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Behavior. A marketplace in the brain?

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Abstract

What would you do if faced with the choice of a smaller reward that you could have today versus a larger reward that you would receive after several weeks' delay? Such questions are explored by Ainslie and Monterosso in their Perspective, which discusses a recent study that uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure the brain activity of student volunteers as they are faced with immediate versus delayed monetary rewards ( McClure et al.).

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... And the idea that the nonexponential component of discounting is a function of a categorical devaluation of anything that is not immediate is inconsistent with behavioral data (Green & Myerson, 2004) and conceptually problematic since all goal-directed behavior, by definition, entails delayed reward. The fact that the shortest delay used in the study was 2 weeks makes it difficult to discern a continuous effect of delay if discounting is relatively steep (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004). ...
... Moreover, taxing of high-order cognitive capacity with a dual-task manipulation or through fatigue (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996) or through chronic drug use (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002) would be expected to lead to self-control lapses. But while the predictions are highly overlapping with those of the beta-delta/System 1 versus System 2 models, the present model maintains that higher-level processes have their impact by brokering reward within a single motivation marketplace (Ainslee & Monterosso, 2004). We think this account is consistent with the exciting recent finding reported by Hare, Camerer, and Rangel (2009) that health considerations only sometimes affected choice and signal change in the VMPFC, and whether or not they did was at least statistically mediated by the presence of more activity in the DLPFC. ...
... cent associative cortex, its effect is realized within a single underlying market place of valuation (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004). ...
Article
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The dynamic inconsistency of preference is well documented in behavioral research, but its basis remains controversial. In this article, we summarize recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) work in the domain of intertemporal choice, specifically considering evidence bearing on the hypothesis that delay discounting in humans is determined by competition between an evolutionarily older system that discounts precipitously with delay (System 1), and a newer system that exhibits very little discounting (System 2). We argue that neuroimaging evidence does not support the hypothesized separate and competing value systems. While it is clear that the sophisticated cognitive capacities that lead to greater valuation of larger later alternatives (e.g., selective attention and self-signaling) depend critically on neocortical structures, these capacities affect intertemporal choice through mediation of (rather than competition with) older cortical and subcortical structures central to reward and motivation. Taken together, neuroimaging evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that intertemporal choice is guided by a single valuation system.
... Exponential functions 15 are most frequently used in economics to model intertemporal choice, but exponential functions cannot describe the example mentioned above. More recently, economists have suggested the use of hyperbolic and beta-delta functions (Ainslie and Monterosso 2004). These models do a better job at describing the choices in the example above, but little empirical evidence has been provided to support one functional form over the other. ...
... The more impulsive, immediate decisions were influenced by the limbic system while the less impulsive, delayed decisions were influenced by cortical systems. 15 Ainslie and Monterosso (2004) give the following examples for the functional forms: -exponential function: current value = nondelayed value * (1-discount rate) delay -hyperbolic function: current value = nondelayed value/[1 + (discount rate * delay)] -beta-delta function: current value = nondelayed value * β*δ delay where δ delay is the standard exponential function (shown above) and β is a value between 0 and 1 for all delays greater than 0. ...
... Printed in the United States of America doi:10.1017/S0140525X0800472X an overvaluation of drug-seeking (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Di Chiara 1999; Redish 2004); (5) impulsivity, in which users make rash choices, without taking into account later costs (Ainslie 1992; Ainslie & Monterosso 2004; Bickel & Marsch 2001; Giordano et al. 2002; Odum et al. 2002 ); (6) situation recognition and categorization , based on a misclassification of situations that produce both gains and losses (Custer 1984; Griffiths 1994; Langer & Roth 1975; Wagenaar 1988); and (7) deficiencies in the balance between executive and habit systems, in which it becomes particularly difficult to break habits through cognitive mechanisms either through over-performance of the habit system ( Tiffany 1990 ) or under-performance of flexible, executive, inhibitory systems (Gray & McNaughton 2000; Jentsch & Taylor 1999; Lubman et al. 2004) or a change in the balance between them (Bechara 2005; Bickel et al. 2007; Everitt et al. 2001; Everitt & Wolf 2002). (SeeTable 1.) ...
... g Custer (1984); Griffiths (1994); Langer and Roth (1975);; Sylvain et al. (1997); Wagenaar (1988). h Ainslie (1992;; Ainslie and Monterosso (2004); Bickel and Marsch (2001); Giordano et al. (2002); Odum et al. (2002). i Bickel et al. (2007); Everitt et al. (2001); Everitt and Wolf (2002); Nelson and Killcross (2006); Robbins & Everitt (1999). ...
Article
In our target article, we proposed that addiction could be envisioned as misperformance of a decision-making machinery described by two systems (deliberative and habit systems). Several commentators have argued that Pavlovian learning also produces actions. We agree and note that Pavlovian action-selection will provide several additional vulnerabilities. Several commentators have suggested that addiction arises from sociological parameters. We note in our response how sociological effects can change decision-making variables to provide additional vulnerabilities. Commentators generally have agreed that our theory provides a framework within which to site addiction and treatment, but additional work will be needed to determine whether our taxonomy will help identify and treat subpopulations within the addicted community.
... Printed in the United States of America doi:10.1017/S0140525X0800472X an overvaluation of drug-seeking (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Di Chiara 1999; Redish 2004); (5) impulsivity, in which users make rash choices, without taking into account later costs (Ainslie 1992; Ainslie & Monterosso 2004; Bickel & Marsch 2001; Giordano et al. 2002; Odum et al. 2002 ); (6) situation recognition and categorization , based on a misclassification of situations that produce both gains and losses (Custer 1984; Griffiths 1994; Langer & Roth 1975; Wagenaar 1988); and (7) deficiencies in the balance between executive and habit systems, in which it becomes particularly difficult to break habits through cognitive mechanisms either through over-performance of the habit system ( Tiffany 1990 ) or under-performance of flexible, executive, inhibitory systems (Gray & McNaughton 2000; Jentsch & Taylor 1999; Lubman et al. 2004) or a change in the balance between them (Bechara 2005; Bickel et al. 2007; Everitt et al. 2001; Everitt & Wolf 2002). (SeeTable 1.) ...
