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Embodied simulation: from mirror neuron systemsto interpersonal relations.” Novartis Foundation Symposium 278, 3-12
Abstract
A direct form of 'experiential understanding' of others is achieved by modelling their behaviours as intentional experiences on the basis of the equivalence between what the others do and feel and what we do and feel. This modelling mechanism is embodied simulation. By means of embodied simulation we do not just 'see' an action, an emotion, or a sensation. Side by side with the sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the body states associated with actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he/she would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. Mirror neurons are likely the neural correlate of this mechanism. The mirror neuron matching systems map the different intentional relations in a compressed fashion, which is neutral about the specific quality or identity of the agentive/subjective parameter. By means of a shared neural state realized in two different bodies that nevertheless obey to the same functional rules, the 'objectual other' becomes 'another self'.
... Therefore, the mirror perception system is "a direct form of 'experiential understanding' of others, achieved by modelling their behaviours as intentional experiences, based on the equivalence between what the others do and feel and what we do and feel." [17] This means that the human body is an essential basis for our perception to have an empathetic relationship with the world besides vision [14]. In brief, the mechanism of mirror neurons is based on people's memory of past bodily experiences and feelings. ...
... Based on the mirror neuron, the notion of "embodied simulation" was proposed as an extension to explain the mechanism of how humans not only "see" the built environment but also feel and simulate emotions and actions from the world through the medium of the body [17]. The findings of the embodied simulation were based on the premise that perception and cognition inherently depend upon the organisms' interaction with their environment [18] [19]. ...
... The findings of the embodied simulation were based on the premise that perception and cognition inherently depend upon the organisms' interaction with their environment [18] [19]. Which meanings, human perception emerges from the active dynamic interaction and movement, and thus get the "meaning" through the evocation of similar experiences of our bodies, which is a form of "experiential understanding" of the environment [17] [20]. The recent studies also show that our embodied simulation is not restricted to the social world. ...
The paper attempts to provide a neuroscientific perspective on the discussion of structural expression. Taking human perception as the clue, this article starts with the notion of strong structures, take it as the base to review and analyses the principles of structural perception under the neurophysiological perspective. Based on the findings from mirror neuron and embodied simulation, this article further reviewed the impact of embodied structural ambivalence on structural expression and human perception from the concrete example to the theoretical implication. Therefore provides a neuroscience-based scientific perspective on the research of structural expression.
... Many areas of visual perception are hardwired, such as color perception, for which we have different types of receptors, or simple shape orientations, which are represented by neurons in the visual cortex . Indeed, some researchers have suggested that perceiving an emotion, or more generally inferring a mental state, happens equally automatically, via MN (Gallese, 2003b(Gallese, , 2007a(Gallese, , 2007bGallese & Goldman, 1998;). This line of thought gave rise to the theory of embodied simulation, which states that we understand other persons' mental states because our brain activation is the same when we observe someone expressing an emotion, as when we experience that emotion ourselves. ...
... While the results of study 1 allow conclusions on the similarities in brain activation between tasks, the question how exactly the MNS is involved in these processes is left unanswered. The theory of embodied simulation proposes that the MNS allows the understanding of another person's emotions (Gallese, 2007b). If this is true, the MNS would not only respond to facial dynamics perceived as expressing emotions in general, but also distinguish between emotions. ...
... The assumption that emotion perception is a social-cognitive skill which is accomplished via embodied simulation with the automatic response of the MNS (Gallese, 2007a(Gallese, , 2007bGallese & Goldman, 1998;Gallese et al., 2004) is central to my PhD thesis. However, as the MNS preferentially processes familiar movements (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005;Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006), one might expect that the same is true for facial configurations. ...
In my PhD thesis, I present three functional magnetic resonance imaging studies aimed at investigating neurobiological mechanisms underlying social cognition. My thesis focuses on fast and automatic processes that are proposed to build the basis of social understanding, and might be activated in parallel to more effortful deliberate mechanisms. The proposed neural substrate of fast and automatic processes are mirror neurons, which according to the theory of embodied simulation allow humans to understand other individuals’ actions, and even emotions and intentions. Since non-invasive techniques cannot be applied to measure mirror neurons, but only neural populations assumed to constitute the mirror neuron system, experimental paradigms and analysis routines that allow approximation of mirror neuron functions need to be developed. In study 1, I demonstrated that different social cognitive skills, including imitation, affective empathy and theory of mind share a common neural basis, located in regions associated with the mirror neuron system. In addition to standard analyses, a shared voxel analysis was applied that revealed common activation for social-cognitive processes not only across, but also within participants. Study 2 was set up to investigate whether the mirror neuron system can distinguish the valence of facial configurations. The use of a functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation paradigm allowed to determine neural populations sensitive to emotional valence. While the fusiform gyrus was sensitive to changes from fearful to smiling faces and also from smiling to fearful faces, Brodmann area 44 reaching into insula, and superior temporal sulcus, i.e. regions more commonly associated with the mirror neuron system and with the so called mentalizing network, showed particularly increased activation for switches from smiling to fearful faces. Study 3 was dedicated to the investigation of decision making in the context of ambiguous facial configurations. While probabilistic decision making on these facial configurations lead to activation in the executive control network, final decisions for an emotion resulted in nucleus accumbens activation. In addition, perceiving fear in a face lead to higher nucleus accumbens activation during final decisions than perceiving happiness. This finding can be linked to salience processing in the nucleus accumbens. In conclusion, all three studies show an involvement of fast and automatic processing regions for different social-cognitive processes. Study 3 additionally examined the interaction with slower and more deliberate processes, as involved in probabilistic decision making on ambiguous faces. The mirror neuron system seems to be critically involved in different social-cognitive tasks and also sensitive to emotional valence. In cases when automatic processing is not possible, as when presented with ambiguous facial configurations, brain regions commonly associated with probabilistic decision making assist, and the nucleus accumbens, possibly by directing salience, is involved in the final decision. These results deepen the understanding of the mechanisms of social cognition and encourage the use of sophisticated methods in experimental paradigms and analysis.
... It would achieve this by directly mapping the observed movements onto the own motor system, a mechanism known as the direct matching hypothesis (Gallese and Goldman 1999;. Such an automatic motor simulation may subsequently allow one to recognize the goals and mental states of others, by accessing in one's own action system the goals that may lead to the simulated surface behaviour (Gallese and Goldman 1999;lacoboni et al. 2005;Gallese 2007). ...
... The shared activation patterns between a person performing an action and the observer of these actions has been taken to suggest that the observer generates an internal simulation of the other's actions (Gallese and Goldman 1999). Such a simulation may serve to understand action intentions and mental states of others, by literally adopting their perspective (Gallese and Goldman 1999;Gallese 2007). A related view suggest that simulation during action observation contributes to the perceptual processing of that action. ...
... Het zou hierin slagen door het direct mappen van de waargenomen beweging op het eigen motorische systeem, een mechanisme dat bekend staat als de direct matching-hypothese (Gallese and Goldman 1999;. Zo'n automatische motorische simulatie zou de persoon vervolgens in staat stellen om de doelen en mentale toestanden van anderen te herkennen, door in het eigen motorische systeem de doelen op te roepen die zouden kunnen leiden tot het gesimuleerde uiterlijke gedrag (Gallese and Goldman 1999;Iacoboni et al. 2005;Gallese 2007). ...
... Besides the explicit recognition of facial expressions, facial mimicry and autonomic regulation have specific relevance in the study of the processing of the facial expressions of emotions. On the one hand, facial mimicry represents the automatic, rapid and congruent electromyographic muscular reaction to others' facial expressions [12,13] implicated in empathy, emotional reciprocity and emotions recognition [14][15][16]. Generally speaking, corrugator mimicry is facilitated during the observation of facial expressions of negative emotions and suppressed by positive ones [17]. Conversely, zygomaticus mimicry is promoted by facial expressions of positive emotions, like joy, and suppressed by negative ones. ...
... Corrugator. Mauchly's test conducted on corrugator EMG activity showed a violation of sphericity assumption for Epoch factor (χ 2 (14) = 92.92, p< 0.001). ...
... Mauchly's test conducted on corrugator EMG activity considering only negative emotions showed a violation of sphericity assumption for Epoch factor (χ 2 (14) = 95.41, p< 0.001). ...
Facial mimicry and vagal regulation represent two crucial physiological responses to oth-ers' facial expressions of emotions. Facial mimicry, defined as the automatic, rapid and congruent electromyographic activation to others' facial expressions, is implicated in empa-thy, emotional reciprocity and emotions recognition. Vagal regulation, quantified by the computation of Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA), exemplifies the autonomic adaptation to contingent social cues. Although it has been demonstrated that childhood maltreatment induces alterations in the processing of the facial expression of emotions, both at an explicit and implicit level, the effects of maltreatment on children's facial mimicry and vagal regulation in response to facial expressions of emotions remain unknown. The purpose of the present study was to fill this gap, involving 24 street-children (maltreated group) and 20 age-matched controls (control group). We recorded their spontaneous facial electromyo-graphic activations of corrugator and zygomaticus muscles and RSA responses during the visualization of the facial expressions of anger, fear, joy and sadness. Results demonstrated a different impact of childhood maltreatment on facial mimicry and vagal regulation. Maltreated children did not show the typical positive-negative modulation of corrugator mimicry. Furthermore, when only negative facial expressions were considered, maltreated children demonstrated lower corrugator mimicry than controls. With respect to vagal regulation , whereas maltreated children manifested the expected and functional inverse correlation between RSA value at rest and RSA response to angry facial expressions, controls did not. These results describe an early and divergent functional adaptation to hostile environment of the two investigated physiological mechanisms. On the one side, maltreatment leads to the suppression of the spontaneous facial mimicry normally concurring to empathic understanding of others' emotions. On the other side, maltreatment forces the precocious development of the functional synchronization between vagal regulation and threatening social cues facilitating the recruitment of fight-or-flight defensive behavioral strategies.
... Gallese proposed the concept of "embodied simulation" based on mirror neurons to explain further how humans not only "see" the built environment but also feel and simulate emotions and actions within it via the body [44]. Embodied simulation is a functional mechanism that enables us to make a pre-reflective sense of others' behaviour, emotions, and feelings. ...
... The finding of embodied simulation is based on the premise that perception and cognition are fundamentally dependent on an organism's interaction with its environment [47,48]. It argues that embodiment is an active mode of movement and experience for our bodies, an active "experiential understanding" of our environment [44,49]. And it is precisely these activations of embodied mechanisms of simulated action, emotion, and bodily sensation that underpin an aesthetic experience of art. ...
