From Husserl to Van Manen: A review of different phenomenological approaches

Abstract

This paper traces the development of phenomenology as a philosophy originating from the writings of Husserl to its use in phenomenological research and theory development in nursing. The key issues of phenomenological reduction and bracketing are also discussed as they play a pivotal role in the how phenomenological research studies are approached. What has become to be known as "new" phenomenology is also explored and the key differences between it and "traditional" phenomenology are discussed. van Manen's phenomenology is also considered in light of its contemporary popularity among nurse researchers.

Full text

International Journal of Nursing Studies 44 (2007) 131–142
From Husserl to van Manen. A review of different
phenomenological approaches
Maura Dowling
Centre for Nursing Studies, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland
Received 11 May 2005; received in revised form 9 November 2005; accepted 24 November 2005
Abstract
This paper traces the development of phenomenology as a philosophy originating from the writings of Husserl to its
use in phenomenological research and theory development in nursing. The key issues of phenomenological reduction
and bracketing are also discussed as they play a pivotal role in the how phenomenological research studies are
approached. What has become to be known as ‘‘new’’ phenomenology is also explored and the key differences between
it and ‘‘traditional’’ phenomenology are discussed. van Manen’s phenomenology is also considered in light of its
contemporary popularity among nurse researchers.
r2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Bracketing; Husserl; Phenomenological reduction; Phenomenology; van Manen
1. Introduction
An examination of the philosophical basis of knowl-
edge development is an essential component of nursing
scholarship (Packard and Polifoni, 2002). Phenomenol-
ogy has become a dominant means in the pursuit of
knowledge development in nursing, and presents ‘‘cred-
ible displays of living knowledge for nursing’’ (Jones and
Borbasi, 2004, p. 99). However, the term ‘‘Phenomen-
ology’’, although used frequently in nursing scholarship,
is accompanied by confusion surrounding its nature.
Firstly, it is not only a research method as that employed
frequently by qualitative researchers; it is also a
philosophy. Secondly, there are as many styles of
phenomenology as there are phenomenologists (Spiegel-
berg, 1982). There are a number of schools of
phenomenology, and even though they all have some
commonalities, they also have distinct features. Further-
more, the many perspectives of phenomenology locates
its various forms in the positivist (Husserl), post-
positivist (Merleau–Ponty), interpretivist (Heidegger)
and constructivist (Gadamer) paradigms (Racher and
Robinson, 2003). Finally, a type of phenomenology as a
research method, which has evolved in the US, known as
new phenomenology (Crotty, 1996) is evident of a
transformation that has occurred in phenomenology as
a research method utilised by nurses. This paper adds
clarification to the blurred boundaries of phenomenol-
ogy as a philosophy and as a research method. This
paper aims to unravel the origins of phenomenology as a
philosophy to its adoption as a methodological ap-
proach and its subsequent transformation into what is
known as new phenomenology. It is hoped that by
taking the reader on this dual philosophical and
methodological journey, a deeper understanding of an
often perplexing issue will ensue.
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doi:10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2005.11.026
E-mail address: maura.dowling@nuigalway.ie.

2. Philosophy of phenomenology
2.1. The phenomenology of Husserl
Phenomenology arose as a philosophy in Germany
before World War 1 and has since occupied a prominent
position in modern philosophy. It challenged the
dominant views on the origin and nature of truth of
the time. The word phenomenon comes from the Greek
phaenesthai, to flare up, to show itself, to appear
(Moustakas, 1994). Thus the motto of phenomenology:
‘‘Zu den Sachen’’ which means both ‘‘to the things
themselves’’ and ‘‘let’s get down to what matters!’’ (van
Manen, 1990, p. 184).
The term phenomenology was used by philosophy
texts in the 18th century, especially by Kant and later by
Hegal, who made the most prominent use of the term
when it featured in the title of his 1807 work
‘‘Phenomenology of Spirit’’ (Moran, 2000). However,
the inspiration for Husserl’s use of the term was neither
Kant nor Hegal, but Franz Brentano (Moran, 2000).
Brentano (1838–1917) employed the phrase ‘‘descrip-
tive psychology or descriptive phenomenology’’ and this
provided the most important intellectual motivation for
Husserl’s development of phenomenology (Moran,
2000). Husserl adopted Brentano’s account of intention-
ality as the fundamental concept for understanding and
classifying conscious acts and experiential mental
practices (Moustakas, 1994). Intentionality is the
principle that every mental act is related to some object
(Moran, 2000), and implies that all perceptions have
meaning (Owen, 1996). All thinking i.e. ‘‘imagining,
perceiving, remembering, etc’’ is always thinking about
something (van Manen, 1990, p. 182). Intentionality
therefore refers to the internal experience of being
conscious of something (Moustakas, 1994).
Husserl’s goals are strongly epistemological and he
regarded experience the fundamental source of knowl-
edge (Racher and Robinson, 2003). For Husserl, the aim
of phenomenology is the rigorous and unbiased study of
things as they appear in order to arrive at an essential
understanding of human consciousness and experience
(Valle et al., 1989). In order to hold subjective
perspectives and theoretical constructs in abeyance and
facilitate the essence of the phenomena to emerge,
Husserl devised phenomenological reduction (Racher
and Robinson, 2003).
