ArticlePDF Available

Lessons Learned from the 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota

Authors:

Figures

Public Health Chronicles
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122 803
LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE 1918–1919 INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC IN MINNEAPOLIS
AND ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA
M O, AB
S F. S, MPH
R N. D, PD, MPH
R L, MD
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it.
— George Santayana
Spanish Inuenza of 1918–1919 killed more than 50
million people worldwide over the course of two years.1
The true origin of the 1918 inuenza pandemic is
unknown. During World War I, propaganda in war-
engaged countries only permitted encouraging news, so
as a neutral party, Spain was the rst country to publicly
report on the health crisis.1 Thus, Spanish Inuenza
became a popular term. However, historical research
has shown that Spain was an unlikely candidate as the
initial source and some suggest that it originated in
Kansas in the spring of 1918.
Inuenza pandemics have occurred regularly every
30 to 40 years since the 16th century. Today, inuenza
experts consider the possibility of another inuenza
pandemic, not in terms of if but when. Due to the
high likelihood of an inuenza pandemic, planning is
underway in many U.S. states and other countries. We
reviewed the responses of two neighboring Minnesota
cities during the 1918–1919 pandemic to gain insight
that might inform planning efforts today.
Many of the components of current pandemic
inuenza plans were utilized to some degree in Min-
neapolis and St. Paul during 1918–1919. Coordination
between different levels and branches of government,
improved communications regarding the spread of
inuenza, hospital surge capacity, mass dispensing of
vaccines, guidelines for infection control, containment
measures including case isolation and closures of pub-
lic places, and disease surveillance were all employed
with varying degrees of success. We focus on medical
resources, community disease containment measures,
public response to community containment, infection
control and vaccination, and communications.
PANDEMIC BEGINNINGS IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota’s rst Spanish Inuenza cases were identi-
ed in the last week of September 1918. As in the rest
of the country, Minnesota’s rst cases “were directly
traceable to soldiers, sailors, or [their] friends.”2 Every
military base and military hospital in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul area was severely affected. Case isolation was
slowly implemented at both Fort Snelling and the
Dunwoody Naval Detachment (military installations
in Minneapolis). On September 30, the rst day of
isolation, cases numbered in the hundreds.3
Inuenza cases were not limited to enlisted men
for long. In Minneapolis, the number of civilian cases
outstripped the number of military cases for the rst
time on October 9, less than two weeks after the rst
case was identied in the state (700 civilian cases; 675
cases at Fort Snelling).4 Inuenza had become a report-
able condition in Minnesota on October 8 in response
to the growing epidemic.5
MEDICAL RESOURCES
Two major issues contributed to the gravity of the pan-
demic: the war effort and limited scientic knowledge.
World War I was not only costly, it required much of the
medical community to be stationed overseas. In 1918,
little was known about inuenza. While this lack of
knowledge did not negatively impact infection control
actions, effective treatment and prevention methods
were not fully utilized.
When inuenza rst appeared in Minnesota on
September 27, the state was ill equipped for a health
crisis.2 Although World War I was coming to an end,
more than four million Americans were mobilized and
the nation’s resources were directed to supporting the
war effort. An editorial in the Minneapolis Tribune daily
newspaper described the lack of physicians and nurses:
“The medical fraternity is severely taxed already. So
many physicians and surgeons have gone to Europe or
to training that those at home have more than they can
attend to comfortably and to good advantage.”6
The number of inuenza patients that needed the
attention of physicians and nurses overwhelmed St.
Paul and Minneapolis clinicians. The war’s consider-
able drain on the medical profession was compounded
by other factors that hindered nurse and physician
mobilization. Methods to keep them healthy while
caring for inuenza patients were ineffective. Many
804 P H C
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
health-care providers fell ill, and some died. At one
point, Minneapolis’s City Hospital reported that “nearly
half of the nursing staff has been ill with inuenza in
the last three weeks.”7 This bleak situation discouraged
some clinicians from providing their services. Dr. H.M.
Bracken, Secretary of the Minnesota State Board of
Health, reported to Dr. Rupert Blue, U.S. Surgeon
General, on his campaign to recruit physicians for the
inuenza effort: “A number who we have called for
have made excuses and have not come at all.”8 Other
physicians who were recruited by Dr. Bracken simply
did not show up.9
Dr. Bracken attempted to secure senior medical
students for inuenza work. Dr. Bracken worked not
only with the U.S. Surgeon General but also with the
Surgeon General of the Army, the Committee on
Education and Special Training, and the Dean of the
University of Minnesota Medical School for three weeks
and still was unable to obtain senior medical students
for assistance, because each party insisted that someone
else had to authorize it. In the end, Bracken failed to
receive any medical students.10
Not surprisingly, Minneapolis and St. Paul hospitals
proved to be inadequate to handle the large num-
ber of patients. Minneapolis’s City Hospital and St.
Paul’s St. John’s Hospital were solely devoted to treat-
ing inuenza patients. Non-inuenza patients were
transferred to other area hospitals. This inadequacy
was not entirely due to the lack of beds and supplies;
there simply were not enough healthy nurses. At City
Hospital, Superintendent Dr. Harry Britton reported
that the “hospital was caring for about 150 cases, and
had about 70 on the waiting list. It had beds available
for that waiting number, but not nurses.”11
In St. Paul, a system was set up between St. John’s
Hospital and other hospitals to insure an adequate
number of nurses to care for inuenza patients, but
unfortunately this system failed. Dr. F.C. Plondke, St.
