strong protections of cognitive liberty may proscribe neurotechnological intrusions but also ordinary intrusions. Thus, the cognitive libertarian position “hog-ties” others’ use of their own liberties. This problem for the cognitive libertarian is the same problem that ordinary libertarianism faces in protecting individual rights to property and person. But the libertarian strategies for resolving the problem don’t work for the cognitive libertarian. I conclude that the right to mental privacy is weaker than what cognitive libertarians want it to be.
The current human rights framework can shield people from many of the risks associated with neurotechnological applications. However, it has been argued that we need either to articulate new rights or reconceptualise existing ones in order to prevent some of these risks. In this paper, we would like to address the recent discussion about whether current reconceptualisations of the right to mental integrity identify an ethical dimension that is not covered by existing moral and/or legal rights. The main challenge of these proposals is that they make mental integrity indistinguishable from autonomy. They define mental integrity in terms of the control we can have over our mental states, which seems to be part of the authenticity condition for autonomous action. Based on a fairly comprehensive notion of mental health (ie, a notion that is not limited to the mere absence of illness), we propose an alternative view according to which mental integrity can be characterised both as a positive right to (medical and non-medical) interventions that restore and sustain mental and neural function, and promote its development and a negative right protecting people from interventions that threaten or undermine these functions or their development. We will argue that this notion is dissociated from cognitive control and therefore can be adequately distinguished from autonomy.
While the prominence of neuroscience and neurotechnologies has generated intensive debates about the normative analysis of the ethical-legal challenges in public opinion and academia, these debates are relatively scarce among law and religion experts. To overcome the shortfall, this contribution describes the impact of the main neuroscientific applications on the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Considering how neurosciences techniques can alter the mind, decode thoughts, and enhance cognitive functions, particularly individual thought and conscience, I suggest revising the traditional dichotomy of forum internum and forum externum of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and rethinking the protection of the forum internum , which is at risk in the Age of Neuroscience.
Background The neurorights initiative has been postulated as a way of ensuring the protection of individuals from the advances of neurotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI). With the advancement of neurotechnology, the human nervous system may be altered, modified, intervened with, or otherwise controlled. However, how do neurorights safeguard legal interests when an individual consciously chooses to modify their experiences using neurotechnology? Neurorights—the protection of cognitive liberty, psychological continuity, free will, personal identity, and mental privacy—are challenged when individuals opt for ‘artificial memories’, implanted experiences, etc., disrupting their natural cognitive dimensions. The present article examines these complex dilemmas through a legal and ethical lens. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of a ‘neuroduty’ to preserve identity, a moral obligation that stands in stark contrast to the individual’s right to self-determination. In the same way that neurorights protect us from external interference in our nervous system, is it possible to think of a neuroduty to preserve our identity? This article explores the tensions between neurorights, neuroduty, and the potential misuse of neurotechnology. Methods First, we explore these dilemmas, investigating the often-blurred lines between neurotechnology, neurorights, and personal autonomy. Secondly, we focus into the concept of voluntary alterations of one’s own brain, assessing the wider implications such actions could have on both individual and societal levels, in the light of the concept of neuroduty to preserve personal identity. Also, we examine the potential repercussions on personal identity and interpersonal relations. Finally, we advocate for a reassessment and potential reformulation of existing neurorights frameworks to account for the personal autonomy to use advancing neuroscientific capabilities. Results Our examination reveals a complex interplay between neurorights and neuroduty to preserve personal autonomy. Conclusions This analysis will provide valuable insights for stakeholders, policymakers, and society at large, guiding the responsible integration of neurotechnology into our lives.
En el presente artículo se analiza el papel de la bioética y el derecho ante el desarrollo de las actuales técnicas de intervención meliorativa sobre el genotipo y el cerebro. Con el desarrollo de la técnica de CRISPR/Cas9 en los últimos años, un individuo podría mejorar sus condiciones genéticas manipulando sus células somáticas. No obstante, el interés doctrinal se ha centrado más en la línea germinal pues, a diferencia de la anterior —que se extingue con el fallecimiento—, tiene la capacidad para afectar al genoma de la descendencia. Del mismo modo, con las nuevas técnicas de BCI, un individuo podría conectar su cerebro a una IA con la finalidad de estimular y potenciar determinadas áreas cerebrales. Sin embargo, tanto desde la bioética como desde el derecho parece inferirse una prohibición general de intervenciones meliorativas. ¿Qué argumentos racionales sostienen esta prohibición? ¿Es el cuerpo humano un bien indisponible para el individuo? ¿Se trata de una limitación injustificada de la autonomía de la voluntad?
