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The standard model of labor is one in which individuals trade their time and energy in return for monetary rewards. Building on Fiske's relational theory (1992), we propose that there are two types of markets that determine relationships between effort and payment: monetary and social. We hypothesize that monetary markets are highly sensitive to the magnitude of compensation, whereas social markets are not. This perspective can shed light on the well-established observation that people sometimes expend more effort in exchange for no payment (a social market) than they expend when they receive low payment (a monetary market). Three experiments support these ideas. The experimental evidence also demonstrates that mixed markets (markets that include aspects of both social and monetary markets) more closely resemble monetary than social markets.
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Research Article
Effort for Payment
A Tale of Two Markets
James Heyman
and Dan Ariely
University of California, Berkeley, and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT—The standard model of labor is one in which
individuals trade their time and energy in return for
monetary rewards. Building on Fiske’s relational theory
(1992), we propose that there are two types of markets
that determine relationships between effort and payment:
monetary and social. We hypothesize that monetary
markets are highly sensitive to the magnitude of compen-
sation, whereas social markets are not. This perspective
can shed light on the well-established observation that
people sometimes expend more effort in exchange for no
payment (a social market) than they expend when they
receive low payment (a monetary market). Three exper-
iments support these ideas. The experimental evidence
also demonstrates that mixed markets (markets that in-
clude aspects of both social and monetary markets) more
closely resemble monetary than social markets.
People often need help accomplishing tasks such as moving
their possessions to a new residence, painting a room, preparing
tax returns, and even taking care of their offspring. When we ask
for help, we may wonder whom to approach and how best to
motivate him or her. Should we ask a professional or a friend? If
we ask a friend, should we offer compensation? If so, how much
should we offer, and what form of compensation would be most
effective? Would cash or token rewards (e.g., personal gifts or
chocolates) provide a stronger incentive? Finally, are there in-
teractions between these factors such that different levels of
incentives are more or less effective for different forms of
Suppose, for example, that you are about to give birth (or pass
a kidney stone) and want someone to be there to support and
help you. You are faced with multiple options: You can ask
friend A; you can hire a professional doula (a birthing coach); or
you can ask friend B, who is also a professional doula. You want
someone motivated to give you the best possible support despite
the long hours and the expected pain and difficulty. You also
know that you will get accurate information about this person’s
ability and dedication only once you are in the hospital, well
past the point when you can ask someone else to help. You are
also considering ways to further motivate your potential helper.
You can offer the helper nothing, you can offer different amounts
of cash, or you can offer token rewards such as gifts. Which type
of reward will be the most effective, and will this depend on
whom you select to help you?
Another example, highly relevant to experimental psycholo-
gists, concerns motivating participants in laboratory experi-
ments. Psychologists typically either pay participants or offer
them a course credit as a reward for showing up, rather than
rewarding them directly for their effort. Participants in psy-
chological experiments, however, have control over their own
effort level and are unlikely to face any adverse consequences of
low performance. Under these conditions, it is important to
know how to motivate participants so they exert the maximum
effort in their tasks.
In this article, we focus on cases such as these—that is, sit-
uations in which payment is independent of effort—by exam-
ining the relationship between forms of compensation (cash vs.
token), the levels of payment (no, low, and medium), and the
resulting effort expended. We propose that the relationship
between compensation and effort hinges on the distinction be-
tween two kinds of markets: monetary markets and social
markets, which are characterized not only by the type of good or
service exchanged but also by the form of compensation offered.
Using monetary payments causes participants to invoke mon-
etary-marketplace frames and norms. When money is not in-
volved (i.e., when there is no monetary reward or there is a gift
reward), the market is perceived to be a social market. Three
experiments demonstrate that this distinction has material
consequences for payment-effort trade-offs.
The foundation for our proposal is Fiske’s relational theory
(1992; see also Aggarwal, 2004). Fiske’s model posits four basic
types of social relationships: communal sharing (CS), authority
ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing
(MP). High levels of cooperation and ‘‘we-ness’’ earmark CS
Address correspondence to Dan Ariely, MIT, 38 Memorial Dr., E56-
311, Cambridge, MA 02142; e-mail:
Volume 15—Number 11 787Copyright r2004 American Psychological Society
relationships. AR relationships are recognized by their clear
superior-subordinate relationships. For example, in the work
environment, there is no question as to who is the boss (the one
giving orders) and who is the peon (the one doing menial tasks).