Structural art should not be marginalised as an integral part of structural design. By reviewing historical understandings of structural art, this article discusses the ambiguous and neglected perspective of structural art on architectural design and human perception dimensions, concentrating the attention of structural art on the question of human aesthetic perception. Based on significant changes in how art is perceived due to recent neuroaesthetics research, this article introduces recent findings from cognitive neuroscience regarding embodied perception principles, sheds new light on the aesthetic experiences inherent in the built environment, and clarifies and expands previously held beliefs about structural art. Finally, while emphasising the significance of structural art, this article attempts to provide a body-informed perspective on structural art that can aid in incorporating human neuroaesthetic perception principles during the conceptual phase of the structural design process, thereby redefining the effect of structures on architectural space and aesthetics, thus redefining structural art.
... It is a precognitive or pre-reflective instant perception occurring prior to conscious awareness and is evocative of a previous similar bodily experience (Gallese and Gattara, 2015, p. 162). Therefore, the mirror perception system is "a direct form of 'experiential understanding' of others, achieved by modelling their behaviours as intentional experiences, based on the equivalence between what the others do and feel and what we do and feel" (Gallese, 2007). This idea implies that human body is necessary for us to have an empathic relationship with the world (Rizzolatti et al., 2006). ...
... Following the unconscious impression, the structural engineer's knowledge as well as the knowledge of other individuals with varying educational/psychological backgrounds and cultural sensibilities, will manifest in the conscious and analytical reading of the structural expression. On the basis of the mirror neuron, the notion of "embodied simulation" was proposed as an extension to explain how humans not only "see" the built environment but also feel and simulate emotions and actions from the world through the medium of the body and experience (Gallese, 2007) (Thompson, 2007). This idea is similar to Merleau-Ponty's view that "the body is the vehicle of being in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962)." ...
The analogy between the human body and architectural structures dates all the way back to ancient times and has significantly shaped the design of buildings and structures. The article examines the body's historical influence on how structures are perceived and designed , demonstrating how the body shapes the "technical truth" dimension of structural design while oblivious to the importance of an "artistic truth" or perceptual dimension. This article aims to connect recent neuroscience findings and their implications for structural design through graphic statics and its design methods. Finally, this article proposes an equilibrium-based structural design approach for designing embodied structures based on graphic statics.
... The notion of direct or unmediated simulation is indeed an extension of the direct matching hypothesis developed by Gallese and Goldman (Gallese, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007bGallese et al., 2004;Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011;Goldman, 2006;Goldman & Sripada, 2005) to provide a direct and non-propositional explanation not only of our action understanding but also of our understanding of emotions, sensations, and even language (Gallese, 2007a;Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). Consider Gallese who notes that: ...
... But NK's experience of fear and anger has been quite normal. The same pattern of evidence is also found for other emotions (Gallese, 2001(Gallese, , 2003(Gallese, , 2005(Gallese, , 2007bGallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). Taken together, direct simulation advocates argue that evidence arising from these and other studies supports the claim that "in our brain, there are neural mechanisms (mirror mechanisms) that allow us to directly understand the meaning of the actions and emotions of others by internally replicating ('simulating') them" (Gallese et al., 2004, p. 396). ...
Some simulationists have argued that the information obtained during the perceptual process of facial expression (the geometric features) is sufficient for recognition of the emotion intended by that expression. Drawing on evidence from cross-cultural studies, with particular attention to conceptual act theories, I show that both emotion expression and recognition are top-down modulated by expressivity norms, observer-specific internal representations, and expectations. I thus conclude that direct simulation, or a purely bottom-up approach, is not sufficient for emotion recognition. Next, I will consider the generate and test strategy as an alternative to direct simulation. This is a highly promising approach in that top-down and bottom-up processes work in parallel, according to the presence, or not, of additional information. For this reason, it avoids the difficulties of direct simulation. I will argue, however, that it is based on a misconception of emotions, specifically on how emotions are represented in the brain. To improve the model, I distinguish between two different categorical approaches to emotions, then argue that only one of which is viable in a simulational account of emotion recognition.
... A key role has been proposed for mirror neurons [27] in interpreting other people's actions; the process has been named embodied simulation by Gallese [29], who explains: "we do not just 'see' an action, an emotion, or a sensation [by other people]. Side by side with the sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the body states associated with actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he/she would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation" [30]. Interestingly, Gallese [29] concludes that "action observation constitutes a form of action simulation", which is automatically triggered by viewing an action, at difference with voluntary imagination. ...
Several theories of consciousness (ToC) have been proposed, but it is hard to integrate them into a consensus theory. Each theory has its merits, in dealing with some aspects of the question, but the terminology is inconsistent, each ToC aims at answering a different question, and there is not even a reasonable agreement about what ‘consciousness’ is in the first place. Some common implicit assumptions, and the way some critical words – such as ‘sensation’, ‘perception’, ‘neural correlate of consciousness’ (NCC) – are thought to relate to consciousness, have introduced a series of misconceptions that make it difficult to pinpoint what consciousness consists in and how it arises in the brain.
The purpose of this contribution is twofold: firstly, to discern the various steps that lead from the detection of a stimulus to a conscious experience, by redefining terms such as sensation and perception with an adequate operative meaning; secondly, to emphasize the inevitable contribution of emotions and the active role of imagination in this process.
The diffuse view, for the layperson but among scientists as well, is that the brain produces an internal ‘representation’ of the external reality and of oneself. This tends to consign one to a Cartesian perspective, i.e., the idea that some entity must be there to witness and interpret such representation. This approach splits the conscious experience into brain activity, which generates a (possible) content of consciousness (still unconscious), and a vaguely defined entity or process that ‘generates’ consciousness and injects (or sheds the light of) consciousness onto the content of brain activity. This way, however, we learn nothing about how such consciousness would arise.
We propose here that consciousness is the function that generates a subjectively relevant and emotionally coloured internal image of the experience one is living. In this process, endogenous, spontaneous activity (imaginative activity, consisting in recalling and reviving memories, prefiguring consequences, analysing conjectures) produces many vague and ambiguous hints, rich of symbolic links, which compete in giving rise to an implicit, emotionally characterized, and semantically pleiotropic, internal experience. Cognitive elaboration may extract from this a defined and univocal, complete and consistent, explicit experience, that can be verbally reported (‘what it is like to...’).
... The authors argued that the complexity of action representation is determined not merely by the communicative nature of the observed behavior but, indeed, by the relational context in which such behavior is performed. Thus, the AON could be considered to be an early key processing component that supports and contributes to the understanding of nonverbal social interaction; and an automatic movement analysis might be performed to adequately understand an observed agent's social intentions (Gallese, 2006;Gallese & Goldman, 1998;Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). ...
Affective states can be understood as dynamic interpersonal processes developing over time and space. When we observe emotional interactions performed by other individuals, our visual system anticipates how the action will unfold. Thus, it has been proposed that the process of emotion perception is not only a simulative but also a predictive process - a phenomenon described as interpersonal predictive coding. The present study investigated whether the recognition of emotions from dyadic interactions depends on a fixed spatiotemporal coupling of the agents. We used an emotion recognition task to manipulate the actions of two interacting point-light figures by implementing different temporal offsets that delayed the onset of one of the agent's actions (+0 ms, +500 ms, +1000 ms or + 2000 ms). Participants had to determine both the subjective valence and the emotion category (happiness, anger, sadness, affection) of the interaction. Results showed that temporal decoupling had a critical effect on both emotion recognition and the subjective impression of valence intensity: Both measures decreased with increasing temporal offset. However, these effects were dependent on which emotion was displayed. Whereas affection and anger sequences were impacted by the temporal manipulation, happiness and sadness were not. To further investigate these effects, we conducted post-hoc exploratory analyses of interpersonal movement parameters. Our findings complement and extend previous evidence by showing that the complex, noncoincidental coordination of actions within dyadic interactions results in a meaningful movement pattern and might serve as a fundamental factor in both detecting and understanding complex actions during human interaction.
... How countertransference actually occurs remained somewhat mysterious until the discovery by neuroscientists of mirror neurons in primates (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Gallese and others discovered that mirror neurons in humans not only unconsciously trigger in the observer the same pre-motor neurons activated to induce behavior in the observed, but that by mirroring facial expression and gesture they generate understanding of intention and meaning, and induce the same emotions in the observer as experienced by the observed (Gallese, 2007). Like synchronization, this is a "mandatory, nonconscious, and prereflexive mechanism" (Gallese et al., 2007, p. 143). ...
Acting out and enactment are terms in widespread use colloquially and in psychoanalytic psychotherapy to describe patient and therapist behavior. Both terms are poorly defined in the literature and have varied in interpretation as theoretical frameworks have changed. The advent of relational and inter-personal therapeutic approaches has blurred both the distinction between talking and action established by Freud and the boundaries of clinical practice. A review of the history of both terms reveals their core meaning as transgressive; by one of the analytic pair or by both, respectively. Behavior violating therapeutic boundaries and the analytic attitude, including those triggered by countertransference, are important indicators of repressed trauma as Freud originally thought. His retreat from the seduction theory led to the confusion of acting out with transference and to later authors confusing enactment with countertransference. Traumatic memories are uniquely stored and difficult to recover and characterized by hypofunction in the default mode network and hyperfunction in the central executive and salience networks leading to their behavioral expression in acting out and enactment in contrast to verbal expression. Thus understood these forms of behavior can make an important contribution to the “talking cure.”
... These areas have often been linked to the mirror network. This network scaffolds the capacity to share others' actions and emotions by their simulation through one's own sensorimotor and affective systems (Gallese, 2007), and thus providing a potential neural basis for empathy (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012;Corradini & Antonietti, 2013;Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013;Pacella et al., 2017;Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). ...
“Body integrity dysphoria" (BID) is a severe condition affecting non-psychotic individuals. In the amputation variant of BID a limb may be experienced as not being part of the body, despite normal anatomical development and intact sensorimotor functions. We previously demonstrated altered brain structural (gray matter) and functional connectivity in 16 men with BID with a long-lasting and exclusive desire for left leg amputation. Here we aimed to identify, in the same sample, altered patterns of white matter structural connectivity. Fractional anisotropy (FA), derived from Diffusion Tensor Imaging data, was considered as a measure of structural connectivity. Results showed reduced structural connectivity of: i) the right superior parietal lobule (rSPL) with the right cuneus, with the superior occipital and with the posterior cingulate gyri ii) the pars orbitalis of the right middle frontal gyrus (rMFGOrb) with the putamen, and iii) the left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG) with the pars triangularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus. Increased connectivity was found between the right paracentral lobule (rPLC) and the right caudate nucleus. By using a complementary method of investigation, we confirmed and extended previous results from the same sample of individuals with BID, showing structural alterations between areas tuned to the processing of the sensorimotor representations of the affected leg (rPCL), and to higher-order components of bodily representation such as the body image (rSPL) and visual processing areas. Alongside this network for bodily awareness, other networks such as the limbic (rMFGOrb) and the mirror (lMTG) systems showed alterations in structural connectivity. These findings consolidate current understanding of the neural correlates of the amputation variant of BID, which might in turn guide diagnostics and rehabilitative treatments.
