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On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect


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Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not always advantageous to engage in thorough conscious deliberation before choosing. On the basis of recent insights into the characteristics of conscious and unconscious thought, we tested the hypothesis that simple choices (such as between different towels or different sets of oven mitts) indeed produce better results after conscious thought, but that choices in complex matters (such as between different houses or different cars) should be left to unconscious thought. Named the "deliberation-without-attention" hypothesis, it was confirmed in four studies on consumer choice, both in the laboratory as well as among actual shoppers, that purchases of complex products were viewed more favorably when decisions had been made in the absence of attentive deliberation.
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Supporting Online Material
Materials and Methods
Figs. S1 to S7
20 October 2005; accepted 14 January 2006
On Making the Right Choice: The
Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect
Ap Dijksterhuis,
Maarten W. Bos, Loran F. Nordgren, Rick B. van Baaren
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not always advantageous to engage in thorough conscious
deliberation before choosing. On the basis of recent insights into the characteristics of conscious
and unconscious thought, we tested the hypothesis that simple choices (such as between different
towels or different sets of oven mitts) indeed produce better results after conscious thought, but
that choices in complex matters (such as between different houses or different cars) should be left
to unconscious thought. Named the ‘deliberation-without-attention’ hypothesis, it was confirmed
in four studies on consumer choice, both in the laboratory as well as among actual shoppers, that
purchases of complex products were viewed more favorably when decisions had been made in the
absence of attentive deliberation.
ommon knowledge holds that thor-
ough conscious thought leads to good
decisions and satisfactory choices.
Whether purchasing a new car, a desktop com-
puter, or a pair of shoes, people generally
believe that serious conscious deliberation in-
creases the probability that they will make the
Bright[ choice. This idea applies especially to
choices between products that are complex,
multifaceted, and expensive. Whereas most
people are willing to buy a new set of towels
without much thought, they are unlikely to buy
a new car or outfit a new kitchen without
A second pervasive idea is that the quality
of a choice benefits from Bsleeping on it.[
Rather than (or in addition to) thinking con-
sciously, people usually feel that Bunconscious
thought[ is useful for making sound decisions.
Whereas conscious thought refers to thought or
deliberation while conscious attention is di-
rected at the problem at hand, unconscious
thought can be defined as thought or delibera-
tion in the absence of conscious attention di-
rected at the problem (1). An example of
unconscious thought is the following: One
compares two holiday destinations (say the
Costa Brava and T uscany) and does not know
what to decide. One puts the problem aside and
after 48 hours of not thinking about it con-
sciously, suddenly the thought BIt_s going to be
Tuscany![ pops into consciou sness. This thou ght
itself is conscious, but the transition from
indecision to a preference 2 days later is the
result of unconscious thought, or of deliberation
without attention.
The scientific literature has emphasized the
benefits of conscious deliberation in decision
making for hundreds of years (2, 3). The idea
that conscious deliberation is the ideal (if not
always attainable) way to approach a d ecision
forms the backbone of classic (4, 5)aswellas
contemporary perspectives on decision making
(6, 7) and attitude formation (8, 9). In contrast,
the notion that unconscious thought is fruitful
hardly developed beyond the status of Bfolk
wisdom.[ It has been postulated or investigated
by scientists infrequently Ebut see (10–13)^.The
question addressed here is whether this view is
justified. We hypothesize that it is not.
First, conscious thought does not always
lead to sound choices. For example, participants
who chose their favorite p oster among a set of
five after thorough contemplation showed less
postchoice satisfaction than participants who
only looked at them briefly (14, 15). Further-
more, conscious deliberation can make multiple
evaluations of the same object less consistent
over time (16). Two reasons why conscious
deliberation sometimes leads to poor judgments
have been identified. First, consciousness has
a low capacity (17, 18), causing choosers to take
into account only a subset of the relevant
informationwhentheydecide(13, 19). Second,
conscious thought can lead to suboptimal weight-
ing of the importance of attributes (13–16):
We tend to inflate the importance of s ome at-
tributes at the expense of others, leading to
worse choices.