2.2. Phenomenological reduction
A key epistemological strategy of phenomenology is
the concept of phenomenological reduction. Phenomen-
ological reduction was proposed by Husserl, revised
by Heidegger, reinvented by Merleau–Ponty and en-
dorsed by Levinas with an ethical emphasis (Moran,
2000).
Husserl (1970) argues that the ‘‘lifeworld’’ (Lebens-
welt) is understood as what individuals experience pre-
reflectively, without resorting to interpretations. Lived
experience involves the immediate, pre-reflective con-
sciousness of life (Dilthey, 1985). Therefore, an attempt
is made to understand the essential features of a
phenomenon as free as possible from cultural context.
Moran (2000) explains this as: ‘‘Explanations are not to
be imposed before the phenomena have been understood
from within’’ (p. 4). This point is key to understanding
the phenomenology of Husserl. The focus in on the
primeval form, what is immediate to our consciousness,
‘‘ybefore we have applied ways of understanding or
explaining it. It is experience as it is before we have
thought about it’’ (Crotty, 1996, p. 95). Therefore,
Husserl’s phenomenological view requires that descrip-
tions of experience be gleaned before it has been
reflected on (Caelli, 2000).
Husserl uses the term ‘‘natural’’ to indicate what is
original, naı
¨ve, prior to critical or theoretical reflection
(van Manen, 1990). In the natural attitude individuals
hold knowledge judgementally but epoche requires a
fresh way of looking at things (Moustakas, 1994).
Epoche is a Greek word meaning to refrain from
judgement or stay away from the everyday, common-
place way of perceiving things (Moustakas, 1994).
However, in order to bracket one’s preconceptions and
presuppositions, one must firstly make them overt, and
render them as clear as possible (Valle et al., 1989).
The use of the term ‘‘reduction’’ quite literally means
that the person ‘‘reduces the world as it is considered in
the natural attitude to a world of pure phenomena or,
more poetically, to a purely phenomenal realm’’ (Valle
et al., 1989, p. 11). Spiegelberg (1982) identifies
phenomenological intuiting as the heart of phenomen-
ological reduction. This is an eidetic understanding of
what is meant in the description of the phenomenon
under investigation (Scheubert and Carpenter, 2003).
This is described by Parse (2001) as ‘‘the process of
coming to know the phenomenon as it shows itself as
described by the participants’’ (p. 79). This involves the
phenomenologist attempting to meet the phenomenon
as free and as unprejudiced as possible in order that the
phenomenon present itself as free and as unprejudiced
way as possible so that it can be precisely described and
understood.
3. Phenomenological reduction and phenomenological
research
Polkinghorne (1983) suggests a two-step process for
phenomenological reduction based on the work of
Husserl. This is achieved by firstly free (imaginative)
variation which leads the researcher to a description of
the essential structures (essence) of the phenomena,
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without which it would not exist. Essence is what makes
a thing what is (and without which it would not be what
it is) (van Manen, 1990). Following this, the researcher
then focuses on the concrete experience itself and
describes how the particular experience is constructed
(intentional analysis) (Polkinghorne, 1983).
Imaginative variation is described by Spiegelberg
(1982) as a sort of mental experimentation in which
the researcher intentionally alters via their imagination,
different aspects of the experience, by either taking from
or adding to the proposed transformation. The point of
this exercise is to ‘‘imaginatively stretch the proposed
transformation to the edges until it no longer describes
the experience underlying the subject’s naive descrip-
tion’’ (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 55). van Manen (1990)
describes the process succinctly as a concern to ‘‘ydis-
cover aspects of or qualities that make a phenomenon
what it is and without which the phenomenon could not
be what it is’’ (p. 107); this process therefore verifies
whether the theme belongs to a phenomenon essentially
(rather then incidentally) (van Manen, 1990). This
process is not unlike determining the defining attributes
and constructing a model case in the approach to
concept analysis outlined by Walker and Avant (1995),
as free imaginative variation asks the question: ‘‘is this
phenomenon still the same if we imaginatively change or
delete this theme from the phenomenon?’’ (van Manen,
1990, p. 107). For example, Endacott (1997) utilises this
strategy through imaginary conversations or scenarios
in attempts to construct additional cases for her concept
analysis of ‘‘need’’.
An adequate transformation should be publicly
verifiable so that other researchers will agree that the
transformed expression does describe a process that is
contained in the original expression (Polkinghorne,
1989). This is similar to what van Manen (1990) refers
to as the ‘‘phenomenological nod’’ (p. 27) as a way of
demonstrating that good phenomenological description
is something that we can nod to, recognising it as an
experience that we had or could have had.
The issue of phenomenological reduction is crucial to
any discussion on what Crotty (1996) terms ‘‘new’’
phenomenology’’, labelled ‘‘scientific’’ by Giorgi (2000a)
and ‘‘American’’ by Silverman (1987) (Table 1). Crotty
(1996) argued that American phenomenology cannot be
phenomenology as it does not adopt the epistemological
situation regarded by Husserl as essential to Phenom-
enology. Paley (2002) also takes issue with nurse
researchers use of phenomenology which he argues has
resulted in the abandonment of scientific rigour.