... Likewise, the notion of presence in intersubjectivity brings together neurobiological and cognitive elements to understand therapeutic change as dependent upon implicit interactivity exchanges between patient and provider. As neuroscientific research on the MNS straddles the interface of bio-philosophical conceptualizations of simulation and embodiment (Gallese, 2006;Goldman, 2009), interpreting CAM provider practices in the context of MNS research can help explicate embodied phenomena such as proprioception, empathy, mentalizing, and action imitation in fields such as somatic-affective-motor studies, education, and post-structuralist critiques of human relations (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 1992;Montero, 2006;Abraham et al., 2018;Pietrzak et al., 2018;Alcalá-López et al., 2019). Conversely, understandings of how the therapeutic relationship draws upon embodied phenomena can be enhanced by interpreting neuroscientific findings on mimicry, simulation, and intercorporeity (Girard, 1965(Girard, , 1977Gallese, 2011) in the CAM domain. ...
This study examines complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) providers’ practices in the treatment of their breast cancer survivor (BCS) clients and interprets these practices within the context of existing neuroscientific research on the mirror neuron system (MNS). Purposive and snowball sampling was conducted to recruit CAM providers (N = 15) treating BCSs from integrative medicine centers, educational institutions, private practices, and professional medical associations across the United States. In-depth semi-structured interviewing (N = 252 single-spaced pages) and inductive qualitative content analysis reveal CAM therapeutic practices emphasize a diachronic form of mimetic self-reflexivity and a serendipitous form of mimetic intersubjectivity in BCS pain management to allow the providers to tune-in to their clients’ internal states over time and experience themselves as an embodied subject in an imaginative, shared space. By employing imagination and an intentional vulnerability in their embodied simulation of the others’ internal states, CAM providers co-create experiences of pain while recognizing what about the other remains an unknown. Although MNs provide the mechanism for imitation and simulation underlying empathy through a neuronally wired grasp of the other’s intentionality, the study suggests that examining mimetic self-reflexivity and intersubjectivity in the therapeutic space may allow for a shared simulation of participants’ subjective experiences of pain and potentially inform research on self-recognition and self-other discrimination as an index of self-awareness which implicates the MNS in embodied social cognition in imaginative ways.
... (Clore & Storbeck 2006). In neuroscience, embodied simulation has been closely linked to the construct of mirror neurons and mirror systems, and the notion that brains resonate with the motor and affective states of perceptual objects with appropriate biological similarity (e.g., Gallese 2007;Keysers & Gazzola 2007). ...
Recent application of theories of embodied or grounded cognition to the recognition and interpretation of facial expression of emotion has led to an explosion of research in psychology and the neurosciences. However, despite the accelerating number of reported findings, it remains unclear how the many component processes of emotion and their neural mechanisms actually support embodied simulation. Equally unclear is what triggers the use of embodied simulation versus perceptual or conceptual strategies in determining meaning. The present article integrates behavioral research from social psychology with recent research in neurosciences in order to provide coherence to the extant and future research on this topic. The roles of several of the brain's reward systems, and the amygdala, somatosensory cortices, and motor centers are examined. These are then linked to behavioral and brain research on facial mimicry and eye gaze. Articulation of the mediators and moderators of facial mimicry and gaze are particularly useful in guiding interpretation of relevant findings from neurosciences. Finally, a model of the processing of the smile, the most complex of the facial expressions, is presented as a means to illustrate how to advance the application of theories of embodied cognition in the study of facial expression of emotion.
... (Clore & Storbeck 2006). In neuroscience, embodied simulation has been closely linked to the construct of mirror neurons and mirror systems, and the notion that brains resonate with the motor and affective states of perceptual objects with appropriate biological similarity (e.g., Gallese 2007;Keysers & Gazzola 2007). ...
The set of 30 stimulating commentaries on our target article helps to define the areas of our initial position that should be reiterated or else made clearer and, more importantly, the ways in which moderators of and extensions to the SIMS can be imagined. In our response, we divide the areas of discussion into (1) a clarification of our meaning of “functional,” (2) a consideration of our proposed categories of smiles, (3) a reminder about the role of top-down processes in the interpretation of smile meaning in SIMS, (4) an evaluation of the role of eye contact in the interpretation of facial expression of emotion, and (5) an assessment of the possible moderators of the core SIMS model. We end with an appreciation of the proposed extensions to the model, and note that the future of research on the problem of the smile appears to us to be assured.
... However, the involvement of different neural networks may substantiate the productive component of somatoparaphrenia. In the present work, we found that the less active the rIFG, the more active the frontoparietal mirror network in the left hemisphere (including Broca area and the left parieto-temporal junction), the network that it is consistently associated with the capacity of mapping actions, sensations, and emotions between the self and others in a social context (review in Gallese, 2006). In other terms, we found evidence for a disconnection between a failed multisensory integration in the right hemisphere and the route to verbal access in the left hemisphere, i.e., those instances dubbed ''narrator" or ''interpreter" originally in split-brain studies (Gazzaniga, 2000) and later in connection with somatoparaphrenia (Halligan et al., 1995). ...
Somatoparaphrenia refers to the delusional belief, typically observed in right brain-damaged patients, that the contralesional limbs belong to someone else. Here, we aimed to uncover the neural activity associated with this productive, i.e. confabulatory, component in a patient, S.P.P., with a large right-sided lesion of both cortical and subcortical gray and white matter. He claimed that his left paralyzed hand belonged to his mother. In a block-design functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) experiment, S.P.P. imagined that the mother would move her (i.e. his left) hand (condition "mother"). Subtraction of the activity elicited by control conditions (imagery of self-generated movement of either left or right hand) from that in the "mother" condition resulted in the focal activation of the pars opercularis of the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). In a separate, resting-state fMRI experiment with S.P.P. and 21 healthy controls, we examined the functional connectivity of the rIFG and the affected hand somatosensory network to the rest of the brain. We found a negative correlation between the activity in the rIFG and that of Broca area and the temporo-parietal junction in the left hemisphere. Furthermore, the affected hand somatosensory network was disconnected from the left secondary somatosensory cortex. Our results link the productive component of somatoparaphrenia to the activity of crucial hubs for integrating the multimodal signals of the affected hand. Furthermore, they provide the first direct evidence supporting the "left narrator model", proposed by Halligan et al. (1995), according to which the confabulations of somatoparaphrenia are due to a disconnection of left hemisphere language areas from right hemisphere parieto-temporal cortex.
... Embodied cognition Wilson, 2002;Leitan and Chaffey, 2014;Shapiro, 2014 Biological embedding of experiences Danese et al., 2011;Rutter, 2012;Nelson, 2017;Bush et al., 2018;Aristizabal et al., 2019 Embodied simulation Gallese and Goldman, 1998;Gallese, 2007Gallese, , 2017Gallese, , 2019 Developmental Origin of Health and Disease (DOHaD) Barker, 1995Barker, , 1998Hanson and Gluckman, 2008;Gluckman et al., 2016 Somatic marker hypothesis Damasio, 1994, 1996Environmental epigenetics Weaver et al., 2004Zhang and Meaney, 2009;Bollati and Baccarelli, 2010 Inference-control loop Petzschner et al., 2017 Phenomenological approaches to embodiment MacLachlan, 2004;Gallagher, 2005;Thompson, 2007;Fuchs, 2008 Bio-looping Seligman et al., 2015;Kirmayer and Gómez-Carrillo, 2019 Phenomena Abstract mental processing Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006;Zdrazilova et al., 2018Bullying Mulder et al., 2020 Action Interoception Craig, 2004Craig, , 2009bSeth, 2013;Seth and Friston, 2016 Traumatic events Ramo-Fernández et al., 2015;Kuan et al., 2017 Joint action Sebanz et al., 2006;Vesper et al., 2010 Joint attention Moore et al., 1995;Eilan, 2005 Language development Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998;Fuchs, 2016b;Inkster et al., 2016;Sidhu and Pexman, 2016 Mental health Herbert and Pollatos, 2012;Petzschner et al., 2017;Khalsa et al., 2018 Motor imagery Lotze and Halsband, 2006;Filimon et al., 2007;Munzert et al., 2009 Social perception and judgement IJzerman and Semin, 2010; Kang et al., 2011;Meier et al., 2012 Fields of research Environmental approaches to embodiment, on the other hand, explicitly examine the developmental outcome related to the environmental impact under study. The goal is to trace the underlying biological processes, which lead to the observed associations in longitudinal epidemiological data (Hanson and Gluckman, 2008;Rutter, 2016; see also references in Table 1). ...
Embodiment research is at a turning point. There is an increasing amount of data and studies investigating embodiment phenomena and their role in mental processing and functions from across a wide range of disciplines and theoretical schools within the life sciences. However, the integration of behavioral data with data from different biological levels is challenging for the involved research fields such as movement psychology, social and developmental neuroscience, computational psychosomatics, social and behavioral epigenetics, human-centered robotics, and many more. This highlights the need for an interdisciplinary framework of embodiment research. In addition, there is a growing need for a cross-disciplinary consensus on level-specific criteria of embodiment. We propose that a developmental perspective on embodiment is able to provide a framework for overcoming such pressing issues, providing analytical tools to link timescales and levels of embodiment specific to the function under study, uncovering the underlying developmental processes, clarifying level-specific embodiment criteria, and providing a matrix and platform to bridge disciplinary boundaries among the involved research fields.
... Quant au phénomène de « simulation incorporée » proposé par Gallese (2006Gallese ( , 2011, il permet de rendre compte non seulement de notre expérience intersubjective au contact des autres, mais aussi de notre expérience esthétique en présence d'un événement artistique (Gallese, 2017). Ce concept permet de préciser les effets d'accordage et de familiarité induits par la simulation chez l'observateur·rice, non seulement des actions, mais aussi des intentions et des émotions perçues chez la personne qu'il observe. ...
... However, the involvement of different neural networks may substantiate the productive component of SP. In the present work, we found that the less active the rIFG, the more active the fronto-parietal mirror network in the left hemisphere (including Broca area and the left parieto-temporal junction), the network that it consistently associated with the capacity of mapping actions, sensations, and emotions between the self and others in a social context (review in Gallese, 2006). In other terms, we found evidence for a disconnection between a failed multisensory integration in the right hemisphere and the route to verbal access in the left hemisphere, i.e. those instances dubbed "narrator" or "interpreter" originally in splitbrain studies (Gazzaniga, 2000) and later in connection with SP (Halligan et al., 1995). ...