Conversely, unconscious thought, or thought
without attention, can lead to good choices
(13, 14). In a recent experiment, participants
read information about four apartments of dif-
ferent desirability (20). They were either asked
to choose their favorite immediately, or given
the opportunity to choose after a period of
conscious thought, or distracted for some time
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail:
Fig. 1. Percentage of participants who chose the
most desirable car as a function of complexity of
decision and of mode of thought (n 0 18 to 22 in
each condition). Error bars represent the stan-
dard error .
Fig. 2. Difference in attitude (on a scale of –25 to
þ25) toward the desirable and undesirable car as a
function of complexity of decision and of mode of
thought (n 0 12 to 14 in each condition). Error
bars represen t the standard error.
1005 SCIENCE VOL 311 17 FEBRUARY 2006
before they chose. In the third of these con-
ditions, participants could only engage in
unconscious deliberation: They knew they
would have to choo se later, but the distraction
task prevented them from devoting conscious
attention to the choice. Interestingly, un-
conscious thinkers made better decisions than
conscious thinkers or than immediate choosers
(13, 14).
Recently, we formulated the Unconscious
Thought Theory (UTT) (21) about the strengths
and weaknesses of conscious thought and un-
conscious thought, that is, of deliberation with
and without attention. Two characteristics of
conscious and unconscious thought are impor-
tant in the current context. First, conscious
thought is rule-based and very precise (22, 23).
Unconscious thought can conform to rules in
that it detects recurring patterns, as the literature
on implicit learning shows (24). However, in
order to actively follow strict rules, conscious
attention is necessary. For example, one cannot
do arithmetic without conscious attention. This
capacity to follow rules makes conscious thought
more precise in decision making, because it
can strictly follow self-generated rules such as
not exceeding a maximum price. Second, as
alluded to earlier, conscious thought suffers
from the low capacity of consciousness, mak-
ing it less suitable for very complex issues.
Unconscious thought does not suffer from low
capacity. Indeed, it has been shown that during
unconscious thought, large amounts of infor-
mation can be integrated into an evaluative
summary judgment (13).
These characteristics of conscious and un-
conscious thought led us to postulate the
Bdeliberation-without-attention[ hypothesis, on
the relation between mode of thought or
deliberation (conscious versus unconscious)
and the complexity and quality of choice.
Complexity is defined as the amount of in-
formation a choice involves. A choice between
objects for which one or two attributes are
important (such as oven mitts or toothpaste) is
simple, whereas a choice between objects for
which many attributes are important (cars or
houses) is complex. Conscious thought is hy-
pothesized, due to its precision, to lead to good
choices in simple matters. However, because of
its low capacity, conscious thought leads to
progressively worse choices with more com-
plex issues. Unconscious th ought (i.e., deliber-
ation without attention) is expected, because of
its relative lack of precision, to lead to choices
of lower quality. However, the quality of choice
does not deteriorate with increased complexity,
allowing unconscious thought to lead to better
choices than conscious thought under com-
plex circumstances, this latter idea being the
kernel of the deliberation-without-attention
hypothesis. Quality of choice was operation-
alized both normatively (studies 1 and 2) as
well as subjectively (as postchoice satisfaction,
in studies 3 and 4).
Study 1. Participants were subjected to a 2
(mode of thought: conscious versus uncon-
scious) 2 (complexity of choice problem: sim-
ple versus complex) factorial design (25). All
participants read information about four hypo-
thetical cars. Depending on the condition, each
car was characterized by 4 attributes (simple) or
by 12 attributes (complex). The attributes were
either positive or negative. One car was char-
acterized by 75% positive attributes, two by
50% p ositive attributes, and one by 2 5% posi-
tive attributes (supporting online text). After
reading the information about the four cars,
participants were assigned either to a conscious
thought condition or to an unconscious thought
condition. In the conscious thought condition,
participants were asked to think about the cars
for 4 min before they chose their favorite car.