... g Custer (1984); Griffiths (1994); Langer and Roth (1975);; Sylvain et al. (1997); Wagenaar (1988). h Ainslie (1992;; Ainslie and Monterosso (2004); Bickel and Marsch (2001); Giordano et al. (2002); Odum et al. (2002). i Bickel et al. (2007); Everitt et al. (2001); Everitt and Wolf (2002); Nelson and Killcross (2006); Robbins & Everitt (1999). ...
Article
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The model of addiction proposed by Redish et al. shows a lack of fit with recent data and models in psychological studies of addiction. In these dual process models, relatively automatic appetitive processes are distinguished from explicit goal-directed expectancies and motives, whereas these are all grouped together in the planning system in the Redish et al. model. Implications are discussed.
... Printed in the United States of America doi:10.1017/S0140525X0800472X an overvaluation of drug-seeking (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Di Chiara 1999; Redish 2004); (5) impulsivity, in which users make rash choices, without taking into account later costs (Ainslie 1992; Ainslie & Monterosso 2004; Bickel & Marsch 2001; Giordano et al. 2002; Odum et al. 2002 ); (6) situation recognition and categorization , based on a misclassification of situations that produce both gains and losses (Custer 1984; Griffiths 1994; Langer & Roth 1975; Wagenaar 1988); and (7) deficiencies in the balance between executive and habit systems, in which it becomes particularly difficult to break habits through cognitive mechanisms either through over-performance of the habit system ( Tiffany 1990 ) or under-performance of flexible, executive, inhibitory systems (Gray & McNaughton 2000; Jentsch & Taylor 1999; Lubman et al. 2004) or a change in the balance between them (Bechara 2005; Bickel et al. 2007; Everitt et al. 2001; Everitt & Wolf 2002). (SeeTable 1.) ...
... g Custer (1984); Griffiths (1994); Langer and Roth (1975);; Sylvain et al. (1997); Wagenaar (1988). h Ainslie (1992;; Ainslie and Monterosso (2004); Bickel and Marsch (2001); Giordano et al. (2002); Odum et al. (2002). i Bickel et al. (2007); Everitt et al. (2001); Everitt and Wolf (2002); Nelson and Killcross (2006); Robbins & Everitt (1999). ...
Article
The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) changing allostatic set points, (3) euphorigenic "reward-like" signals, (4) overvaluation in the planning system, (5) incorrect search of situation-action-outcome relationships, (6) misclassification of situations, (7) overvaluation in the habit system, (8) a mismatch in the balance of the two decision systems, (9) over-fast discounting processes, and (10) changed learning rates. These vulnerabilities provide a taxonomy of potential problems with decision-making systems. Although each vulnerability can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each vulnerability also implies a characteristic symptomology. Different drugs, different behaviors, and different individuals are likely to access different vulnerabilities. This has implications for an individual's susceptibility to addiction and the transition to addiction, for the potential for relapse, and for the potential for treatment.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross, 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al., 2012), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher, 2009;Loewenstein et al., 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross, 2005) and utility (Burnham, 2013). ...
Book
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This volume brings together a collection of seven articles previously published by the author, with a new introduction reframing the articles in the context of past and present questions in anthropology, psychology and human evolution. It promotes the perspective of ‘integrated’ social science, in which social science questions are addressed in a deliberately eclectic manner, combining results and models from evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, economics, anthropology and history. It thus constitutes a welcome contribution to a gradually emerging approach to social science based on E. O. Wilson’s concept of ‘consilience’. Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens spans a wide range of topics, from an examination of ritual behaviour, integrating neuro-science, ethology and anthropology to explain why humans engage in ritual actions (both cultural and individual), to the motivation of conflicts between groups. As such, the collection gives readers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the applications of an evolutionary paradigm in the social sciences. This volume will be a useful resource for scholars and students in the social sciences (particularly psychology, anthropology, evolutionary biology and the political sciences), as well as a general readership interested in the social sciences.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross, 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al., 2012), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher, 2009;Loewenstein et al., 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross, 2005) and utility (Burnham, 2013). ...
Chapter
Full-text available
This volume brings together a collection of seven articles previously published by the author, with a new introduction reframing the articles in the context of past and present questions in anthropology, psychology and human evolution. It promotes the perspective of ‘integrated’ social science, in which social science questions are addressed in a deliberately eclectic manner, combining results and models from evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, economics, anthropology and history. It thus constitutes a welcome contribution to a gradually emerging approach to social science based on E. O. Wilson’s concept of ‘consilience’. Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens spans a wide range of topics, from an examination of ritual behaviour, integrating neuro-science, ethology and anthropology to explain why humans engage in ritual actions (both cultural and individual), to the motivation of conflicts between groups. As such, the collection gives readers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the applications of an evolutionary paradigm in the social sciences. This volume will be a useful resource for scholars and students in the social sciences (particularly psychology, anthropology, evolutionary biology and the political sciences), as well as a general readership interested in the social sciences.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
Why are our intuitive beliefs about economic issues often so misguided, asks psychologist Pascal Boyer
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
We extend Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) model of folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) by suggesting FEBs serve self-interest (broadly defined), which includes indirect benefits such as creating alliances, advancing self-beneficial ideologies, and signaling one's traits. By expanding the definition of self-interest, the model can predict who will hold what FEBs, which FEBs will propagate, when they will change, why, and in which direction.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out an evolutionarily grounded framework to produce concrete, testable predictions about economic phenomena. We commend this step forward, but suggest the framework requires more consideration of cultural contexts that provide necessary input for cognitive systems to operate on. We discuss the role of culture when examining both evolved cognitive systems and social exchange contexts.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
We applaud Boyer & Petersen for the advancement of an ultimate explanation of the dynamics of folk-economic beliefs and the political actions linked to them. To our mind, however, key inference systems regulating societal interaction and resource distribution evolved for more core relations than those of proportionate exchange, and situational factors are not the only constraints on how such systems produce economic beliefs
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Folk-economic beliefs may be regarded as “evidential fictions” that exploit the natural tendency of human cognition to organize itself in narrative form. Narrative counter-arguments are likely more effective than logical debunking. The challenge is to convey sound economic reasoning in narratively conspicuous forms – an opportunity for economics to rethink its role and agency in public discourse, in the spirit of its old classics.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
The target article by Boyer & Petersen (B&P) contributes a vital message: that people have folk economic theories that shape their thoughts and behavior in the marketplace. This message is all the more important because, in the history of economic thought, Homo economicus was increasingly stripped of mental capacities. Intuitive theories can help restore the mind of Homo economicus .