John’s Hospital’s Medical Director, complained that
the other hospitals were abandoning their promises
to assign help from their nursing staff. “The other
hospitals had refused to furnish a single nurse to aid
the fteen who are caring for ninety patients at St.
John’s from their individual nursing staffs.”12
In 1918, medical science maintained that inuenza
was bacterial in origin. Physicians at Fort Snelling
claimed that the “bacillus inuenza of Pfeiffer,” which
is today known as Haemophilus inuenzae, was the cause
of Spanish Inuenza.1,13 Nevertheless, despite this lack
of understanding about viruses, advice to curb infection
was relatively accurate. The Minnesota State Board of
Health recommended the use of handkerchiefs to cover
sneezes and coughs, plenty of fresh air, avoidance of the
sick and of crowds, and to contact a physician if ill.14
CommunItY dIsease ContaInment
As inuenza was beginning to take hold in the civil-
ian population, there was disagreement between the
Minneapolis and St. Paul health commissioners, Dr.
Guilford and Dr. Simon, respectively. Their approaches
varied; Dr. Guilford tended to be broadly proactive
to prevent cases, whereas Dr. Simon tended toward
initiating activities in response to individual cases. Dr.
Guilford believed that closing public places was the
best course of action and that isolation of individual
cases was useless.15 Dr. Simon asserted that isolation of
inuenza cases would be more effective in preventing
the spread of disease.14
The St. Paul Health Department and the Minnesota
State Board of Health met Dr. Guilford’s strong advo-
cacy with opposition. Dr. Bracken, siding with St. Paul,
questioned, “If you begin to close, where are you going
to stop? When are you going to reopen, and what do
you accomplish by opening”?11
Debate between the two cities on the merits of clos-
ing schools caused further strain. Dr. Simon held that
St. Paul’s school nurses were the best defense against
the spread of the disease, and that closing schools
would allow cases to go undetected as the children
would not be under any medical supervision. Dr.
Guilford disagreed, pointing out that 30 school nurses
would not be able to adequately care for the 50,000
pupils in the Minneapolis public school system during
a pandemic.16 Minneapolis closed the schools on two
separate occasions (October 12 to November 17, and
December 10 to December 29, 1918).
Despite Dr. Simon’s conviction that the closing of
public places would be ineffective, on November 6 St.
Paul government ofcials overruled him and enacted
a closing order for the whole city, including schools,
theaters, churches, and dance halls. The St. Paul Citi-
zens’ Committee—consisting of 15 physicians, church
leaders, and community members who were appointed
by Dr. Simon—which was concerned by the record of
218 new cases on November 5, as well as 36 deaths
between November 4 and November 5, 1918, recom-
mended this policy change (Figure 1).17 The number
of new cases began to decline 10 days later, with only
24 new cases, and the next day, Dr. Simon reopened
St. Paul businesses and churches.
Minneapolis and St. Paul both attempted to combat
inuenza by limiting crowding in places with restricted
access to fresh air. Both cities enacted streetcar regula-
tions aimed to keep the air in the streetcars fresh by
mandating open windows and limiting the number
of passengers to 84 (streetcars had a seating capacity
of 46).5,17,18 Because the measure limiting the number
of car passengers, implemented on October 26 in St.
P H C 805
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
Paul, was deemed successful, Minneapolis enacted a
similar regulation on October 30.17 As an experiment,
Dr. Bracken also proposed that St. Paul regulate the
business hours of stores and theaters to keep streetcar
congestion to a minimum. Once again, Minneapolis
followed St. Paul’s example on October 16, 1918, by
regulating the hours of retail stores, ofce buildings,
and wholesale stores.19
There were several complaints that the mandate in
Minneapolis to keep three streetcar windows open at
all times caused people to get sick due to winter colds.
A compromise was reached by Dr. Guilford allowing
streetcars with heating and ventilation systems to close
their windows once the temperature dropped to 32
degrees Fahrenheit.20
St. Paul also targeted elevators as places where
inuenza could easily be transmitted due to the tight
quarters and limited fresh air. Buildings with fewer
than six stories were no longer permitted to use their
elevators.21
Public response to community disease containment
The measures used to contain inuenza greatly affected
the day-to-day lives of citizens. While some accepted
the changes imposed on them, others protested regula-
tions that they considered unfair. Some called for more
stringent methods, while others blatantly broke the new
rules that were intended to protect them.
The closing of public places in Minneapolis was
announced in advance, so people rushed to complete
those activities that would soon be banned, resulting
in the very same crowded conditions the ban sought
to prevent. “Downtown theaters were packed last night
with patrons who took advantage of their last chance
to see a performance until the ban is lifted.”22 While
some St. Paul citizens were relieved that Dr. Simon
initially pledged to keep public places open, others
felt this was wrong. “Fear of inuenza contagion in
crowded places has reduced the patronage of St. Paul
motion picture theaters by nearly half, according to
reports to Dr. H.M. Bracken.”23
Many sporting organizations responded negatively
to closing orders. For example, in November 1918, the
bowlers of St. Paul drew up a petition that requested
permission to begin bowling again.24 Minneapolis
football teams chose to ignore the ban and attempted
to play against each other in front of large crowds.
Police were called in to disperse the crowds and halt
Figure 1. Influenza cases in St. Paul as recorded by the St. Paul Health Department
in the St. Paul Daily News, 1918–1919a
aCases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.
806 P H C
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
the games.25 Minneapolis teams found a way to play
despite the closing order. Because Minneapolis high
school football games were banned, practice games
were scheduled with St. Paul teams.26 Several estab-
lishments serving alcohol and food deliberately broke
the closing order to continue their regular business.