Agents often exert influence when interacting with humans and non-human agents. However, the ethical status of such influence is often unclear. In this paper, we present the SHAPE framework, which lists reasons why influence may be unethical. We draw on literature from descriptive and moral philosophy and connect it to machine learning to help guide ethical considerations when developing algorithms with potential influence. Lastly, we explore mechanisms for governing influential algorithmic systems, inspired by regulation in journalism, human subject research, and advertising.Keywordsinfluencemanipulationmental interferencenudgingchoice architecturesuasionpersuasioncognitive libertymental integritymental self-determinationfreedom of thoughtpreference change
This research aims to conceptualize cognitive liberty and the psychedelic humanities by examining their constitutive elements. The importance of this study lies in the fact that it is widespread to talk about psychedelic science nowadays, but there is a significant gap in the research. For instance, the role and importance of the humanities need to be acknowledged. Regarding cognitive liberty, this research considers that people have the right to use or refrain from using emerging neurotechnologies and psychedelics. People’s freedom of choice vis-à-vis these technologies must be protected, in particular with regard to coercive and non-consensual uses. Firstly, an analysis will be carried out of the constitutive elements of cognitive liberty, especially within the context of a philosophical approach. Secondly, this research will address some arguments for the philosophical uses of psychedelics. Finally, this paper will discuss the scope and significance of psychedelic humanities as a vein of research. Cognitive liberty is a crucial concept for the psychedelic humanities, likely to broaden our understanding of consciousness studies and reflect on ethical and social issues related to scientific research. Cognitive liberty is an update of freedom of thought according to the challenges of the 21st century. In addition, this paper will highlight the possible philosophical uses of psychedelic substances to broaden the research scope since, at present, the ritual and therapeutic uses of psychedelics have the most significant legitimacy. Recognition of philosophical uses demonstrates that learning from non-clinical uses of psychedelics is possible. The psychedelic humanities represent an underexplored avenue of research that can contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between science and culture.
El presente artículo se aboca conforme a una investigación teórica documental bajo una propuesta que pretende tener cimientos de rigurosidad ortodoxa científica realista debido a que no es una novela de ciencia ficción más bien es un marco realista de lo que acontece en el progreso neo contemporáneo a axiomas futuristas que se pueden apreciar como fenómenos retro futuristas en cuanto a la aplicabilidad de la ciencias de la “complejidad” como le llaman hoy en día para el progreso de las ciencias neurojuridicas a nivel internacional y nacional en cualquier entidad. Esto con la finalidad de ver los alcances ante un punto crítico ante sus infinitesimales axiomas que puede brindar los campos colaborativos de alta especialidad científica de los cuales son la neurofisica teórica cognitiva experimental en apoyo auxiliar a las neurociencias cognitiva computacional evolutiva y biofísicamente inspirada. Como primordial alcance está en recapitular los más grandes avances desde una perspectiva actual de los desarrollos que la comunidad científica quiere alcanzar para apoyar dichos campos teórico aplicativos de los cuales puede sustentarse esta aportación documental y a una propuesta teórica de cómo estos avances pueden llegar a su punto crítico de evolución a su axioma ultimo de desarrollo. Las disciplinas a investigar de relevancia y de importancia son: Física teórica en base a la neurofisica de la cognición humana. Neurociencia cognitiva computacional Ciencias cognitivas Neuroderecho y ciencia aplicada. La prioridad de esta obra es que la comunidad científica que ejerce a niveles profesionales en el ámbito de las ciencias neurojuridicas esté abierto a nuevos retos como cambios aplicativos a esta ciencia de cambio y orden social. Por lo tanto, a la vez que la ciencia y la tecnología van evolucionado, así como la conciencia a la mente humana los cambios sin duda superan a las de la ciencia ficción ya que se trata de un marco de referencia de la realidad objetiva. Por último, se tiene la encomienda científica de solo realizar una aportación objetiva de los acontecimientos actuales y probabilidades que pueden surgir al transcurso del tiempo en materia de la ciencia neurojuridica a nivel mundial.