EM relationships lie somewhere between CS and AR relation-
ships—they are very structured but exhibit equality. In EM
relationships, everybody receives the same rewards, and reci-
procity is monitored to ensure that the scales never get too far
out of balance. Finally, MP relationships generally involve
ongoing cost-benefit analysis, and participants’ payments for
their labor are based on a wage rate that reflects the amount and
quality of the work performed.
From the perspective of labor, we can divide Fiske’s four
types of social relationships into two general categories: one
based on economic exchanges and one based on social ex-
changes. The economic-exchange category (which we term
money market) includes only MP relationships and represents
the most common incarnation of labor markets. The social-ex-
change category (which we term social market) includes the
other three relationship types (CS, AR, and EM) and represents
most nonmonetary exchange relationships.
Our central proposition is that the relationship between
payment and effort will depend on the type of exchange (money
vs. social markets). In money-market relationships, effort will
be exerted according to reciprocity, and the amount of com-
pensation directly influences individuals’ level of effort (Clark
& Mills, 1993; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Rabin, 1993). Reciprocity
means that performance will be lowest when there is no pay-
ment, higher in exchange for low payment, and still higher in
exchange for medium payment. Conversely, in social-market
relationships, effort is shaped by altruism, the amount of com-
pensation is irrelevant, and individuals work as hard as they can
regardless of payment (Batson, Sager, Garst, & Kang, 1997;
Cialdini, 1997; Trivers, 1971). Altruism results in a level of
performance that is high, constant, and insensitive to payment
level. Thus, we have the following hypotheses for one-shot
markets in which individuals are compensated up front for
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between compensation level
and effort will be different in social versus money markets.
Hypothesis 1a: In money-market relationships, effort will
increase with payment level.
Hypothesis 1b: In social-market relationships, effort will be
at a high level and insensitive to payment level.
Hypothesis 1 also predicts a distinction between exchanges
in which payment is not mentioned (‘‘not paying at all’’) and
those in which individuals are told explicitly that they will not
be paid (‘‘paying nothing’’). Whereas not mentioning payment is
likely to cause individuals to consider themselves to be in a
social-market relationship, telling individuals explicitly that
they are not getting paid is likely to cause them to consider
themselves to be in a money-market relationship. Our frame-
work predicts that not paying at all in the context of social-
market relationships can create higher levels of incentives than
low levels of compensation in the context of money-market re-
lationships, a prediction that is shared by many other accounts
(Bem, 1965; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Festinger, 1957;
Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000b; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973).
Thus, we have an additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c: Effort in exchange for no payment can be
higher than effort in exchange for low monetary payment.
It is important to consider factors that influence whether
exchanges are perceived as money or social markets. One im-
portant aspect of Fiske’s (1992) model is that relationships be-
tween two parties can take on different forms at different times.
Consider, for example, a stereotypical nuclear family in which
chores can be completed because everyone pitches in (CS),
because mom tells family members what to do (AR), or because
allowances depend on performance (MP). Similarly, the rela-
tionship between an employer and an employee can sometimes
be characterized as a social-market relationship and at other
times as a money-market relationship. The question arises, what
shifts the relationship from one type of market to the other?
Our second central prediction is that markets containing sig-
nals of both social-market relationships and money-market rela-
tionships will be perceived and treated much like money-market
relationships (for a related study on the effect of monetary out-
comes on the type of market, see Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a):
Hypothesis 2: Including both monetary payments and signals
of social exchanges will cause individuals to perceive an
exchange as a money-market exchange, and the pattern
predicted by Hypothesis 1a will follow.
According to these predictions, in social markets, when the
payoffs are nonmonetary or when there is no payment at all,
effort will be high and relatively insensitive to reward levels. In
contrast, in money markets, effort will start at low levels and will
increase with payment (reciprocity). Finally, mixed markets,
which have both social and monetary components, will behave
much like money markets. Figure 1 illustrates these predictions.
Experiment 1 tested the hypotheses via a survey in which re-
spondents were asked to rate how likely other
students would
be to help load a sofa into a van in return for various levels
and forms of payment. Although hypothetical scenarios do not
test real behavior, they have the advantage of allowing one
to test participants’ intuitions. Hypothesis 1 was tested by
manipulating whether or not money was offered in exchange for
loading a sofa onto a van, and by varying the amount of money
We used ratings of others in order to reduce the social demand to respond
favorably to the request for help (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Fisher, 1993; Fisher
& Katz, 2000).