However, Rapport (2002) responds with a reminder
that phenomenology is not an empirical analytic science
but a human science in which the ‘‘object’’ can be
defined and defined through the medium of ‘‘subject’’
and its relationships. This argument will be further
discussed later.
4. The phenomenology of Heidegger
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was also born in
Germany. His hermeneutic phenomenology like Hus-
serl’s phenomenology is concerned with human experi-
ence as it is lived.
Heidegger agrees with Husserl’s declaration ‘‘to the
things themselves’’, but does not agree with Husserl’s
view of the importance of description rather than
understanding (Racher, 2003). He differs from Husserl
in his views of how the lived experience is explored, and
he advocates the utilisation of hermeneutics as a
research method founded on the ontological view that
lived experience is an interpretive process (Racher and
Robinson, 2003).
Heidegger’s work Being in Time, published in 1927,
proposes that consciousness is not separate from the
world of human existence, and he argues for an
existential adjustment to Husserl’s writings that inter-
prets essential structures such as basic categories of
human experience rather than as pure, cerebral con-
sciousness (Polkinghorne, 1983). He is one of the first
thinkers to combine existential matters with phenomen-
ological methodology, being influenced by the Danish
thinker Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) who is generally
regarded as the founder of existential philosophy (Valle
et al., 1989).
Heidegger’s focus is ontological and he believes that
the primary phenomenon that concerned phenomenol-
ogy was the meaning of Being (presence in the world)
(Cohen and Omery, 1994). To ask for the Being of
something is to ask for the nature or meaning of that
phenomenon (van Manen, 1990). Heidegger also uses
the phrase ‘‘Being-in-the-world’’ to refer to the way
human beings exist, act, or are involved in the world
(van Manen, 1990). He argues that understanding is a
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Table 1
Clarification of terms
American phenomenology Traditional phenomenology
Other descriptions New phenomenology (Crotty, 1996) European phenomenology (Silverman, 1987)
Continental phenomenology (Silverman, 1987) Philosophical phenomenology (Giorgi, 2000b)
M. Dowling / International Journal of Nursing Studies 44 (2007) 131–142 133

reciprocal activity and proposed the concept of ‘‘herme-
neutic circle’’ to illustrate this reciprocity (Koch, 1996).
The hermeneutic circle is viewed as one between
preunderstanding and understanding which Alvesson
and Skoldberg (2000) label ‘‘the circle of alethic
hermeneutics’’ (p. 57), to differentiate it from the
original so-called hermeneutic circle (the part related
to the whole) of objectivist hermeneutics.
Historicality and the hermeneutic circle may be
perceived as a ‘‘revisioning’’ (p. 473) of phenomenolo-
gical reduction, rather than a rejection of it as suggested
by some (Racher and Robinson, 2003). Interestingly,
strict followers of Husserl’s transcendental method
would maintain that phenomenological research is pure
description and that interpretive (hermeneutic) fits
outside the limits of phenomenological research (van
Manen, 1990). However, it is argued that ‘‘phenomen-
ology without hermeneutics can become shallow’’
(Todres and Wheeler, 2001, p. 6).
It is not surprising that researchers from the caring
movement such as Benner and Wrubel (1989) adopted
Heideggerian philosophy in their study of caring in
nursing. Moreover, Walsh (1999) utilises three existen-
tials of Heidegger (‘‘Being-with’’ as understanding;
‘‘Being-with’’ as possibility; and ‘‘Being-with’’ as care-
full concern) in his study of nurse–patient encounter in
psychiatric care, arguing that ‘‘being-with’’ allows the
nurse to share more fully in the human experience of
the patient as it becomes part of their ‘‘shared
humanity’’ (p. 7). However, Bradshaw (1995) argues
that Heideggarian philosophy does not provide a basis
for the relationship on which care for others depends.
5. Merleu–Ponty
Merleau–Ponty built on the writings of Husserl and
Heidegger. In his work, Phenomenology of Perception,
the goal of phenomenology proposed is to rediscover
first experience, which he terms as the ‘‘primacy of
perception’’ (Racher and Robinson, 2003). Like Husserl,
Merleau–Ponty advocates phenomenological reduction
in order to reach an original awareness (Racher and
Robinson, 2003). The goal of Merleau–Ponty’s ‘‘phe-
nomenology of origins’’ is to help us view our experience
in a new light, not relying on the categories of our
reflective experience; a pre-reflective experience (Moran,
2000). The usefulness of Merleau–Ponty’s writings for
nurse researchers is evident in the utilisation of the
four existentials considered to belong to the funda-
mental structure of the lifeworld; lived space (spatiality),
lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality),
and lived human relation (relationality or communality),
are productive for the process of phenomenolo-
gical questioning, reflecting and writing (van Manen,
1990).
6. Gadamer
Gadamer, with his work Truth and Method, followed
on the work of Heidegger. The two central positions
advanced by Gadamer are: (a) prejudgement (one’s
preconceptions or prejudices or horizon of meaning that
is part of our linguistic experience and that make
understanding possible) and (b) universality (the persons
who express themselves and the persons who understand
are connected by a common human consciousness,
which makes understanding possible) (Ray, 1994).
