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10.1177/0146167205276429PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETINGalinsky et al. / REGULATORY FOCUS AND NEGOTIATIONS
Regulatory Focus at the Bargaining Table:
Promoting Distributive and Integrative Success
Adam D. Galinsky
Northwestern University
Geoffrey J. Leonardelli
University of Toronto
Gerardo A. Okhuysen
University of Utah
Thomas Mussweiler
University of Cologne
The authors demonstrate that in dyadic negotiations, negotia-
tors with a promotion regulatory focus achieve superior outcomes
than negotiators with prevention regulatory focus in two ways.
First, a promotion focus leads negotiators to claim more resources
at the bargaining table. In the first two studies, promotion-
focused negotiators paid more attention to their target prices
(i.e., their ideal outcomes) and achieved more advantageous dis-
tributive outcomes than did prevention-focused negotiators. The
second study also reveals an important mediating process: Nego-
tiators with a promotion focus made more extreme opening offers
in their favor. Second, a promotion focus leads negotiators to cre
-
ate more resources at the bargaining table that benefit both par
-
ties. A third study demonstrated that in a multi-issue negotia
-
tion, a promotion focus increased the likelihood that a dyad
achieved a jointly optimal or Pareto efficient outcome compared
to prevention-focused dyads. The discussion focuses on the role of
regulatory focus in social interaction and introduces the notion
of interaction fit.
Keywords: regulatory focus; negotiations; social interaction; distribu
-
tive outcomes; integrative outcomes
To become successful negotiators, individuals must
carefully navigate conflicting tendencies to compete and
maximize self-interest, on one hand, and to cooperate
and maximize joint interests, on the other (Carnevale &
Pruitt, 1992). The mixed-motive setting of most bargain
-
ing situations can make negotiators feel torn between a
drive to bargain hard and risk walking away from mutu
-
ally beneficial agreements, or bargain soft and risk fail
-
ing to claim as much of the resource as they could. To be
most effective, negotiators must both create as “large a
pie” as possible, to produce the most economically effi-
cient agreements, and “claim” as much of that pie as pos-
sible, to satisfy their self-interest. An important research
question, then, is how might individuals circumvent this
conflict to simultaneously compete and cooperate to
achieve favorable agreements.
This tension between competition and cooperation
connects to the larger and more fundamental challenge
of how individuals regulate their thoughts, emotions,
and behavior. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998)
was created to explicate how individuals self-regulate
toward desired end states. Regulatory focus emphasizes
that there are two distinct types of needs, nurturance and
security, toward which individuals may self-regulate and
that the processes of self-regulation are fundamentally
altered depending on which type of need is of primary
concern at any given point. Despite the widespread influ
-
ence of regulatory focus on thoughts, emotions, and
behavior (for a review, see Higgins, 1998), little research
has examined the role of regulatory focus in interper
-
sonal interaction more generally and in competitive,
mixed-motive, social interactions more specifically. In
1087
Authors’ Note: We are indebted to Don Moore for his helpful and in
-
sightful comments on a draft of this article. Correspondence may be
addressed to Adam D. Galinsky, Department of Management and Or
-
ganizations, Leverone Hall, Kellogg School of Management, North
-
western University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208; e-mail:
agalinsky@northwestern.edu.
PSPB, Vol. 31 No. 8, August 2005 1087-1098
DOI: 10.1177/0146167205276429
© 2005 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
the current studies, we investigated the effect that regu
-
latory focus has on negotiations, on the creation and
distribution of resources.
REGULATORY FOCUS
At the core of regulatory focus theory is the notion
that people are driven to approach pleasure and to avoid
pain. Sometimes people are motivated more by the
desire to secure pleasure and other times by the desire
to elude pain. Underneath these different ways to navi
-
gate the physical and social landscape are two funda
-
mental concerns, nurturance and security. Nurturance
needs activate and are best met through a promotion
focus in which people tend to be concerned with
accomplishments, hopes, and aspirations (Higgins,
1998). Promotion-focused individuals are directed
toward achieving positive outcomes, on attaining their
ideals, and this focus is characterized by a general state
of eagerness. By contrast, individuals with security con
-
cerns tend to adopt a prevention focus, a state of self-
regulation concerned with safety, responsibilities, and
obligations (Higgins, 1998). These individuals are
focused on avoiding negative outcomes, and this focus is
characterized by a general state of vigilance. Thus, the
regulatory foci, promotion and prevention, are distinct
states and result in divergent strategic inclinations for
achieving the desired end states of nurturance and secu-
rity, respectively.
Regulatory focus can both be conceived as a chronic
state and as a momentary product of the situation. The
individual difference approach recognizes that some
individuals differ in the extent to which they chronically
focus on hopes and nurturance concerns or on obliga
-
tions and safety concerns. Higgins (1998) suggests that
these chronic states emerge from different patterns of
parenting, with a promotion regulatory focus associated
with withholding or withdrawing love and a prevention
regulatory focus associated with punishment as forms of
parental discipline. Not only can regulatory focus be
considered a chronic state but certain situations make
one regulatory focus predominant over the other.
Because all individuals, regardless of their chronic focus,
are capable of adopting either of the two regulatory foci,
each can be dominant at any one time. Situationally
induced regulatory focus can, for example, be brought
on by asking people to think about their hopes and aspi
-
rations (promotion focus) or duties and obligations
(prevention focus) or by task instructions that
emphasize either gains (promotion focus) or losses
(prevention focus).
A vast literature has accumulated showing the wide
-
spread effects of regulatory focus. Promotion-focused
individuals are more open to change (Liberman, Idson,
Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), generate more hypotheses
(Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001), but make
more errors of commission (Crowe & Higgins, 1997)
and experience cheerfulness after positive outcomes
and dejection after negative outcomes (Shah & Higgins,
2001). Prevention-focused individuals, on the other
hand, are fixated on stability (Liberman et al., 1999) and
excluding erroneous hypotheses (Liberman et al.,
2001), they tend to make errors of omission (Crowe &
Higgins, 1997), and experience relief after positive out
-
comes and agitation after negative outcomes (Shah &
Higgins, 2001).