788 Volume 15—Number 11
Two Markets
from low to medium (Hypothesis 1a). Students not paid were
assumed to be in a social-market condition, whereas those paid
(low and medium payment levels) were assumed to be in a
money-market condition. Hypothesis 1b was tested by includ-
ing scenarios in which the students were offered similar finan-
cial compensation, but in units of candy. We propose that such
exchanges are part of the social market and thus expected that
results for these scenarios would be different from results for the
scenarios involving monetary payment (contrasting Hypotheses
1a and 1b). Hypothesis 2 states that introducing money is suf-
ficient to shift individuals from the social market to the money
market. We tested this hypothesis by combining the compen-
sations of the money-market condition (payment) and the social-
market condition (candy).
Six hundred fourteen students at the University of California,
Berkeley, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology were ap-
proached in a variety of campus locations and asked to complete
a brief survey. The between-participants experimental design
included three forms of payment crossed with two levels of
payment, plus a control condition with no payment (see Table 1).
The payment form was cash, candy, or ‘‘monetized candy’’ (i.e.,
the payment was candy and the cost of the candy was men-
tioned). The low payment level was $0.50 or its candy equiva-
lent. The medium
payment level was $5.00 or its candy
equivalent. The control condition mentioned no payment and
thus had no payment form. After reading the scenario, partici-
pants were asked to rate the likelihood that the average student
would help move a sofa. The rating scale ranged from 1, not at
all likely to help, to 11, will help for sure.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Figure 2, the results supported all the hypotheses.
As predicted in Hypothesis 1a, the expected willingness to help
in the cash condition (money market) increased when the
payment level increased from low to medium, F(1, 607) 55.03,
a pattern that is similar to reciprocation. As pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 1b, the expected willingness to help in the
candy condition (social market) was insensitive to the increase
in payment level from low to medium, F(1, 607) 50.25,
p5.81, n.s., a pattern that is similar to altruism. Both of these
results support Hypothesis 1 by demonstrating the expected
interaction between compensation level and form of payment in
determining effort, F(1, 607) 53.44, p<.001. As predicted in
Hypothesis 1c, the expected willingness to help in the low-
payment level of the cash condition (money market) was below
that in the no-payment control condition, F(1, 607) 54.65,
p<.001; in contrast, the expected willingness to help in the
low-payment level of the candy condition was not below that in
the control condition, F(1, 607) 50.2, p5.84, n.s. The differ-
ence in the reaction to the low level of payment in the two
markets was statistically significant, F(1, 607) 54.53, p<
.001, again supporting Hypothesis 1. Finally, as predicted in
Hypothesis 2, the monetized-candy condition resembled the
cash condition, F(1, 607) 51.27, n.s., but not the candy condi-
tion, F(1, 607) 53.36, p<.01, showing an increase in expected
willingness to help when payment level increased from low to
medium, F(1, 607) 53.48, p<.001, and a lower expected
willingness to help at the low-payment level than was found in
the no-payment control condition, F(1, 607) 53.84, p<.001.
Fig. 1. Graphical summary of the predicted levels of effort in social and
money markets.
Fig. 2. Results from Experiment 1: expected willingness to help (WTH)
as a function of payment level (none, low, or medium) and payment form
(money, candy, or monetized candy).
We use the term medium for our highest level of payment to emphasize that
its magnitude is within the range of acceptable payment for such small tasks.
All analyses were carried out as planned contrasts within analyses of vari-
ance, because standard factorial designs were not used.
Volume 15—Number 11 789
James Heyman and Dan Ariely
This initial experiment measured participants’ intuitions
about how individuals would react to a request for assistance
under different incentives. The results supported the distinction
between money and social markets (Hypothesis 1) by docu-
menting a higher predicted level of compliance when no pay-
ment was offered than when low monetary payment was
offered, and by documenting a higher level of predicted com-
pliance when a low level of candy was offered than when a
low monetary payment was offered. The results also showed that
monetizing candy resulted in a predicted willingness to help
that resembled predicted willingness to help in the cash con-
dition (Hypothesis 2).
Whereas Experiment 1 examined hypothetical situations, Ex-
periment2 tested participants’ actual effort under a variety of pay-
ment levels and across monetary and candy forms of payment.
Following the tradition of using mind-numbing tasks devoid of
any intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Festinger & Carlsmith,
1959; Kreps, 1997), and updating these tasks to the 21st cen-
tury, we asked respondents to repeatedly drag a computerized
ball to a specified location on the screen. Pretesting and post-
experiment debriefing showed that our implementation con-
tinues in the grandest tradition of tasks that participants view as
being utterly uninteresting and without any redeeming value.