“One saloon was discovered with the back door route
open.”27
The elevator regulations in St. Paul were particularly
unpopular. “Some of the downtown hotels objected to
stopping their elevators, saying that they would lose
guests. This caused a change in the ruling to permit
hotel elevators and those in apartment houses to oper-
ate.”28 Many insisted it was unhealthy for the sick to
be forced to climb stairs in their impaired state, while
others felt concerned that people would be shut off
from fresh air if they were not allowed to use their
elevators. Consequently, the city compromised and
all elevators were back in use starting November 9,
1918, although only one person per 5 square feet was
permitted.29
The Hennepin County School Board (where Min-
neapolis is located) was exceptionally deant to the
closing order. The school board was concerned for the
health of the students as well as the “12,000 dollars a
day” that the closing orders cost because teachers con-
tinued to be paid, and extra school days would have
to be added to the school year.30 Against the explicit
orders of Dr. Guilford, and the pleading of several
Parent-Teacher Association ofcers, the school board
reopened schools on October 21, only to be shut down
on the same day under threat of police action.31
In St. Paul, all inuenza cases were supposed to
be reported to a physician, who in turn was required
to isolate the case in his or her own home and notify
the health department. Several problems sprung up
with these requirements that hampered surveillance,
the care of patients, and protecting people from get-
ting sick. For one, both physicians and patients were
often hesitant to bring attention to cases. “Physicians
are not reporting their cases to prevent homes from
being quarantined.”21 (Note: At the time of the 1918
inuenza pandemic, the separation of the ill from the
general population, what is now referred to as isola-
tion, was termed “quarantine.”) The ill also sought to
evade isolation in their homes by not seeking medical
attention, or only seeking medical attention when they
became gravely ill. “Hundreds of persons in the city do
not call for medical assistance until the second, third,
or fourth day and in many cases pneumonia already
has developed when medical attention is rst given.”29
Stafng shortages made isolation even less desirable.
Because there were a limited number of inspectors to
release houses from isolation, houses were not released
promptly from isolation.32
Starting on November 15, St. Paul telephone opera-
tors went on strike. According to the Pioneer Press daily
newspaper, “Less than one third the new cases [are]
being reported to the health department,” as a result
of the telephone strike.33 This strike not only affected
the reporting of cases, but also isolation, as well as their
release from such a measure.
After all of the difculties involved in establishing
isolation for each case, some agrantly disobeyed
the isolation orders altogether. “Disregard of the city
quarantine yesterday caused the arrest of one man who
insisted on taking his child from the city hospital before
the patient was ready to be discharged. The mother
and father and the child later were found mingling
with other persons in the neighborhood.”29
InfeCtIon ControL and VaCCInatIon
In addition to closing public places and isolating
cases in their homes, both Minneapolis and St. Paul
health departments took other steps to keep people
from getting infected. The use of gauze masks, more
stringent sanitation laws, and vaccination campaigns
were deployed in this effort.
Directions for wearing the masks were issued to the
public. “The outside of a face mask is marked with a
black thread woven into it. Always wear this side away
from the face. Wear the mask to cover the nose and
the mouth, tying two tapes around the head above the
ears. Tie the other tapes rather tightly around the neck.
Never wear the mask of another person. When the mask
is removed . . . it should be carefully folded with the
inside folded in, immediately boiled and disinfected.
When the mask is removed by one seeking to protect
himself from the inuenza it should be folded with
the inside folded out and boiled ten minutes. Persons
considerably exposed to the disease should boil their
masks at least once a day.”21 However, there was incon-
sistent advice on the use of gauze masks. Dr. Bracken,
of the State Board of Health, advocated the wearing
of masks, though he did not wear one himself, saying,
“I personally prefer to take my chances.”34
Medical students working in clinics in each district
of St. Paul distributed gauze masks.12 But the Citizens’
Committee rejected an ordinance requiring the wear-
ing of masks at all times, even though, “All physicians
were united in the opinion that the gauze covering
should be worn in hospitals or in the presence of
doubtful cases.”35 Despite the lack of ofcial orders
requiring the wearing of masks and Dr. Bracken’s
unclear message, many people sought out masks for
P H C 807
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
themselves. The Northern Division of the American
Red Cross manufactured tens of thousands of masks.
Minneapolis ordered 15,000 masks from the Red Cross
on October 1, 1918.36 These masks were used by nurses
in schools and hospitals, doctors, hospital visitors, and
those suspected of being infected with inuenza.37
As the number of cases increased in St. Paul,
employers sought ways to keep their workers healthy
and productive. Several companies requested masks
to distribute to their workers. Despite the thousands
of masks provided by the Red Cross, still more were
needed to fulll the demand. The Citizens’ Committee
suggested that companies ask their female employees
to fabricate masks for all their employees.21 St. Paul
introduced new sanitation laws that called for the
sterilization of dishes and cups in restaurants and bars,
and the banning of roller towels and common drinking
cups in public restrooms.38
At least two different vaccines were administered
in Minneapolis-St. Paul, neither of them effective as
neither actually contained inuenza virus. One made
by bacteriologists at the University of Minnesota was
purported to prevent pneumonia.39 The Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, Minnesota, made another vaccine that was
intended to prevent both pneumonia and inuenza.40
This latter vaccination was composed of Streptococcus
pneumoniae types I, II, and III, S. pneumoniae group
IV, hemolytic streptococci, Staphylococcus aureus, and
“inuenza bacillus.”41
Military personnel as well as civilians were inoculated
beginning as early as October 4, 1918.37 Both city health
departments purchased vaccine and distributed it to
physicians at no charge to encourage widespread use.