In the unconscious thought condition, partic-
ipants were distracted for 4 min (they solved
anagrams) and were told that after the period of
distraction they would be asked to choose the
best car.
The percentages of participants who chose
the best car are shown in Fig. 1. The crucial two-
way interaction supporting the deliberation-
without-attention hypothesis was significant
EF(1,76) 0 4.85, P G 0.04^. Unconscious think-
ers fared relatively well and showed no differ-
ences between conditions (F G 1, not significant).
Conscious thinkers generally made the proper
choice under simple conditions, but performed
poorly under complex circumstances EF(1,40) 0
4.95, P G 0.04^.
Study 2. For the second study we made one
change (25). Rather than asking for a choice,
we asked participants about their attitudes
toward each of the four cars. As the dependent
variable, we used the difference in attitude
toward the best car and the worst car. Again,
conscious thinkers were better able to differen-
tiate the quality of the cars under simple
conditions, whereas unconscious thinkers were
better able to differentiate the quality of the cars
under complex conditions E F(1,47) 0 5.63, P G
0.03^. The means are shown in Fig. 2.
Study 3. In a pilot study, undergraduate
students were asked how many aspects of a
product they would take into account in the
purchase of 40 different products. In this way,
we obtained an average Bcomplexity score[
for 40 different products (supporting online
For the actual study, other students were
presented with this list of 40 products. From the
list, they were asked to choose a product that
they had recently purchased and were asked the
following questions: Which product did you
purchase? Did you know the product before
you went on the shopping trip? How much did
you think about the product between seeing it
for the first time and b uying it? How satisfied
are you with the product?
To test our hypothesis, we distinguished
participants who thought (either consciously or
unconsciously) about their purchase from im-
pulse buyers who did not think much at all.
Hence, participa nts who indicated that they
bought a product they had never come across
before the shopping trip were not included,
leaving only participants who knew the product
beforehand (n 0 49).
It is impossible to know whether people are
engaged in unconscious thought by asking
them, so strictly speaking, we can only test
the relationship between conscious thought,
Fig. 3. The relation between mode of
thought and postchoice satisfaction
(on a scale of 1 to 7) for the six
products most frequently chosen in
study 3. Higher bars indicate more
satisfaction. The more complex the
product (on a scale of 1 to 5), the fur-
ther to the right it is shown. The
complexity score is given in parenthe-
ses. Participants were divided into
conscious and unconscious thinkers
on the basis of a median-split for
each product individually. Each bar
repres ents between two and five
Fig. 4. Postchoice satisfaction of IKEA (n 0 27)
and Bijenkorf (n 0 27) shoppers as a function
of mode of thought. Error bars represent the
standard error.
complexity, and quality. However, it follows
from our definition of conscious and uncon-
scious thought (according to which attention
to the problem at hand is the crucial distin-
guishing factor) that they are at least partly
dependent. At any one point in time, attention
is either directed at the decision under con-
sideration, or it is not; that is, at any partic-
ular point in time, either you are attending to
buying a car, or you are not. The more you
think about a decision consciously (that is,
with attention), the less time remains to think
about the same decision unconsciously (that
is, without attention).
We regressed the amount of thought and the
average number of aspects on postchoice satis-
faction. As expected, thinking does not make
people more satisfied, nor does complexity
(t_s G 1). However, the interaction of the two
parameters significantly predicted postchoice
satisfaction Et(48) 0 2.13, P G 0.04^.Correla-
tions were calculated between amount of
thought and postchoice satisfaction for three
categories of products: complex, medium, and
simple. For products of medium complexity, no
correlation was found Er(18) 0 –0.03^;for
simple products, a positive correlation was
found Er(15) 0 0.57, P G 0.03^; and for complex
products, a negative correlation was found
Er(16) 0 –0.56, P G 0.03^. As expected, the
more people thought consciously about simple
products, the more satisfied they were with
their purchase. Conversely, the more people
thought consciously about complex products,
the less satisfied they were with their purchase.
Figure 3 depicts satisfaction as a function of
mode of thought for the six most frequently
chosen products (26).