Despite the voluminous literature, little research has
investigated how regulatory focus plays out in actual
social situations. Even the studies that have touched on
social interaction have generally not had participants
actually engage in interpersonal interaction while under
the influence of one of the regulatory foci. For example,
Camacho, Higgins, and Luger (2003) found that regula
-
tory focus affected the attractiveness of different ways of
responding to conflict-laden situations but they did not
have participants actually engage in conflict resolution.
Similarly, Sassenberg, Kessler, and Mummendey (2003)
found that regulatory focus affected the amount and
type of ingroup favoritism, but their participants made
resource allocation decisions between unknown
ingroup and outgroup members with whom they had no
actual interaction. We sought to take regulatory focus
theory into a truly interactive context, a face-to-face
negotiation, where individuals compete for scarce
resources but also need to cooperate to meet their own
needs and those of their negotiating partner. Specifi-
cally, we sought to answer the question: Which type of
regulatory foci, promotion or prevention, will benefit
both the negotiator and the negotiating dyad?
ACHIEVING SUCCESS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE
Before turning to the question of which regulatory
focus is better suited for achieving success, it is useful to
consider the factors that generally arm the negotiator
with advantages at the bargaining table. Negotiation out
-
comes depend heavily on which goals and standards are
made salient before and during the negotiation. The
points a negotiator attends to within his or her bargain
-
ing position have profound effects on the resources a
negotiator claims at the bargaining table. For example, a
negotiator who concentrates on his or her ideal or most
preferred outcome (target price) will typically achieve a
more advantageous outcome than the negotiator that
concentrates on a minimally acceptable settlement price
(reservation price; Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec,
2002; White & Neale, 1994). Another standard that influ
-
ences the negotiation process is the level of a first or
opening offer (Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972;
Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Liebert, Smith, Hill, &
1088 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Keiffer, 1968). Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001), for
example, found that the amount of the first offer affects
outcomes, with more extreme or aggressive first offers
leading to better outcomes for the person making that
first offer. In fact, initial offers tend to be better predic
-
tors of final settlement prices than subsequent conces
-
sionary behavior (Yukl, 1974). Across a number of differ
-
ent articles, negotiating contexts, and experimental
manipulations, the aggressiveness of the first offer often
explains more than 50% of the variance in final out
-
comes (Galinsky et al., 2002; Galinsky & Mussweiler,
2001; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). Finally, it is
important to note that there is a relationship between
target prices and the aggressiveness of first offers:
Negotiators fixated on their target prices make more
extreme first offers (Galinsky et al., 2002).
Focusing on target prices, setting aggressive goals,
making the first offer, and making aggressive first offers
have all been shown to lead negotiators to secure better
agreements for themselves at the bargaining table. In
the current research, we examine if one of the regula
-
tory foci, promotion or prevention, can lead to these
behaviors and, by extension, to these outcomes. By defi-
nition, the promotion regulatory focus is directed to
achieving ideals, contemplating one’s hopes and aspira-
tions, and approaching positive outcomes. Therefore,
we predict that the promotion regulatory focus will lead
to more advantageous outcomes and will do so by
increasing the attention of negotiators to target prices
and by leading to more extreme opening offers. Thus, a
promotion regulatory focus should provide the negotia-
tor with an advantage at the bargaining table. The first
two studies investigate whether a promotion focus will
give a negotiator a bargaining advantage. In these stud
-
ies, we used a single-issue negotiation, which is typically
called a distributive negotiation because the two
negotiators are only competing over the distribution of
the resources from this one issue.
A promotion regulatory focus also may have advan
-
tages for the negotiating dyad that go beyond the ones
provided for an individual negotiator. Such a situation
could occur in negotiations that involve multiple issues.
In many multiple-issue negotiations, both negotiators
will not prioritize the issues in the same order because,
although some issues may be more important to one
party, they may be less important to the other party. As a
result, both negotiators can improve their outcomes by
conceding on low priority issues in exchange for their
most preferred outcome on high priority issues, a tech
-
nique called logrolling (Froman & Cohen, 1970). Thus,
multiple-issue negotiations are often called integrative
negotiations because people can integrate their conflict
-
ing priorities to achieve the most efficient outcome that
“expands the pie.” To the extent that negotiators are
able to integrate their conflicting priorities, an agree
-
ment is said to be more “efficient,” and an agreement is
considered to be maximally or Pareto efficient if there
are no possible agreements that would improve the util
-
ity of one or both parties without hurting either party
(Thompson, 1990, 2001; Tripp & Sondak, 1992). Mere
compromise, or simply “splitting” all issues down the
middle, is an impediment to reaching Pareto-efficient
agreements; instead, negotiators should use the
logrolling technique. We contend that one way that
negotiators can resist the temptation to simply compro
-
mise is by focusing on their target prices and setting high
aspirations. Knowing what one wants should allow the
negotiator to achieve the best possible outcomes on high
priority issues in exchange for concession on low priority
ones. Thus, a promotion focus, relative to a prevention
focus, may yield a greater likelihood of reaching a
Pareto-efficient outcome because individuals will probe
more aggressively for opportunities to achieve their
aspirations.
These predictions for regulatory focus in distributive
and integrative negotiations were tested in the following
three studies. We follow the example set by Higgins and
colleagues in their work by first measuring regulatory
focus in Study 1 and then manipulating it in Studies 2
and 3. Studies 1 and 2 investigate whether a negotiator in
promotion regulatory focus will achieve a better distrib-
utive outcome for himself or herself than a prevention-
focused negotiator and whether a promotion focus
advantage leads to greater attention to target prices.
Study 2 also explores whether a promotion focus leads
negotiators to make more extreme and aggressive open-
ing offers. Because placing both negotiators into the
same regulatory focus could cancel out the effects, we
measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) the regu
-
latory focus of only one of the negotiators in each dyad.
Finally, Study 3 examines whether a promotion focus
leads to the achievement of Pareto-efficient outcomes.