Gadamer (1989) argues that the detachment of our
fruitful prejudices that facilitate understanding from our
prejudices that obstruct our understanding occurs in the
process of understanding itself (Gadamer, 1989). There-
fore, in his version of phenomenology, understanding is
derived from personal involvement by the researcher in a
reciprocal processes on interpretation that are inextric-
ably related with one’s being-in-the-world (Spence,
2001). The inquiry using Gadamerian hermeneutics
becomes dialogue rather than individual phenomenol-
ogy and interpretation permeates every activity, with the
researcher considering social, cultural and gender
implications (Koch, 1999).
Gadamer takes the concept of the hermeneutic circle a
step further, and researchers following the work of
Gadamer should ensure that feedback and further
discussion takes place with study participants (Fleming
et al., 2003). Therefore, the hermeneutic process becomes a
dialogical method whereby the horizon of the interpreter
and the phenomenon being studied are combined together.
7. Phenomenology as a methodological approach
As a philosophy, phenomenology is associated with
the writings of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt,
Levinas, Sarte, Merleau–Ponty and Derrida (Moran,
2000). It has been called a pre-science by Carl Stumpf
because of its position before making any claims of
knowledge (Spiegelberg, 1982). Although none of the
phenomenological philosophers developed research
methods, their philosophies are often used to fortify
contemporary qualitative research (Fleming et al., 2003).
Moreover, Husserl is credited with founding an empiri-
cal philosophy, which is both a descriptive method and
an a priori philosophical science derived from the
method (Owen, 1996). In order for what Giorgi
(2000a) calls ‘‘scientific practices’’ (p. 4) to be performed,
the insights of the philosophy of phenomenology must
be mediated. Indeed, if nurse researchers were to pursue
the philosophy of Husserl as it was originally conceived,
they would be practicing philosophy, rather than
research (Giorgi, 2000a).
Many nurses utilise the work of Husserl and
Heiddegger as, using the words of Giorgi (2000a)
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‘‘inspiration’’ (p. 10) for their research. However, others
are increasingly utilising the philosophy of Gadamer
(Mak and Elwyn, 2003;Bergman and Bertero, 2001)and
Merleau–Ponty (Sadala and Adorno, 2002).
The inclusion of a discussion on the work of the
scientific phenomenology community from the field of
psychology, in particular those from the Dusquesne
school (Pittsburgh University) is necessary as their work
greatly influences many nurse researchers. These Psy-
chologists (for instance, Giorgi, Colazzi and van Kaam),
with their proposed method involving description,
reduction and the search for essential structures have
been credited with the quest to establish reliable
methods for conducting existential-phenomenological
research, arising from their dissatisfaction with the
limitations of empiricism, and proposed a method
involving (Giorgi, 2000a).
All three psychologists (van Kaam, Giorgi and
Colazzi) employ a similar series of steps: (a) the original
descriptions are divided into units, (b) the units are
transformed by the researcher into meanings that are
expressed in psychological and phenomenological con-
cepts and (c) these transformations are combined to
create a general description of the experience (Polk-
inghorne, 1989).
Colaizzi’s (1978) method is commonly adopted by
nurse researchers who employ a phenomenological
method (e.g. Scannell-Desch, 2005). However, his
method is also regarded as one suitable for Heideggarian
phenomenological research (Hodges et al., 2001;Flem-
ing et al., 2003;Perreault et al., 2004). Colaizzi’s final
step in his method involves the researcher returning to
participants and asking: ‘‘How does my descriptive
results compare with your experiences?’’ which suggests
that some interpretation is acknowledged rather than
just description.
Colaizzi developed his steps while a psychology
student doing his 1973 doctoral dissertation (Thomas,
2005), and his work is frequently cited as a method of
data analysis (e.g. Priest, 2002). However, his phenom-
enological method as detailed by Polkinghorne (1989)
is also a procedure for phenomenological research,
and utilised by, for instance, Beitz and Goldberg
(2004).
Thomas (2005) finds nurse researchers’ ‘‘prolonged
allegiance’’ with Colaizzi’s work, ‘‘puzzling’’ (p. 66) as
she could find no evidence that Colaizzi remained active
in phenomenological scholarship. Colaizzi’s (1978) work
is related to what is termed ‘‘Bibliotherapy’’; which
arose from the concept that reading could affect an
individual’s attitude and behaviour and thus influence
the shaping and changing of values (Marlowe and
Maycock, 2000). This process is similar to Bildung as
referred to by van Manen (1990) where reflective
awareness experienced in the natural attitude transforms
an individual.
van Kaam (1966) also operationalised empirical
phenomenological research in the field of psychology
(Moustakas, 1994). van Kaam’s (1969) steps in the
phenomenological generation and analysis of data is
only occasionally utilised by nurse researchers, but less
so recently (e.g. Lee, 1997). van Kaam too, did not
continue with the development of phenomenological
research methods (Polkinghorne, 1989).