Study 4. On the basis of the pilot study to
study 3, two shops were selected: one where
people generally buy complex products (IKEA,
which sells mainly furniture) and one where
people generally buy simple products (Bijenkorf,
a department store like Macy_s that sells
clothes, clothing accessories, and kitchen ac-
cessories). At the exit, shoppers were asked the
following questions: What did you buy? How
expensive was it? Did you know the product
before you went on the shopping trip? and
How much did you think about the product
between seeing it for the first time and buying
it? A few weeks later, the shoppers were asked
(over the phone) how satisfied they were with
their purchases. As in study 3, participants who
indicated that they bought a product they had
never come across before the shopping trip
were not included.
We divided participants (Bthinkers[)onthe
basis of a median-split procedure into those
who engaged in much conscious thought
(conscious thinkers) and those who engaged
in little conscious thought (unconscious think-
ers). As expected, conscious thinkers reported
more p ostchoice satisfaction than uncon-
scious thinkers for Bijenkorf products (simple
products) EF(1,25) 0 6.52, P G 0.02^. The oppo-
site was true for the IKEA customers (complex
products), in which case unconscious thinkers
showed more postchoice satisfaction than con-
scious thinkers EF(1,25) 0 6.12, P G 0.02^
(Fig. 4).
In sum, in four studies we demonstrated the
deliberation-without-attention effect. Conscious
thinkers were better able to make the best
choice among simple products, whereas un-
conscious thinkers were better able to make the
best choice among complex products. Among
people who knew the product they purchased
before they went on a shopping trip, the amount
of conscious thought was positively related to
postchoice satisfaction for simple products and
negatively related to postchoice satisfaction for
complex products.
Our aim was to test the Bdeliberation-
without-attention[ hypothesis both in the labo-
ratory and among shoppers. In that sense, it is
important to view our set of studies as a whole
rather than as a series of individual studies.
Study 4 has unavoidable disadvantages such as
that the IKEA and Bijenkorf samples may have
differed (after all, different shops attract a
different clientele), which naturally opens the
potential for alternative explanations. There-
fore, study 3 was done in order to Bbridge[ the
laboratory studies with study 4. It has many of
the assets of study 4 (real choices between real
products with satisfaction as the dependent
variable), except that all participants were
Although we investigated choices among
consumer products in our studies, there is no a
priori reason to assume that the deliberation-
without-attention effect does not generalize to
other types of choices—political, managerial,
or otherwise. In such cases, it should benefit
the individual to think consciously about
simple matters and to delegate thinking about
more complex matters to the unconscious.
References and Notes
1. It is important to note that attention to the problem at
hand is the crucial distinction in our definitions of conscious
and unconscious thought. Thinking about buying a new
car while attention is directed at possible new cars is
conscious thought. Thinking about buying a new car
while attention is temporarily directed elsewhere is
unconscious thought. This distinction does not mean that
conscious thought only comprises conscious processes.
One can compare it to speech. Speech is a conscious
process (i.e., attention is directed at it while one speaks),
but it is in part dependent on accompanying unconscious
processes (such as processes responsible for syntax or
word choice).
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20. Quality of decision was operationalized from a
normative perspective. One of the choice options was
made more desirable than the others because it
had been assigned more positive aspects than the
other apartments.
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in press.
22. The important distinction between following rules and
merely conforming to them (and the need for conscious
attention in the former) was made by S. A. Sloman
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but there is an important difference. Implicit learning
refers to aspects of a task that are learned while
working on the task (and that are inaccessible to
consciousness). Unconscious thought refers to thought
processes that take place after the encoding of relevant
information. A good example of this definition of
unconscious thought is the groundbreaking work by
Stickgold and colleagues on learning during sleep.
See, e.g., (30, 31).
25. Materials and methods are available as supporting
material on Science Online.
26. We found a correlation between number of aspects and
amount of thought (r 0 0.54, P G 0.001): The more
complex a product is, the more people think consciously
when deciding to purchase it. Understandable as this
may be, our analysis suggests that people should do the
opposite, i.e., think unconsciously when deciding to
purchase a complex product. The correlation between
number of aspects and price was also significant
(r 0 0.45, P G 0.001): Expensive products were more
complex than inexpensive ones.