Design and Stimuli
One hundred fifty-nine students participated in the experiment.
The between-participants experimental design included two
forms of payment crossed with two levels of payment, plus a
control condition with no payment (see Table 1). The form of
payment was either cash or an equivalent amount in Jelly Belly
jellybeans. It is important to note that participants were not told
the market price of the candy. The level of payment was either
low ($0.10 in the cash condition or five Jelly Bellies in the candy
condition) or medium ($4.00 in the cash condition or a half-
pound of Jelly Bellies in the candy condition). The control
condition mentioned no payment and thus had no payment form.
The software instructed participants that a light gray circle (the
‘‘ball’’) would appear on the left side of the screen and that their
task was to drag as many of these balls as they could onto a dark
gray square on the right side of the screen for a period of 3 min.
Next, participants saw a screen that informed them of the
payment they would receive (unless they were in the control
condition). As an added reminder of their payment, they were
given a piece of paper and asked to write, ‘‘I participated in the
ball study and received [the incentive promised]’’ and sign their
names (MacCoun & Kerr, 1987). In the control condition, par-
ticipants were asked to write a sentence acknowledging their
Results and Discussion
As shown in Figure 3, the results supported the basic hypoth-
eses. As predicted in Hypothesis 1a, effort in the cash condition
increased when the payment level increased from low to me-
dium, F(1, 154) 510.27, p<.001. As predicted in Hypothesis
1b, effort in the candy condition was insensitive to the increase
in payment level from low to medium, F(1, 154) 51.13,
p5.26, n.s. Both of these results support Hypothesis 1 by
demonstrating the expected interaction between level of com-
pensation and form of payment in determining the level of effort,
F(1, 154) 55.86, p<.001. As predicted in Hypothesis 1c,
Experimental Design of the Three Experiments
Payment form
Payment level
No Low Medium
Experiment 1: Willingness to help load a sofa into a van
Cash $0.50 $5.00
Monetized candy $0.50 candy bar $5.00 chocolate box
Candy Candy bar Chocolate box
Experiment 2: Physical effort dragging balls on a computer screen
Cash $0.10 $4.00
Candy 5 Jelly Bellies 0.5 lb Jelly Bellies
Experiment 3: Mental effort solving arithmetic puzzles
Cash $0.50 $5.00
Monetized candy $0.50 candy bar $5.00 chocolate box
Note. All experiments had three levels of payment (no, low, medium), crossed with either two or three forms of payment
(cash, candy, monetized candy). Note that the no-payment control condition was the same across the different forms of
payment. Bold entries represent conditions that, according to the hypotheses, are part of the money-market condition.
790 Volume 15—Number 11
Two Markets
effort under the low-payment level of the cash condition was
below that of the no-payment control condition, F(1,
154) 512.15, p<.001, but effort in the low-payment level of
the candy condition was not, F(1, 154) 51.04, p5.3, n.s. The
difference in the reaction to the low level of payment in the two
markets was statistically significant, F(1, 154) 512.53,
p<.001, again supporting Hypothesis 1. It is also interesting
to note that the level of effort was about 10 ball drags higher in
the no-payment control condition than in the medium-payment
cash condition, although this difference was not significant,
F(1, 154) 51.6, p5.112, n.s.
In summary, these results supported the distinction between
money and social markets. The results of Experiment 2 rein-
force those of Experiment 1 by demonstrating that the decrease
in performance from no-payment to low-payment conditions is
found in monetary exchanges, but not in gift exchanges. The
similarity in results between Experiments 1 and 2 also suggests
that individuals have a reasonable level of intuition about this
aspect of human behavior and can generally predict the pattern
of behavior.
Experiment 3 was designed to replicate the part of Experiment 1
that was not tested with real effort in Experiment 2: the contrast
among no payment, cash, and monetized candy. That is, in
addition to testing for the effect of no payment, Experiment 3
tested Hypothesis 2. Our prediction was that once the retail
value of the candy was mentioned, the resulting effort would be
similar to that observed with cash payment. In addition, Ex-
periment 3 was designed to test a domain of effort that required
mental rather than physical effort.