The main subject of this paper is an overview of legal regulations on neurotechnology. The purpose of the analysis is also to define threats posed by the development of neurotechnology, to present proposals of laws and regulations that would counteract these threats, referred to as ‘neurolaws’, which have already been formulated in science, to review and analyse national regulatory solutions adopted in recent years (Chile) and international standards (OECD). The study is also an attempt at encouraging debate about the advancement in neurotechnology and the validity of the laws in view of this innovation.
Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology is a promising research area in many domains. Brain activity can be interpreted through both invasive and noninvasive monitoring devices, allowing for novel, therapeutic solutions for individuals with disabilities and for other non-medical applications. However, a number of ethical issues have been identified from the use of BCI technology. In previous work published in 2020, we reviewed the academic discussion of the ethical implications of BCI technology in the previous 5 years by using a limited sample to identify trends and areas of concern or debate among researchers and ethicists. In this chapter, we provide an overview on the academic discussion of BCI ethics and report on the findings for the next phase of this work, which systematically categorizes the entire sample. The aim of this work is to collect and synthesize all the pertinent academic scholarship into the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of BCI technology. We hope this study will provide a foundation for future scholars, ethicists, and policy makers to understand the landscape of the relevant ELSI concepts and pave the way for assessing the need for regulatory action. We conclude that some emerging applications of BCI technology—including commercial ventures that seek to meld human intelligence with AI—present new and unique ethical concerns.KeywordsBrain–computer interface (BCI)Brain–machine interface (BMI)Ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI)NeuroethicsScoping review
Cyberbiosecurity is an emerging field that brings together diverse professionals, including biologists, computer scientists, anti-terrorism experts, and policy makers to research the growing intersection between cybersecurity and the biosciences. Cyberneurosecurity is the nascent subfield that is particularly focused on the issues related to neuroscience and cybersecurity. Internet-enabled Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs) like the futuristic Neuralink Link devices (Neuralink, 2023) which is expected to be on the market within a decade create numerous ethical and policy issues that are one of the chief concerns of cyberneurosecurity.These issues can relate to (1) privacy and misappropriation resulting from the interception of neural signals that could disclose behaviors and inclinations; (2) the inoperability of associated devices like prosthetics that could result from the obfuscation or manipulation of neural signals; (3) the potential physical and cognitive and existential harms that result from receiving hacked signals in the brain and/or the hijacking of neural signals sent from the brain for medical purposes; or (4) self-hacking by the user themselves for their own putative benefits.These and others are issues that cyberneurosecurity must engage. In response to these concerns, researchers need to devise standards, policies, and best practices to prevent malicious hackers from manipulating the technology. Practitioners need to develop tools to stress-test and assess the cyber-readiness of various BCIs, especially the increasing number of healthcare devices that employ AI that could obscure or magnify harmful hacks due in part to the lack of transparency and explainability of AI systems (Zhang et al., Ann Transl Med 8(11):712, 2020, Olsen et al., J Neural Eng 18(4):046053, 2021, Aggarwal and Chugh, Arch Comput Methods Eng 29:3001–20, 2022). BCI manufacturers need to ultimately implement industry-wide standards to protect the privacy, security, and safety of their users, and governments may need to develop regulatory oversight to promote these and other aspects of cyberneurosecurity.KeywordsCyberbiosecurityCyberneurosecurityNeurorightsNeurohypeBrain–computer interfaces (BCI)
Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) technology is a promising and rapidly advancing research area. It was initially developed in the context of early government-sponsored futuristic research in biocybernetics and human–machine interaction in the United States (US) [1]. This inspired Jacques Vidal to suggest providing a direct link between the inductive mental processes used in solving problems and the symbol-manipulating, deductive capabilities of computers, and to coin the term “Brain-Computer Interface” in his seminal paper published in 1973 [2]. Recent developments in BCI technology, based on animal and human studies, allow for the restoration and potential augmentation of faculties of perception and physical movement, and even the transfer of information between brains. Brain activity can be interpreted through both invasive and noninvasive monitoring devices, allowing for novel, therapeutic solutions for individuals with disabilities and for other non-medical applications. However, a number of ethical and policy issues have been identified in context of the use of BCI technology, with the potential for near-future advancements in the technology to raise unique new ethical and policy questions that society has never grappled with before [3, 4]. Once again, the US is leading in the field with many commercial enterprises exploring different realistic and futuristic applications of BCI technology. For instance, a US company named Synchron recently received FDA approval to proceed with first-in-human trials of its endovascularly implanted BCI device [5].
