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Operation FLYSWATTER: a war within a war

Authors:
  • A. L. Young Consulting, Inc.

Abstract and Figures

Despite extensive experience with mosquito-borne diseases affecting combat capability of the Armed Forces during World War 11 and Korea, in 1965 the United States military was unprepared to deal with the Anopheles mosquito in the highlands of South Vietnam and the subsequent malarial casualties. Regardless of the weekly use of prophylactic measures, up to 50 percent of American soldiers initially involved in combat operations in the heavily forested regions of South Vietnam developed malaria. Not until nearly two years after the introduction of American ground troops into the Southeast Asian conflict did the Department of Defense authorize the extensive insecticide aerial spraying necessary to protect both Allied and indigenous forces. Even then, military leadership failed to take advantage of much of the knowledge and experience of an existing stateside unit specifically tasked in aerial spraying and mosquito control. This commentary reviews the events and supporting historical information related to the fixed-wing aerial spraying of insecticides from October 1966 to December 1971 during the Vietnam War. The historical information was divided into two categories; the need for critical information assessing the spread and impact of malaria among military and civilian personnel, and the operational information essential for combating the mosquitoes that were the carriers of malaria. Using modified UC-123 transport planes to spray malathion insecticide, Operation FLYSWATTER was the eventual fixed-wing, large-area answer to the biting insect. Unlike the short time-on-target of the defoliation missions, the insecticide spray aircraft's treetop level flights lasted for as much as two very hazardous hours of flying. So successful were these missions in controlling mosquitoes that preventative medicine requests ultimately resulted in 14 major allied military bases and their adjoining Vietnamese cities being sprayed routinely every 9 days, weather permitting. The 'mosquito war' required over 1,300 individual missions and dispensed approximately 1.76 million liters of malathion concentrate. Operation FLYSWATTER was a significant part of the overall United States' preventative medicine program to reduce the number of man-days lost to ground forces due to malaria. Ironically, although the program was widely publicized through both military and civilian in-country channels, the memories of many veterans of the Vietnam War would later confuse exposure to the insecticide spray missions with the spraying of the Agent Orange defoliant in Vietnam.
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Commentaries Operation FLYSWATTER
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© Springer-Verlag 2008
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Commentaries
Operation FLYSWATTER: A War Within a War
Paul F. Cecil, Sr.
1
and Alvin L. Young
2
*
1
Historian and Archivist, The RANCH HAND Vietnam Association, Hurricane, Utah, USA
2
Institute for Science and Public Policy, Sarkeys Energy Center, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, USA
* Corresponding author
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1065/espr2007.12.467
Preamble
Despite extensive experience with mosquito-borne diseases affect-
ing combat capability of the Armed Forces during World War II and
Korea, in 1965 the United States military was unprepared to deal
with the
Anopheles
mosquito in the highlands of South Vietnam and
the subsequent malarial casualties. Regardless of the weekly use of
prophylactic measures, up to 50 percent of American soldiers ini-
tially involved in combat operations in the heavily forested regions of
South Vietnam developed malaria. Not until nearly two years after
the introduction of American ground troops into the Southeast Asian
conflict did the Department of Defense authorize the extensive in-
secticide aerial spraying necessary to protect both Allied and indig-
enous forces. Even then, military leadership failed to take advan-
tage of much of the knowledge and experience of an existing stateside
unit specifically tasked in aerial spraying and mosquito control.
This commentary reviews the events and supporting historical infor-
mation related to the fixed-wing aerial spraying of insecticides from
October 1966 to December 1971 during the Vietnam War. The his-
torical information was divided into two categories; the need for criti-
cal information assessing the spread and impact of malaria among
military and civilian personnel, and the operational information es-
sential for combating the mosquitoes that were the carriers of ma-
laria. Using modified UC-123 transport planes to spray malathion
insecticide, Operation FLYSWATTER was the eventual fixed-wing,
large-area answer to the biting insect. Unlike the short time-on-tar-
get of the defoliation missions, the insecticide spray aircraft's treetop
level flights lasted for as much as two very hazardous hours of fly-
ing. So successful were these missions in controlling mosquitoes
that preventative medicine requests ultimately resulted in 14 major
allied military bases and their adjoining Vietnamese cities being
sprayed routinely every 9 days, weather permitting. The 'mosquito
war' required over 1,300 individual missions and dispensed approxi-
mately 1.76 million liters of malathion concentrate. Operation
FLYSWATTER was a significant part of the overall United States'
preventative medicine program to reduce the number of man-days
lost to ground forces due to malaria. Ironically, although the program
was widely publicized through both military and civilian in-country
channels, the memories of many veterans of the Vietnam War would
later confuse exposure to the insecticide spray missions with the
spraying of the Agent Orange defoliant in Vietnam.
Please cite this paper as: Cecil PF Sr., Young AL (2007): Op-
eration FLYSWATTER: A War Within a War. Env Sci Pollut Res
15 (1) 3–7
1 Introduction
Malaria, spread by mosquitoes, has been influencing mili-
tary campaigns in Southeast Asia since Kubula Khan [1].