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
Specific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are “seen” and others are “not seen.” Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary psychology (sect. R3). We also comment on the difficulty of explaining folk-economic beliefs in terms of domain-general processes or biases (sect. R4), as developmental studies show how encounters with specific environments calibrate domain-specific systems (sect. R5). We offer a more detailed description of the connections between economic beliefs and political psychology (sect. R6) and of the probable causes of individual variation in that domain (sect. R7). Taken together, these arguments point to a better integration or consilience between economics and human evolution (sect. R8).
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processesand this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick et al. 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso 2004) and neurocognitive findings (Glimcher 2009;Loewenstein et al. 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross 2005) and utility (Burnham 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
Although Boyer & Petersen (B&P) make the case for evolutionary roots of folk economics stronger, their evolutionary model ultimately does not deliver folk-economic explanations that are both novel and correct. We argue that (a) most current explanations are evolutionary already; (b) B&P's model is as ad hoc as other theories, and proves too much; and (c) it overrates evolution at the cost of discounting other crucial factors.
... Approaching economic decision-making in this perspective could make economic theory more congruent with findings and models from the cognitive sciences (Ross, 2005). In that perspective, decision-making in any domain is the outcome of a competition between distinct computational processes -and this of course applies to economic decisions as well (Kenrick, Li, White, & Neuberg, 2013), a view that is supported by behavioral evidence (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004) and neuro-cognitive findings (Glimcher, 2009;Loewenstein et al., 2008). However, it is still difficult to describe how these models and findings could be integrated with classical, and often empirically successful, descriptions of economic behavior in terms of rationality (Ross, 2005) and utility (Burnham, 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
The domain of “folk-economics” consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as e.g., the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs, and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner-choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference-systems, resulting in particular intuitions, e.g., that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and as a consequence exert a crucial influence on political choices.
... Empirical studies also showed that the preferences of real decision makers are inconsistent with respect to consequences that appear time-shifted (Ainslie, 1991;Eisenführ;Weber, 2003;Monterosso, 2004;Ainslie, 2006;Steel;König, 2006). When choosing between different consequences it could be observed, that participants prefer short-term, low rewards (smaller sooner rewards) versus long-term, but higher rewards (larger rewards longer) (Ainslie, 2006). ...
Article
Knowledge-intensive services from internal and external stakeholders pro-vide a substantial contribution to the development of material goods, tak-ing a top position in the global market. Knowledge-intensive services are characterized by a great degree of human work within the service process. For the development of a realistic service process model the consideration of human behavior – in particular human decision making, cooperation, and human reliability – is necessary. The simulation model will be able to support service planners to set up a highly productive service organiza-tion.
... In the other branch, the emotional, the decision is shortcut because the process largely relies on emotional experience. Both streams compete for the decision that produces the concomitant behavioural output in a way similar to the proposed by McClure, Laibson, Lowenstein, and Cohen (2004) and discussed by Ainslie and Monterosso (2004). In their study involving preferred (target) versus diverse brands, found large support for this theory, involving the ventro medial prefrontal cortex among others in the decision for the target brand, together with deactivations in the middle frontal gyrus, a brain structure linked to working memory, planning, and reason-based decision-making. ...
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Although somewhat outdated, the American Marketing Association definition of brand still is largely accepted. In this case, brands are signs for product differentiation. The present research, instead, finds brands and their logos as meaningful signs that belong to the human communicative lexicon. Logos are ideograms, i.e. graphic representations that convey meanings. These meanings are transferred from one mind to other minds through brands, establishing communication between humans, and which is also used to self-monitoring in a self-reflexive process, i.e., reading the reactions of others to the ideographic messages once sent to them. Brands are intimately connected to meta-representational processes, whether they are seen as the repository of human attributes, whether themselves are perceived as interlocutors, in a quasi-human level. It also finds that the human emotion system is used to perceive, interpret, and classify brands. Founding in the neuro-based model of emotions developed by Damásio, the present research reveals that brands systematically recruits the emotion system when stimulate brains, which leads to posit that brands are felt in order to be perceived. It is also largely relying in the brain structures that support emotion processing, but also based in other regions that support self-relatedness processing, that is trained an artificial neural network that yields predictions of subjects' choices at a level much higher than mere chance. This procedure allows a coarse but promising consumers' "mind reading".
... The key factor in valuation for the imminent future becomes the arousal of emotion, which has as much to do with the person's choices, for instance to entertain "hot" or "cool" thoughts (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), as it does with the properties of the reward itself. Abstract rewards such as money, Amazon coupons, and the satisfaction of curiosity have been claimed to behave as visceral rewards (Loewenstein, 1999;McClure et.al., 2004), as Ainslie and Monterosso (2004) pointed out; while tempting foods can be experienced as cool options (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). There is also the problem that some impulsive choices involve mundane activities that are not emotionally arousing -procrastination is a prominent example (Ainslie, 2010c; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999a) -while others may take longer than arousal can literally be sustained. ...