STUDY 1
The first study tested the hypothesis that greater pro
-
motion focus leads to better outcomes in a distributive
negotiation. To test this prediction, participants
engaged in a job negotiation concerning a signing
bonus. Prior to the negotiation, we measured the regula
-
tory focus of participants who played the role of the
recruiter,
1
whose goal was to pay the lowest possible
bonus to the candidate. We used a continuous measure
of regulatory focus, with higher numbers indicating
more promotion focus. We predicted that the more the
recruiter reported approaching negotiations with a pro
-
motion focus, the lower the final bonus would be in this
negotiation.
Galinsky et al. / REGULATORY FOCUS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1089
Greater promotion focus was predicted to yield better
outcomes in part because promotion focus should lead
to greater attention to an individual’s ideal outcome, or
target price; that is, the more negotiators report focusing
on promotion, the greater attention they will give to
their target prices. In addition, this study tested a second
possible explanation for why promotion focus might
lead to a better distributive outcome than prevention
focus. Individuals with a prevention focus seem more
concerned with meeting other people’s expectations
(Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000) and are concerned with
avoiding negative outcomes. As a result, individuals with
a prevention focus may be more concerned with secur
-
ing an agreement, and therefore may pay more attention
to meeting their lowest acceptable (or reservation)
price. Thus, the more the negotiators reported focusing
on promotion, the less attention we predicted that they
would give to their reservation prices.
Method
Participants and procedure. In all, 52 master’s of busi
-
ness administration (MBA) students, enrolled in a nego-
tiations course, participated in the 2nd week of the
course. The sex distribution of the MBA classes is
approximately 28% female, with a mean age of 28 years
old. Because this was the 2nd week of class, participants
were not expert in negotiations yet but they were knowl-
edgeable of core negotiation terms.
2
In all of the negotia-
tions in this and the following studies, participants nego-
tiated with their partners in relatively soundproof rooms
so they could not hear or observe other dyads
negotiating.
The participants were randomly assigned to 26 nego
-
tiating dyads, where they represented the recruiter or
candidate in the simulated negotiation, “The Bonus”
(see Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, & Galinsky, 2003; Galinsky
et al., 2002; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Recruiters
were told that they were the director of personnel, that
the firm was hiring only one candidate this year, and that
the employment negotiation had been finalized except
for the signing bonus. In addition, they were informed
that the largest bonus the company was willing to offer
was $20,000 (they were told this was the highest bonus
the firm had ever paid) but the firm would prefer to pay
$5,000, thus minimizing its costs. By contrast, candidates
were told that they were a 2nd-year MBA from a presti
-
gious university and they already possessed an offer from
a well-respected Boston consulting firm. Although the
Boston firm had only offered $5,000, the candidate had
heard that bonuses of up to $30,000 had been offered to
others in the consulting field. To accept the offer of
employment in the current negotiation, the candidate
needed to get at least $10,000 as a signing bonus. In
other words, the recruiter had a reservation price of
$20,000 and a target price of $5,000, whereas the candi
-
date had a reservation price of $10,000 and a target price
of $30,000. Thus, the bargaining zone ranged from
$10,000 to $20,000 (i.e., the distance between the two
negotiators’ reservation prices), yielding a range of
$10,000.
3
If the negotiators could not agree on a bonus
amount, they could choose to declare impasse and not
reach a deal.
Before negotiating, recruiters were asked, “Do you
focus more on avoiding negative outcomes in negotia
-
tions or do you focus more on approaching positive out
-
comes in negotiations?” and responded using an 8-point
scale (1 = focus more on avoiding negative outcomes,8=focus
more on approaching positive outcomes). This measure repre
-
sented our index of regulatory focus; lower numbers
indicated greater prevention focus and higher numbers
indicated greater promotion focus.
4
After the negotiation, recruiters were given a
postnegotiation form that asked them two questions, “To
what extent did you focus on the least price you would
accept before walking away from this negotiation?” and
“To what extent did you focus on the ideal price that you
could get from the negotiation?” Participants responded
to each question using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all,7=
very much). These ratings represented measures of atten-
tion to reservation and target price, respectively. After
the negotiation, participants were fully debriefed as part
of the class discussion.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 summarizes recruiters’ regulatory focus ten
-
dencies, attention to their target prices, attention to the
reservation prices, and the outcome. All negotiating
dyads reached an agreement and, therefore, there were
no impasses. The results are presented from the perspec
-
tive of the recruiter, such that lower agreements indicate
lower costs and, thus, better outcomes. Consistent with
predictions, as recruiters focused more on promotion,
they achieved lower costs by agreeing to smaller bonuses.
In addition, as recruiters focused more on promotion,
they also reported paying more attention to their target
prices. Consistent with past research that demonstrates
that as individuals pay more attention to their aspira
-
tions they obtain better outcomes (Galinsky et al., 2002),
recruiters who paid more attention to their target prices
achieved better outcomes. Finally, regulatory focus was
uncorrelated with the extent to which participants paid
attention to their least acceptable price, and this variable
was not correlated with final outcomes.
The evidence collected in Study 1 supported our pre
-
dictions. The more an individual had a promotion focus,
the better the outcome that individual received for him
-
1090 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
self or herself. In addition, the more individuals
reported focusing on promotion, the more they were
likely to pay attention to their target prices. Of interest,
this study did not support the prediction that greater
prevention focus would yield greater attention to the res
-
ervation price (which would have resulted in a signifi
-
cant negative correlation between the two variables).
STUDY 2
The first study provided correlational evidence that a
promotion regulatory focus leads to better distributive
outcomes than does a prevention regulatory focus. The
second study was designed to replicate this effect and to
test it experimentally to establish causal support for the
hypothesis. To test this prediction, participants engaged
in a negotiation over the sale of a pharmaceutical plant.
We experimentally manipulated the buyer’s regulatory
focus (promotion vs. prevention). Thus, buyers who
were primed with a promotion regulatory focus were
expected to pay more attention to their target prices and
to minimize their cost by agreeing to a lower sales price
for the plant (a better outcome for them) than buyers
who were primed with a prevention regulatory focus.