During World War II Allied forces in the Pacific theater suf-
fered more casualties from this disease than from enemy
action, and solving this problem became a major objective
of Allied commanders. Despite this historical experience,
during the first two years of combat-force involvement in
South Vietnam, more than 10,000 Americans were rendered
casualties by this bothersome insect and the rediscovery of
an operational solution was not implemented until 1967.
To combat the impact of malaria among military personnel,
the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV) ultimately authorized Operation FLYSWATTER,
using 7
th
Air Force 'RANCH HAND' UC-123 defoliation
aircraft modified to an insecticide configuration. Little has
been published on the history of this Operation, and as a
consequence there exists much confusion in the civilian and
Vietnam veteran communities as to the use of RANCH
HAND aircraft for this mission.
2 Background
The Vietnamese phrase for malaria is sat ret rung, which
literally means 'jungle fever'. The principal malarious re-
gion of South Vietnam was the central highlands where the
malaria parasitic species encountered were Plasmodium
falciparum, P. vivax, and some P. malariae. P. vivex predomi-
nated in the Coastal Plains and Delta Region. Unfortunately,
the most serious malaria, falciparum, was also most preva-
lent, accounting for 50–75% of cases in the US Army in Viet-
nam. Although both falciparum malaria cases and the abun-
dance of Anopheles mosquitoes increased with the summer
monsoon season, neither disappeared in tropical Vietnam as
they did in winter in the temperate zones. Furthermore trans-
fers of parasite reservoirs from hyperendemic, independent
malaria foci to all parts of Vietnam became increasingly
obvious in 1966 as Montagnard and Vietnamese refugees
and military personnel moved from one area to another [2,3].
The deployment of major US combat forces into South Viet-
nam found them unprepared for the disease-ridden conditions.
Despite the weekly use of prophylactic choroquine-primaquine
pills, 5 to 50% of American soldiers coming off early field
actions in the heavily forested regions of South Vietnam would
develop malaria [4]. By December 1965, the overall Army
admission rate for hospitalization was 98.4 admissions per
thousand per year, nearly rivaling some Pacific theater rates
of World War II. Indeed, some units operating in the Ia Drang
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Valley had rates as high as 600/thousand/year. Two of the
first infantry battalions sent into the Central Highlands "were
rendered ineffective" as a result of losses due to malaria [5].
Compounding the threat to Allied troops in South Vietnam
was the discovery of chloroquine-resistant Plasmodium
falciparum infections in 1965, when up to 80% of cases
failed to be cured by standard chloroquine therapy [3,6]. A
highly effective new regimen using quinine, pyrimethamine,
and dapsone was adopted by the US Army, but at the risk of
some complications and side effects. From 1965 to 1969,
more than two of every three US Army hospital admissions
in Vietnam were as a result of disease, mainly malaria. Dur-
ing the same period, battle injuries accounted for only one
of six admissions. Equally important was the problem of
introduction of malarial parasites into local Anopheles mos-
quitoes by veterans of the various Allied nations on their
return from Vietnam. Unlike previous wars, the rapid repa-
triation home of veterans by air transport interfered with
the requirement for the full eight weeks of chemoprophy-
laxis, especially for the long latency P. vivax. Malaria would
be the greatest medical problem imported to the Continen-
tal United States by Vietnam veterans [3,6].
Ironically, the enemy in Vietnam was both a major contribu-
tor to and a target of the same malarial infections that
plagued the Allied forces. Interrogations of prisoners and
review of captured documents indicated that the most seri-
ous problem faced by infiltrating North Vietnamese soldiers
was malaria [7]. Unit incident rates as high as 50% were
reported, with the most serious cases left behind at rest stops
along the way, or even returned north; however, most dis-
ease-stricken infiltrators were forced to stay with their group,
albeit at the cost of lowered morale and delayed movement.
Even groups fortunate enough to be accompanied by medi-
cal corpsmen frequently faced a shortage of medical sup-
plies to treat the various diseases [8,9]. The resultant high
infection rates among enemy personnel, in conjunction with
rates of 50–75% among chronically infected indigenous
personnel, provided a ready reservoir for the mosquito popu-
lation to feed on [7]. Obviously combat contact in enemy-
held areas exposed Allied forces to regions where little or
no preventive medicine had taken place.
As a 1965 Preventive Medicine Orientation to Vietnam pam-
phlet stated, there was "a foolproof method of avoiding ma-
laria in Vietnam: don't get bitten by Anopheles mosquitoes"
[3]. As desirable as this solution was, it was equally unlikely.
Obviously, in addition to identification and treatment of the
disease came eradication of the parasite carrier. But enemy
activity made use of traditional ground-based equipment and
processes hazardous except in secure areas, while the publica-
tion of Rachal Carson's Silent Spring made the widespread
use of dichlorodipbenyltrichloroethane (DDT) unacceptable.