... This means that the innovative aspect introduced by the embodied simulation concept is that the Mirror Neuron system allows us to directly (i.e. automatically, intuitively or empathetically) 'grasp' the minds of others, rather than through a conscious, elaborate process of conceptual reasoning and interpretation (Gallese 2007a). We suggest in this article that it is this automatic implicit nature of the Mirror Neuron system that can be harnessed for improving human factors and ergonomics. ...
... Evidence from experimental research suggests that manipulation of facial expression may influence a subject's emotional state, judgments about emotional stimuli (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989;Price & Harmon-Jones, 2015) and even cognitive functions such as memory and language (Baumeister, Rumiati, & Foroni, 2015;Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010). Building, for example, on mirror neuron theories (Gallese, 2007;Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2016), it has been hypothesized that facial emotion recognition depends on simulation of observed emotion expressions and the use of efference copy signals to infer other's emotional states (Wood, Rychlowska, Korb, & Niedenthal, 2016). This 'Sensorimotor Embodiment' theory predicts an impairment of facial emotion recognition in subjects with disorders affecting facial motricity. ...
We investigated the impact of acute facial palsy on the recognition of emotional facial expressions. Thirty-one patients with acute facial palsy and 30 healthy controls performed a well-established test battery with tasks both for mere face recognition (FACE) and for recognition of emotional facial expressions (EMO). Participants were tested at disease onset (t1) and about eight weeks thereafter (t2). Recognition accuracy did not differ between groups in FACE and EMO tasks at t1 and t2. By contrast, mean reaction time (RT) in the EMO task was significantly longer for patients than for controls at t1 (10.228 ± 710 ms vs 7.386 ± 283 ms; p = .001), whereas RT in the FACE task did not differ between groups. Parallel to clinical remission, patient's RTs in EMO tasks decreased but remained significantly prolonged at t2. Consistent with theories of embodied cognition, our findings show that facial palsy delays recognition of emotional facial expressions but not face recognition per se. Furthermore, normal accuracy of emotion recognition suggests efficient compensatory mechanisms that preserve this essential social function. We hypothesize that deficient sensorimotor embodiment may contribute to disturbances of non-verbal communication in patients with impaired facial motricity.
... These social attentional properties are probably based on specific mechanisms, among which, a functional gaze-following network that is preferentially biased toward processing gaze information (Birmingham and Kingstone 2009), and neuronal networks that seem to have evolved to enable the subject to share the world of others through direct attention, such as mirror neurons (e.g. Gallese 2007;Heyes 2010;Sartori et al. 2011). ...
Being in the bodily presence of others facilitates important perceptual, social, and informational advantages. For example, it enables direct access to other subjects’ embodied perspectives, motivates intersubjective engagements, and is involved in the construction of shared experiences and joint actions. These advantages are based on and gained through attending to and with others, i.e. they rely on social attention. It is no surprise, therefore, that a growing body of empirical data indicates that social attention is a special attentional state that involves specific behavioral and neural-cognitive properties. Another important feature of the human capacity for social attention, which is highlighted in this article is that in everyday environments social attention considerably extends and enriches the subject’s attentional field. This idea draws on phenomenological considerations and on findings from cognitive science research that suggest that subjects can attend to more than in the center of their attention and that under normal conditions we can gain more features and more situations when attending to the movements, gestures, and facial expressions of others. The influence of others on the structure of our attentional field is evident from situations where others are absent from our daily surroundings. In these circumstances our attentional field narrows and the world transforms into an unfamiliar and sometimes uncanny place. Intriguingly, the same most likely occurs in social pathologies such as BPD (border line personality disorder) and SAD (social anxiety disorder), in which the bodily presence of others does not generate the emotional response we see in healthy humans even though the subject’s basic capacity for social attention is intact.
... Der Begriff des »Embodiment« wird in unterschiedlichen Kontexten verwendet, sei es bei der Beschreibung impliziter/prozeduraler Gedächtnisinhalte, im Hinblick auf automatische Resonanzprozesse für intentionale Handlungen oder Gefühle auf Grundlage gemeinsamer (neuronaler) Repräsentationen für Wahrnehmung und Handlung oder als substratnahe Basis für sozialkognitive Prozesse (Gallese, 2007). Darüber hinaus mag eine leiblich verankerte, gegenseitige Synchronizität, das »rhythmische Attunement« zwischen Patient und Therapeut, mit der Qualität der therapeutischen Beziehung und dem Erfolg einer Psychotherapie zusammenhängen Seikkula et al., 2015). ...
... Der Begriff des »Embodiment« wird in unterschiedlichen Kontexten verwendet, sei es bei der Beschreibung impliziter/prozeduraler Gedächtnisinhalte, im Hinblick auf automatische Resonanzprozesse für intentionale Handlungen oder Gefühle auf Grundlage gemeinsamer (neuronaler) Repräsentationen für Wahrnehmung und Handlung oder als substratnahe Basis für sozialkognitive Prozesse ( Gallese, 2007). Darüber hinaus mag eine leiblich verankerte, gegenseitige Synchronizität, das »rhythmische Attunement« zwischen Patient und Therapeut, mit der Qualität der therapeutischen Beziehung und dem Erfolg einer Psychotherapie zusammenhängen Seikkula et al., 2015). ...
... A third interpretation of embodiment, proposed and termed by Gallese (2005) Embodied Simulation, refers to the role that mental representations involving the body can have on cognition. This last interpretation of embodiment is strongly associated with the construct of empathy, and several authors, more or less explicitly, have suggested that embodied simulation/mirroring mechanisms are at the basis of the most automatic component of empathy (Gallese and Goldman, 1998;Gallese, 2003Gallese, , 2008Gallese et al., 2006;Csibra, 2008;Hickok, 2009;Singer and Lamm, 2009;Lamm and Singer, 2010;Uithol et al., 2011; but see also Lamm and Majdandžić, 2015). Caggiano et al. (2009) have shown the existence of a subpopulation of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of rhesus monkeys whose activity is modulated on the basis of the spatial position in which the observed action occurs; in particular, half of these neurons are activated preferentially for the monkey's peripersonal space while the other half is more responsive for the extrapersonal space. ...
Social and affective relations may shape empathy to others’ affective states. Previous studies also revealed that people tend to form very different mental representations of stimuli on the basis of their physical distance. In this regard, embodied cognition and embodied simulation propose that different physical distances between individuals activate different interpersonal processing modes, such that close physical distance tends to activate the interpersonal processing mode typical of socially and affectively close relationships. In Experiment 1, two groups of participants were administered a pain decision task involving upright and inverted face stimuli painfully or neutrally stimulated, and we monitored their neural empathic reactions by means of event-related potentials (ERPs) technique. Crucially, participants were presented with face stimuli of one of two possible sizes in order to manipulate retinal size and perceived physical distance, roughly corresponding to the close and far portions of social distance. ERPs modulations compatible with an empathic reaction were observed only for the group exposed to face stimuli appearing to be at a close social distance from the participants. This reaction was absent in the group exposed to smaller stimuli corresponding to face stimuli observed from a far social distance. In Experiment 2, one different group of participants was engaged in a match-to-sample task involving the two-size upright face stimuli of Experiment 1 to test whether the modulation of neural empathic reaction observed in Experiment 1 could be ascribable to differences in the ability to identify faces of the two different sizes. Results suggested that face stimuli of the two sizes could be equally identifiable. In line with the Construal Level and Embodied Simulation theoretical frameworks, we conclude that perceived physical distance may shape empathy as well as social and affective distance.
... 12aJola et al. , 2012b. In this context, few recent studies in neuroscience have explored how mirror neuron activity can facilitate physical empathy to explain the experience of the dancer and the audience which directly affects how one experiences the performance ( Behrends et al. 2012;Brown et al. 2005;Calvo-Merino et al. 2006;Fadigo et al. 1995;Gallese. 2007;Iacoboni. 2009;Rizzolatti et al. 1996;Strafella and Paus. 2000;). ...
The act of dance appears as a pattern of conscious movements in space and time, but a dancer who has the ability to go beyond the limits of space and time (experientially) can bring about a non-local experience of oneself and the audience making it an ecstatic communion. In this paper, we are interested in examining the extent of subjective experience of a dancer and his audience; hence, we take up a case study in first-person to understand the performer-audience interaction. For this purpose, we chose Indian contemporary dancer Astad Deboo, an artist who is known to create such a magical two-way interaction consigning his audience as well as himself to a state of being mesmerized. The art of creating a non-local experience seems to be his forte, where the audience can feel him within, while he feels his audience within. To explain this phenomenon, we propose the resonance of inner experiential states of the performer and audience as the underlying mechanism that creates a non-local interaction between them. To validate the present hypothesis, one must subject both the performer and observer to experimental studies, which involve simultaneous tracking and monitoring of the active zones in the brain associated with performing and performance viewing. In the above context, it would also be interesting to see if there exists a point of time during the performance event, where both these subjects report similar active zones in the brain.
... This means that the innovative aspect introduced by the embodied simulation concept is that the Mirror Neuron system allows us to directly (i.e. automatically, intuitively or empathetically) 'grasp' the minds of others, rather than through a conscious, elaborate process of conceptual reasoning and interpretation (Gallese 2007a). We suggest in this article that it is this automatic implicit nature of the Mirror Neuron system that can be harnessed for improving human factors and ergonomics. ...
A great challenge for cognitive neuroscience is studying human behavior in its complexity as it manifests in the real world. The field of aviation provides a unique opportunity to investigate how perception, action and cognition interact in complex yet controlled ecologically valid environments. We suggest a novel cross-domain approach that combines insights from ecological psychology and embodied cognition with a neurophysiological framework to explain patterns of human performance across a variety of aviation contexts. Specifically, we argue that studying the interaction between an agent and the environment, as manifest in the Mirror Neuron system as a neural correlate, is key to understanding complex behavior. We can describe the experience and skills involved with task-relevant actions-like flying an airplane-using brain mechanisms of motor simulation of the observed action. With this direct coupling between perception and action, the automatic implicit nature of the Mirror Neuron system can be harnessed to improve human factor and ergonomics. This analysis offers three areas for future study and application: (1) enhancing flight training by isolating specific agent-environment relations; (2) tracking training progression based on brain signatures of flight expertise; and (3) neuroscientific-inspired ecological design of next-generation human-machine interfaces in flight decks.