27. A. Schopenhauer, in Essays and Aphorisms (Penguin,
London, 1851/1970), p. 123.
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30. R. Stickgold, M. Walker, Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 191 (2004).
31. R. Stickgold et al., Science 294, 1052 (2001).
32. We thank E. Neimeijer, L. Schreers, and R. Wassenberg
for help with conducting study 4. This research was
supported by a grant from Nederlandse Organisatie voor
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (016.025.030).
Supporting Online Material
Materials and Methods
20 October 2005; accepted 9 January 2006
1007 SCIENCE VOL 311 17 FEBRUARY 2006
... Despite the use of sophisticated axiomatic and formal framework (Luce and Raiffa, 1989), these traditional models have limited capacities to decode the intentions and thoughts driving consumer behavior in the real market. The observed behavior of consumers is much more complex than these traditional models assume (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Second, behavioral economic models have shown that consumers often violate the basic axioms of traditional models (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). ...
... Common knowledge holds that when purchasing a new house, a laptop, or a pair of shoes, people generally believe that conscious deliberation increases the likelihood that they will make the right choice. However, recent insights show that often the "deliberation-without-attention" leads to better decisions and satisfaction levels among consumers than does conscious deliberation (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Furthermore, current research has shown that behavioral science methods do not provide a sufficiently comprehensive picture of consumers' actual decision-making. ...
... This occurs because people verbalized their choice before researchers secretly switched the content of the sample containers (Hall et al., 2010). In addition, it has been confirmed that consumers' purchases of complex products were viewed more favorably when decisions had been made in the absence of verbalization and attentive deliberation (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Asking consumers how much they like something requires several mental and neurophysiological operations, including the initial processing of the stimulus, referencing similar items with which the consumer has experience, and projection of future benefit, all of which may be subject to the mental overshadowing effects of the experiment. ...
Full-text available
Experimental setups that probe consumers’ underlying feelings, purchase intentions, and choices. The Topic Editors are honoured to present 14 multidisciplinary contributions that focus on successful implementations of physiological and neuroscientific measures in the field of cognitive psychology, marketing, design, and psychiatry. Keywords: preference formation, neuroscience, physiology, evaluative processing, consumer behavior
... Compare work on the 'Deliberation-without-attention' effect byDijksterhuis et al. (2006), who explicitly make room for the notion of unconscious deliberation. It also seems like our everyday notion of deliberation allows it to be unconscious; otherwise, 'conscious deliberation' would sound redundant. ...
My dissertation defends the importance of epistemic norms on what I call ‘inquiring further.’ Inquiring further is a familiar practice we engage in when we redeliberate, gather more evidence, or double-check our beliefs. Nonetheless, many philosophers have argued that norms governing further inquiry are at most practical or moral norms. Against this, I argue that norms on inquiring further are central to our understanding of responsible epistemic agency. I do this by appealing to both the roles of epistemic evaluations and our practices of holding agents epistemically accountable. My dissertation thereby expands and deepens our understanding of epistemic evaluations and normativity. Each chapter of my dissertation focuses on a different practice of inquiring further. The first, “A Puzzle About Fickleness,” motivates a puzzle about changes of mind resulting from redeliberation. The puzzle is to explain the asymmetry between one-off changes of mind, which often seem permissible, and multiple changes of mind—or fickleness—which often seem problematic. After motivating an epistemic solution to the puzzle, I propose and defend the Ratifiable Reasoning Account. On this solution, as agents redeliberate, they gain two types of evidence. First, they gain inductive evidence that they will not stably settle their belief. Second, this inductive evidence affords higher-order evidence that they are unreliable at assessing the matter at hand. The fact that fickle agents gain this higher-order evidence explains why fickleness can be epistemically—not just practically—irrational. The second chapter turns to our practices of evidence-gathering. In “Epistemic Norms on Evidence-Gathering,” I and my co-author, Carolina Flores, argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Though this view is intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has; justified or rational beliefs are those based on appropriate responses to that evidence. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. The third chapter, “Why Double-Check?”, explores the relationship between double-checking and knowledge. I argue that agents can simultaneously know that p and rationally double-check that p. Call this view the Synchronic Compatibility Thesis. Although intuitive, this thesis faces two challenges. First, some have argued that agents who double-check ought to suspend judgment while inquiring; they thus lose knowledge while double-checking, if only temporarily. Second, some have argued that if it is rational to double-check that p, then one does not know that p. This claim is motivated by strong conceptions of belief or pragmatic encroachment. I argue that these competing views fail to accommodate the many reasons why agents might double-check, ranging from seeking certainty to making one’s beliefs more resilient. Moreover, the alternative views rely on overly strong assumptions about what inquiry, knowledge, or belief requires. By exploring fickleness, evidence-gathering, and double-checking—three phenomena that traditional epistemology has neglected—this dissertation enriches epistemology by making it more relevant to real-world agents.