In addition, this study examined the extent to which a
promotion focus produces more extreme or aggressive
opening offers and whether the aggressiveness of open
-
ing offers might account for why a promotion focus
yields better outcomes than a prevention focus. Focus on
target price has been shown to lead to more extreme
opening offers (Galinsky et al., 2002). Individuals with a
promotion focus may be more likely to make aggressive
opening offers as a way to achieve their aspirations; that
is, extreme offers may represent a strategy particularly
suited for achieving promotion goals. Previous research
(Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001) has established that open
-
ing offers in deal-making can anchor the final outcome
in a negotiation so that more extreme opening offers
lead to better distributive outcomes for the person mak
-
ing that offer. Thus, a promotion focus may lead individ
-
uals to focus on their target prices, resulting in more
extreme opening offers, which in turn should lead to
better distributive negotiation outcomes.
Method
Participants and procedure. In all, 54 MBA students who
were enrolled in a course on negotiations participated
during the 1st week of the course. They were randomly
assigned to 27 negotiating dyads and conducted the sim
-
ulated negotiation called “Synertech-Dosagen” (for
details, see Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), where a buyer
and seller negotiated the purchase of a pharmaceutical
plant. Both negotiators were given the same general
information regarding the plant. The plant was located
in an area with many start-up biotechnology firms and an
experienced, but highly mobile, workforce. The seller
purchased the plant 3 years before for $15 million,
which was below market value because the previous
seller was in bankruptcy, and the plant was appraised 2
years ago for $19 million. The local real estate market
had declined 5% since then but the plant was a unique
property and thus general real estate trends might not
apply. Finally, a plant similar to this one recently sold for
$26 million. If the negotiators could not agree on a sale
price, they could choose to declare an impasse.
Buyers also were told that as chief financial officer,
they needed to purchase a new plant for their company
to manufacture a highly specialized compound. The
plant for sale had a number of advantages (i.e., it was cur
-
rently in operation, had FDA approval, and had a well-
trained workforce, if they could be retained) and a major
disadvantage (i.e., it was far from the company’s head
-
quarters and research and development [R&D] facility).
They were told that their “best alternative to a negotiated
agreement” (i.e., BATNA) was to build a new plant at a
cost of $25 million. This new plant would take a year to
be fully operational (including FDA approval) and
would be close to headquarters. By contrast, sellers were
told that they were selling the plant because the com
-
pany they represented was phasing out the product line
that the plant produced. The sellers’ BATNA was to strip
the plant and sell the equipment separately; the pro
-
jected profit if the plant were stripped would be $17 mil
-
lion. Thus, the bargaining zone for this negotiation
ranged from $17 million to $25 million, a range of $9
million.
Galinsky et al. / REGULATORY FOCUS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1091
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations: Study 1
MSD Range 1 2 3
1. Regulatory focus 5.50 1.10 4-8 1.0
2. Attention to target price 5.31 .74 4-7 .44** 1.0
3. Attention to reservation price 3.50 .76 2-5 .02 –.36* 1.0
4. Outcome (bonus) $14,160 $2,796 $10,000-$19,000 –.40** –.49** .04
NOTE: For each dyad, only the recruiter completed the first three variables. For regulatory focus, higher numbers indicate greater promotion focus
for the recruiter. For outcome, lower scores indicate better outcomes for the recruiter.
*p < .10. **p < .05.
Regulatory focus manipulation. Prior to reading their
role materials, all participants were asked to write down
their thoughts about negotiations, but only buyers were
induced to adopt a promotion or prevention focus. Buy
-
ers in the Promotion Condition were told, “Please take a
couple of minutes to briefly describe the negotiation
behaviors and outcomes you hope to achieve during this
class. Think about how you could promote these behaviors
and outcomes.” Buyers in the Prevention Condition
were told, “Please take a couple of minutes to briefly
describe the negotiation behaviors and outcomes you
seek to avoid during this class. Think about how you
could prevent these behaviors and outcomes.” By con
-
trast, all of the sellers were simply asked, “Please take a
couple of minutes to briefly describe the types of ques
-
tions you hope to answer in this negotiation class.”
After participants completed the negotiation, buyers
were given a postnegotiation questionnaire. First, buyers
recorded their opening offer. Next, they wrote down the
negotiation’s outcome and finally answered the same
two questions from Study 1 about the extent to which
they paid attention to their reservation and target prices.
After the negotiation, participants were fully debriefed
as part of the class discussion.
Results and Discussion
All dyads reached an agreement. Consistent with pre-
dictions, buyers with a promotion focus were more suc-
cessful in reducing their costs by agreeing to lower sales
prices (M = 21.24, SD = 2.52) than those with a preven-
tion focus (M = 24.07, SD = 2.10). The plant’s sale price
was submitted to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
regulatory focus as the between-participant predictor.
Analysis revealed that regulatory focus significantly
predicted the plant’s sale price, F(1, 25) = 9.95, p = .004.
Also, promotion-focused buyers (M = 5.14, SD = 1.10)
paid more attention to their target prices than did
prevention-focused buyers (M = 4.23, SD = 1.17), F(1,
25) = 4.38, p = .05. As in Study 1, there was no effect of
regulatory focus on attention to reservation prices, F <1.
Overall, then, an experimental design replicated the
effects found in Study 1.
Novel to Study 2, however, is an examination of open
-
ing offers. Consistent with the goal of reducing the cost
of the purchase, buyers with a promotion focus reported
lower opening offers (M = 16.83, SD = 2.59) than did buy
-
ers with a prevention focus (M = 20.77, SD = 2.41), F(1,
25) = 16.68, p < .001. This pattern suggests that opening
offers may mediate the extent to which the regulatory
focus manipulation affected the plant’s final sale price.
According to the criteria required to establish a medi
-
ated relationship (Baron & Kenny, 1986), the regulatory
focus manipulation first must predict the plant’s sale
price and opening offers. Both of these criteria have
been met. Furthermore, opening offers must be posi
-
tively correlated with the plant’s sale price; consistent
with this criterion, analysis revealed that opening offers
were highly correlated with the plant’s sale price, r(25) =
.72, p < .001, with lower initial offers leading to lower
final sales prices. A final analysis submitted sale price to a
regression analysis with regulatory focus and opening
offers entered as simultaneous predictors. For this analy-
sis, regulatory focus was dummy coded; those in the pre-
vention condition were assigned a 0, those in the promo-
tion condition were assigned a 1. Analysis revealed that
opening offers remained a significant predictor of sale
price (β = .64, p = .002). However, regulatory focus no
longer significantly predicted sale price (β = –.13, p =
.49) and, in addition, the change in the association
between regulatory focus and sale price was significant
(z = –2.64, p = .008). A summary of the mediation analy
-
ses is presented in Figure 1. Thus, it appears that open
-
ing offers mediated the association between regulatory
focus and sale price.