Neurotechnologies necessitate new thinking on human rights.
Nöroteknoloji alanında son yıllarda yaşanan büyük gelişmeler, insan beynindeki verilere erişme, bu verileri toplama ve işleme konusunda önemli olanaklar sunmaktadır. Özellikle fonksiyonel manyetik rezonans tekniği gibi beyin görüntüleme tekniklerinin kullanımıyla, insan beynine herhangi bir müdahalede bulunmaksızın beyin aktivitelerinin görüntülenmesi ve kaydedilmesi mümkün hale gelmiştir. Günümüzde, beyin görüntüleme tekniklerinin, kişilerin düşünce ve tutumları hakkında bilgi edinmenin yanında, klinik amaçlarla kullanımı da son derece yaygındır. Bununla birlikte, nöroteknolojinin kullanımı, kişilerin davranışlarında istenmeyen değişikliklere ve mental zararlara yol açarak, temel hak ve özgürlüklerine yönelik tehdit yaratma potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Özellikle ABD’de ortaya çıkan nöro-pazarlama ve nöro-reklamcılık gibi sektörlerin, kişilerin tercihlerinin yönlendirilmesi gibi ticari amaçlarla nöroteknolojik yöntemleri kullanması buna örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışmada, öncelikle nöroteknoloji ve insan hakları arasındaki ilişki ortaya konulmaya çalışılmakta ve halihazırdaki hakların, nöroteknoloji alanındaki gelişmelere yanıt vermek bakımından yeterli olmayabileceğinden hareketle, son yıllarda tartışılmaya başlanan bilişsel özgürlük kavramı ile Lenca ve Andorno’nun “nöro-haklar” adı altında öne sürdüğü, “mental gizlilik hakkı”, “mental bütünlük hakkı” ve “psikolojik devamlılık hakkı” tartışılmaktadır.
As humanity improves its use of technologies that can replace parts of a biological organism with ones containing mechanical or electronic components, it raises important legal and political issues. For example, the successful implantation of devices in human bodies could lead to the emergence of new cognitive and motor abilities, thereby resulting in the creation of a new class of people. Undoubtedly, this new class of people with extraordinary abilities would require a legal and governmental response. However, the question that arises is what legal rights might be given to these people, considering that they are more similar to machines than to men or women. The following legal aspects are of the utmost importance: the legal rights and responsibilities of cyborgs; the regulation of access to neuroprosthetic devices by third parties; and the limitation of the illegal use of the damaging capabilities of cyborgs. This article examines a number of laws and regulations from various jurisdictions in the United States, the European Union, South Korea and China that apply to cyborg technologies, with a particular focus on a legal doctrine that applies to neuroprostheses.
This article examines soldier performance optimisation, enhancement, and augmentation across the three dimensions of physical performance, cognitive performance, and socio-cultural understanding. Optimisation refers to combatants attaining their maximum biological potential. Enhancement refers to combatants achieving a level of performance beyond their biological potential through drugs, surgical procedures, or even gene editing. Augmentation refers to a blending of organic and biomechatronic body parts such as electronic or mechanical implants, prosthetics, and brain–machine interfaces. This article identifies that soldier optimisation is a necessity to protect individual combatants and to give them the ability to make legal and morally justifiable decisions in battle. While enhancement and augmentation of military personnel can lead to accelerated and more destructive warfare, it can also be argued that there is an ethical and moral responsibility to provide combatants the best opportunity for survivability, and that better functioning, less fatigued, and better informed military personnel can make better decisions in battle. There is also a moral responsibility of the state for the combatants themselves, and short-term military success must be balanced against the short- and long-term health and wellbeing of the personnel. This article concludes that it is both the intent and the degree that decide the acceptability.
Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill-treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.
We stand at the threshold of a new renaissance in science and technology, based on a comprehensive understanding of the structure and behavior of matter from the nanoscale up to the most complex system yet discovered, the human brain. Unification of science based on unity in nature and its holistic investigation will lead to technological convergence and a more efficient societal structure for reaching human goals. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, concentrated effort can bring together nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and new technologies based in cognitive science. With proper attention to ethical issues and societal needs, the result can be a tremendous improvement in human abilities, new industries and products, societal outcomes, and quality of life.