In Minneapolis, people desiring the vaccine “thronged”
the ofces of doctors hoping to be vaccinated, and
in St. Paul it was reported that “thousands of persons
have been inoculated.”39,42 Some physicians took advan-
tage of their access to vaccine and the public’s fear of
inuenza. According to St. Paul’s Citizens’ Committee,
it was discovered that “a few physicians were charg-
ing a fat fee for inoculations.”29 This was particularly
disturbing as the vaccinations were supplied to the
physicians for free.
CommunICatIons
Postal workers, Boy Scouts, and teachers were enlisted
to provide educational materials to the public and to
teach health precautions. Mail carriers distributed
educational materials on their routes. Boy Scouts
distributed posters to stores, ofces, and factories in
downtown Minneapolis.22 Minneapolis teachers who
were put out of work by the closing of schools were
asked to volunteer for a health education campaign.
The main goals of the campaign were to get rid of
shared drinking cups, which were the precursor of the
water fountain, as well as the roller towels, which were
used to dry hands after washing.43 St. Paul teachers were
sent “to ascertain the plight of families worst affected
by the epidemic.”28 This was accomplished through a
canvas of homes where the teachers learned if anyone
was sick, needed to see a physician, or needed food.27
St. Paul set up a public kitchen, a children’s home,
and an emergency hospital for these cases.21
Limitations
Although the two cities chose different methods of
disease containment, determining which method was
more successful is challenging. Information on cases
in both cities depended on ill individuals seeking the
attention of physicians, who were in short supply. The
physicians were then required to report the number
of new cases each day to their city health department.
The city then reported the total number of cases to
the newspapers, which published the number of new
cases and deaths each day. This chain of information
left much room for error and possible falsication.
Because St. Paul chose to utilize isolation and Min-
neapolis did not, case reporting varied greatly between
the two cities. Individuals with inuenza who had their
status reported in St. Paul had to endure isolation
until they were released with a physician’s approval.
This may have discouraged people from seeking the
attention of physicians, and thus being reported—an
undesired consequence of enforced isolation (Table).
Because those with inuenza were not isolated in Min-
neapolis, more people might have felt comfortable
seeking medical attention. This could explain why St.
Paul had such a high case fatality rate compared with
Minneapolis (Table, Figures 2 and 3).
ConCLusIon
Several factors impede direct comparisons of the two
cities’ approaches. The cities border each other and
Table. Minneapolis and St. Paul influenza cases and
deaths, September 30, 1918, to January 6, 1919
Minneapolis St. Paul
Total deaths 747 645
Total cases 14,411 4,399
Death rate (per 100,000) 264 300
Incidence rate (per 100,000) 4,781 2,049
Case fatality rate (percent) 5.2 14.7
808 P H C
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
residents travel back and forth. Although the contain-
ment philosophies differed greatly, in reality St. Paul
government ofcials overruled public health, and
schools and public gathering places were closed in
both cities for varying lengths of time. Although the
effects of isolation vs. closure of public places cannot
be specically determined, other lessons can be learned
from what happened in 1918. Many steps could have
been taken to prevent illness and save lives. Prior plan-
ning, clear orders, as well as consistent and transparent
advice and information to the public may have made
a signicant difference in the number of cases and
deaths due to inuenza in 1918.
There was a paucity of planning for a health emer-
gency when inuenza rst appeared. While the actions
that the two city health departments took to stem the
spread of inuenza align closely with current pandemic
plans, health ofcials had the disadvantage of trying
to conceive and realize plans during a health crisis.
Many current recommendations were implemented,
including the use of masks, the use of vaccines (albeit
ineffective ones), increasing the stringency of sanita-
tion measures, limiting crowding in public places,
and trying to coordinate hospitals, nurses, physicians,
and medical students to maximize resources. As part
of maximizing human resources during an inuenza
pandemic, it is imperative that the safety of health-care
workers is insured. The number of nurses and physi-
cians who fell ill and even died as a result of assisting
in the ght against the pandemic scared other nurses
and physicians away.
Had these ideas been generated prior to such a
large emergency, several problems could have been
averted. The debates and disagreements between dif-
ferent public ofcials and health agencies, as with the
Hennepin County School Board and the Minneapolis
Health Department or between the Minneapolis Health
Department and the St. Paul Health Department, could
have been discussed in advance. Supplies could have
been stockpiled, business leaders and community mem-
bers could have provided input on controversial disease
containment policies, and medical students could have
been put to work in hospitals and communities that
lacked physicians. Unfortunately, these disputes arose
and continued throughout the pandemic.
Clear authority and management by public health
Figure 2. Influenza case rates per 100,000, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1918–1919a
aCases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.
P H C 809
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
ofcials were generally lacking at the federal and state
levels. It was almost as if the fear of using their author-
ity led Surgeon General Blue and Dr. Bracken to fail
to take decisive action. Surgeon General Blue suggested
to Dr. Bracken, and all other state health ofcials, “the
advisability [of] discontinuing all public meetings,
closing all schools and places of public amusement…
on appearance of local outbreaks.”44 Because this was
merely a suggestion, and local outbreaks were not
dened objectively, Blue’s urgent telegram had no
effect.
On the state level, Dr. Bracken acknowledged that
the St. Paul Health Department “followed his advice” to
not close public places, and went on to say that St. Paul,
“has the power to do the opposite any time it wants
to.”11 This statement forced local health departments
to dene their own rules while attempting to decipher
conicting messages from the state and federal level.