Although we found no differences in attention to res
-
ervation prices, it is interesting to note that 3 of the 13
(23%) prevention-focused negotiators, but only 1 of 14
(7%) promotion-focused negotiators, reached agree
-
ments that were worse than their best alternative to build
a new plant. According to prescriptive negotiation the
-
ory, individuals should walk away from a negotiation
and declare an impasse when they cannot reach an
agreement better than their best alternative available,
yet prevention-focused negotiators seemed less likely to
do so. Recent research suggests that when negotiators
fear the possibility of impasse, they inappropriately
reduce their reservation prices and agree to outcomes
that are worse than their alternatives (Diekmann et al.,
2003). Perhaps prevention-focused negotiators, who are
geared toward security needs and avoiding negative out
-
comes, fear and try to protect against the possibility of
impasse, thereby making themselves more susceptible to
inferior agreements. Or, perhaps prevention-focused
1092 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Opening
Offers
Regulatory
Focus
–.63**
Plant Sale
Price
.72**
–.
53
**/–.13
/.64**
Figure 1 Opening offers as a mediator of regulatory focus on plant’s
sale price: Study 2.
NOTE: Numbers to the right of the slash are associations resulting
from the simultaneous regression analysis. All others are bivariate cor
-
relations. All participants were buyers and thus wanted lower prices.
For these analyses, regulatory focus was dummy coded (0 = prevention,
1 = promotion).
**p < .05.
negotiators commit to these inferior agreements
because they tend to pursue behaviors that minimize
interpersonal rejection (Ayduk, May, Downey, & Hig
-
gins, 2003). Although not our current goal, an excellent
direction for future research will be to determine when
regulatory focus affects the decision to walk away from
the bargaining table.
Consistent with Study 1, Study 2 experimentally dem
-
onstrated that promotion-focused negotiators achieved
more beneficial outcomes and had a greater focus on
target prices than did prevention-focused negotiators.
Study 2 also revealed that individuals with a promotion
focus made more extreme opening offers and that these
opening offers mediated the extent to which regulatory
focus affected the final outcome of the negotiation.
STUDY 3
Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated that promotion-
focused negotiators achieve superior distributive out
-
comes for themselves than do prevention-focused nego
-
tiators in single-issue negotiations. Study 3 examined the
role of regulatory focus in a multi-issue negotiation, one
that contained integrative possibilities. We specifically
explored whether a promotion focus would produce
more Pareto-efficient outcomes.
As Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated, individuals
with a promotion focus attended more to their target
prices. Target price focus may allow individuals to be
optimizers or maximizers rather than satisficers
(Schwartz et al., 2002; Simon, 1955); that is, target price
focus may lead negotiators to avoid satisficing on a mini-
mally acceptable agreement. Struggling to meet one’s
ideal outcome should force negotiators to avoid merely
compromising and splitting the issues down the middle;
they should try to maximize their outcomes and in doing
so discover mutually beneficial trade-offs that can be
logrolled. We expected, therefore, that a promotion reg
-
ulatory focus also can help identify integrative outcomes
and achieve Pareto efficiency because it will lead negoti
-
ators to try and meet their target prices (Lax & Sebenius,
1986; Pruitt, 1983).
In Study 3, we also examined an alternative to the
robustness of the promotion regulatory advantage at the
bargaining table, exploring whether there is a bargain
-
ing situation in which a prevention regulatory focus
might be particularly helpful for negotiators. Recent
work on regulatory focus suggests that task performance
depends on the relative fit between one’s regulatory
focus and task demands (Higgins, 200l; Higgins, Idson,
Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). For example, a pre
-
vention regulatory focus is associated with greater per
-
formance on tasks that require vigilance because there is
a “fit” between the regulatory focus and the task strate
-
gies (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Foerster, Higgins, & Idson,
1998). Thus, the Pareto efficiency of each regulatory
focus may depend in part on the type of resources indi
-
viduals are negotiating over. Individuals may be negotiat
-
ing over desirable benefits (e.g., money, enjoyable activi
-
ties, and natural resources) or, in contrast, they might be
negotiating over burdens that they wish to avoid (e.g.,
debt, undesirable tasks, and hazardous waste; Mannix,
Neale, & Northcraft, 1995; Okhuysen, Galinsky, &
Uptigrove, 2003; Sondak, Neale, & Pinkley, 1995). Bene
-
fits are seen as positive, as rewards that individuals aspire
to, whereas burdens are seen as negative, as punish
-
ments to be avoided. Individuals perceive that negotiat
-
ing over the distribution of burdens is more contentious
(Okhuysen et al., 2003), which makes it more difficult to
reach an agreement (Mannix et al., 1995). Even when
agreements are reached, outcomes concerning burdens
are less efficient than agreements over benefits
(Okhuysen et al., 2003; Sondak et al., 1995).
Based on the notion of regulatory fit, it is possible that
when individuals are negotiating the amount of a bur
-
den they are willing to accept, a prevention regulatory
focus may lead to more Pareto optimal outcomes than
would a promotion regulatory focus. When individuals
take a prevention focus, they want to avoid negative out-
comes. When negotiating over burdens, there would be
a fit between task strategy (avoiding burdens) and a pre-
vention regulatory focus, and this fit may make it easier
for negotiators to uncover integrative outcomes neces-
sary for achieving Pareto optimality. In contrast, when
resources are framed as benefits, a promotion focus may
lead to more efficient outcomes than a prevention focus
because a promotion focus is congruent with the goal of
achieving positive benefits. When regulatory focus fits
resource valence, achieving the Pareto optimal outcome
should be more likely.