Article
We review efforts by economists to capture the qualitative predictions of picoeconomics – that is, accounts of willpower based on hyperbolic discounting of future rewards – using so-called quasi-hyperbolic or β-δ functions. We find that these models do not predict the full suite of phenomena associated with reward bundling, the re-framing of discrete sequences of choices into series. External, specifically social, structures often promote such bundling; thus willpower is not a strictly internal process based on management of visceral influences. We then present an experiment that demonstrates manipulation of dispositions to bundle in a group of nicotine addicts. Non-smokers in the experiment are not similarly influenced, which may reflect the fact that people who avoid addiction have generally learned to bundle without specific cueing or suggestion.
... When subjects chose the delayed option, the lateral prefrontal network was more active than the limbic network; when the immediate option was chosen, there was a trend toward the limbic network being more active than the lateral prefrontal network. While the use of a quasi-hyperbolic instead of a true hyperbolic function has been questioned (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004), these results provide evidence that a right-lateralized prefrontal network, including the right VLPFC, is utilized when exerting self-control over temporal decision-making (McClure et al., 2004). such as pigeons, rats, and primates, supports hyperbolic discounting models, in which the tendency to choose immediate rewards drops o steeply with time. ...
... When subjects chose the delayed option, the lateral prefrontal network was more active than the limbic network; when the immediate option was chosen, there was a trend toward the limbic network being more active than the lateral prefrontal network. While the use of a quasi-hyperbolic instead of a true hyperbolic function has been questioned (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004), these results provide evidence that a right-lateralized prefrontal network, including the right VLPFC, is utilized when exerting self-control over temporal decision-making (McClure et al., 2004). such as pigeons, rats, and primates, supports hyperbolic discounting models, in which the tendency to choose immediate rewards drops o steeply with time. ...
Article
This book presents social, cognitive, and neuroscientific approaches to the study of self-control, connecting recent work in cognitive and social psychology with recent advances in cognitive and social neuroscience. It consists of three sections: The Social, The Mental, and The Brain. The “Mental” section is the book's anchor, examining within-individual self-control processes at all levels, from low-level attention to motivation and motivational systems. The “Social” section looks at group processes, broadly defined, and how groups and societies (attempt to) resolve conflicts between their global goals and the individual's self interest. The “Brain” section explores the brain processes that underlie self control attempts and which speak directly to mental-level processes. The book brings together multiple perspectives on self-control dilemmas from researchers in various allied disciplines in order to illustrate the depth and breadth of the research in the new field of self control.
... Because of this, it appears, they say, that on balance the brain is discounting hyperbolically, but it is not. Ainslie and Monterosso (2004) counter by arguing that the conclusions drawn by McCIure et al. (2004) go beyond their data. There is not enough evidence, for instance, to argue that different brain regions are competing for choice decisions. ...
Article
Neuroeconomics has found no definitive role in the explanation of consumer choice and its undeveloped philosophical basis limits its attempt to explain economic behaviour. The nature of neuroeconomics is explored, especially with respect to what it reveals about the valuation of alternatives, choice and emotion. The tendency of human consumers to discount future rewards illustrates how behavioural and neuroscientific accounts of choice contribute to psychological explanations of choice and the issues this raises for both routine everyday choices and more extreme compulsions. Central to this is the phenomenon of matching in which consumers tend to select the immediately larger or largest reward and the neurophysiological and behavioural bases of this choice. Recognition that rewards are evoked by reinforcement contingencies and that the rewards themselves engender emotional responses via classical conditioning enhances understanding the contribution of neurological activity to the explanation of consumer behaviour. It is argued that neuroeconomics can play a vital explanatory role by providing an evolutionarily consistent warrant for the ascription of intentionality. The Behavioural Perspective Model is used as a template for investigations of consumer choice that lead to iterative theoretical development, forming the basis of a neurophilosophy in which neuroeconomics can find a decisive role. Copyright
... McClure et al. (2004) interpreted the results as a neural reflection of Laibson's (1997) beta–delta model of quasihyperbolic discounting: when the patient delta (fronto-parietal) regions exerted greater influence than the impulsive beta (limbic) regions, participants tended to select the larger, delayed reward. 5 However, the McClure et al. (2004) results were not universally interpreted as reflecting the interaction of separate systems in the brain (e.g., Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004; Glimcher, Kable, & Louie, 2007). Kable and Glimcher (2007) most forcefully argued against such a perspective. ...
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Much is understood about loss aversion (the tendency for losses to have greater hedonic impact than comparable gains), but open questions remain. First, there is debate about whether loss aversion is best understood as the byproduct of a single system within the brain that treats losses and gains asymmetrically or the interaction of separate deliberative and emotional systems. Second, some have questioned whether loss aversion alone is the best account for the endowment effect. Alternative accounts, based on the differential focus induced by buying versus selling, the order in which buyers and sellers consider positive and negative aspects of the good, the extent to which ownership induces liking, and the desire to avoid making a bad deal, have been proposed. Third, it is unclear whether losses are actually experienced more intensely than comparable gains, or whether people simply behave as if they were. Some have argued that loss aversion is nothing more than an affective forecasting error, while others have argued that there are many situations in which losses are actually more impactful than comparable gains. This review synthesizes the insights that behavioral researchers and neuroeconomists have contributed to each debate, and highlights potential avenues for future research.
... This implies a discount rate that decreases into the future as a hyperbolic function; such discounting has come to be called " hyperbolic. " This phenomenon has presented a conundrum to economists and psychologists alike, as described by Ainslie and Monterosso (2004). It means that subjects, in effect, change their answer as to which of two options they would prefer (a smaller reward at time t or larger reward at time t +δt) depending on how far into the future t is. ...
... FMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scans show that different -and conflicting -parts of the brain kick into action depending on the time frame. Short-term gratification is the domain of the limbic system, the impulsive part of the brain, whereas the neocortex -the part of the brain in charge of planning -wins on matters involving a long-term horizon (see, for example, Ainslie and Monterosso, 2004). ...