... Many experiments have shown that motor resonance is fine-grained and occurs according to somatotopic rules (Borroni Baldissera, 2008 Montagna, Cerri, Borroni, Baldissera, & 2005). Furthermore, studies indicated that the motor replica is automatic, since somatotopic specificity is present even when the individual is not aware of the use of muscles necessary to perform the action (see ). Embodied theories Fadiga et al., 1995 of cognition (Decety Chaminade, 2004;Gallese, 2003Gallese, , 2008& Keysers Gazzola, 2007 & ), claim that this motor replica supports action perception and recognition since this automatically induced, motor representation of the observed action corresponds to that which is spontaneously generated during active action and whose outcome is known to the acting individual ( ). Indeed, studies inves- Rizzolatti Craighero, 2004 & tigating the perception of intransitive actions, such as phoneme discrimination ( ), and cate- Ito, Tiede, Ostry, 2009 & gorization of facial expressions (Mele, Ghirardi, Craighero, & 2017), clearly showed that the sensorimotor system is involved in action perception, given that the implementation in the observer of low-level movement details influences the discrimination of ambiguous stimuli differing for a specific involvement of those movement details. ...
Motor resonance is considered to be an index of the automatic under threshold motor replica of the observed action. Similar actions may be quite different in terms of long-term goals (e.g., grasp to eat vs grasp to throw) and, recently, it has been proposed that the distal goal subtly modulates movements execution, and that observers automatically use these differences in kinematics to discriminate between different intentions. This interpretation is in line with computational approaches proposing that in the agent the generative process causes that intention shapes the kinematics, and in the observer the recognition process causes that the kinematics cues the intention. Given the close entanglement between the two processes, here we investigated whether the mere knowledge of agent's intentions induces in the observer a generative process able to modulate motor resonance. We used transcranial magnetic stimulation to examine motor evoked potentials in the Opponens Pollicis muscle to verify if observer's knowledge of agent's positive, negative, or neutral intentions on a third person influences corticospinal excitability during observation of the same action performed with equal kinematics, and in the same visual context. Results showed that the observation of an action executed with the intention to induce negative effects determined a reduction of motor resonance, revealing the presence of a specific inhibition to reenact an action that results in unpleasant consequences in the other. These data suggest that the information at the intention level activates a generative process which overcomes the replica of kinematics at the goal level, and shapes motor resonance according with observer's mind and not with agent's intention, revealing the possibility of a mere cognitive influence on motor resonance based on individual's ethical values.
... Foru nderstanding cognition as embodied cognition we have to consider the bodya st he place wherep erception and action coincide. Italian neurobiologist Vittorio Gallese (2007) states that we should be wary of proposings trict dichotomies between action and perception. The elements that connect action and perception Gallese calls mirror neurons,and explains them thus: When one watches someone cry,l augh,org et punched, one can almost feel the same sadness, joy, or paint hat person experiences.The reason is thatb yw atchingb odilyo re motional expressions mirror-neurons are activated that triggers imilar somatic and cognitive states in the brain and bodyofthe observer.Most of the human ability for empathyi sb ased on the function of mirror-neurons. ...
... Embodied simulation theories of emotion suggest that observing a facial expression elicits stereotyped facial movements specific to that expression, and these automatic reactive expressions entrain a feedback process that produces the corresponding emotional state in the observer (Gallese 2007;Goldman and Sripada 2005;Hatfield et al. 1992). This emotion "embodiment" (Niedenthal et al. 2001;Niedenthal 2007) then facilitates recognition of the emotion expressed by the other person. ...
According to recent theories, the detection of emotions involves somatic experiences. In this study, we investigated the relation between somatic responses to affective stimuli, emotion perception, and alexithymia. Variations in automatic rapid facial reactions (RFRs) were measured in a selected population of participants with high and low levels of alexithymia (HA and LA, respectively). Electromyographic activity was recorded from the corrugator supercilii and the zygomaticus major, while participants performed a gender classification task on faces expressing various emotional states. LA participants showed congruent RFRs in response to both fearful and happy stimuli. On the other hand, HA participants did not show congruent RFRs in response to fearful faces. They showed congruent, but delayed, RFRs in response to happy faces. These results provide evidence of a deficit in somato-motor emotional processing in people with high alexithymic personality traits, and thus support the hypothesis that alexithymia is associated with a deficit in emotional embodiment.
... Moreover, vicarious neural responses were positively correlated with self-reported purchasing intention. These neural activities in bilateral MNS indicate embodied mental simulation of others' hand actions and tactile sensations [Ando et al., 2015;Gallese, 2007Gallese, , 2014Grafton, 2009]. Such simulated experiences could have provided sensory information about the products, which helped increase participants' purchasing intention. ...
The growth of online shopping increases consumers' dependence on vicarious sensory experiences, such as observing others touching products in commercials. However, empirical evidence on whether observing others' sensory experiences increases purchasing intention is still scarce. In the present study, participants observed others interacting with products in the first- or third-person perspective in video clips, and their neural responses were measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We investigated (1) whether and how vicariously touching certain products affected purchasing intention, and the neural correlates of this process; and (2) how visual perspective interacts with vicarious tactility. Vicarious tactile experiences were manipulated by hand actions touching or not touching the products, while the visual perspective was manipulated by showing the hand actions either in first- or third-person perspective. During the fMRI scanning, participants watched the video clips and rated their purchasing intention for each product. The results showed that, observing others touching (vs. not touching) the products increased purchasing intention, with vicarious neural responses found in mirror neuron systems (MNS) and lateral occipital complex (LOC). Moreover, the stronger neural activities in MNS was associated with higher purchasing intention. The effects of visual perspectives were found in left superior parietal lobule (SPL), while the interaction of tactility and visual perspective was shown in precuneus and precuneus-LOC connectivity. The present study provides the first evidence that vicariously touching a given product increased purchasing intention and the neural activities in bilateral MNS, LOC, left SPL and precuneus are involved in this process. Hum Brain Mapp 00:000–000, 2017.
... Embodied theories of cognition claim that embodied simulation supports stimulus recognition (Decety and Chaminade 2004;Gallese 2003Gallese , 2008Keysers and Gazzola 2007), given that motor and somatosensory areas are involved in what has been assumed to be a purely perceptual task. The assumption is that high-level cognitive processes base themselves on partial reactivations of states in sensory, motor, and affective systems since knowledge representation consists in re-instantiation of modality-specific states captured during perception, action, and interoception of past experience (Niedenthal 2007). ...
A long-term debate concerns whether the sensorimotor coding carried out during transitive actions observation reflects the low-level movement implementation details or the movement goals. On the contrary, phonemes and emotional facial expressions are intransitive actions that do not fall into this debate. The investigation of phonemes discrimination has proven to be a good model to demonstrate that the sensorimotor system plays a role in understanding actions acoustically presented. In the present study, we adapted the experimental paradigms already used in phonemes discrimination during face posture manipulation, to the discrimination of emotional facial expressions. We submitted participants to a lower or to an upper face posture manipulation during the execution of a four alternative labelling task of pictures randomly taken from four morphed continua between two emotional facial expressions. The results showed that the implementation of low-level movement details influence the discrimination of ambiguous facial expressions differing for a specific involvement of those movement details. These findings indicate that facial expressions discrimination is a good model to test the role of the sensorimotor system in the perception of actions visually presented.
... 3 This tendency to automatically match others' states relies on our mirror neurons (Gallese : 2007 ;Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia: 2008) 4 As Ferrari & Gallese (2007) put it: "Every time we observe an action made by another individual, we are able to understand its goal because the observed action is matched on our internal representation of it". 5 For instance, it has been demonstrated that strongly adhering to the liberal ideology according to which one will succeed if he/she tries hard enough tend to reduce empathy toward poor people: their poverty is seen as a consequence of their laziness (Candace: 1997). 6 For instance, an explanation for suicide bombers' atrocities is that the process of indoctrination destroyed all their empathy towards out-group members (Ginges & Atran: 2009). ...
Can multiculturalism work? Can people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds live side by side peacefully and, even better, enrich each other? There are two ways social scientists can deal with this question. The first one, which I would label as “macro”, focuses on statistics and opinion surveys. A macro approach would, for instance, analyze the effects of an increase in religious and ethnic diversity on social indicators such as trust in neighbors, civic engagement or political participation. The second one, which I would label as “micro”, focuses on the skills citizens need for a better management of cultural diversity. This paper falls into the second category and will provide support for two claims: (1) training for intercultural communication should focus first and foremost on empathy; (2) ancient rhetorical exercises offer an effective way to develop empathy. To support the first claim, it will be argued that for a multicultural society to be peaceful, citizens need to be willing and able to use empathy when interacting with their fellow citizens of different religious, ethnic or ideological background (section I). A method to develop empathy using rhetorical exercises will then be described (section II). Finally, I present the results of an experiment to test its effectiveness with secondary school teachers (section III).
... According to the recent embodied account of emotion understanding [4][5][6], in order to effectively infer others' feelings from their facial expressions, we implicitly "simulate" the observed bodily state by generating representations of how we would feel when displaying that particular emotion within our own sensorimotor cortices. Additionally, facial muscles responsible for expression-specific motor repertoires-for example, the zygomatic major activated when smiling or the corrugator supercilii when frowning [7]-are spontaneously activated by mere vision of emotional expressions [8][9][10]. ...
The effect of food substances on emotional states has been widely investigated, showing, for example, that eating chocolate is able to reduce negative mood. Here, for the first time, we have shown that the consumption of specific food substances is not only able to induce particular emotional states, but more importantly, to facilitate recognition of corresponding emotional facial expressions in others. Participants were asked to perform an emotion recognition task before and after eating either a piece of chocolate or a small amount of fish sauce—which we expected to induce happiness or disgust, respectively. Our results showed that being in a specific emotional state improves recognition of the corresponding emotional facial expression. Indeed, eating chocolate improved recognition of happy faces, while disgusted expressions were more readily recognized after eating fish sauce. In line with the embodied account of emotion understanding, we suggest that people are better at inferring the emotional state of others when their own emotional state resonates with the observed one.
... Ce mécanisme de simulation serait à l'origine de la compréhension des actions, des sensations, des émotions et peut-être même de la compréhension du langage (GALLESE 2006(GALLESE , 2007(GALLESE , 2008(GALLESE , 2010GALLESE & SINIGAGLIA 2011 ;RIZZOLATTI & SINIGAGLIA 2011 : 129-149 ;WOJCIEHOWSKI & GALLESE 2011). Selon l'hypothèse défendue par Gallese (2003) nous partageons avec les autres êtres humains un espace intersubjectif qui occupe un rôle central depuis l'enfance jusqu'à l'âge adulte. ...