Participants, Design, and Materials
Ninety students participated in the experiment. The between-
participants experimental design included two levels of pay-
ment crossed with two forms of payment, plus a control condi-
tion with no money (see Table 1). The level of payment was
either low ($0.50 in the cash condition and a candy bar in the
candy condition) or medium ($5.00 in the cash condition and a
Godiva chocolate box in the candy condition). The payment
form was either cash or an equivalent amount in chocolate
(monetized candy). It is important to note that participants in the
monetized-candy condition were specifically told the market
price of the candy when informed about their reward: for ex-
ample, ‘‘You will receive a 50bcandy bar.’’ The control con-
dition mentioned no payment and thus had no payment form.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed
what their payment for participating would be (unless they were
in the control condition) and instructed to leave the lab when
they decided to end the experiment. The task was to solve a
series of puzzles, each consisting of 12 numbers; a puzzle was
solved by selecting a subset of the numbers that added up to 100
(see Fig. 4 for examples). At the bottom of the screen was a
button labeled ‘‘I give up’’; participants were told to push this
button if they wanted to quit the experiment. The first four
puzzles were relatively easy and served to introduce the pro-
cedure and make participants feel that they were capable of
completing this task (Koblitz, 1987). The final, fifth puzzle did
not have a solution, and the dependent measure was the length
of time that participants spent trying to solve it.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Figure 5, the results supported the basic hypoth-
eses. As predicted in Hypotheses 1a and 2, effort in both the
cash and monetized-candy conditions increased when payment
level increased from low to medium, F(1, 84) 52.41, p5.018,
and F(1, 84) 52.52, p5.014, respectively, and there was no
difference between these conditions, F(1, 84) 50.84, n.s. As
predicted in Hypothesis 1c, effort was lower in the low-payment
condition than in the no-payment control condition for both the
cash and the monetized-candy conditions, F(1, 84) 53.11,
p5.007, which were not different from each other, F(1,
84) 50.111, n.s. In addition, persistence in the no-payment
control condition was about 40 s longer than in the medium-
payment cash condition, and about 35 s longer than in the
medium-payment monetized-candy condition, although neither
of these effects was significant, F(1, 84) 51.02, p5.31, and
F(1, 84) 50.73, p5.47, respectively.
In summary, these results replicated the results of the cash
conditions from Experiments 1 and 2. More important, the
similarity of the results between the cash and monetized-candy
Fig. 3. Results from Experiment 2: measured effort (number of balls
dragged in 3 min) as a function of payment level (none, low, or medium)
and payment form (money or candy).
Volume 15—Number 11 791
James Heyman and Dan Ariely
conditions suggests that the existence or saliency of monetary
compensation can act as a strong signal invoking norms of
money markets instead of social-market relations. Thus, when
an individual is faced with signals from both the money market
and the social market, the countervailing forces seem to favor
money-market relations (Hypothesis 2).
In Chapter Two of Mark Twain’s (1876) novel Tom Sawyer,Tom
is faced with the unenviable job of whitewashing his aunt’s
fence. When his friends pass by and mock him for having to
work, he turns around, asking, ‘‘Do you call this work? Does a
boy get a chance to whitewash a fence every day? And beside
Aunt Polly’s awful particular about her fence’’ (p. 15). Armed
with this ‘‘new information,’’ his friends discover the joys of
whitewashing a fence, and before long give him all their per-
sonal treasures for the privilege of painting the fence.
Twain ended the chapter by noting that ‘‘if [Tom] had been a
great and wise philosopher, like the writer of this book, he would
now have comprehended that work consists of whatever a body
is obliged to do, and that play consists of whatever a body is not
obliged to do.’’ Twain then added, ‘‘There are wealthy gentleman
in England who drive four-horse passenger-coaches twenty or
thirty miles on a daily line in the summer because the privilege
costs them considerable money; but if they were offered wages
for the service, that would turn it into work, and then they would
resign’’ (pp. 16–17).
In this description of the negative effects of compensation on
motivation, Twain suggested that monetary incentives can have
profound influences on the ways in which tasks are framed, and
hence on the motivation to engage in them. Following Twain,
and Fiske’s (1992) relational theory, we have presented a model
that categorizes labor markets into two types: monetary and
social. Money markets are characterized by a monotonic rela-
tionship between payment and effort. In social markets, effort is
largely independent of compensation levels.
Two real-behavior experiments and one hypothetical-be-
havior experiment were carried out in a general setting of one-
shot games, in which payment was granted or credibly promised
before effort was exerted. The results support the two-markets
perspective: When payments were given in the form of gifts
(candy) or when payments were not mentioned, effort seemed to
stem from altruistic motives and was largely insensitive to the
magnitude of the payment. In contrast, when payments were
given in the form of cash, effort seemed to stem from recipro-
cation motives and was sensitive to the magnitude of the pay-
ment. Finally, in mixed markets (payment was in the form of
gifts but cost was also mentioned), the mere mention of mone-
tary payment was sufficient to switch the perceived relationship
from a social-market relationship to a money-market relation-
ship. That is, money itself can be a cue to the type of exchange
that individuals consider themselves to be in, which in turn
influences their propensity to exert effort.