... The reality of unconscious cognitive and sensoryemotional processing is unquestionable [15][16][17][18][19][20]. For instance, the consciously verbally reported strategy to perform a task may not be the one the child used, according to the observable eye movements of the child [21]. ...
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Objective: This study aims to characterize electrical signals to establish a diagnosis of cognitive-emotional dysfunction and guide a successful therapeutic intervention. Therefore, the present study aimed to observe these frequency bands in a sample of dysfunctional neurological behaviors to establish a neural marker of neural dysfunction that helps diagnose and monitor treatment. Methods: A descriptive retrospective (extracted from the database) observational study design based on real-world historical data from routine clinical practice. According to DSM-5, low academic achievement (n =70), disruptive behavior (externalizing behavior problems) (n=70), and somatic syndrome disorder (n=70) were the subjects. The mean age of the sample was 14.13 (SD = 1.46; range 12-18), 31.5% women. The measuring instrument was the NeXus-10, which is suitable for acquiring a wide range of physiological signals. Brain electrical activity was recorded by using the quantitative electroencephalograph (qEEG) in accordance with the 10-20 International Electrode Placement System. In particular, the specific form of miniQ (mini-qEEG) was used. Results: A pattern record present in all cases were identified. The record refers to (a) activity along the midline, namely, Fz-Cz-Pz, (b) activity from the center (Cz) to back, namely, Pz-O1 and O2, (c) activity from the center (Cz) forward (Fz), and (d) comparison between hemispheres. The characteristics of theta, alpha, and beta waves define the characteristic pattern of neurological dysfunction. The reversal of the dysfunctional pattern coincided with the remission of the clinical symptoms after treatment, which occurred in 87,6% of the subjects. We define remission as not meeting DSM-5 criteria. Conclusion: This study suggests that miniQ register could be considered a simple and objective tool for studying neurological dysfunction. This dysfunction is explained according to current neurological knowledge of interactive cognition-emotion processing. MiniQ may be a cheap and reliable method and a promising tool for the investigation in the field.
In this non-experimental quantitative study, it was aimed to investigate if high school students’ critical thinking (CT) dispositions, decision making (DM) styles, and perceived problem solving (PS) skills differ by gender and their CT dispositions and DM styles are significant predictors of perceived PS skills. The study was carried out with 170 high school students and the data were collected with UF/EMI Critical Thinking Disposition Instrument, Problem Solving Skills Perception Scale, and Adolescent Decision Making Questionnaire. It was found out that gender did not significantly affect students’ CT dispositions, perceived PS skills, and DM styles except for decisional self-esteem. Also, CT dispositions (engagement, maturity, and innovativeness) and DM styles (decisional self-esteem, vigilance, panic, cop out, and complacency) were significant predictors of the students’ perceived PS skills. While CT dispositions explained 51% of the total variance on students’ perceived PS skills, DM styles explained 48% of the total variance.