This paper is an inquiry on the relationship between the human ability to share others' feelings thanks to a mechanism of simulation and one of the functions of rhetoric: maintaining social cohesion through epideictic speeches. As a starting point of this inquiry, we go back to Aristotle's concept of synaesthesia (from the ancient Greek syn=together and aisthesis=sensation). We then clarify the extent to which this concept can be used to provide a naturalistic account of the feeling of concord that the orator intends to create through praise and blame.
... Theoretical treatments, including (but not limited to) those invoking the mirror neuron system, propose high-level reasons for a relationship between praxis and social/communicative networks [Gallese, 2007;Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003;Mostofsky & Ewen, 2011]. Lacking is a description of precisely how children with ASD perform praxis gestures incorrectly. ...
Children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have long been known to have deficits in the performance of praxis gestures; these motor deficits also correlate with social and communicative deficits. To date, the precise nature of the errors involved in praxis has not been clearly mapped out. Based on observations of individuals with ASD performing gestures, we hypothesized that the simultaneous execution of multiple movement elements is especially impaired in affected children. We examined 25 school-aged participants with ASD and 25 age-matched controls performing seven simultaneous gestures that required the concurrent performance of movement elements and nine serial gestures, in which all elements were performed serially. There was indeed a group × gesture-type interaction (P<0.001). Whereas both groups had greater difficulty performing simultaneous than serial gestures, children with ASD had a 2.6-times greater performance decrement with simultaneous (vs. serial) gestures than controls. These results point to a potential deficit in the simultaneous processing of multiple inputs and outputs in ASD. Such deficits could relate to models of social interaction that highlight the parallel-processing nature of social communication. © 2016 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
... A few studies have noted the theme of parallel brain regions involved in emotional and sensory processes being recruited when "I feel your pain" (Avenanti et al., 2005;Hein and Singer, 2008;Engen and Singer, 2013). Mirror neurons may provide one explanation of how we can experience "secondhand" pain or emotion (Gallese, 2007;Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Several other mechanisms have been put forward to explain the experience of vicarious pain (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010). ...
Social interaction can have a profound effect on individual behavior, perhaps most salient in interactions between sick suffering children and their parents. Chronic pain is a difficult condition that can produce considerable changes in behaviors in children that can secondarily have profound effects on their parents. It may create a functionally disabling negative feedback loop. Research supports the notion of alterations in the brain of individuals who observe and empathize with loved ones in acute pain. However, neural activity in relation to empathic responses in the context of chronic pain has not been examined. Ongoing suffering with chronic pain in a child can result in child's brain circuit alterations. However, prolonged suffering jointly experienced by the parent may putatively also produce maladaptive changes in their neural networks and consequently in parental behaviors. Here we put forth the conceptual framework for 'Chronic pain contagion' (CPC). We review the underlying processes in CPC and we discuss implications for devising and implementing treatments for children in chronic pain and their parents.
In order to integrate the perceptual and human dimensions into structural design, this paper begins with the contrast between structure and body, and reinterprets body-based structural thinking from a neuroscientific perspective by introducing recent research findings on embodied perception, using Dasher architecture as an example. The paper aims to combine the principles of embodied perception in neuroscience with structural design, so as to form a design idea that connects structure, space, and the body.
Paul DiMaggio's (1997) Annual Review of Sociology article urged integration of the cognitive and the cultural, triggering a cognitive turn in cultural sociology. Since then, a burgeoning literature in cultural sociology has incorporated ideas from the cognitive sciences-cognitive anthropology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and philosophy-significantly reshaping sociologists' approach to culture, both theoretically and methodologi-cally. This article reviews work published since DiMaggio's agenda-setting piece-research that builds on cross-disciplinary links between cultural sociology and the cognitive sciences. These works present new ideas on the acquisition , storage, and retrieval of culture, on how forms of personal culture interact, on how culture becomes shared, and on how social interaction and cultural environments inform cognitive processes. Within our discussion, we point to research questions that remain unsettled. We then conclude with issues for future research in culture and cognition that can enrich sociological analysis about action more generally.
The Danish Johansen Skovsted Arkitekter is new generation architectural firm in Nordic countries. Their works show the rationality and sensibility of architectural structures through the perspective of structural polysemy. This paper takes the firm’s most representative case, the Tipperne Tower as an insight into their innovative structural thinking based on body and perception. Based on the vision of structural polysemy, this paper also sorted out two key aspects from their design: the principle of embodied perception and the corresponding structural design approach.
Paul DiMaggio's (1997) Annual Review of Sociology article urged integration of the cognitive and the cultural, triggering a cognitive turn in cultural sociology. Since then, a burgeoning literature in cultural sociology has incorporated ideas from the cognitive sciences—cognitive anthropology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and philosophy—significantly reshaping sociologists’ approach to culture, both theoretically and methodologically. This article reviews work published since DiMaggio's agenda-setting piece—research that builds on cross-disciplinary links between cultural sociology and the cognitive sciences. These works present new ideas on the acquisition, storage, and retrieval of culture, on how forms of personal culture interact, on how culture becomes shared, and on how social interaction and cultural environments inform cognitive processes. Within our discussion, we point to research questions that remain unsettled. We then conclude with issues for future research in culture and cognition that can enrich sociological analysis about action more generally.
In this paper, I deploy Gallagher et al.’s theory of Direct Social Perception (DSP) to help explain how we perceive others’ subjective time. This process of second-person temporal perception plays an important role in interpersonal interaction, yet is often glossed over in discussions of intersubjectivity. Using A.D. Craig (2009) ‘awareness’ model of subjective time to unify converging evidence that subjective time is embodied, affective, and situated, I argue that subjective time cannot be considered as a hidden or invisible aspect of a private mind, but is partially externally visible through our gestures, expressions, and other behaviours as they unfold within a particular context. My central thesis is that, in face to face interactions, we are able to directly perceive these visible components of other people’s subjective time. This is made possible by our “enculturated” (Menary, 2015) and enactive perceptual faculties. The process of social perception is not a passive, unidirectional affair where static information about one person’s subjective time is transmitted to the other, but rather inextricably linked with action (both at the personal and subpersonal level) and interaction effects produced by a dynamic coupling between participants. Such an enactive perspective reveals how others’ subjective time can be perceived in everyday interactions.
Embodied cognition theories suggest that observation of facial expression induces the same pattern of muscle activation, and that this contributes to emotion recognition. Consequently, the inability to form facial expressions would affect emotional understanding. Patients with schizophrenia show a reduced ability to express and perceive facial emotions. We assumed that a physical training specifically developed to mobilize facial muscles could improve the ability to perform facial movements, and, consequently, spontaneous mimicry and facial expression recognition. Twenty-four inpatient participants with schizophrenia were randomly assigned to the experimental and control group. At the beginning and at the end of the study, both groups were submitted to a facial expression categorization test and their data compared. The experimental group underwent a training period during which the lip muscles, and the muscles around the eyes were mobilized through the execution of transitive actions. Participants were trained three times a week for five weeks. Results showed a positive impact of the physical training in the recognition of others’ facial emotions, specifically for the responses of “fear”, the emotion for which the recognition deficit in the test is most severe. This evidence suggests that a specific deficit of the sensorimotor system may result in a specific cognitive deficit.
Time, complementarity and psychological development Aspects of a theory of neurosociology. A system theoretical, neuroscientific and sociological analysis of findings about the relations between the (neuro)psychological and sociological levels of human life. Attempting to elucidate methods for the development and recovery of basic dialogue for persons with severe mental handicap or autism, this work compares complementary levels of human psychological existence. The range of this analysis extends from the fundamental level of intersystemic exchange of energy and information (including ‘pragmatic information’ and ‘Shannon-information’) between living systems, to the findings of neuroscientific research on matching of motor intentions by ‘Mirror Neuron’ systems. It also discusses the inherent isomorphy between sociological and neuropsychological theories, namely the Theory of Social Systems of N. Luhmann and the Theory of Neural Group Selection of G. M. Edelman. A preliminary result is a clarification of the information theoretical and neuroscientific assumption of the essential uncertainty of pragmatic information in a single moment of (therapeutic) action. This analysis thus supports the current interdisciplinary multi-level strategy intended to foster ‘inclusive’ education or pedagogy for those with mental handicap. It elucidates the relations between neuroscientific, psychological and social explanations of human experience, and it calls for the reconception of participatory institutional solutions for people with severe mental handicap, as recommended by the UN-Convention for the rights of people with disability (2006). Zeitliche Struktur, Komplementarität und psychische Entwicklung Eine Analyse kybernetischer, neurowissenschaftlicher und systemtheoretischer Forschungsergebnisse als Beitrag zum Verständnis der Übergänge und Wechselwirkungen sozialer, neuronaler und psychologischer Dimensionen psychischer Entwicklung. Aspekte einer Theorie der Neurosoziologie Diese Arbeit versucht, für eine erweiterte theoretische Fundierung basalen Dialogaufbaus (z.B. bei schwerer geistiger Behinderung oder Autismus) divergente Systemebenen menschlicher psychischer Existenz konsistent miteinander zu verbinden. Die Analysearbeit erstreckt sich dabei einerseits bis hinunter auf den intersystemischen Energie- und Informationsaustausch (u.a. mit strengem Bezug auf kybernetische Begriffe wie der ‚pragmatischen Information‘ und der ‚Shannon-Information‘) als auch auf die Ergebnisse neurowissenschaftlicher Forschung hinsichtlich der Funktionsweise sog. Spiegelneuronensysteme. Andererseits untersucht sie zum Zweck der ebenenübergreifenden Theoriekonstruktion im weiteren die inhärente Isomorphie der Systemtheorie sozialer Prozesse nach N. Luhmann (auf soziologischer Ebene) und der Theorie der Selektion neuronaler Gruppen nach G. M. Edelman (auf neurowissenschaftlicher Ebene). Ein vorläufiges Resultat ist die kybernetisch und neurowissenschaftlich begründete Annahme einer notwendigen Unschärfe der pragmatischen Information im je einzelnen (therapeutischen) Handlungsakt. Diese Analyse versteht sich als Beitrag zur aktuellen interdisziplinären Mehrebenenanalyse für eine zeitgemäße inklusive Pädagogik, als Hilfe zur Erläuterung der Übergänge zwischen neurowissenschaftlicher, psychischer und sozialer Wirklichkeit zur drängenden Neubestimmung von partizipativen Lösungsansätzen für Menschen mit Behinderungen im Sinne der UN-Konvention (2006).