Of all the phenomenological psychologists, Amedeo
Giorgi continues to write regularly about phenomenol-
ogy as a method for the human sciences (e.g. Giorgi,
1989, 2000a, b, 2005). His work is representative of the
further outgrowth of his work with the Duquesne group
during the 1960s and of his own re-examination of the
phenomenological literature undertaken during his 1969
stay in Europe (Polkinghorne, 1989). His human science
approach to phenomenology follows a rigorous pro-
gram of Husserl’s writings and maintains that the object
of phenomenological description is achieved ‘‘solely’’
through a direct grasping (intuiting) of the essential
structure of phenomena as they show in consciousness
(van Manen, 1990). Giorgi’s influence on nursing theory
is also evident in Watson’s (1985) theory of caring,
where she elaborates on the notion of a ‘‘human
science’’ proposed by the followers of the Duquesne
school of phenomenology (Holmes, 1990). Parse’s (1981)
theoretical work took the notion of a ‘‘human science’’ a
step further with her work clearly based on philosophi-
cal views proposed in the existential phenomenology
work of Heidegger and Merleu–Ponty. Her theory is
considered to belong to the Simultaneity paradigm
which embraces qualitative research approaches (Parse,
1987).
Benner’s middle-range theory of novice to expert
(Benner, 1984) is another example of phenomenology
being used as a research approach to develop nursing
theory. Such theory developments through the utilisa-
tion of phenomenology are very appropriate for a
practice discipline such as nursing. Nursing theory
developed through a phenomenological approach re-
flects the reality of nursing practice, which is complex
and situational. Such knowledge generated from prac-
tice has therefore more relevance for nurses. Never-
theless, it must be acknowledged that adapting the
fundamentally philosophical process of phenomenology
as a practical and robust attempt to understand nursing
practice is problematic (Lawler, 1998).
Giorgi’s work is utilised frequently by nurse research-
ers in the analysis of interview data. For instance by
Moore and Miller (2003) in their phenomenological
study of older men’s experiences of living with severe
visual impairment, and Schulmeister et al. (2005) in their
method triangulation study exploring and measuring
perceptions of Quality of Life among patients under-
going autologuous out-patient stem cell transplantation.
An interesting example of the utilisation of Giorgi’s
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(1985) process of descriptive phenomenological analysis
is by Silen-Lipponen et al. (2004) in their study using
critical incident analysis to detail how 30 nursing
students (British, American and Finnish) experienced
learning about teamwork during their Operating Room
placement. The use of critical incident analysis suggests
a stripping away of the layers shaping the incident in
order arrive at the essence of the phenomenon of
learning about teamwork. This is not unlike what van
Manen describes as ‘‘protocol writing’’ (p. 63) where the
phenomenological researcher asks selected individuals to
write down their experiences.
7.1. The role of bracketing in phenomenological research
The issue of bracketing is key to this discussion as it is
fundamental strategy in phenomenology. Crotty (1996)
argues that nurse researchers view bracketing, instead of
the philosophical underpinnings of phenomenology, as
the feature of the phenomenological tradition. Bracket-
ing also differentiates the chiasm between phenomenol-
ogy as a philosophy and as a research endeavour. Study
respondents are not typically asked to bracket in nursing
phenomenological research (Yegdich, 1999). If they were
this would render it a philosophical endeavour. When
bracketing is referred to in phenomenological studies, it
usually relates to the researcher examining their
prejudices in order to allow them include the views of
the respondents.
However, at what stage of a study bracketing should
occur generates some discussion. Drew (2004) refers to a
talk by Giorgi at the University of Minnesota’s 1998
Conference on Phenomenological Nursing Research,
where he argues that bracketing is properly done in the
analysis phase of the research and is not appropriate
while interviewing, when closeness with the other takes
priority. Indeed, sometimes the utilisation of bracketing
during data analysis is the only evidence that a study has
some phenomenological influence. However, nurse
researchers are not alone in this use of bracketing. For
instance, in a study by Canadian physical education
academics examining stress among Aboriginal men and
women with diabetes in Canada, a phenomenological
approach for data analysis in which ‘bracketing’ was
employed (Iwasaki et al., 2004). No other aspect of this
study suggests any other phenomenological influence.
Sometimes bracketing is also employed at other stages
of a phenomenological study. Lytle and Hutchinson
(2004), also physical education academics utilise a
qualitative approach based on a ‘‘phenomenological
theory’’ (p. 3) and employ what they call a ‘‘phenom-
enological approach’’, where they describe the experi-
ences and roles adapted by physical educators engaged
in consultation interactions. They cite the work of
Denzin and Lincoln, Strauss and Corbin and Patten to
support their stance. However, they indicate that epoche
was ‘‘conducted’’ (p. 41) prior to, during and after data
collection (Lytle and Hutchinson, 2004).
Moreover, the strategy termed ‘‘bracketing inter-
views’’ is employed to meet the needs of reflexivity.
Reflexivity refers to the engagement by the qualitative
researcher in continuous self-critique and self-appraisal
and the provision of an explanation of how his/her own
experiences did or did not influence the stages of the
research process (Koch and Harrington, 1998). Graber
and Mitcham (2004) utilise bracketing interviews by
engaging their reflexivity team (academics from the
disciplines of anthropology, ethics and divinity, who
were familiar with the interview design) prior to and
after their study. Similarly, Rolls and Relf (2004) report
that they utilised their project advisory group to engage
in a series of taped interviews through which they
identified the assumptions and past experiences of the
principal researcher in order to ‘bracket’ or put them to
one side. Such a process assisted in understanding how
these assumptions may have impacted on the data
collection and analysis process (Rolls and Relf, 2004).
What Northway (2000) calls ‘‘critical friends’’, and
Drew (2004) refers to as a ‘‘bracketing supervisor’’ can
also help in this process.