Because clear orders were not being given to public
health ofcials, the public in turn was not receiving
transparent and consistent advice and information.
Should the public wear masks? Why was it allowable
to be next to someone in a streetcar and not in an
elevator? Why were church services closed while Red
Cross workers gathered in crowded conditions in those
very same churches? Was inuenza a life-threatening
condition, or was panic the most dangerous element of
the inuenza pandemic? In Minneapolis and St. Paul.
there was no single message on any of these issues.
In many cases, the public had to decide for itself. In
which case, the effect of the messages that were com-
municated only served to contradict each other.
In reviewing this history, some lessons stand out.
Recent analyses of nonpharmaceutical interventions
during 1918 indicate cities in which multiple interven-
tions were implemented early in the pandemic fared
better.45 Of primary importance is developing a plan
ahead of time that incorporates all levels of govern-
ment health infrastructure and describes clear lines
of responsibilities and roles. Plans for surge capacity
and community containment must be discussed with
stakeholders and consensus must be achieved.
Further, general approaches should be put forth
for public comment and approval. The public health
benet of isolation should be weighed against the pos-
sibility that some people would be discouraged from
Figure 3. Daily death rates per 100,000, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1918–1919a
aCases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.
810 P H C
P H R / N–D 2007 / V 122
seeking care. Clear explanations of the reason for isola-
tion, generous employer support, and providing food,
medicine, and social service to those in isolation may
mitigate fears and increase cooperation. The public
must also be educated about the reasoning behind
other health measures (i.e., closures), should those
methods be implemented.
Approaches and plans should be based on scien-
tic data whenever possible, and include input from
ethicists. Unlike in 1918, a pandemic inuenza vaccine
will likely be available today, albeit four to six months
after the pandemic starts. But similar to 1918, the
challenge will be designing an orderly and ethical
distribution of a scarce commodity. Further, experts in
risk communication should assist in developing mes-
sages that are scientically accurate, understandable,
clear, and useful. Finally, we need to take careful note
of local and national lessons from the past so we do
not repeat them.
Miles Ott is a Public Health Graduate Student Worker, Shelly F.
Shaw is an Epidemiologist, Richard N. Danila is a Deputy State
Epidemiologist, and Ruth Lyneld is a Medical Director and State
Epidemiologist. All are with the Minnesota Department of Health
Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Prevention and Control Division,
in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Address correspondence to: Richard N. Danila, PhD, MPH,
Minnesota Department of Health Infectious Disease Epidemiol-
ogy, Prevention and Control Division, Acute Disease Investigation
and Control Section, 625 Robert St. N, P.O. Box 64975, St. Paul,
MN 55164-0975; tel. 651-201-5414; fax 651-201-5743; e-mail
<richard.danila@health.state.mn.us>.
referenCes
1. Barry JM. The great inuenza: the epic story of the deadliest plague
in history. New York: Penguin; 2004.
2. State Board of Health and Vital Statistics of Minnesota. Eighth
biennial report 1918–1919. Minneapolis: State Board of Health
and Vital Statistics of the State of Minnesota; 1920.
3. Spanish Inuenza gains headway here. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Oct 1; 8.
4. Inuenza gains slowly in city. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 10;
1,8.
5. Inuenza gains among civilians. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 9;
1,7.
6. Editorial. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 3; 16.
7. Sailors may attend inuenza patients. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Nov 3; 4.
8. Henry Bracken to Rupert Blue, 1918 Nov 13, Minnesota Department
of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records, 1895–1954,
Minnesota Historical Society.
9. Henry Bracken to Rupert Blue, 1918 Nov 2, Minnesota Department
of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records, 1895–1954,
Minnesota Historical Society.
10. Henry Bracken to Dr. Merritte W. Ireland, 1918 Nov 16, Minnesota
Department of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records,
1895–1954, Minnesota Historical Society.
11. Business hours may be changed to curb epidemic. Minneapolis
Tribune 1918 Oct 15; 1,10.
12. Lid on tomorrow includes schools. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov
5; 6.
13. 150 cases of inuenza in Minneapolis. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Sep 30; 1.
14. Mill City closed. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Oct 12; 1,6.
15. Doctors propose drastic lid be clamped on city. Minneapolis Tribune
1918 Oct 11; 1,2.
16. Clash over school order due Monday. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Oct 20; 1.
17. Push grip ght. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Oct 30; 1.
18. Epidemic controlled in city’s army camps car crowds, 558 pupils
stricken. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 29; 10.
19. Trade hours set to stem Spanish Inuenza here. Minneapolis Tri-
bune 1918 Oct 16; 1,2.
20. Ban on until deaths decrease to 7 a day. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Nov 10; 14.
21. Sweeping order against inuenza in effect here today. St. Paul
Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 6; 1,7.
22. Inuenza lid clamped tight all over city. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Oct 13; 1,10.
23. See less inuenza. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Oct 15; 8.
24. Pins will fall. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 17; 7.
25. “Flu” order stops park grid games. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct
14; 18,12.
26. High school games neither on nor off. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Oct 15; 18,12.
27. Fail to report grip. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 8; 10.
28. Plan survey of inuenza cases. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 7;
1.
29. All lifts to run. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 9; 1,7.
30. School chiefs face arrest or injunction, city ofcials to use law as
directors defy inuenza ban. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 21;
1,2.
31. Guilford wins ght to keep schools shut. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Oct 22; 1.
32. Shows open today. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 15; 1.
33. Inuenza relief work disrupted as a result of telephone strike. St.
Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 16; 1.