Growing evidence indicates that perceptual-motor codes may be associated with and influenced by actual bodily states. Following a spinal cord injury (SCI), for example, individuals exhibit reduced visual sensitivity to biological motion. However, a dearth of direct evidence exists about whether profound alterations in sensorimotor traffic between the body and brain influence audio-motor representations. We tested 20 wheelchair-bound individuals with lower skeletal-level SCI who were unable to feel and move their lower limbs, but have retained upper limb function. In a two-choice, matching-to-sample auditory discrimination task, the participants were asked to determine which of two action sounds matched a sample action sound presented previously. We tested aural discrimination ability using sounds that arose from wheelchair, upper limb, lower limb, and animal actions. Our results indicate that an inability to move the lower limbs did not lead to impairment in the discrimination of lower limb-related action sounds in SCI patients. Importantly, patients with SCI discriminated wheelchair sounds more quickly than individuals with comparable auditory experience (i.e. physical therapists) and inexperienced, able-bodied subjects. Audio-motor associations appear to be modified and enhanced to incorporate external salient tools that now represent extensions of their body schemas.
The phenomenological psychology and psychotherapy, which cannot access the meaning of experience through reflective objectification, must do so by grasping it in its enactment: by grasping the taking shape of lived experience in relation to this or that circumstance, as it actually occurs in everyday life—in different ways for different people. The specifying of what method guides us in grasping the way in which each person prereflectively experiences this or that situation is the cornerstone of this chapter. In the footsteps of Heidegger’s phenomenology, we have referred to this method as formal indication. In order to account for the incompleteness of each person’s being-there, this indication focuses on the intentional involvement without specifying any content. This method, which accompanies the taking shape of other people’s experience of this or that, enables us to study the way in which ipseity relates to the world in different situations, in a way that carries different meanings for different people. The analysis of a clinical case helps further explicate the new method.
The introductory pages of this contribution deal with one of the main discussions in the field of media studies with a possible impact on an aesthetic interpretation of filmed opera: the opposition between spectacle and narration as described by Andrew Darley. In opposition to Darley’s theory, or its possible application to filmed opera, I posit the hypothesis that the increased visibility of the actions and gestures in filmed opera enhances the audience’s attention to the narrative as one of the salient features of its aesthetic experience. The main section of this article will examine some findings in the fields of cognitive aesthetics and neurosciences as a support for a deeper understanding of the hypothesis proposed above.
Many object-related actions can be recognized by their sound. We found neurons in monkey premotor cortex that discharge when
the animal performs a specific action and when it hears the related sound. Most of the neurons also discharge when the monkey
observes the same action. These audiovisual mirror neurons code actions independently of whether these actions are performed,
heard, or seen. This discovery in the monkey homolog of Broca's area might shed light on the origin of language: audiovisual
mirror neurons code abstract contents—the meaning of actions—and have the auditory access typical of human language to these
contents.
Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain
activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating
that their loved one—present in the same room—was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal
that a loved one experienced pain. AIand ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior
insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain.
Thus, a neural response in AIand rostral ACC, activated in common for “self” and “other” conditions, suggests that the neural
substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire “pain matrix.” We conclude that only that part of the pain network
associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.
A category of stimuli of great importance for primates, humans in particular, is that formed by actions done by other individuals. If we want to survive, we must understand the actions of others. Furthermore, without action understanding, social organization is impossible. In the case of humans, there is another faculty that depends on the observation of others' actions: imitation learning. Unlike most species, we are able to learn by imitation, and this faculty is at the basis of human culture. In this review we present data on a neurophysiological mechanism--the mirror-neuron mechanism--that appears to play a fundamental role in both action understanding and imitation. We describe first the functional properties of mirror neurons in monkeys. We review next the characteristics of the mirror-neuron system in humans. We stress, in particular, those properties specific to the human mirror-neuron system that might explain the human capacity to learn by imitation. We conclude by discussing the relationship between the mirror-neuron system and language.
Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to assess the cortical areas active during the observation of mouth actions performed by humans and by individuals belonging to other species (monkey and dog). Two types of actions were presented: biting and oral communicative actions (speech reading, lip-smacking, barking). As a control, static images of the same actions were shown. Observation of biting, regardless of the species of the individual performing the action, determined two activation foci (one rostral and one caudal) in the inferior parietal lobule and an activation of the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent ventral premotor cortex. The left rostral parietal focus (possibly BA 40) and the left premotor focus were very similar in all three conditions, while the right side foci were stronger during the observation of actions made by conspecifics. The observation of speech reading activated the left pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus, the observation of lip-smacking activated a small focus in the pars opercularis bilaterally, and the observation of barking did not produce any activation in the frontal lobe. Observation of all types of mouth actions induced activation of extrastriate occipital areas. These results suggest that actions made by other individuals may be recognized through different mechanisms. Actions belonging to the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., biting and speech reading) are mapped on the observer's motor system. Actions that do not belong to this repertoire (e.g., barking) are essentially recognized based on their visual properties. We propose that when the motor representation of the observed action is activated, the observer gains knowledge of the observed action in a "personal" perspective, while this perspective is lacking when there is no motor activation.
In this study, we describe a new form of synaesthesia in which visual perception of touch elicits conscious tactile experiences in the perceiver. We describe a female subject (C) for whom the observation of another person being touched is experienced as tactile stimulation on the equivalent part of C's own body. Apart from this clearly abnormal synesthetic experience, C is healthy and normal in every other way. In this study, we investigate whether C's 'mirrored touch' synesthetic experience is caused by overactivity in the neural system that responds to the observation of touch. A functional MRI experiment was designed to investigate the neural system involved in the perception of touch in a group of 12 non-synesthetic control subjects and in C. We investigated neural activity to the observation of touch to a human face or neck compared with the observation of touch to equivalent regions on an object. Furthermore, to investigate the somatosensory topography of the activations during observation of touch, we compared activations when observing a human face or neck being touched with activations when the subjects themselves were touched on their own face or neck. The results demonstrated that the somatosensory cortex was activated in the non-synesthetic subjects by the mere observation of touch and that this activation was somatotopically organized such that observation of touch to the face activated the head area of primary somatosensory cortex, whereas observation of touch to the neck did not. Moreover, in non-synesthetic subjects, the brain's mirror system-comprising premotor cortex, superior temporal sulcus and parietal cortex-was activated by the observation of touch to another human more than to an object. C's activation patterns differed in three ways from those of the non-synesthetic controls. First, activations in the somatosensory cortex were significantly higher in C when she observed touch. Secondly, an area in left premotor cortex was activated in C to a greater extent than in the non-synesthetic group. Thirdly, the anterior insula cortex bilaterally was activated in C, but there was no evidence of such activation in the non-synesthetic group. The results suggest that, in C, the mirror system for touch is overactive, above the threshold for conscious tactile perception.
Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) neurons were studied when monkeys performed motor acts embedded in different actions and when
they observed similar acts done by an experimenter. Most motor IPL neurons coding a specific act (e.g., grasping) showed markedly
different activations when this act was part of different actions (e.g., for eating or for placing). Many motor IPL neurons
also discharged during the observation of acts done by others. Most responded differentially when the same observed act was
embedded in a specific action. These neurons fired during the observation of an act, before the beginning of the subsequent
acts specifying the action. Thus, these neurons not only code the observed motor act but also allow the observer to understand
the agent's intentions.
Pain is intimately linked with action systems that are involved in observational learning and imitation. Motor responses to one's own pain allow freezing or escape reactions and ultimately survival. Here we show that similar motor responses occur as a result of observation of painful events in others. We used transcranial magnetic stimulation to record changes in corticospinal motor representations of hand muscles of individuals observing needles penetrating hands or feet of a human model or noncorporeal objects. We found a reduction in amplitude of motor-evoked potentials that was specific to the muscle that subjects observed being pricked. This inhibition correlated with the observer's subjective rating of the sensory qualities of the pain attributed to the model and with sensory, but not emotional, state or trait empathy measures. The empathic inference about the sensory qualities of others' pain and their automatic embodiment in the observer's motor system may be crucial for the social learning of reactions to pain.
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are largely characterized by deficits in imitation, pragmatic language, theory of mind, and empathy. Previous research has suggested that a dysfunctional mirror neuron system may explain the pathology observed in ASD. Because EEG oscillations in the mu frequency (8-13 Hz) over sensorimotor cortex are thought to reflect mirror neuron activity, one method for testing the integrity of this system is to measure mu responsiveness to actual and observed movement. It has been established that mu power is reduced (mu suppression) in typically developing individuals both when they perform actions and when they observe others performing actions, reflecting an observation/execution system which may play a critical role in the ability to understand and imitate others' behaviors. This study investigated whether individuals with ASD show a dysfunction in this system, given their behavioral impairments in understanding and responding appropriately to others' behaviors. Mu wave suppression was measured in ten high-functioning individuals with ASD and ten age- and gender-matched control subjects while watching videos of (1) a moving hand, (2) a bouncing ball, and (3) visual noise, or (4) moving their own hand. Control subjects showed significant mu suppression to both self and observed hand movement. The ASD group showed significant mu suppression to self-performed hand movements but not to observed hand movements. These results support the hypothesis of a dysfunctional mirror neuron system in high-functioning individuals with ASD.
Infants between 12 and 21 days of age can imitate both facial and manual gestures; this behavior cannot be explained in terms of either conditioning or innate releasing mechanisms. Such imitation implies that human neonates can equate their own unseen behaviors with gestures they see others perform.
We recorded electrical activity from 532 neurons in the rostral part of inferior area 6 (area F5) of two macaque monkeys. Previous data had shown that neurons of this area discharge during goal-directed hand and mouth movements. We describe here the properties of a newly discovered set of F5 neurons ("mirror neurons', n = 92) all of which became active both when the monkey performed a given action and when it observed a similar action performed by the experimenter. Mirror neurons, in order to be visually triggered, required an interaction between the agent of the action and the object of it. The sight of the agent alone or of the object alone (three-dimensional objects, food) were ineffective. Hand and the mouth were by far the most effective agents. The actions most represented among those activating mirror neurons were grasping, manipulating and placing. In most mirror neurons (92%) there was a clear relation between the visual action they responded to and the motor response they coded. In approximately 30% of mirror neurons the congruence was very strict and the effective observed and executed actions corresponded both in terms of general action (e.g. grasping) and in terms of the way in which that action was executed (e.g. precision grip). We conclude by proposing that mirror neurons form a system for matching observation and execution of motor actions. We discuss the possible role of this system in action recognition and, given the proposed homology between F5 and human Brocca's region, we posit that a matching system, similar to that of mirror neurons exists in humans and could be involved in recognition of actions as well as phonetic gestures.
In area F5 of the monkey premotor cortex there are neurons that discharge both when the monkey performs an action and when he observes a similar action made by another monkey or by the experimenter. We report here some of the properties of these 'mirror' neurons and we propose that their activity 'represents' the observed action. We posit, then, that this motor representation is at the basis of the understanding of motor events. Finally, on the basis of some recent data showing that, in man, the observation of motor actions activate the posterior part of inferior frontal gyrus, we suggest that the development of the lateral verbal communication system in man derives from a more ancient communication system based on recognition of hand and face gestures.