However, the use of the term ‘‘bracketing’’ is not
without its critics. Dahlberg and Dahlberg (2004) prefer
to use the term ‘bridling’ instead of bracketing. They
argue that this term is preferred to bracketing as
bracketing carries with it an ‘‘exactness and finitude of
mathematics’’ (p. 272) and ‘bridling’ also ‘invokes the
thought of being respectful, or humble, to that which it
bridled in order not to dominate, violate it, or ‘swallow’
it as ‘bracketing’ seems to do’’ (p. 272). This view is
interesting as it suggests a change to the view of
bracketing as originally espoused by Husserl.
However, confusion regarding bracketing still
abounds. For instance, Donalek (2004) advises that:
‘‘Research is not truly phenomenological unless the
researcher’s beliefs are incorporated into the data
analysis’’ (p. 516). Donalek seems to be referring to
Interpretive phenomenology here but does not attempt
to differentiate between descriptive and interpretive
phenomenology. The focus in her article is very much
on method and little on the philosophical underpin-
nings. Donalek’s (2004) puzzling description of phenom-
enological research illustrates the importance of paying
attention to the philosophical underpinnings of phe-
nomenology by nurse researchers as stressed by Thomas
(2005). This sentiment is echoed by Giorgi (2000a) adding
that it ‘‘is simply good scholarly practice’’ (p. 10).
8. Debates over new phenomenology
The real debates on the use of phenomenology in
nursing however centre on the views of Crotty (1996)
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and Paley (1997, 1998). Their arguments have placed a
spotlight on phenomenology which has helped expose its
complexities.
Crotty (1996) argues that nurse researchers have not
developed their own phenomenology but ‘‘they have
avidly embraced a form of phenomenology which
developed around them and which appears to serve
their purposes well’’ (p. 24). Crotty is of course referring
to the hybrid phenomenology embraced by nurse
researchers in what he calls ‘‘new’’ phenomenology,
which he argues is descriptive, subjective and lacks
critique. ‘‘Scientific’’ phenomenology, as labelled by
Giorgi (2000a) also comes under this heading.
Crotty (1996) reached his conclusions following his
review of 30 nursing research papers adopting phenom-
enology. Subsequently, he proposed that because nurse
researchers focused on experience, they were not
following the original intentions of phenomenology
(i.e. to seek the essence of the phenomenon under
investigation). In Crotty’s opinion, the process of
phenomenological reduction is essential for the bringing
forth of such essences. Caelli (2000) suggests that it was
not nurses who changed the way phenomenology was
conducted in America, Australia and at times in the UK,
but American philosophy that changed and adapted the
traditional phenomenologies developed in Europe. In
North America especially, phenomenology came to be
applied to the study of other people’s experience, which
is reported in the third person, and as Crotty (1996)
argues, to be linked with and informed by the
intellectutal tradition, in which pragmatist philosophy,
symbolic interactionism and humanistic psychology
make important contributions. Indeed, Benner (1984)
acknowledges the influences on her interpretive phe-
nomenology as the hermeneutical tradition and the
existential phenomenology of Kierkagaard, Heidegger,
Merleu–Ponty, Wittgenstein, Druyfus and Taylor.
American phenomenology therefore fits with a human
science perspective and seeks to understand the reality of
the individual’s experience as they engage with the
phenomenon rather than the more objective reality of
the nature of the phenomenon itself (Caelli, 2000). An
example of this is evident in Parse’s phenomenological
research method which she describes as ‘‘generically
phenomenological in that the entities for study are
experiences as described by people who have lived them’’
(Parse, 1995, p. 153).
However, it is again important to stress that the
changes evident in American phenomenology have
resulted because the approach is being used for research
and not for the solitary philosophical reflections as
espoused by Husserl and Heidegger (Caelli, 2000).
Moreover, Giorgi (2000a) stresses that critics should
distinguish between ‘‘inspiration’’ and ‘‘imitation’’ as he
argues that ‘‘Often, to be inspired means that one is
attracted by someone’s thought, even though one is
aware that he or she has to modify what was said in
order to make it meaningful in the context where the one
inspired wants to use it’’ (p. 10).
There are two distinct differences between what has
been come to be known as new phenomenology or
American phenomenology (Caelli, 2000), referred to
as ‘‘Continental’’ phenomenology by the philosopher
Silverman (1987), and European phenomenology
(Table 1). Firstly, American phenomenology questions
do not usually seek the prereflective experience but
include thoughts and interpretations of the experience in
the data collection and analysis (Caelli, 2000). This lack
of emphasis on phenomenological reduction is impor-
tant as Crotty (1996) argues that through the process of
phenomenological reduction, the essences of the phe-
nomenon under investigation may be brought to the
fore. Crotty (1996) therefore concludes that the research
conducted by nurses is not phenomenology according to
the European tradition, but a North American hybrid.
However, in a clinical discipline such as nursing,
phenomenological reduction is often accompanied by
practical and even ethical issues in attempts at divorcing
nurse and researcher identities. The adoption of a
hermeneutic approach which emphasises reflexivity is
perhaps essential in addressing this dilemma. Divorcing
the ‘‘nurse’’ and ‘‘researcher’’ identities is raised by Allen
(2004) and Whitehead (2004) among others. Reflexivity
therefore assumes a key role in current discussions of
interpretive phenomenological methods. This would
seem an appropriate development as it embraces a
human science perspective of intersubjectivity methodo-
logically as well as philosophically.