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Key findings in behavioral economics are that people’s behavior (revealed preferences) is often not in line with their intentions (normative preferences), that they are sensitive to the way choices are presented to them, and that their cognitive abilities are limited. This is manifest in particular in areas of intertemporal choice, like personal finance and health-related behavior. Policy makers can develop policies that help citizens to make choices that are more in line with their normative preferences. In this paper we summarize the behavioral evidence, discuss the motivations for interventions, and show how recent behavioral insights can help to improve upon existing policies. These new policies could be described as libertarian paternalism, and include setting defaults thoughtfully and using unorthodox commitment mechanisms. Keywordsbehavioral economics-health policies-savings policies JEL Code(s)D03-D14-I18
... Therefore, the model is consistent with both hyperbolic discounting, as suggested by experimental evidence from psychology (e.g. Ainslie and Monterosso (2004), Rachlin (2006)), and exponential discounting, as the dominant specification strategy in economics. A more flexible preference function would cause an additional identification problem because personality traits affecting preferences for leisure and those affecting time preferences would have to be identified by additional functional form assumptions. ...
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This paper investigates the relationship between personality traits and female labor force participation. While research on the role of cognitive skills for individual labor market success has a long tradition in economics, comparatively little is known about the channels through which non-cognitive skills affect individual labor market behavior. There is striking evidence that personality traits play a major role in explaining individual differences in school attendance and school performance. However, comparatively little is known about how and which personality traits effect labor supply decisions. In this paper, we relate personality traits to preference parameters using a conventional structural framework of labor force participation. This allows us to separate the direct effects of personality traits affecting the individual participation decision through different individual preferences from the indirect effects through wages. We can show that personality traits play an important role in the female labor force participation decision. The channels through which personality traits effect labor force participation are manifold and depend on the specific trait. Aggregation of traits to a single index is therefore a suboptimal strategy. --
... Taken collectively, findings from the Bing study over many decades converge with those from other studies of 'willpower' and executive functions at the social cognitive (e.g. Mischel and Ayduk, 2004) and brain levels of analysis (Casey et al., 1997Casey et al., , 2000 Ainslie and Monterosso, 2004; McClure et al., 2004; Hare et al., 2005; Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Nee and Jonides, 2008; Somerville et al., in press). They lead to a clear, albeit still tentative, set of hypotheses about the 'Willpower' over the life span: decomposing self-regulation SCAN (2010) 3 of 5 underlying cognitive mechanisms, as discussed above, that we are currently testing. ...
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In the 1960s, Mischel and colleagues developed a simple 'marshmallow test' to measure preschoolers' ability to delay gratification. In numerous follow-up studies over 40 years, this 'test' proved to have surprisingly significant predictive validity for consequential social, cognitive and mental health outcomes over the life course. In this article, we review key findings from the longitudinal work and from earlier delay-of-gratification experiments examining the cognitive appraisal and attention control strategies that underlie this ability. Further, we outline a set of hypotheses that emerge from the intersection of these findings with research on 'cognitive control' mechanisms and their neural bases. We discuss implications of these hypotheses for decomposing the phenomena of 'willpower' and the lifelong individual differences in self-regulatory ability that were identified in the earlier research and that are currently being pursued.
... The mismatch between the expected exponential discounting used in most TD models and the hyperbolic discounting seen in humans and other animals has been recognized for many years [5,8,37,38,41,71,72]. ...
... The mismatch between the expected exponential discounting used in most TD models and the hyperbolic discounting seen in humans and other animals has been recognized for many years [5,8,37,38,41,71,72]. ...
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Temporal-difference (TD) algorithms have been proposed as models of reinforcement learning (RL). We examine two issues of distributed representation in these TD algorithms: distributed representations of belief and distributed discounting factors. Distributed representation of belief allows the believed state of the world to distribute across sets of equivalent states. Distributed exponential discounting factors produce hyperbolic discounting in the behavior of the agent itself. We examine these issues in the context of a TD RL model in which state-belief is distributed over a set of exponentially-discounting "micro-Agents", each of which has a separate discounting factor (gamma). Each microAgent maintains an independent hypothesis about the state of the world, and a separate value-estimate of taking actions within that hypothesized state. The overall agent thus instantiates a flexible representation of an evolving world-state. As with other TD models, the value-error (delta) signal within the model matches dopamine signals recorded from animals in standard conditioning reward-paradigms. The distributed representation of belief provides an explanation for the decrease in dopamine at the conditioned stimulus seen in overtrained animals, for the differences between trace and delay conditioning, and for transient bursts of dopamine seen at movement initiation. Because each microAgent also includes its own exponential discounting factor, the overall agent shows hyperbolic discounting, consistent with behavioral experiments.
... S is the time-toreinforcement on the standard side, timed from the moment the animal becomes committed to the standard side; C is the time-toreinforcement on the time-left side, timed from the beginning of the trial; while T is the time elapsed since trial onset (see Figure 19). (As an interesting side note, if we use exponential discounting, a popular alternative to hyperbolic discounting in economics, although it is difficult to reconcile with experimental data [Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004], BEM fails to simulate the time-left procedure in that the indifference point is no longer a linear function of the interval on the standard side but something more like a logarithmic function of it). Just like the free-operant psychophysical procedure, the timeleft procedure is a free-operant procedure, hence Equation 16 applies to it and P(x) 1. But, one important difference between the time-left procedure and the free-operant psychophysical one is that the time-left procedure does not use a truly VI schedule: The time-of-(conditioned)-reinforcement is drawn randomly (and without replacement) from a finite list of n intervals distributed arithmetically: Now, time-without-a-reinforcement does convey some information about the likelihood that the next response will be reinforced. ...
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The authors propose a simple behavioral economic model (BEM) describing how reinforcement and interval timing interact. The model assumes a Weber-law-compliant logarithmic representation of time. Associated with each represented time value are the payoffs that have been obtained for each possible response. At a given real time, the response with the highest payoff is emitted. The model accounts for a wide range of data from procedures such as simple bisection, metacognition in animals, economic effects in free-operant psychophysical procedures, and paradoxical choice in double-bisection procedures. Although it assumes logarithmic time representation, it can also account for data from the time-left procedure usually cited in support of linear time representation. It encounters some difficulties in complex free-operant choice procedures, such as concurrent mixed fixed-interval schedules as well as some of the data on double bisection, which may involve additional processes. Overall, BEM provides a theoretical framework for understanding how reinforcement and interval timing work together to determine choice between temporally differentiated reinforcers.