34. Inuenza lid to go on city today. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov
4; 1,3.
35. Speed grip ght. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 2; 1.
36. Inuenza spread held slight here. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct
2; 1,4.
37. Inuenza halts “U” opening to all but S.A.T.C. Minneapolis Tribune
1918 Oct 5; 1,22.
38. Cafes and bars hit by grip ban. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Dec 14;
1.
39. Serum to be issued. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Oct 19; 6.
40. Epidemic statistics show decline in city. Minneapolis Tribune 1918
Oct 25; 15.
41. Rosenow EC. Prophylactic inoculation against respiratory infections
during the present pandemic of inuenza. Preliminary report.
JAMA 1919;72:31-4.
42. Epidemic brings mercy problems. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov
17; 1.
43. Teachers released for school closing period. Minneapolis Tribune
1918 Oct 15; 11.
44. Telegram from Rupert Blue to Dr. Henry Bracken, 1918 Oct 6,
6:49 pm, Minnesota Department of Health Correspondence and
Miscellaneous Records, 1895–1954, Minnesota Historical Society.
45. Hatchett RJ, Mercher CE, Lipsitch M. Public health interventions
and epidemic intensity during the 1918 inuenza pandemic. Proc
Natl Acad Sci 2007;104:7582-7.
... Such comparisons can be directly seen; in 1918 social distancing was introduced, schools and cinemas were shut, and fines were given out for not wearing protective clothing or bulk buying food items. 10 Similarly, in 2009 measures, such as school closures were implemented, aiming to reduce transmission but research suggested that these were implemented too late. 11 In 2009 once schools reopened there was a large second wave of cases particularly affecting children. ...
... The condensed nature of many medical school programmes, particularly graduate entry programs in the United Kingdom (UK), means that the curriculum included has to be both concise and fit with the learning outcomes set by the General Medical Council. 23 The recent outbreak of COVID-19 has raised many questions surrounding medical education, including what role medical students should play in a pandemic and the effects of a pandemic on medical education (10)(11)(12). ...
... In 1918, the influenza pandemic led to significant improvements in disease surveillance and vaccine development. 10 By understanding these changes, it allows decision makers to make informed choices about resource allocation and campaigns to reduce transmission such as vaccine introduction. Epidemiologists have argued that when comparing the 1918 and 2009 pandemics the earlier implementation of social distancing and school closures in 1918 had a larger effect on fewer overall cases and improved long term economic outcomes. ...
Article
Full-text available
Introduction The dramatic global impact of the coronavirus pandemic has increased consideration on epidemiological progressions of pandemics. Measures implemented to reduce viral transmission have been largely historical, comparable in nature with the 1918 and 2009 influenza pandemics, demonstrating the importance of clinicians’ awareness on historical pandemics. Despite this, literature suggests medical students’ knowledge on previous pandemics is poor. Objectives This study aims to gather stakeholder information from UK medical students on the importance of including the history of pandemics in the medical school curriculum. Methods A cross-sectional cohort study conducted via a mixed question type online survey was distributed to all UK medical schools to explore stakeholder views. Grounded theory emergent coding was used to generate themes to free-text answers and SPSS and Excel were used to analyse quantitative data using pivot tables and Fishers exact tests. Results Two hundred and forty-one students consented to take part from eight medical schools in the UK with 98% of these students completing the questionnaire. 34% of students reported having teaching on pandemics with 78% of students stating it would be beneficial. Knowledge was poor with 5.7% of students achieving 100% on knowledge-based questions. 72% of students believed that learning about the history of medicine would be beneficial with 87% of these students referring to ‘benefiting (the) future’ in their answers. Additionally, 79% of students thought it would be beneficial to learn about historical pandemics with reference to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Conclusion To date, this is the only UK based study assessing stakeholders’ views on including the history of pandemics in the medical school curriculum. Our findings demonstrate that medical students wish to have more historical content included in their degree to better prepare tomorrow's doctors for situations that may occur when history repeats itself.
... Increased travel and trade have enhanced the spread of diseases beyond endemic and epidemic outbreaks, to pandemics. The Spanish flue grew to a pandemic in 1918-1919 due to WW I soldiers returning home with the virus 2 (Ott et al. 2007). The spread of COVID-19 into a pandemic was made possible by the global interconnectedness, which has become the new normal. ...
Article
One Health as integrated approach to link human, animal and environmental health has become current by the COVID-19 pandemic. Its veterinary and medical scientific and occidental cultural origin raises several paradoxes. Health is culturally constructed whereas the reductionist medical sciences focus on disease and reducing health hazards. Critical reflection on the ontology and epistemology underlying the One Health approach, actors and activities, assists in identifying strategic directions to further shape One Health. To incorporate eco-health and societal health calls for a Systemic One Health approach, requiring different leadership structures, community-based approaches and political engagement. Health hazard risk reduction and preparedness and response are non-systemic activities, but no less important to pursue.
... During the Spanish flu nurses were responsible for personalized nursing care including clinical duties, liaison with multiple other teams, infection control monitoring and communication (Keeling, 2021). Based on the experiences of the Spanish flu, many current health policies and procedures including effective communication of health policies, public awareness of the reasoning for health measures, isolation, early use of non-pharmaceutical measures have been modelled on previous experiences (Matta et al., 2020;Minissian et al., 2021;Ott et al., 2007). ...