Study 3 tested whether a promotion regulatory focus
would uniformly increase the number of Pareto optimal
agreements regardless of the valence of the resource to
be negotiated or whether the integrative advantages of a
promotion regulatory focus would be limited to negotia
-
tions over the distribution of benefits. The hypothesis
that promotion regulatory focus is a robust advantage at
the bargaining table argues for a main effect of regula
-
tory focus that is independent of resource valence. No
matter whether resources are framed as benefits or bur
-
dens, a promotion focus may lead to more Pareto opti
-
mal outcomes than prevention focus because a promo
-
tion focus induces negotiators to focus on and express
their aspirations, which should help to identify the inte
-
grative potential of a multi-issue negotiation. The regu
-
latory fit prediction calls for an interaction between
regulatory focus and valence of the resource to be
negotiated.
Galinsky et al. / REGULATORY FOCUS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1093
Method
Participants and procedure. In all, 326 MBA students
enrolled in an introductory organizational behavior
course participated during the 5th week of the class.
They were randomly assigned to 163 negotiating dyads.
Although in earlier class sessions the students had
engaged in a number of exercises concerning decision
making, this was their first introduction to a negotiation.
We used the same negotiation exercise used by
Sondak et al. (1995), where each individual played the
part of general manager of a company (i.e., either Acme
or Pinnacle). Participants were asked to negotiate an
agreement with one another to provide a particular set
of services to the city. The firms were introduced as waste
management companies that were located in the same
city and had similar businesses (environmental services
and reclamation) but which operated in different mar
-
kets. In both conditions, participants were asked to
“arrive at a joint agreement on a series of issues related to
pollution and/or waste management.” Participants were
told that the negotiation involved five issues and they
were given (a) a written description of each issue and (b)
a scoring sheet that provided information on how many
dollars each option of each issue was worth. They were
told that to reach an agreement they “must agree on one
option for each of the five issues presented.” If the negotiators
could not reach an agreement, they could choose to
declare an impasse.
Resource valence manipulation. The experimental con-
ditions regarding resource valence were manipulated
through the exercise materials. The basic information
was held constant across the two conditions and the only
difference was whether the resources to be negotiated
were described as benefits or burdens.
In the Benefits Condition, participants acted as man
-
agers for firms that were in the waste management indus
-
try and who had been asked to provide construction and
reclamation services for the city. The scenario suggested
that an agreement for a joint bid by the two companies
for the business would be accepted by the city. In this
condition, the companies were expected to reap the
benefits of providing the construction services to the
city. Thus, the objective in this condition was to reach an
agreement on the distribution of the benefits derived
from the contract with the city. The scoring sheet pro
-
vided to participants listed the dollar amounts in positive
terms (i.e., in terms of dollar benefits).
In the Burdens Condition, participants were told that
they had been asked to pay for construction and recla
-
mation services by the city. The materials suggested that
the companies were responsible for providing reclama
-
tion services to the city due to previous activity that had
caused pollution in the city and that an agreement for a
joint solution would be accepted by the city. In this con
-
dition, the companies were expected to pay for the
burden of providing reclamation services to the city.
Thus, the objective in this condition was to reach an
agreement on the distribution of burdens derived from
the demands of the city. The scoring sheet provided to
participants listed the dollar amounts in negative terms
(i.e., in terms of dollar costs).
Regulatory focus manipulation. Participants were asked
to write down their thoughts about negotiation stan
-
dards. The manipulation was held constant within each
negotiating dyad. Thus, both Acme and Pinnacle roles
within a dyad were primed with the same regulatory
focus. We chose to have both negotiators in the same reg
-
ulatory focus because we were primarily concerned with
the Pareto efficiency of the negotiated agreements
rather than the distribution of those resources. Partici
-
pants in the Prevention Condition were told, “Please
take a couple of minutes to think about the obligations
you have in a negotiation. What are the negotiation
behaviors and outcomes you seek to avoid during a nego
-
tiation? How you could prevent these behaviors and out-
comes?” Participants in the Promotion Condition were
told, “Please take a couple of minutes to think about the
aspirations you have in a negotiation. What are the nego-
tiation behaviors and outcomes you hope to achieve dur-
ing a negotiation? How you could promote these behav-
iors and outcomes?”
Negotiation issues. In both the benefits and burdens
condition, the negotiation involved five issues. One issue
was distributive, meaning that the parties’ preferences
were in complete opposition to each other. One issue
was congruent or compatible, meaning that the parties’
preferences were identical. The remaining three issues
were integrative, meaning that each party had a different
strength of preferences for the three issues. If both par
-
ties conceded on the issues they cared less about, then
each party could do better in terms of the number of dol
-
lars they each earned (in the benefits condition) or in
terms of the number of dollars the agreement cost them
(in the burdens condition) and the dyad could achieve a
Pareto optimal agreement (Neale & Bazerman, 1991;
Thompson, 1991; Tripp & Sondak, 1992).
Pareto efficiency. We calculated an efficiency score for
each agreement according to the procedure proposed
by Tripp and Sondak (1992) and used by Sondak et al.
(1995). This score compares the agreement achieved by
the parties to the total set of possible agreements. In this
scheme, a Pareto optimal agreement achieves a score of
1,000, with scores varying from 0 to 1000. The efficiency
scores effectively capture the outcomes of congruent
and integrative issues; they represent the degree to
which parties selected the mutually preferred option for
1094 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
the congruent issue and discovered mutually beneficial
trade-offs for the integrative issues. In all, 72% of the
sample achieved a Pareto optimal outcome, that is,
where neither participant could improve their score
without reducing the score for their opponent (where
efficiency scores equaled 1,000). Agreements that were
Pareto optimal were given a score of 1 and agreements
that were not Pareto optimal were given a score of 0.
Results and Discussion
Using standard procedures (Kleinbaum, 1994),
Pareto optimal scores were submitted to a binary hierar
-
chical logistic regression analysis. Thus, the model con
-
tained a test of the first-order effect of Pareto optimal
outcomes (i.e., similar to an intercept test in ANOVA);
tests of the second-order associations (i.e., similar to a
main effect test) between regulatory focus and Pareto
optimal outcomes and resource valence and Pareto opti
-
mal outcomes; and a third-order association between
regulatory focus, resource valence, and Pareto optimal
outcomes (i.e., similar to a two-way interaction between
regulatory focus and resource valence on Pareto optimal
outcomes).