... These results have been interpreted by the authors as reflecting the operation of two fundamentally different brain systems: one that is responsible for reasoning and future planning and one that motivates impatient emotional choices. However, this interpretation of the data seems to be somewhat premature (see Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004, for a critical discussion of this interpretation); hence, future research is needed to address this issue. ...
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This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate (usually referred to as akrasia) and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework (building on existing models of decision-making stages), focusing on option generation as an aspect that has been neglected by previous models. In the main body of this article, we review how both philosophy and neuropsychiatry have provided accounts of dysfunction in each decision-making stage, as well as where these accounts can be integrated. Also, the neural underpinnings of dysfunction in the three different stages are discussed. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of our integrative approach.
... Unlike gift certificates, drink rewards allow us to control both when reward is delivered and when it is consumed. Such control is absent from most previous studies of time discounting in people (Ainslie and Monterosso, 2004), which has generated debate over the validity of time discounting studies (Cubitt and Read, 2005). ...
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Previous research, involving monetary rewards, found that limbic reward-related areas show greater activity when an intertemporal choice includes an immediate reward than when the options include only delayed rewards. In contrast, the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex (areas commonly associated with deliberative cognitive processes, including future planning) respond to intertemporal choices in general but do not exhibit sensitivity to immediacy (McClure et al., 2004). The current experiments extend these findings to primary rewards (fruit juice or water) and time delays of minutes instead of weeks. Thirsty subjects choose between small volumes of drinks delivered at precise times during the experiment (e.g., 2 ml now vs 3 ml in 5 min). Consistent with previous findings, limbic activation was greater for choices between an immediate reward and a delayed reward than for choices between two delayed rewards, whereas the lateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex responded similarly whether choices were between an immediate and a delayed reward or between two delayed rewards. Moreover, relative activation of the two sets of brain regions predicts actual choice behavior. A second experiment finds that when the delivery of all rewards is offset by 10 min (so that the earliest available juice reward in any choice is 10 min), no differential activity is observed in limbic reward-related areas for choices involving the earliest versus only more delayed rewards. We discuss implications of this finding for differences between primary and secondary rewards.
... It was expected the difference would be greater. Thus, this is consistent with the literature suggesting the effect of incentives on behavior is complex [45,62]. ...
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Internet-based interventions hold promise as an effective channel for reaching large numbers of youth. However, log-on rates, a measure of program dose, have been highly variable. Methods to enhance log-on rate are needed. Incentives may be an effective method. This paper reports the effect of reinforcement schedule and recruitment method on log-on rates to an 8-week Internet-based obesity prevention program. It also explores trends in log-on rate. Girls were randomized to receive immediate (weekly) or delayed (program end) incentives ($5). The study was powered to detect a moderate-to-large effect (0.65). Overall log-on rate was 74.5%. A higher but not statistically different log-on rate was observed in the immediate incentive group (79%) than in the delayed incentive group (70%) (P = 0.118), and among girls recruited via media (80%) as opposed to non-media methods (69%) (P = 0.058). Trend analysis indicated a significant drop in log-on rate between weeks 4 and 5 among all participants (P = 0.009). Although an acceptable log-on rate was achieved in this program, there was a substantial drop between weeks 4 and 5. Identifying the reason that this occurred may provide insight into how to further enhance log-on rate. Recruitment method may influence log-on rate.
Chapter
Study of how we come to know—the nature of modeling and anticipation of our unpredictable, often dangerous environment—is the province of evolutionary epistemology. Constructivism depends upon knowledge being static or non-evolutionary and therefore cannot address the unforeseen and unknown in either our behavior or acquisition of knowledge. It has no anticipatory or feedforward mechanisms for the unanticipated. Likewise, constructivism has no mechanism for addressing error—either its detection or correction. Social or market orders (e.g., science) are sources of information used by agents to generate knowledge and to detect error. Trying to control science or the market by top-down intervention falsifies knowledge claims, fails to detect error, and reduces productivity in society. Socialism is not scientific, it kills inquiry by controlling its output.KeywordsAnticipatory systemsError eliminationCreativityControl
Chapter
This chapter begins by addressing questions about the meaning of life from the perspectives of both philosophy and psychiatry. The section on philosophy discusses objectivist and subjectivist positions on the question of meaning in life, and proposes an integrative approach that draws on the strengths of each. The section on psychiatry describes parallel debates in the clinic, and considers the question of whether psychotherapy should be aiming to facilitate a meaningful life. The view is put forward that we need to be wary of self-focused navel-gazing; meaning and purpose are found in engaging with the world, and we learn most about ourselves when we do this. Work in cognitive-affective neuroscience is then used to shed light on these philosophical and psychiatric debates. Finally, work on a range of relevant issues is discussed: free will and willpower, what it means to ‘find oneself’, the issue of individual differences in meaning-making; the concepts of truth, beauty, and goodness, and the nature of spirituality and generativity, so exemplifying and expanding the positions put forward here.
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This chapter discusses the involvement of certain prefrontal areas in the collection of sensory inputs, the generation of motor outputs, and their visceral and emotional functions, all of which undoubtedly serve the eminently integrative executive functions of the frontal lobe. Electrophysiological data corroborate the connective links of the prefrontal cortex. In accord with anatomical evidence, fiber connections of this cortex with other cortical regions, with the thalamus, and with the basal ganglia have been electrically traced. Significantly complementing and substantiating lesion studies, electrophysiological research has provided insight into the roles of the prefrontal cortex in sensory, motor, visceral/emotional, social, and executive functions. Because of the abundant convergence of sensory inputs on the cortex of the prefrontal convexity of the primate, it is justified to consider most of that cortex to be cortex of sensory association. It mediates behavioral and cognitive associations between stimuli of diverse origin and qualities. The prefrontal cortex also plays a role in sensorial attention. Electrophysiological research provides evidence of the prefrontal control of movement. Neuronal activity in the caudate nucleus, a major collector of output from the prefrontal cortex to motor systems, is modulated by abundant influences from prefrontal cortex. Orbital and medial areas of the prefrontal cortex control a variety of visceral and hormonal functions. Four executive functions have well-substantiated electrophysiological correlates: attention, working memory, anticipatory activity, and monitoring.