A long history of research has demonstrated that rewards can
decrease motivation and attitudes (Festinger & Carlsmith,
1959), alter self-perception (Bem, 1965), increase overjustifi-
Fig. 4. One of the four easily completed numerical puzzles (a) and the
impossible puzzle (b) from Experiment 3.
Fig. 5. Results from Experiment 3: measured effort (time spent before
giving up on an impossible task) as a function of payment level (none, low,
or medium) and payment form (money or monetized candy).
792 Volume 15—Number 11
Two Markets
cation (Lepper et al., 1973), and turn feelings of competence
into feelings of being controlled (Deci & Ryan, 1985). The
debate over these findings (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996;
Ryan & Deci, 2000) has generally shifted to the question of what
specific circumstances give rise to these counterintuitive ef-
fects. The current work sheds some light on this debate by
pointing out an additional factor that can influence the rela-
tionship between reward and motivation—the type of market in
which the exchange takes place. Note, however, that this work is
methodologically different from most previous research on the
perverse effects of rewards, in that rewards in the current work
were provided up front and were not contingent on performance,
performance rather than attitudes was measured, and per-
formance was measured on trials that immediately followed the
manipulation. One possible implication of the current results is
that social rewards do not easily undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion. A second implication is that the social aspects of reward
are fragile and a social reward can easily be made into a non-
social extrinsic reward by merely mentioning monetary cir-
cumstances or perhaps just promoting comparisons to other
tasks or other individuals’ reward levels.
The two-markets distinction suggests that compensations for
employment and effort should be considered separately for so-
cial and monetary markets and that the level and type of com-
pensation should be designed to fit the defined relationship.
There are many questions remaining regarding these two mar-
kets: What types of labor are best suited for social and monetary
markets? How can employment institutions be shaped to allow
changes from one type of exchange to the other? What kinds of
environmental factors affect effort in the social market? An-
swering these questions is likely to shed some light on the ways
in which individuals construct their social environment. As to
whom to ask when you need help moving, we suggest asking
friends and offering them dinner. Just do not tell them how much
the dinner costs.
Acknowledgments—The authors thank Barbara Spellman, Uri
Gneezy, Stacy Woods, Mike Norton, and two anonymous re-
viewers for their constructive comments. The authors also want
to acknowledge the support of Harvard’s Computer Lab for
Experimental Research (CLER).
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Volume 15—Number 11 793
James Heyman and Dan Ariely
... Также подробного внимания заслуживает Д. Ариели (Heyman, Ariely, 2004), профессор университетов Дьюка и MIT, на сегодня один из ведущих мировых специалистов в области поведенческой экономики и принятия иррациональных решений индивидами под воздействием эмоций. Широкую известность Д. Ариели приобрел, издав две книги, ставшие бестселлерами по версии «Нью-Йорк таймс»: «Предсказуемо иррациональный» и «Внешняя сторона иррациональности». ...
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Ограничение экологической информации нарушает механизм формирования общего интереса и приводит к избыточным объемам товаров, произведенных за счет экономии расходов на защиту окружающей среды и соблюдение экологических требований. Эти товары, которые можно отнести к разряду демериторных, обществу желательно сокращать.
... As a critical predictor of follow-up social support provision [26,65], reciprocity is a prominent characteristic of OHCs and refers to mutual exchange between the users. It emphasizes users' return of the favor to others, especially those who have helped them before [66]. Inaction will, on the other hand, harm the healthy, functional, and dynamic environment of OHCs. ...
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Online health communities (OHCs) are able to facilitate social support exchange among people with similar health concerns, and the relationship between self-disclosure and social support exchange has been widely discussed. Build upon the previous studies, we extend the seminal theory of reasoned action (TRA) in this research, through the adoption of an salient but understudied construct, user role, which captures user inclination toward providing or seeking social support, and further explore how it impacts OHC users’ self-disclosure intention. We adopt a mixed methods approach including manual coding, machine learning algorithms, and econometric analyses, and investigate over 4 million posts over 17 years from a well-developed breast cancer OHC to uncover both direct and indirect effects of user role on OHC users’ intention of future self-disclosure intention. The results reveal both the main and moderating effects of user roles regarding users’ self-disclosure intention. First, user with a more clear intention of social support seeking or providing are more likely to disclose personal information. Second, the relative tendency of support provision magnifies the positive effects of attitudinal and normative factors toward future disclosure. We also discuss the findings and implications of the extended TRA framework to generate some actionable insights of OHC design.