As noted earlier, most dyads (72%; N = 163) reached a
Pareto optimal outcome and the first-order effect
revealed (B = .93, SE = .17, p < .001) that this was signifi-
cantly different from 50%. In addition, negotiators were
more likely to reach Pareto optimal outcomes when they
had a promotion focus (79%; n = 84) than when they had
a prevention focus (65%; n = 79); this second-order
effect of regulatory focus was significant (B = .79, SE = .37,
p = .03). Furthermore, negotiators were more likely to
reach Pareto optimal outcomes when they negotiated
over the distribution of benefits (87%; n = 55) than when
they negotiated over the distribution of burdens (64%;
n = 108). This second-order effect of resource valence
also was significant (B = 1.42, SE = .46, p = .002). Finally,
the third-order effect between regulatory focus and
resource valence was not significant (B = 1.37, SE = 1.19,
p = .25).
The findings from Study 3 provide further evidence
for the advantage of a promotion regulatory focus in
negotiations. As expected, the results show that the
advantages of promotion focus extend to the realm of
multi-issue integrative negotiations. Negotiators in a
promotion regulatory focus were more likely to reach a
Pareto optimal outcome than were those in a prevention
regulatory focus. Furthermore, this was the case regard
-
less of whether benefits or burdens were negotiated.
Focusing on what one hopes to achieve in a negotiation
thus appears to yield to the accumulation of more bene
-
fits as well as the successful avoidance of burdens.
At first sight, this finding may appear surprising in
light of recent work on regulatory focus suggesting that
task performance depends on the relative fit between
one’s regulatory focus and task demands (Higgins, 200l;
Higgins et al., 2003). In contrast to this reasoning, how
-
ever, the results of Study 3 demonstrate that the negotiat
-
ing advantage of promotion focus holds even if the nego
-
tiators battle over the distribution of burdens. Thus, the
increased tendency to focus on and communicate one’s
aspirations that is associated with a promotion focus
appears to foster the process of identifying integrative
potential and accomplishing Pareto optimality more
than a fit between negotiator’s regulatory focus and the
valence of the negotiated outcome.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have examined how the distribution and effi
-
ciency of negotiated outcomes depends on the type of
regulatory focus in which negotiators are placed. Across
three studies, a promotion regulatory focus led to supe
-
rior negotiation outcomes relative to a prevention regu
-
latory focus. Using a distributive negotiation in which
negotiator’s regulatory focus was assessed rather than
manipulated, Study 1 demonstrated that in a single-issue
negotiation, a promotion regulatory focus is associated
with a distributive advantage: The more recruiters in a
simulated hiring negotiation focused on achieving posi-
tive outcomes, the more they were able to minimize their
own costs by agreeing to pay a lower bonus to the candi-
date. Study 2 extended these basic findings by using an
experimental design in which regulatory focus was
manipulated rather than measured. Consistent with the
results of the first study, negotiators in a promotion regu-
latory focus were more successful in a distributive negoti
-
ation than were those in a prevention regulatory focus.
Our final study further extends these findings by demon
-
strating that a promotion regulatory focus is not only
beneficial in single-issue distributive negotiations but it
seems similarly advantageous to be in a promotion regu
-
latory focus in the context of multi-issue, integrative
negotiations. In Study 3, when both negotiators in a dyad
were primed with a promotion regulatory focus, they
were more likely to achieve a Pareto-efficient outcome.
In other words, the dyad benefited from its focus on pro
-
motion. Furthermore, this promotion advantage was
independent of the valence of the negotiated outcome.
Regardless of whether benefits or burdens were being
negotiated, dyads were more likely to obtain a Pareto
optimal outcome than when they were in a promotion
rather than prevention regulatory focus. A promotion
regulatory focus allows a negotiator to not only create
value and expand the pie but also to claim value at the
bargaining table.
The present findings not only demonstrate the nego
-
tiation benefits of promotion regulatory focus but also
hint at the mechanisms that may be responsible for this
Galinsky et al. / REGULATORY FOCUS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1095
advantage. Across both of the first two studies, promotion-
focused negotiators paid greater attention to their target
prices than did prevention-focused negotiators. Attend
-
ing to target prices not only leads negotiators to strive
and achieve this lofty aspiration, and thereby accrue
more advantageous distributive outcomes, but it also
prevents them from simply satisficing on minimally
acceptable outcomes and compromises; in trying to
maximize outcomes, a promotion regulatory focus leads
negotiators to discover mutually beneficial trade-offs
and achieve Pareto optimality.
In addition, Study 2 revealed that negotiators’ open
-
ing offers are instrumental in obtaining superior distrib
-
utive outcomes. Negotiators who were induced to focus
on promotion obtained better outcomes by making
more advantageous initial offers. Doing so introduces a
powerful anchor to the subsequent negotiation process
to which the final agreement is tied (Galinsky &
Mussweiler, 2001). This suggests that the effect of pro
-
motion focus in negotiations is partially produced via
the effect of anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). One
of the most striking characteristics of anchoring effects is
their robustness (for an overview, see Mussweiler &
Strack, 1999). In fact, anchoring effects are so robust
that neither expertise (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001;
Northcraft & Neale, 1987) nor incentives (Wilson, Hous-
ton, Etling, & Brekke, 1996) nor explicit warnings (Wil-
son et al., 1996) nor time (Mussweiler, 2001) wards judg-
ment and decision making against their influence. In
light of this well-established robustness of judgmental
anchoring, the negotiating effects of promotion focus
may be equally persistent. Once a negotiator with a pro-
motion focus has started with an extreme and advanta
-
geous initial offer, it may be very difficult for the other
side to undo the effects of this powerful anchor.