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In this paper a person-centered, actor-driven project simulation approach is presented that can cope with highly parallel tasks in multiple projects and can, therefore, help managers to plan concurrent product development projects. The task execution sequence is determined by means of a bounded rational choice model accounting for the urgency of tasks. The model creates realistic project dynamics using only a small number of input parameters. The project manager is, for instance, not forced to specify fixed predecessor-successor-relations of tasks. The model was validated with historical project data from a company of the German electronics industry. Using Student's t-tests the simulated project durations showed no significant derivation from the historical duration.
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Professor Joaquín M. Fuster is an eminent cognitive neuroscientist whose research over the last five decades has made fundamental contributions to our understanding of the neural structures underlying cognition and behaviour. This book provides his view on the eternal question of whether we have free will. Based on his seminal work on the functions of the prefrontal cortex in decision-making, planning, creativity, working memory, and language, Professor Fuster argues that the liberty or freedom to choose between alternatives is a function of the cerebral cortex, under prefrontal control, in its reciprocal interaction with the environment. Freedom is therefore inseparable from that circular relationship. ‘The Neuroscience of Freedom and Creativity’ is a fascinating inquiry into the cerebral foundation of our ability to choose between alternative actions and to freely lead creative plans to their goal.
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Die empirische Glücks-und Zufriedenheitsforschung kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass in den westlichen Wohlstandsgesellschaften beim steigendem Konsum das Niveau an Zufriedenheit und Wohlbefinden gleich geblieben ist. Für dieses konsumistische Paradoxon werden drei Erklärungen geliefert: (1) (neuro-) biologisch widerspricht das konsumistische Glücksversprechen der Spezieskonstitution, (2) der Konsum kommt in kognitiv-psychologischen Theorien des Well-being kaum vor und (3) determiniert auf der sozioökonomischen Ebene ein Lock-in Effekt die Pfadabhängigkeit des Konsums, dessen Höhe und Struktur über die (wohlfahrtsschädliche) Statuskonkurrenz bestimmt ist. Die vorherrschenden, nicht glücklich machenden Konsummuster sind demnach das Ergebnis eines Konditionierungsprozesses. Zur längerfristigen Re-Konditionierung dieser Konsummuster werden einige Lösungsansätze diskutiert.
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This paper explores the interface between personality psychology and economics. We examine the predictive power of personality and the stability of personality traits over the life cycle. We develop simple analytical frameworks for interpreting the evidence in personality psychology and suggest promising avenues for future research.
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The models of internal self-control that have recently been proposed by behavioral economists do not depict motivational interaction that occurs while temptation is present. Those models that include willpower at all either envision a faculty with a motivation (“strength”) different from the motives that are weighed in the marketplace of choice, or rely on incompatible goals among diverse brain centers. Both assumptions are questionable, but these models’ biggest problem is that they do not let resolutions withstand re-examination while being challenged by impulsive alternatives. The economists’ models all attempt to make a single equilibrium preference predictable from a person’s prior incentives. This was the original purpose of these models’ hyperboloid (“β–δ”) delay discount functions, which have been widely justified by the assumption that a person’s intertemporal inconsistency (impulsiveness) can be accounted for by the arousal of appetite for visceral rewards. Although arousal is clearly a factor in some cases of intertemporal inconsistency, it cannot be blamed for others, and furthermore does not necessarily imply hyperboloid discounting. The inadequacy of β–δ functions is particularly evident in models of internal self-control. I have reviewed several of these models, and have argued for a return to pure hyperbolic discount function as originally proposed, the relatively high tails of which can motivate a recursive process of self-prediction and thereby the formation of self-enforcing intertemporal contracts. Such a process does not require a separately motivated faculty of will, or incompatible goals among brain centers; but it also does not permit the prediction of unique preferences from prior incentives. KeywordsHyperbolic delay discounting–Intertemporal inconsistency–Self-control–Strength of will–Intertemporal bargaining–Visceral reward–Self as population–Economic models
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Printout. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Neuroeconomics has further bridged the once disparate fields of economics and psychology. Such convergence is almost exclusively attributable to changes within economics. Neuroeconomics has inspired more change within economics than within psychology because the most important findings in neuroeconomics have posed more of a challenge to the standard economic perspective. Neuroeconomics has primarily challenged the standard economic assumption that decision making is a unitary process--a simple matter of integrated and coherent utility maximization--suggesting instead that it is driven by the interaction between automatic and controlled processes. This article reviews neuroeconomic research in three domains of interest to both economists and psychologists: decision making under risk and uncertainty, intertemporal choice, and social decision making. In addition to reviewing new economic models inspired by this research, we also discuss how neuroeconomics may influence future work in psychology.
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This chapter provides an introduction to hyperbolic discounting. It supplies a promising mechanism for temporary preference. The implications of hyperbolic discounting clearly bear on phenomenon of temporary preference. A subject who discounts expected rewards hyperbolically is apt to choose imminent but inferior alternatives that one would pass up if he/she chose at a distance. Hyperbolic discounting provides a framework for understanding the cycles of resolution, indulgence, and regret that are the sin qua non of addiction. This chapter includes several problems with the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis, and provides suggestions as to how they might be solved within the hyperbolic discounting framework. Hyperbolic discounting motivates self-control; there have been many opinions about how people achieve self-control. The simplest would be that people learn to modify the steepness of their discount curves directly.