Article
Full-text available
Aim To explore how nurses and nursing knowledge contributed to the success of an Australian nurse‐led medical hotel quarantine facility during the COVID‐19 pandemic. The facility was established to accommodate returning travellers who were COVID‐19 positive or at risk of becoming positive, to travellers requiring complex care and expanded to community members who could not quarantine at home. Design This descriptive qualitative study explored how nurses and nursing knowledge in the quarantine facility contributed to the low transmission incidence of COVID‐19 infection. Method Twelve semi‐structured interviews were conducted via ZOOM from February to May 2022 with all levels of nursing staff (nurse managers to assistants in nursing) who had worked in the facility for 3 months or more. The nurses were asked to describe their experiences, the challenges they faced and how they overcame them. The data were rich and were analysed using Braun and Clarke's six‐step thematic analysis. Results Four broad themes were generated demonstrating how nurses played a pivotal role in the success of the facility. First: nursing knowledge was evident through the development of policies, which minimized risks to nurses and patients. Second: a community of learning was developed as nurses supported upskilling and capacity building of staff, particularly new graduates with the facility. Third: a supportive management structure promoted teamwork and a positive workplace culture. And finally: the nurses were encouraged to develop techniques that promoted self‐care which enabled them to develop resilience. Conclusion This was a nurse‐led service that developed strategies to manage care delivery and overcame unanticipated difficulties in a unique clinical setting. Reporting Method The quality of the research design was ensured by using the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Studies (COREQ) checklist. Patient or Public Contribution No patient or public contribution.
... Jenks was a keen photographer and took still and movie cameras with him to Algeria, making a delightful movie. Details of Maud's later life are not available, beyond the fact that she had a son, born in the Philippines in 1905, who died in 1918, no doubt a victim of the Spanish flu which raged through Minneapolis and St. Paul late that year (Ott et al. 2007). ...
Chapter
Full-text available
... 2 La grippe espagnole de 1918 a fait progresser les stratégies de gestion de la santé publique qui sont toujours présentes dans la pratique moderne. 3 Les décès liés aux opioïdes ont doublé depuis 2019 au Canada, ce qui a suscité une innovation continue en matière de prévention et de réduction des risques pour faire face à cette crise. 4 De même, la pandémie de COVID-19 continue de stimuler l'innovation médicale grâce aux défis qui restent à relever près de trois ans après son déclenchement. ...
... In this era Walter Reed discovered that the yellow fever is caused by the Aedes aegypti mosquito48 . In the year 1918, influenza infection dispersed and caused loss to enormous human lives49 . In the year 1907 Mary Mallon identified the carrier of typhoid for which she was quarantined for the whole life on an island50 . ...
Article
Full-text available
The global public health menaces are increasing day by day. The public health accouters broadly deal with chronic infections, ageing people's physical and psychological health, environmental health and social health. The global individuals are facing enormous public issues since historic times. In today's scenario comprehensive public health laws are scattered due to the establishment of numerous public wellness laws. Comprehensive public health laws are required to be espoused universally so that the public health crisis can be faced. Health guidelines are crucial requisites in the modern world to resist the public health espouse being posed. It is becoming a mandatory requirement for the global populace to establish legislations that can overcome the threats being burdened to the world. The threats to world public health include epidemics, radiations, pollution, injuries or accidents, food spoilage, climate transformation, global warming and natural disasters. In order to gain public wellness it requires deliberate efforts to incite health conducts, investigate pestilent infections and their shielding. Public wellness can be achieved by conjoint endeavours of societies, academies, populace and both private and public societies. Public health rules are statutes framed by the legislatures and judiciaries. It is inferred in this research study that though numerous legal tools are available at the global scale still global individuals are struggling with the public health issues. This study is of the view that both establishment and proper implementation of legislations is required to furnish global public health.
Article
Full-text available
Ahmet Yusuf Akyüz is an English language literature educator and a researcher in the literary field, specializing in English novels, and historical and postmodern fiction, he has some works on Hilary Mantel’s Wolf Hall Trilogy, Emma Donoghue’s The Pull Of The Stars, Aravind Adiga’s The White Tiger and other works.
Article
One Health as integrated approach to link human, animal and environmental health has become current by the COVID-19 pandemic. Its veterinary and medical scientific and occidental cultural origin raises several paradoxes. Health is culturally constructed whereas the reductionist medical sciences focus on disease and reducing health hazards. Critical reflection on the ontology and epistemology underlying the One Health approach, actors and activities, assists in identifying strategic directions to further shape One Health. To incorporate eco-health and societal health calls for a Systemic One Health approach, requiring different leadership structures, community-based approaches and political engagement. Health hazard risk reduction and preparedness and response are non-systemic activities, but no less important to pursue.
Article
Full-text available
In this third installment of our four-part historical series, we evaluate contributions that shaped our understanding of heat and cold stress during occupational and athletic pursuits. Our first topic concerns how we tolerate, and sometimes fail to tolerate, exercise-heat stress. By 1900, physical activity with clothing- and climate-induced evaporative impediments led to an extraordinarily high incidence of heat stroke within the military. Fortunately, deep-body temperatures > 40 °C were not always fatal. Thirty years later, water immersion and patient treatments mimicking sweat evaporation were found to be effective, with the adage of cool first, transport later being adopted. We gradually acquired an understanding of thermoeffector function during heat storage, and learned about challenges to other regulatory mechanisms. In our second topic, we explore cold tolerance and intolerance. By the 1930s, hypothermia was known to reduce cutaneous circulation, particularly at the extremities, conserving body heat. Cold-induced vasodilatation hindered heat conservation, but it was protective. Increased metabolic heat production followed, driven by shivering and non-shivering thermogenesis, even during exercise and work. Physical endurance and shivering could both be compromised by hypoglycaemia. Later, treatments for hypothermia and cold injuries were refined, and the thermal after-drop was explained. In our final topic, we critique the numerous indices developed in attempts to numerically rate hot and cold stresses. The criteria for an effective thermal stress index were established by the 1930s. However, few indices satisfied those requirements, either then or now, and the surviving indices, including the unvalidated Wet-Bulb Globe-Thermometer index, do not fully predict thermal strain.