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Human pathophysiology is occasionally too complex for unaided hypothetical-deductive reasoning and the isolated application of additive or linear statistical methods. Clustering algorithms use input data patterns and distributions to form groups of similar patients or diseases that share distinct properties. Although clinicians frequently perform tasks that may be enhanced by clustering, few receive formal training and clinician-centered literature in clustering is sparse. To add value to clinical care and research, optimal clustering practices require a thorough understanding of how to process and optimize data, select features, weigh strengths and weaknesses of different clustering methods, select the optimal clustering method, and apply clustering methods to solve problems. These concepts and our suggestions for implementing them are described in this narrative review of published literature. All clustering methods share the weakness of finding potential clusters even when natural clusters do not exist, underscoring the importance of applying data-driven techniques as well as clinical and statistical expertise to clustering analyses. When applied properly, patient and disease phenotype clustering can reveal obscured associations that can help clinicians understand disease pathophysiology, predict treatment response, and identify patients for clinical trial enrollment.
This chapter addresses Chalmers’ hard and easy problems of consciousness. In the first part of the chapter, priming and blindsight are discussed, as instances of easy-problem ‘consciousness’ that are actually not conscious. Cognitive processes (particularly, those targeted in cognitive dissonance studies and decision-making studies) are also shown to be dissociated from consciousness. The second part of the chapter concerns ‘the hard problem’ of consciousness. This problem is often approached in much the same way the easy problems are approached. However, it is more plausible to account for perceptual awareness in terms of whether attention is being paid to perceptions, rather than whether or not perceptions are conscious. Therefore, such research sheds little light on either the easy or the hard problems of consciousness.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the role of different thinking preferences when employees make judgments about the credibility and accuracy of information privacy issues at work. We investigate the relationship between people's thinking processes and their perceived credibility of information with respect to collection of personal data and processing of personal data, in the context of workplaces in Slovakia. We test the most well-known concepts from intuition research and practice simultaneously and contribute to the applied literature on domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision-making. The findings of this study can help managers and data controllers in small-and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in reflecting about the way in which people employ different thinking processes for decision-making about data policy in their organizations.
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The sports industry seems to be embedded in the global culture to such a degree that many activities positioning or using sports elements seem to emerge every day, such as esport, competitive video games. At the same time, other activities, which have the legal status of a sport, such as chess, are mostly not considered as sports by consumers. A paradox thus seems to exist between the classification of an activity as a sport and the categorization and mental representation that consumers have of it.Based on this observation, the first objective of this research is to understand and measure the elements that influence the perception of leisure activities as sports by consumers. This measurement, called perceived sportivity, is carried out through an initial historical and sociological review of the concept of sport. We go back to its origin and analyze its evolution to understand its components and influences. Then, based on a series of qualitative and quantitative studies, we develop a measurement instrument to measure this perception and categorization as a sport by consumers. This measurement instrument consists of 8 items divided into two dimensions called physicality (5 items) and equipment (3 items).Once this instrument measuring perceived sportivity has been created and validated from a convergent and discriminating point of view, but also within a nomological network, we propose to test it in two contexts. First, we test the effects of perceived sportivity in a field study. This field study uses one of the most-watched and most-played video games in the world: League of Legends. In this field study, we test and confirm the effects of perceived sportivity on brand perception, i.e. brand personality, brand identification, and perceived brand legitimacy. Finally, we also measure and confirm the influence of brand perception on 3 variables: consumer engagement, perceived value, and purchase intention. These results are then replicated in an experiment where the two dimensions of sportivity are manipulated through visual and textual stimuli.
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Dark patterns – design interfaces or features that subtly manipulate people in making suboptimal decisions – are ubiquitous especially in e-commerce websites. Yet, there is little research on the effectiveness of dark patterns, and even lesser studies on testing interventions that can help mitigate their influence on consumers. To that end, we conducted two experiments. The first experiment tests the effectiveness of different dark patterns within a hypothetical single product online shopping context. Results show that, indeed, dark patterns increase the purchase impulsivity across all dark patterns, relative to the control. The second experiment tests the effectiveness of three behaviorally informed interventions on four different dark patterns also in a hypothetical online shopping scenario, but this time offering multiple products instead of a single product. Between-subject analysis shows that not all interventions are equally effective, with uneven impact across dark patterns. However, within-subject results indicate that all interventions significantly reduce purchase impulsivity pre- versus post-intervention, indicating that any intervention is better than none when it comes to combating dark patterns. We then end by discussing the policy implications of our results.