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Current thinking about Pavlovian conditioning differs substantially from that of 20 years ago. Yet the changes that have taken place remain poorly appreciated by psychologists generally. Traditional descriptions of conditioning as the acquired ability of one stimulus to evoke the original response to another because of their pairing are shown to be inadequate. They fail to characterize adequately the circumstances producing learning, the content of that learning, or the manner in which that learning influences performance. Instead, conditioning is now described as the learning of relations among events so as to allow the organism to represent its environment. Within this framework, the study of Pavlovian conditioning continues to be an intellectually active area, full of new discoveries and information relevant to other areas of psychology.
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Six male albino Holtzman rats were given a choice between a short-duration, immediate shock, and a long-duration, delayed shock. When Ss were given the opportunity to commit in advance to the shorter, more immediate shock, thereby avoiding the subsequent choice, they did so. The number of commitment responses increased with time between the opportunity for commitment and when the shocks occurred (Exp I). Control experiments showed that if a "nonleverpress response" resulted in the short-duration shock, lever responding decreased (Exp II). If a commitment response still resulted in the later choice having to be made, the number of commitment responses also decreased (Exp III). (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Describes a theory of temporal control which treats responding of animal Ss at asymptote under a variety of learning procedures. Ss are viewed as making estimates of the time to reinforcement delivery using a scalar-timing process, which rescales estimates for different values of the interval being timed. Scalar-timing implies a constant coefficient of variation. Expectancies of reward based on these estimates are formed, and a discrimination between response alternatives is made by taking a ratio of their expectancies. In periodic schedules of reinforcement the discrimination is between local and overall expectancy of reward. In psychophysical studies of duration discrimination, the expectancy ratio reduces the likelihood ratio, and in conjunction with the scalar property, results in a general form of Weber's law. The psychometric choice function describing preference for different amounts and delays of reinforcement also results in a form of Weber's law. (102 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Hyperbolic discount functions induce dynamically inconsistent preferences, implying a motive for consumers to constrain their own future choices. This paper analyzes the decisions of a hyperbolic consumer who has access to an imperfect commitment technology: an illiquid asset whose sale must be initiated one period before the sale proceeds are received. The model predicts that consumption tracks income, and the model explains why consumers have asset-specific marginal propensities to consume. The model suggests that financial innovation may have caused the ongoing decline in U. S. savings rates, since financial innovation increases liquidity, eliminating commitment opportunities. Finally, the model implies that financial market innovation may reduce welfare by providing “too much” liquidity.
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Projections from cortical and subcortical limbic structures to the basal ganglia are predominantly directed to the ventral striatum. The present study investigated how the expectation of external events with behavioral significance is reflected in the activity of ventral striatal neurons. A total of 420 neurons were studied in macaque monkeys performing in a delayed go-no-go task. Lights of different colors instructed the animal to do an arm-reaching movement or refrain from moving, respectively, when a trigger light was illuminated a few seconds later. Task performance was reinforced by liquid reward in both situations. A total of 60 ventral striatal neurons showed sustained increases of activity before the occurrence of individual task events. In 43 of these neurons, activations specifically preceded the delivery of reward, independent of the movement or no-movement reaction. In a series of additional tests, these activations were time locked to the subsequent reward, disappeared within a few trials when reward was omitted, and were temporally unrelated to mouth movements. Changes in the appetitive value of the reward liquid modified the magnitude of activations, suggesting a possible relationship to the hedonic properties of the expected event. Activations also occurred when reward was delivered in a predictable manner outside of any behavioral task. These data suggest that neurons in the ventral striatum are activated during states of expectation of individual environmental events that are predictable to the subject through its past experience. The prevalence of activations related to the expectation of reward suggests that ventral striatal neurons have access to central representations of reward and thereby participate in the processing of information underlying the motivational control of goal-directed behavior.
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Certain classes of stimuli, such as food and drugs, are highly effective in activating reward regions. We show in humans that activity in these regions can be modulated by the predictability of the sequenced delivery of two mildly pleasurable stimuli, orally delivered fruit juice and water. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, the activity for rewarding stimuli in both the nucleus accumbens and medial orbitofrontal cortex was greatest when the stimuli were unpredictable. Moreover, the subjects' stated preference for either juice or water was not directly correlated with activity in reward regions but instead was correlated with activity in sensorimotor cortex. For pleasurable stimuli, these findings suggest that predictability modulates the response of human reward regions, and subjective preference can be dissociated from this response.
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Two experiments tested the efficacy of linking a current choice with similar future choices as a means of increasing self-control. Participants were offered choices between smaller and sooner vs. larger and later amounts of money (Experiment 1, n = 60) or food (Experiment 2, n = 34). After a small-large pair for which the participant preferred the smaller reward was found, a choice between the same pair was offered as the 1st of 5 such choices to be offered over a period of weeks. The majority of participants in both experiments who chose between all 5 smaller and all 5 larger rewards chose the larger rewards. One third of participants in Experiment 1 who could choose independently on each pair in the series reversed their previous preference and chose the larger reward in the context of the series. These results suggest that self-control can be enhanced by viewing one's current choice as predictive of future choices.
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Impulsive choice can be defined as temporary preference for a smaller-sooner reward (SS) over a larger-later reward (LL). Hyperbolic discounting implies that impulsive choices will occur less when organisms choose between a series of SSs versus LLs all at once than when they choose between single SS versus LL pairs. Eight rats were exposed to two conditions of an intertemporal choice paradigm using sucrose solution as reward. In both conditions, the LL was 150 microl delayed by 3 s, while the SS was an immediate reward that ranged from 25-150 microl across sessions. Preference for the LL was greater when the chosen reward was automatically delivered three times in succession (bundled) than when it was chosen singly and delivered after each choice. For each of the 8 rats, the estimated SS amount that produced indifference was higher in the bundled condition than in the single condition. Because bundling in humans may be based on the perception that one's current choice is predictive of future choices, the data presented here may demonstrate an important building block of self-control.
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