However, Caelli (2000) takes a broader view of what
phenomenological research is and argues ‘‘thoughtful,
reflective, and previously interpreted descriptions of
experience given by research participants provide a
broader canvas on which to paint a description of a
phenomenon than is provided by traditional phenom-
enology alone’’ (p. 373). New phenomenology is there-
fore strongly influenced by the work of Heideggerian
phenomenology which emphasises the acknowledge-
ment of methodologically historical constraints on the
researcher themselves and others’ interpretations (Ra-
cher and Robinson, 2003). This point is paramount, as
Husserl (1970) was concerned with the world of every-
day experience as expressed in everyday language, and
the life-world prior to reflection (Valle et al., 1989), and
it distinguishes European phenomenology from new
phenomenology as the latter seeks descriptions from a
personal perspective of the individual.
Another key distinguishing feature is the issue of how
culture is considered in new phenomenology. Benner
(2000) argues that the goal of interpretive phenomenol-
ogy is ‘‘yto look for commonalitiesy.in culturally
grounded meaning’’ (p. 104). However, Husserl and
Heidegger both were rigorously critical of the effect that
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culture and tradition might have on the true examina-
tion of phenomena (Caelli, 2000).
This development reflects what Caelli (2000) refers to
as recent philosophical thinking which recognises that
is impossible for individuals to think ‘‘aculturally’’
(p. 371). Benner (2000) suggests a phenomenological
approach to studying illness holds that cultural and
social contexts create the conditions of possibility for the
illness experience. In light of this, with American
phenomenology, analysis focuses on describing partici-
pants’ lived experience within the context of culture as
opposed for a universal meaning of it (Caelli, 2000). This
issue of overlooking culture in traditional phenomenol-
ogy is also related to the issue of phenomenological
reduction. With American phenomenology, the need for
phenomenological reduction is less evident as there is
not the same impetus to eliminate traditional and
cultural understandings as in European phenomenology
(Caelli, 2000).
Crotty (1996) argues that nurses should not claim
Husserlian or Heideggerian influences on research that
utilises new phenomenological methods. If the research-
er wants a subjective understanding of the experience of
the phenomenon from the participant’s, new phenom-
enology is appropriate, particularly if the subjective
experience is objectively scrutinised as suggested by
Giorgi (2000b). On the other hand, if a researcher
chooses to explore and understand the phenomenon
itself, or the object of the participants’ experience,
European or ‘philosophical’ phenomenology should be
employed (Giorgi, 2000b).
Giorgi (2000b) admits that there are many weak
examples of the application of phenomenology in the
nursing literature and these efforts usually are found in
the phenomenology of the scientific type and not the
philosophical form. To give an example: Moyle (2003)
presents a study that sought to understand the
importance of the therapeutic relationship in patients
with depression through what she terms ‘‘a phenomen-
ological approach’’. Data was analysed following
Giorgi’s steps to phenomenological analysis. However,
Moyle makes no reference to phenomenological terms
such as reduction, bracketing and so on, and the focus is
on the patients’ descriptions rather than the phenomen-
on of the concept of the therapeutic relationship.
Of all the responses to Crotty’s observations, the view
of Giorgi (2000b) is the most helpful. Giorgi (2000b)
argues that Crotty’s assertion that scientific phenomen-
ology seeks to establish the subjective experiences of
people is misplaced as when nurses are asking for the so-
called ‘‘subjective experiences’’; ‘‘they are asking for
descriptions of situations in the world as experienced by
human subjects!’’ (p. 13) (Giorgi’s emphasis). He further
argues that because ‘‘the nature of the experience
depends on the manner in which it was experienced,
how can one avoid obtaining descriptions from sub-
jects?’’ (p. 14). Moreover, it is argued that the ‘‘thrust of
phenomenological research, remains oriented to asking
the question of what is the nature of this phenomenon as
an essentially human experience’’ (van Manen, 1990,
p. 62).
9. Current impact of van Manen’s phenomenology
The influence of the Canadian phenomenologist Max
van Manen also requires attention. As outlined earlier,
his four existential provide guidance for researchers on
phenomenological writing. These existentials also illus-
trate a fusion of the objectivist hermeneutic circle (part-
whole) and the alethic hermeneutic circle (pre-under-
standing) as they acknowledge the experience of a
phenomenon in a whole experience and also the
researcher’s role in the research process. van Manen’s
writings on a human science approach to phenomenol-
ogy offers some solutions to nurse researchers facing the
difficulties of phenomenological reduction and reflects
the ongoing transformation of phenomenology as a
methodological approach.