My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action (see Gallese, 2000b), as between the agent of the action and his/her observer (see below). Agency constitutes a key issue for the understanding of intersubjectivity and for explaining how individuals can interpret their social world. This account of intersubjectivity, founded on the empirical findings of neuroscientific investigation, will be discussed and put in relation with a classical tenet of phenomenology: empathy. I will provide an 'enlarged' account of empathy that will be defined by means of a new conceptual tool: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity.
The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology.
A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey's premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mind-reading have been suggested. According to `theory theory', mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to `simulation theory', other people's mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one's own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory.
This paper reports a habituation study indicating that 12-month-old infants can take the "intentional stance" in interpreting the goal-directed spatial behavior of a rational agent. First, we examine previous empirical claims suggesting that the ability to attribute intentions to others emerges during the second half of the first year. It is argued that neither the perceptual evidence (concerning the early ability to discriminate agents), nor the behavioral data (indicating the use of communicative gestures for instrumental purposes) are sufficient to support such claims about the early appearance of a theory of mind, as there are alternative explanations for these phenomena in terms of simpler psychological processes. It is then suggested that to show that an infant indeed attributes an intention to interpret the goal-directed behavior of a rational agent, one needs to demonstrate that the baby can generate an expectation about the most rational future means action that the agent will perform in a new situation to achieve its goal. We then describe a visual habituation study that meets this requirement. The results demonstrate that based on the equifinal structure of an agent's spatial behavior, 12-month-old infants can identify the agent's goal and interpret its actions causally in relation to it. Furthermore, our study indicates that infants of this age are able to evaluate the rationality of the agent's goal-directed actions, which is a necessary requirement for applying the intentional stance. In closing, we discuss some of the theoretical and methodological implications of our study.
In area F5 of the monkey premotor cortex there are neurons that discharge both when the monkey performs an action and when he observes a similar action made by another monkey or by the experimenter. We report here some of the properties of these 'mirror' neurons and we propose that their activity 'represents' the observed action. We posit, then, that this motor representation is at the basis of the understanding of motor events. Finally, on the basis of some recent data showing that, in man, the observation of motor actions activate the posterior part of inferior frontal gyrus, we suggest that the development of the lateral verbal communication system in man derives from a more ancient communication system based on recognition of hand and face gestures.
In monkeys, the rostral part of ventral premotor cortex (area F5) contains neurons that discharge, both when the monkey grasps or manipulates objects and when it observes the experimenter making similar actions. These neurons (mirror neurons) appear to represent a system that matches observed events to similar, internally generated actions, and in this way forms a link between the observer and the actor. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and positron emission tomography (PET) experiments suggest that a mirror system for gesture recognition also exists in humans and includes Broca's area. We propose here that such an observation/execution matching system provides a necessary bridge from'doing' to'communicating',as the link between actor and observer becomes a link between the sender and the receiver of each message.
Although it is widely accepted that the cortex participates in pain perception, there is no direct evidence for the existence of cortical neurons that respond to noxious or painful stimuli in humans. Anatomical and neurophysiological studies in animals as well as brain imaging and evoked potential studies in humans suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is an important area for processing sensory information related to pain1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We have now identified single neurons in ACC that respond selectively to painful thermal and mechanical stimuli, supporting a role for the ACC in pain perception.
The proper domain of naive psychological reasoning is human action and human mental states but such reasoning is frequently applied to non-human phenomena as well. The studies reported in this paper test the validity of the currently widespread belief that this tendency is rooted in the fact that naive psychological reasoning is initially restricted to, and triggered by, the perception of self-initiated movement of agents. We report three habituation experiments which examine the necessary conditions under which infants invoke a psychological principle, namely the principle of rational action, to interpret behaviour as goal directed action. Experiment 1 revealed that the principle of rational action already operates at 9 (but not yet at 6) months of age. Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptual cues indicating agency, such as self-propulsion, are not necessary prerequisites for interpreting behaviour in terms of the principle of rational action. Experiment 3 confirmed that this effect cannot be attributed to generalisation of agentive properties from one object to another. These results suggest that the domain of naive psychology is initially defined only by the applicability of its core principles and its ontology is not restricted to (featurally identified) object kinds such as persons, animates, or agents. We argue that in its initial state naive psychological reasoning is not a cue-based but a principle-based theory.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to localize brain areas that were active during the observation of actions made by another individual. Object- and non-object-related actions made with different effectors (mouth, hand and foot) were presented. Observation of both object- and non-object-related actions determined a somatotopically organized activation of premotor cortex. The somatotopic pattern was similar to that of the classical motor cortex homunculus. During the observation of object-related actions, an activation, also somatotopically organized, was additionally found in the posterior parietal lobe. Thus, when individuals observe an action, an internal replica of that action is automatically generated in their premotor cortex. In the case of object-related actions, a further object-related analysis is performed in the parietal lobe, as if the subjects were indeed using those objects. These results bring the previous concept of an action observation/execution matching system (mirror system) into a broader perspective: this system is not restricted to the ventral premotor cortex, but involves several somatotopically organized motor circuits.
In the ventral premotor cortex of the macaque monkey, there are neurons that discharge both during the execution of hand actions and during the observation of the same actions made by others (mirror neurons). In the present study, we show that a subset of mirror neurons becomes active during action presentation and also when the final part of the action, crucial in triggering the response in full vision, is hidden and can therefore only be inferred. This implies that the motor representation of an action performed by others can be internally generated in the observer's premotor cortex, even when a visual description of the action is lacking. The present findings support the hypothesis that mirror neuron activation could be at the basis of action recognition.
What are the neural bases of action understanding? Although this capacity could merely involve visual analysis of the action, it has been argued that we actually map this visual information onto its motor representation in our nervous system. Here we discuss evidence for the existence of a system, the 'mirror system', that seems to serve this mapping function in primates and humans, and explore its implications for the understanding and imitation of action.
We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.
The perception of action is associated with increased activity in motor regions, implicating such regions in the recognition, understanding and imitation of actions. We examined the possibility that perception of speech, both auditory and visual, would also result in changes in the excitability of the motor system underlying speech production. Transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied to the face area of primary motor cortex to elicit motor-evoked potentials in the lip muscles. The size of the motor-evoked potentials was compared under the following conditions: listening to speech, listening to non-verbal sounds, viewing speech-related lip movements, and viewing eye and brow movements. Compared to control conditions, listening to and viewing speech enhanced the size of the motor-evoked potential. This effect was only seen in response to stimulation of the left hemisphere; stimulation of the right hemisphere produced no changes in motor-evoked potentials in any of the conditions. In a control experiment, the size of the motor-evoked potentials elicited in the muscles of the right hand did not differ among conditions, suggesting that speech-related changes in excitability are specific to the lip muscles. These results provide evidence that both auditory and visual speech perception facilitate the excitability of the motor system involved in speech production.
It has been proposed that the capacity to code the ‘like me’ analogy between self and others constitutes a basic prerequisite and a starting point for social cognition. It is by means of this self/other equivalence that meaningful social bonds can be established, that we can recognize others as similar to us, and that imitation can take place.
In this article I discuss recent neurophysiological and brain imaging data on monkeys and humans, showing that the ‘like me’ analogy may rest upon a series of ‘mirror–matching’ mechanisms. A new conceptual tool able to capture the richness of the experiences we share with others is introduced: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. I propose that all kinds of interpersonal relations (imitation, empathy and the attribution of intentions) depend, at a basic level, on the constitution of a shared manifold space. This shared space is functionally characterized by automatic, unconscious embodied simulation routines.
In the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the monkey there are neurons that discharge both when the monkey performs specific motor actions and when it observes another individual performing a similar action (mirror neurons). Previous studies on mirror neurons concerned hand actions. Here, we describe the mirror responses of F5 neurons that motorically code mouth actions. The results showed that about one-third of mouth motor neurons also discharge when the monkey observes another individual performing mouth actions. The majority of these 'mouth mirror neurons' become active during the execution and observation of mouth actions related to ingestive functions such as grasping, sucking or breaking food. Another population of mouth mirror neurons also discharges during the execution of ingestive actions, but the most effective visual stimuli in triggering them are communicative mouth gestures (e.g. lip smacking). Some also fire when the monkey makes communicative gestures. These findings extend the notion of mirror system from hand to mouth action and suggest that area F5, the area considered to be the homologue of human Broca's area, is also involved in communicative functions.
Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the 'teleological stance' to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance - a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.
What neural mechanism underlies the capacity to understand the emotions of others? Does this mechanism involve brain areas normally involved in experiencing the same emotion? We performed an fMRI study in which participants inhaled odorants producing a strong feeling of disgust. The same participants observed video clips showing the emotional facial expression of disgust. Observing such faces and feeling disgust activated the same sites in the anterior insula and to a lesser extent in the anterior cingulate cortex. Thus, as observing hand actions activates the observer's motor representation of that action, observing an emotion activates the neural representation of that emotion. This finding provides a unifying mechanism for understanding the behaviors of others.
Watching the movie scene in which a tarantula crawls on James Bond's chest can make us literally shiver--as if the spider crawled on our own chest. What neural mechanisms are responsible for this "tactile empathy"? The observation of the actions of others activates the premotor cortex normally involved in the execution of the same actions. If a similar mechanism applies to the sight of touch, movies depicting touch should automatically activate the somatosensory cortex of the observer. Here we found using fMRI that the secondary but not the primary somatosensory cortex is activated both when the participants were touched and when they observed someone or something else getting touched by objects. The neural mechanisms enabling our own sensation of touch may therefore be a window also to our understanding of touch.
In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.
Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.
It has been suggested that social impairments observed in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can be partly explained by an abnormal mirror neuron system (MNS) [1,2]. Studies on monkeys have shown that mirror neurons are cells in premotor area F5 that discharge when a monkey executes or sees a specific action or when it hears the corresponding action-related sound [3–5]. Evidence for the presence of a MNS in humans comes in part from studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), where a change in the amplitude of the TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) during action observation has been demonstrated [6–9]. These data suggest that actions are understood when the representation of that action is mapped onto the observer's own motor structures [10]. To determine if the neural mechanism matching action observation and execution is anomalous in individuals with ASD, TMS was applied over the primary motor cortex (M1) during observation of intransitive, meaningless finger movements. We show that overall modulation of M1 excitability during action observation is significantly lower in individuals with ASD compared with matched controls. In addition, we find that basic motor cortex abnormalities do not underlie this impairment.