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This chapter outlines the two basic routes to persuasion. One route is based on the thoughtful consideration of arguments central to the issue, whereas the other is based on the affective associations or simple inferences tied to peripheral cues in the persuasion context. This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion. One of the basic postulates of the Elaboration Likelihood Model—that variables may affect persuasion by increasing or decreasing scrutiny of message arguments—has been highly useful in accounting for the effects of a seemingly diverse list of variables. The reviewers of the attitude change literature have been disappointed with the many conflicting effects observed, even for ostensibly simple variables. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempts to place these many conflicting results and theories under one conceptual umbrella by specifying the major processes underlying persuasion and indicating the way many of the traditionally studied variables and theories relate to these basic processes. The ELM may prove useful in providing a guiding set of postulates from which to interpret previous work and in suggesting new hypotheses to be explored in future research. Copyright © 1986 Academic Press Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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This study tested the prediction that introspecting about the reasons for one's preferences would reduce satisfaction with a consumer choice. Subjects evaluated two types of posters and then chose one to take home. Those instructed to think about their reasons chose a different type of poster than control subjects and, when contacted 3 weeks later, were less satisfied with their choice. When people think about reasons, they appear to focus on attributes of the stimulus that are easy to verbalize and seem like plausible reasons but may not be important causes of their initial evaluations. When these attributes imply a new evaluation of the stimulus, people change their attitudes and base their choices on these new attitudes. Over time, however, people's initial evaluation of the stimulus seems to return, and they come to regret choices based on the new attitudes.
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Two experiments examined processes by which analyzing reasons may influence attitude judgments. Participants made multiple liking judgments on sets of stimuli that varied along 6 a priori dimensions. In Study 1, the stimulus set consisted of 64 cartoon faces with 6 binary-valued attributes (e.g., a straight vs a crooked nose). In Study 2, the stimuli were 60 digitized photographs from a college yearbook that varied along 6 dimensions uncovered through multidimensional scaling. In each experiment, half of the participants were instructed to think about the reasons why they liked each face before making their liking rating. Participants' multiple liking ratings were then regressed on the dimension values to determine how they weighted each dimension in their liking judgments. The results support a process whereby reasoning leads to increased variability and inconsistency in the weighting of stimulus information. Wilson's model of the disruptive effects of reasoning on attitude judgments ( e.g., T. D. Wilson, D. S. Dunn, D. Kraft, & D. J. Lisle, 1989 ) is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Introduction, 99. — I. Some general features of rational choice, 100.— II. The essential simplifications, 103. — III. Existence and uniqueness of solutions, 111. — IV. Further comments on dynamics, 113. — V. Conclusion, 114. — Appendix, 115.
Presents a general descriptive theory of decision making under stress, which includes a typology of 5 distinctive patterns of coping behavior, including vigilance, hypervigilance, and defensive avoidance. The theory is illustrated with discussions of laboratory experiments, field studies, autobiographical and biographical material, and analyses of managerial and foreign policy decisions. Two analytical models, a schema for decision-making stages and a decisional "balance sheet," are also presented to clarify the theory. (28 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The "user illusion" of this book's title comes from computer design and refers to thesimplistic mental image most of us have of our PCs. Our consciousness, says the author, is our user illusion of ourselves. This book makes the case that humans are designed for a much richer existence than processing a dribble of data from a computer screen, which actually constitutes a form of sensory deprivation. That there is actually far too little information in the so-called Information Age may be responsible for the malaise of modern society, that nagging feeling that there must be more to life. There is—but we have to get outside and live life with all our senses to experience it more fully. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)