Background:
Evidence of an inverse relationship between central serotonergic (serotonin [5-hydroxytryptamine]) system function and impulsive aggressive behavior has been accumulating for more than 2 decades. If so, pharmacological enhancement of serotonin activity should be expected to reduce impulsive aggressive behavior in subjects in whom this behavior is prominent.Methods:
A double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of the selective serotonin-uptake inhibitor fluoxetine hydrochloride was conducted in 40 nonmajor-depressed, nonbipolar or schizophrenic, DSM-III-R personality—disordered individuals with current histories of impulsive aggressive behavior and irritability. Measures included the Overt Aggression Scale—Modified for Outpatients, Clinical Global Impression Rating of Improvement, and several secondary measures of aggression, depression, and anxiety.Results:
Fluoxetine, but not placebo, treatment resulted in a sustained reduction in scores on the lrritability and Aggression subscales of the Overt Aggression Scale—Modified for Outpatients that was first apparent during months 2 and 3 of treatment, respectively. Fluoxetine was superior to placebo in the proportion of "responders" on the Clinical Global Impression Rating of Improvement: first at the end of month 1, and then finally demonstrating a sustained drug-placebo difference from the end of month 2 through the end of month 3 of treatment. These results were not influenced by secondary measures of depression, anxiety, or alcohol use.Conclusion:
Fluoxetine treatment has an antiaggressive effect on impulsive aggressive individuals with DSM-III-R personality disorder.
Clinical data and uncontrolled observations have suggested that fluoxetine is helpful in some patients with borderline personality disorder. This article describes the results of a 13-week double-blind study of volunteer subjects with mild to moderately severe borderline personality disorder. Thirteen fluoxetine recipients and nine placebo recipients received treatment. Pretreatment and posttreatment measures were obtained for global mood and functioning, anger, and depression. The most striking finding from this study was a clinically and statistically significant decrease in anger among the fluoxetine recipients. This decrease was independent of changes in depression. These data support previous observations that fluoxetine may reduce anger in patients with borderline personality disorder. The number of subjects in this study was small, the placebo responsiveness was high, and the clinical characteristics of the patients were in the mild to moderate range of severity. The data cannot be extrapolated to more severely ill borderline patients, but further study of fluoxetine and other selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors is indicated in this population.
The reported inverse relationship between indices of central serotonin (5-HT) function and indices of impulsive aggression in human subjects suggests the possibility that enhancement of 5-HT activity will reduce impulsive aggressive behavior. Although evidence for this hypothesis is emerging, the relationship between baseline central 5-HT system function and antiaggressive responses to treatment with 5-HT agents has not yet been examined in human subjects.
In this pilot study, we examined the relationship between: a) pretreatment prolactin responses to d-fenfluramine (PRL[d-FEN]) challenge; and b) antiaggressive responses to 12 weeks of treatment with either fluoxetine or placebo in 15 impulsively aggressive personality disordered subjects as observed in a 12-week, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial.
Among all subjects there were positive correlations between the pretreatment PRL[d-FEN] response and the percent improvement in Overt Aggression Scale-Modified scores for "Aggression" and "Irritability." These correlations were present in the fluoxetine (n = 10), but not in the placebo (n = 5), treated subjects.
These data suggest the possibility that the antiaggressive response to fluoxetine is directly, rather than inversely, dependent on the responsiveness of central 5-HT synapses in the brain of impulsive aggressive personality disordered subjects.
To test the hypothesis that traits of aggression and impulsivity correlate negatively with central serotonergic system function in a nonpatient population, a standard fenfluramine challenge (for assessment of serotonergic responsivity) and behavioral measurements germane to aggression/impulsivity were administered to a community-derived sample of 119 men and women. In men, peak prolactin responses to fenfluramine correlated significantly with an interview-assessed life history of aggression (r = -.40, p < .002), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (r = -.30, p < .03), and traits of Conscientiousness (r = +.30, p < .03), Neuroticism (r = -.31, p < .02) and Angry Hostility (r = -.35, p < .01) on the NEO-Personality Inventory. No significant relationships were observed across all women, although subanalyses restricted to postmenopausal subjects (in whom ovarian influences on prolactin secretion may be mitigated because of diminished estrogen) showed a pattern of behavioral associations somewhat similar to that seen in men. By extending documented relationships between an index of central serotonergic system function and traits of aggression and impulsivity to a more normative range of population variability than is represented in prior literature, this study supports speculation that these associations reflect a basic neurobehavioral dimension of individual differences.