Decades of research show that psychosocial treatments are effective for psychosis, yet they remain unimplemented as the American healthcare system relies primarily on pharmacological solutions instead. This book reviews the history and current state of research to provide a more nuanced understanding of the evidence for and barriers to psychosocial care for psychosis. It addresses a wide range of mental health research and multi-professional practice domains from historical, personal, societal, professional, and systems perspectives. The varied perspectives presented illustrate factors that limit support for recovery in SMI and psychosis as well as real hope for recovering the US mental healthcare system. With contributions of experts by training and by experience, this book represents an essential resource for students, practitioners and researchers.
SEE (Social, Emotional and Ethical) attributes are the driving force behind decision-making, which owes its existence to several pioneers, scientists, researchers and educators who have thought creatively and carefully about education as a way to help present and future generations thrive. The SEE Learning framework is the basis for the SEE attributes. The framework is based on the work of the Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) community, which has shown that developing positive emotional regulation, self-compassion and interpersonal skills improves academic growth and individual well-being during key stages of human development. Traditional ways of thinking and acting are based on basic human values that can be seen through common sense, experience and Science. In everything we do, we should truly want the happiness of everyone we can affect and we should work on having an attitude of compassion for everyone. Making decisions is an important part of most people’s daily lives. Every day, everyone has to decide how to handle a situation. People decide what to do based on their SEE traits. In this chapter, we designed a mathematical model-based structure that shows how SEE attributes help us set up our Bioinformatics systems to bring out our hidden forces so we can make the best decision in an environment with multiple options.KeywordsSEE (Social emotionalethical) attributesSelf-compassionTraditional thinkingEthical mindsetDecision-making
This innovative textbook is the first to integrate learning and memory, behaviour, and cognition. It focuses on fascinating human research in both memory and learning (while also bringing in important animal studies) and brings the reader up to date with the latest developments in the subject. Students are encouraged to think critically: key theories and issues are looked at in detail; descriptions of experiments include why they were done and how examining the method can help evaluate competing viewpoints. By looking at underlying cognitive processes, students come away with a sense of learning and memory being interrelated actions taken by the same human being, rather than two separate activities. Lively and engaging writing is supported by lots of examples of practical applications that show the relevance of lab-based research to everyday life. Examples include treatments for phobias and autism, ways to improve eyewitness testimony, and methods of enhancing study techniques.
Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine whether executive compensation structure is a predictor of a value judgment shift facilitating fraud. The Raval (2018) disposition-based fraud model theorizes that in a fraud, a judgment shift occurs that results in an intentional action. Judgment shifts are influenced by intertemporal rewards, an executive compensation structure comprising salary (immediate reward) and delayed compensation in performance-based incentives. Design/methodology/approach Using an archival data set consisting of frauds identified through Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, the compensation structure of executives involved in frauds is compared against the compensation structure of executives in a peer control group. Findings There was a significant difference in the intertemporal rewards of the compensation structures between the two groups, indicating that compensation structure presents intertemporal choices leading to a judgment shift that influences the deliberate action of fraud. Research limitations/implications This study represents the first empirical test of the disposition-based fraud model using intertemporal rewards leading to judgment shift. Practical implications Executive compensation structure should reduce intertemporal rewards for executives reducing judgment shifts that can result in risk of fraud. Originality/value This study addresses how executive compensation structure can result in fraud.
Tipping, as a new model of content monetization, is being adopted widely. Leveraging the policy changes in one of the largest social media platforms, we examined when and how tip-based content monetization incentives work. We adopt framing theory to explain different attitudes toward content monetization incentives between status-framed and benefit-framed users. Our results show that a hierarchical content monetization program decreases status-framed users' content contribution, whereas a general accessible content monetization program will effectively motivate the content supply of all users. Moreover, we identify the underlying mechanisms for heterogeneous content monetization effects by unbinding signaling and rewarding effects of tipping feature.