These findings demonstrate that a promotion regula
-
tory focus is beneficial across a variety of different negoti
-
ation situations. Focusing on promoting one’s success
rather than preventing one’s failures in a negotiation
appears to be a powerful tool for achieving one’s goals at
the bargaining table. It should be noted that all of the
effects of one of the regulatory focus are relative to the
other. We have emphasized for rhetorical purposes that a
promotion regulatory focus is responsible for the
observed effects, but the effects can be equally framed
through the lens of the prevention regulatory focus; that
is, a prevention regulatory focus leads to disadvantages
at the bargaining table. Nonetheless, it is clear, of course,
that negotiators are better off adopting a promotion
focus than a prevention focus.
One possibility that we have not explored here is
whether both a promotion regulatory focus and a pre
-
vention regulatory focus can be available to individuals
simultaneously. Given that previous research has found
positive effects for both promotion and prevention foci,
it would be of interest to explore the ability of individuals
to capitalize on them simultaneously. This may not be
possible given the somewhat contradictory require
-
ments of each focus. Research by Higgins (1989, see
Table IV, p. 122) finds support for the idea that the activa
-
tion of one motivational system may inhibit the other
(see also Brendl, Higgins, & Lemm, 1995).
Regulatory Focus, Social Interaction, and the
Question of Interaction Fit
One of the most important contributions of the cur
-
rent research is to demonstrate that regulatory focus can
have important consequences for social interaction.
Although previous research has touched on how regula
-
tory focus may affect stereotyping (Foerster, Higgins, &
Strack, 2000), conflict resolution preferences (Camacho
et al., 2003), or intergroup behavior (Sassenberg et al.,
2002), no previous research has demonstrated the role
of regulatory focus in determining the course of actual
social interaction. There are a number of avenues that
future research could take in exploring how regulatory
focus plays out in social interaction. Because prevention-
focused individuals appear to be sensitive to the possibil-
ity of rejection (Ayduk et al., 2003), a prevention regula-
tory focus could lead to greater perspective-taking, a
sense of connectedness, and consideration of the other
person’s goals. Support for this possibility comes from
research that shows that individuals with an interdepen-
dent self-construal focus more on prevention-focused
information (Lee et al., 2000). Although at first glance
this research could suggest that prevention-focused indi
-
viduals should be better able to achieve more Pareto
optimal outcomes (in contrast to the findings in Study
3), the combination of this research and Study 3 suggest
that Pareto efficiency depends on individuals also being
concerned with achieving their own optimal outcomes
(Pruitt, 1983).
Another interesting question is when and how does
regulatory focus smooth the cogs of social interaction
and increase social coordination. As mentioned earlier,
evidence exists that task performance depends on the
relative fit between one’s regulatory focus and task
demands (Higgins, 200l; Higgins et al., 2003). This kind
of fit refers to a fit between the goals people have and the
means used to achieve those goals. Considering the role
of regulatory focus in social interaction raises the impor
-
tance of a different type of fit: interaction fit. Interaction
fit concerns whether two interacting individuals need to
be in the same regulatory focus to increase social coordi
-
nation and positive interpersonal consequences. This
question relates to research concerning whether behav
-
ior mimicry or complementarity is the surest route to
smooth interactions. Research on mimicry has shown
1096 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
that engaging in motor mimicry leads to smoother inter
-
actions and increases liking between interaction part
-
ners (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and that motor mimicry
is most likely to be used in an unconscious manner when
an individual has an affiliation goal (Lakin & Chartrand,
2003). In contrast, in hierarchical relationships (i.e.,
where one individual has a higher status than the other),
complementarity behaviors (e.g., having a constricted
posture when one’s interaction partner has an expansive
posture) can lead to more comfortable interactions
(Tiedens & Fragale, 2003).
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that when both
negotiators are in a promotion regulatory focus, they are
more likely to achieve a Pareto optimal agreement than
when both negotiators are in a prevention regulatory
focus. Whether having the same or different regulatory
foci lead to smoother social interactions may depend on
the type and hierarchy of the relationship. It could be
that in hierarchical relationships, the smoothest interac
-
tions would occur when the high power individual is pro
-
motion focused and the low power negotiator is preven
-
tion focused. Indeed, promotion focus, as part of the
Behavioral Approach System, is often associated with the
possession of power (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002;
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). As a corollary, when
power differences exist between negotiators, the most
efficient outcomes may be achieved when the regulatory
foci are complementary rather than mimicked; that is,
the low power negotiator is in a prevention regulatory
focus and the high power negotiator is in a promotion
regulatory focus. Another related avenue for future
research on regulatory focus in social situations is the
exploration of how the different regulatory foci affect
relationship goals, expectations, and behaviors. For
example, prevention-focused individuals may be predis
-
posed to feel jealousy in the context of close relation
-
ships, be ever vigilant for signs of romantic dissolution,
and may, through self-fulfilling prophecies and expec
-
tancy confirmation, ironically produce that very result. It
is clear that by considering the role of regulatory focus in
social interaction, a number of interesting avenues for
future research emerge. By examining the conse
-
quences of regulatory focus for interpersonal contexts,
the current research provides a new direction, a new
horizon for regulatory focus, and offers the promise of
new insights into the dynamics of regulatory focus and
the nature of negotiations and social interaction.
NOTES
1. We did not asses the focus of candidates in Study 1 because we
were concerned that having them answer the question before they
negotiated would have primed their regulatory focus and made it diffi
-
cult to determine any effects of regulatory focus.
2. During every class session, students engaged in a negotiation
exercise and then heard a debriefing in which relevant course concepts
were discussed. No special cover story was needed or provided to partic
-
ipants other than that they would be engaging in a negotiation
exercise.
3. The dollar amounts for each negotiation were designed to match
realistic expectations for the resource to be negotiated. Thus, the
bonus in Study 1 is in thousands of dollars and the pharmaceutical
plant in Study 2 is in millions of dollars.
4. We chose to only use a single measure of regulatory focus because
the constraints of the research context did not afford us the opportu
-
nity to collect extensive measures. Although we have no data validating
this measure with those used by Higgins, given the replication in Study
2, we are confident that we are tapping into real differences in
regulatory focus.
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Received February 20, 2004
Revision accepted November 24, 2004
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