His work has contemporary popularity among not
only nurses but also medical practitioners (Mak and
Elwyn, 2003) and physical educationalists (Goodwin
et al., 2004). His contribution to phenomenology is
curious for although it would appear to come under the
heading of new phenomenology, it would also appear
that it does not, as his writings combine the descriptive
phenomenology of Husserl, with an emphasis on the
study of the world before reflection and also argues that
it is scientific and simultaneously asserts that it involves
interpretation. Also, van Manen (1990) appears to use
the term phenomenon and experience as the same thing
(p. 106). His type of phenomenology is located in what is
termed the Dutch school as it is a combination of
descriptive and interpretive phenomenology (Cohen and
Omery, 1994). He uses the terms ‘‘description’’ to
include both interpretive (hermeneutic) as well as the
descriptive phenomenological element and presents his
work as influenced by the ‘‘spirit of the European
movements as well as by certain North American
developments’’ (van Manen, 1990, iv). Like Heidegger,
van Manen does not embrace Husserl’s view of
bracketing and asks: ‘‘If we simply try to forget or
ignore what we already ‘‘know’’, we might find that the
presupposition persistently creep back into our reflec-
tions’’ (van Manen, 1990, p. 47).
His phenomenology is commonly used in conjunction
with other contemporary influences in nursing phenom-
enological research studies. For instance, Fielden (2003)
utilises Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology in-
formed by van Manen’s (1997) and Benner’s (1985)
(among other Benner work) to explore and interpret the
lived experience of family members after losing a
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close family member to a suicidal death. Moreover,
Hassouneh-Phillips (2003) explored lived spirituality
among abused American Muslim women by utilising
the work of van Manen and Benner’s ‘‘paradigm cases’’
(Benner, 2000). In addition, Brett (2004) utilises the
writings of Heidegger and also utilises the work of van
Manen which she indicates brought ‘‘structure’’ (p. 14)
to the study and ‘‘informed analysis through phenom-
enological reflection’’ (p. 14) in her study exploring how
parents of profoundly handicapped children experience
support in their lives. Finally, Jongudomkarn and West
(2004) utilise Colaizzi’s and van Manen’s work for data
analysis in their case study strategy for data collection
and a phenomenological approach for data analysis.
Others merely refer to the work of van Manen in
passing, especially when they indicate that their quali-
tative research is guided by a phenomenological
approach. For instance, Brajtman (2005) refers to the
work of van Manen in her qualitative study which
utilises a phenomenological approach. No other aspects
of phenomenological research are evident in this study,
which involved focus group and individual interviews
with family members of patients experiencing terminal
restlessness, and utilised content thematic analysis. This
would appear to be an example of what Giorgi (2000a)
terms ‘‘inspiration’’ as mentioned earlier. Moreover, the
use of focus groups is curious in this study as it does not
fit with the tenets of phenomenological research which
explores the individual’s experience (Webb and Kevern,
2000). Hassouneh-Phillips (2003) also utilises group
interviews in their phenomenological study. However,
Spiegelberg (1982) does outline the procedure of co-
operative or group phenomenology, where groups
ranging from 6 to 16 people are brought together for 2
days–2 weeks. Benner (1984) utilised group interviewing
for her phenomenological study. Moreover, conjoint
interviews can also be employed in phenomenological
research where it is deemed appropriate (Racher, 2003).
A curious example that suggests a strongly philoso-
phical phenomenological orientation, is presented in a
study by Hilton and Henderson (2003). They utilise the
writings of van Manen (1997) to ‘‘disclose and under-
stand the contextual meaning of living with bladder
cancer’’ (p. 351). Only one patient was interviewed in the
study and the researchers do not indicate if more than
one interview was conducted. They also indicate that
‘‘constant comparative analysis of responses’’ was
utilised for data analysis, which is a curious utilisation
as it suggests many interviews with different participants
as employed in grounded theory.
A good example of van Manen’s work being utilised
throughout a phenomenological study is that by Thome
et al. (2004). They utilised what they describe as the
hermeneutic phenomenological method described by
van Manen and also utilise van Manen’s (1997) writings
in the data analysis where they attempt to follow his
work and ‘‘transform personal meanings and experi-
ences from interview texts into disciplinary understand-
ing’’ (Thome et al., 2004, p. 401).
10. Conclusion
Caelli (2000) argues that although the traditional
European approach to phenomenology has value to the
‘‘critical, objective analyses of phenomena as they
present in nursing’’ (p. 374), American approaches also
have merit as they are in keeping with the philosophical
movement toward a position located firmly in the
postmodern world where people live and where research
is conducted. Moreover, nursing has a concern to
understand the human condition rather than the
phenomena as such. The view of Spiegelberg (1982) is
noteworthy in this discussion on the changes in
phenomenology as he asserts that it is a moving
philosophy with many parallel currents. On a similar
vein, Owen (1996) highlights that phenomenology ‘‘is a
reminder that all knowledge is human made, and not
timeless and unchanging.’’ (p. 273). He also maintains
that research method has a history that can be traced
back to a certain point when an innovation became
established in a community (Owen, 1996). Phenomen-
ology certainly has become established as a research
approach for nursing and its incarnation can clearly be
traced to its utilisation by nurse researchers in North
America. What is also clear is its evolvement in nature
over the past three decades. This evolvement reflects a
move into the phase of ‘‘crisis of representation’’ where
issues of culture cannot be ignored by researchers
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). However, it also perhaps
reflects too much a shift towards phenomenology as an
approach which simultaneously loses sight of its
philosophical origins. The words of Packard and
Polifoni (2002, p. 163) are apt therefore in ending this
discussion: ‘‘Good science emanates from a solid
philosophical base wherein the ends determine the
means, rather then the other way around’’.
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