In Kapitel 3 des Buches werden die in der Finanzwissenschaft gängigen Rechtfertigungsargumente der Besteuerung ebenso wie die herkömmliche ökonomische Steuerwirkungslehre einer kritischen Betrachtung unterzogen. Dabei kann nicht nur gezeigt werden, dass die traditionelle Begründung von Steuern und sonstigen Abgaben mittels Leistungsfähigkeits- und Äquivalenzprinzip einer Erweiterung um verhaltensökonomische Einsichten bedarf. Zudem wird verdeutlicht, dass die gängige effizienz-, verteilungs- und stabilitätsbezogene Wirkungsanalyse der Besteuerung ohne eine zusätzliche verhaltensökonomische Fundierung rasch an Grenzen stößt. Letzteres gilt auch und insbesondere für die Analyse des Phänomens der Steuerhinterziehung, das mittels traditioneller ökonomischer Ansätze nur unzureichend erklärt werden kann und sich daher zu einem Kernbereich der Steuerpsychologie entwickelt hat. Mit dem sich anschließenden Exkurs zum staatlichen Verschuldungsverhalten wird zudem verdeutlicht, dass sich verhaltensökonomische Einsichten nicht bereits in einer „Psychologie der Besteuerung“ erschöpfen, sondern vielmehr für die Gesamtheit der staatlichen Einnahmen fruchtbar gemacht werden können.
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Bu çalışmanın amacı duygusal ve rasyonel reklam mesajlarının istediğin kadar öde (PWYW) fiyatlama stratejisi üzerinde anlamlı bir etkisinin olup olmadığının hayır kurumu (LÖSEV) ürünleri özelinde test etmektir. Bu amaçlar çerçevesinde çalışmada nicel araştırma yöntemlerinden genel tarama modeli içinde yer alan ilişkisel karşılaştırmalı model tercih edilmiştir. Çalışmanın evreni Türkiye’de yaşamakta olan ve 43-57 yaş aralığında yer alan X kuşağından oluşmaktadır. Anket tekniği ile uygulanarak yapılan saha araştırması sonucunda X kuşağına mensup 335 kişiden veri toplanmıştır. Çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlar, ana akımın iktisadın savunduğu rasyonel bireyin (homoekonomikus) aksine, bireylerin duygusal ve rasyonel mesajların etkisi ile kendi çıkarlarını maksimize etmek yerine diğerlerini düşünerek LÖSEV ürünlerine daha fazla ödeme de bulunma niyetlerini beyan ettiğini göstermektedir. Yapılan karşılaştırmalar sonucunda, rasyonel mesajların duygusal mesajlara göre daha fazla ödeme isteği oluşturduğu tespit edilmiştir. Anahtar Kelimeler: İstediğin Kadar Öde (PWYW), Duygusal Mesaj, Rasyonel Mesaj, LÖSEV
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Unlike prior research that treats social‐desirability bias (SDB) as measure contamination, the present research asserts that significant associations between measures of SDB and value self‐reports are evidence of measure validity. The degree to which value self‐reports are influenced by SDB also reflects the relative importance of values within a culture. Values that are most important have the greatest self‐presentational implications and therefore should be most affected by SDB. Moreover, differences between raw and SDB‐corrected value self‐reports indicate the extent to which values are personal (i.e., private) or public in nature. The research is based on two national samples of American adults 18 years of age and older. Implications for research on values are discussed. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Conducted a field experiment with 3-5 yr old nursery school children to test the "overjustification" hypothesis suggested by self-perception theory (i.e., intrinsic interest in an activity may be decreased by inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means to some extrinsic goal). 51 Ss who showed intrinsic interest in a target activity during baseline observations were exposed to 1 of 3 conditions: in the expected-award condition, Ss agreed to engage in the target activity in order to obtain an extrinsic reward; in the unexpected-award condition, Ss had no knowledge of the reward until after they had finished with the activity; and in the no-award condition, Ss neither expected nor received the reward. Results support the prediction that Ss in the expected-award condition would show less subsequent intrinsic interest in the target activity than Ss in the other 2 conditions. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Replying to Batson (this issue), who argues that the difference between communal and exchange relationships is less than might be imagined, the authors review the communal/exchange distinction, discuss what it does and does not mean, and address specific issues raised by Batson. They conclude, contrary to claims by Batson, that (a) ingratiation cannot account for all the findings supporting the communal/exchange distinction; (b) if desire for a communal relationship leads to ingratiation, that does not contradict the distinction; (c) if communal norms are followed for other than altruistic reasons, that does not undermine the distinction, (d) the difference between communal and exchange relationships is not limited to the breadth of benefits exchanged; (e) the difference between communal and exchange relationships is not limited to a difference in etiquette; rather, the communal/exchange distinction provides a theoretical explanation for the difference in etiquette.