Preprint
Full-text available
BACKGROUND The dramatic global impact of the coronavirus pandemic has increased consideration on epidemiological progressions of pandemics. Measures implemented to reduce viral transmission have been largely historical comparable in nature with the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic, demonstrating the importance of clinicians’ awareness on historical pandemics. Despite this, literature suggests medical students’ knowledge on previous pandemics is poor. This study aims to gather stakeholder information from UK medical students on the importance of including the history of Medicine in the medical school curriculum. METHODS A cross-sectional cohort study conducted via a mixed question type online survey was distributed to all UK medical schools to explore stakeholder views on teaching on the history of Medicine in the curriculum. Grounded theory emergent coding was used to generate themes to free-text answers and SPSS and Excel were used to analyse quantitative data using pivot tables and Fishers exact tests. RESULTS Two hundred and forty-one students consented to take part with a response rate of 98% (n = 237). 34% of students reported having teaching on pandemics with 78% of students stating it would be beneficial. Knowledge was poor with 5.7% of students achieving 100% on knowledge-based questions. 72% of students believed that learning about the history of medicine would be beneficial with 87% of these students referring to ‘benefiting (the) future’ in their answers. Additionally, 79% of students thought it would be beneficial to learn about the H1N1 Influenza 1918 pandemic with reference to the current COVID-19 pandemic. CONCLUSIONS To date, this is the only UK based study assessing stakeholders’ views on including the history of Medicine in the medical school curriculum. Our findings demonstrate that medical students wish to have more historical content included in their degree to better prepare tomorrow’s doctors for situations that may occur when history repeats itself.
Article
In attempting to lessen the incidence and to reduce the severity of infections of the respiratory tract by vaccination, it is essential to consider the wide range of bacterial flora, the relative prevalence of each species, as well as the fluctuations in incidence and severity of these infections with changes in season. The well-defined tendency of bacteria of the same species to localize differently in different epidemics indicates peculiar infecting and antigenic powers. The short duration of immunity to infections following attacks adds greatly to the difficulty. However, owing to the high incidence and high mortality rate from infections of the respiratory tract during the present epidemic, a painstaking effort to raise the resistance of individuals by inoculation with appropriate vaccines appeared to be strongly indicated.In considering prophylactic inoculations in this epidemic of influenza, we put aside the debated question as to the cause of the initial symptoms and
Article
Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) intended to reduce infectious contacts between persons form an integral part of plans to mitigate the impact of the next influenza pandemic. Although the potential benefits of NPIs are supported by mathematical models, the historical evidence for the impact of such interventions in past pandemics has not been systematically examined. We obtained data on the timing of 19 classes of NPI in 17 U.S. cities during the 1918 pandemic and tested the hypothesis that early implementation of multiple interventions was associated with reduced disease transmission. Consistent with this hypothesis, cities in which multiple interventions were implemented at an early phase of the epidemic had peak death rates ≈50% lower than those that did not and had less-steep epidemic curves. Cities in which multiple interventions were implemented at an early phase of the epidemic also showed a trend toward lower cumulative excess mortality, but the difference was smaller (≈20%) and less statistically significant than that for peak death rates. This finding was not unexpected, given that few cities maintained NPIs longer than 6 weeks in 1918. Early implementation of certain interventions, including closure of schools, churches, and theaters, was associated with lower peak death rates, but no single intervention showed an association with improved aggregate outcomes for the 1918 phase of the pandemic. These findings support the hypothesis that rapid implementation of multiple NPIs can significantly reduce influenza transmission, but that viral spread will be renewed upon relaxation of such measures. • mitigation • nonpharmaceutical interventions • closures
Minnesota Department of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records
  • Henry Bracken
  • Rupert Blue
Henry Bracken to Rupert Blue, 1918 Nov 2, Minnesota Department of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records, 1895-1954, Minnesota Historical Society.
2; 1. 36. Influenza spread held slight here. Minneapolis Tribune
  • Speed
  • St
Speed grip fight. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 2; 1. 36. Influenza spread held slight here. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 2; 1,4.
Flu" order stops park grid games
  • See
  • St
See less influenza. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Oct 15; 8. 24. Pins will fall. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 17; 7. 25. "Flu" order stops park grid games. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 14; 18,12.
Influenza relief work disrupted as a result of telephone strike
  • Shows Open Today
  • St
Shows open today. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 15; 1. 33. Influenza relief work disrupted as a result of telephone strike. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 16; 1.
2; 1. 36. Influenza spread held slight here
  • Speed
  • St
Speed grip fight. St. Paul Pioneer Press 1918 Nov 2; 1. 36. Influenza spread held slight here. Minneapolis Tribune 1918 Oct 2; 1,4.
Minnesota Department of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records
  • Henry Bracken To Dr
  • W Merritte
  • Ireland
Henry Bracken to Dr. Merritte W. Ireland, 1918 Nov 16, Minnesota Department of Health Correspondence and Miscellaneous Records, 1895-1954, Minnesota Historical Society.