To provide a clinically useful analysis of the relationship between selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), in particular fluoxetine and violent or suicidal behaviour.
All published papers on Medline and other databases linking serotonin, SSRIs and aggression were reviewed.
A small proportion of patients treated with SSRIs may become akathisic and others may show increases in anxiety in the initial phase of treatment, but no increased susceptibility to aggression or suicidality can be connected with fluoxetine or any other SSRI. In fact SSRI treatment may reduce aggression, probably due to positive effects on the serotonergic dysfunction that is implicated in aggressive behaviour directed towards oneself or others.
In the absence of convincing evidence to link SSRIs causally to violence and suicide, the recent lay media reports are potentially dangerous, unnecessarily increasing the concerns of depressed patients who are prescribed antidepressants.
TheGuilty Knowledge Test (GKT) has been used extensively to model deception. An association between the brain evoked response potentials and lying on the GKT suggests that deception may be associated with changes in other measures of brain activity such as regional blood flow that could be anatomically localized with event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Blood oxygenation level-dependent fMRI contrasts between deceptive and truthful responses were measured with a 4 Tesla scanner in 18 participants performing the GKT and analyzed using statistical parametric mapping. Increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the superior frontal gyrus (SFG), and the left premotor, motor, and anterior parietal cortex was specifically associated with deceptive responses. The results indicate that: (a) cognitive differences between deception and truth have neural correlates detectable by fMRI, (b) inhibition of the truthful response may be a basic component of intentional deception, and (c) ACC and SFG are components of the basic neural circuitry for deception.
The role of serotonin in human aggression and impulsivity was evaluated by administering paroxetine or placebo for 3 weeks and comparing the effects on laboratory measures of aggression and impulsivity among male subjects with a history of conduct disorder.
Twelve male subjects with a history of criminal behavior participated in experimental sessions, which measured aggressive and impulsive responses. Six subjects were assigned to placebo treatment and six subjects to placebo and paroxetine treatment. Aggression was measured using the point subtraction aggression paradigm (PSAP), which provides subjects with an aggressive and monetary reinforced response options. Impulsive responses were measured using a paradigm that gives subjects choices between small rewards after short delays versus larger rewards after longer delays.
Chronic administration of paroxetine (20 mg/day) for 21 days produced significant decreases in impulsive responses. Decreases in aggressive responses were evident only at the end of paroxetine treatment. Decreases in impulsive and aggressive responses could not be attributed to a non-specific sedative action because monetary reinforced responses were not decreased as has been observed following CNS sedation.
Inhibition of serotonin reuptake by paroxetine is the possible mechanism for reductions in aggressive and impulsive responses. These results support other data linking serotonin function and aggression and impulsivity.
There is growing public awareness of the ethical issues raised by progress in many areas of neuroscience. This commentary reviews the issues, which are triaged in terms of their novelty and their imminence, with an exploration of the relevant ethical principles in each case.
To advance awareness of ethical issues in the neurosciences1, 2, 3, we studied historical and emerging trends in neuroimaging, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as a model. Functional MRI has had a significant impact on the neurosciences in the past decade given its wide availability, unprecedented coupling of spatial resolution and safety, and application to a broad range of normative and clinical neurobehavioral phenomena4. Over time, the terrain of fMRI studies has expanded from examination of basic sensorimotor and cognitive processes to topics that more directly relate to human motivation, reasoning and social attitudes. Here we provide empirical validation of these trends and explore what issues they portend for the future.
Brain fingerprinting: databodies to databrains
- Sententia Wrye
Brain Fingerprinting®: a new paradigm in counterterrorism
- Farwell Lawrence
The nano-bio connection and its implications for human performance
- Heller Michael
Aggression, impulsivity, and central nervous system seretonergic responsivity in a nonpatient sample
- Manuck S.B.
Human-machine interaction: potential impact of nanotechnology in the design of neuroprosthetic devices aimed at restoring or augmenting human performance
- Nicolelis Miguel
- A L Mandayam
- A Srinivasan
Engineering of mind to enhance human productivity
- Albus James