In 1966, both the Army and Navy were experimenting with
low volume dispersal of malathion insecticide via helicopter.
The Navy used a "Helicopter Insecticide Dispersal Appara-
tus, Liquid" (HIDAL) that had to be semi-permanently
mounted on a Marine Corps UH-34 helicopter [10]. The Army
trials involved a commercially designed system that could
quickly be mounted on Bell UH-1D helicopters without modi-
fication of the aircraft [11,12].
The principal drawbacks to both the Army and Navy programs
were the helicopter's high vulnerability to ground fire at the
altitude from which the chemical had to be applied, and the
limited amount of chemical that could be carried. The Stan-
dard Agricultural Aviation System for UH-1 helicopters had a
760-liter herbicide supply tank and a 14-meter spray boom,
but the UH-1 could only lift off with a maximum of 570 liters
in the tank, resulting in limited short flights. Furthermore, the
15-meter flight altitude to achieve an effective spray swath of
45 meters was almost suicidal over enemy-controlled areas [13].
Both services had asked for the use of a larger conventional
aircraft, such as the C-123B 'Provider,' to conduct spray tests;
although Preventive Medicine personnel were generally skepti-
cal of the transport's potential for useful results. This concern
was contrary to the experience that the United States Air Force
(USAF) had accrued through the Special Aerial Spray Flight
(SASF) at Tactical Air Command Headquarters, Langley Air
Force Base (AFB), Virginia [14]. This unit represented the cul-
mination of airborne pest spray knowledge dating from the
events of World War II's Pacific theater, the Korean War, and
numerous national emergency situations in the interwar peri-
ods. SASF also was experienced in spraying stateside military
bases and maneuver areas [15]. By 1965, SASF had three C-
123's modified for liquid spray dispersal, but these aircraft
were not deployed to Vietnam. Instead these aircraft were avail-
able worldwide for pest control projects. In Vietnam the diffi-
culty was that the demands for combat operations for the lim-
ited numbers of C-123s apparently took precedence over
"slapping mosquitoes" in the minds of military leadership [16].
3 RANCH HAND Gets an Added Mission
It was not until October 1966 that USAF Headquarters, at
the insistence of the Commander of US Forces in Vietnam,
decided it could spare one of the RANCH HAND UC-123
defoliation aircraft to be reconfigured to spray the insecticide
malathion as part of a test program to reduce mosquitoes in
South Vietnam. The test program, however, required 'bite' and
'count' tests by individuals located on the ground at night with
flashlights in the sprayed areas, not a desirable assignment in
wartime South Vietnam, so the trials were relocated to a test
area in Thailand [17]. On 14 October 1966, a RANCH HAND
aircraft, thoroughly cleaned of herbicide residues and equipped
with the finer orifice nozzles needed for insecticide dispersal,
left Saigon for Bangkok, Thailand.
Unfortunately, when the test aircraft arrived in Bangkok, it
was discovered that an unusually dry season in the test area
had reduced the mosquito breeding areas to the point that
the population was too low for meaningful evaluation. Af-
ter several days in Thailand, the evaluation team returned
to South Vietnam to conduct limited tests. Although reduc-
tion of the mosquito population would benefit the Viet Cong
as well as Allied forces, the test aircraft would occasionally
encounter ground fire. During one flight over a wide river
valley the aircraft received ground fire and a 'hit' in the in-
secticide supply tank. The crew elected to 'emergency dump'
the entire remaining load of insecticide and return to base
[15,18]. In all fairness to the crew, they obviously felt 'na-
ked' without the multiple spray aircraft and the Forward
Air Controller (FAC) and fighter escorts that normally ac-
companied the planes on herbicide targets.
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Despite continuing high casualty rates due to malaria, the
test eradication program was terminated and nothing more
occurred until early 1967. RANCH HAND, now a full-sized
separate USAF squadron, the 12
th
Air Commando Squad-
ron (12
th
ACS), again was tasked to clean and prepare one
of their UC-123 aircraft for in-country tests. As before, the
'decision makers' were ignoring and duplicating nearly 20
years of experience in spray operations and mosquito con-
trol programs already accumulated by the Special Aerial
Spray Flight in the United States. After the initial develop-
ment stages of the herbicide spray concept, SASF's only role
in the Vietnam program had been to provide hands-on spray
training at Langley to aircrews selected for RANCH HAND
assignment. The "reinvention-of-the-wheel" syndrome had
once more become the delaying force behind a needed pro-
gram [16]. Again because of the obvious danger to observ-
ers spending the night in Vietnamese jungles counting mos-
quitoes, the new trials were conducted over Con Son Island,
a secure island off the Mekong delta.
Following successful Con Son trials, the 12
th
Air Commando
Squadron was ordered to modify and permanently assign
one of its eighteen UC-123s to fulltime pesticide duty under
the control of the MACV Surgeon General's Office [19]. Code-
named Operation FLYSWATTER, the UC-123 aircraft was
the ideal vehicle for wide-area pesticide spraying. Insect con-
trol had become an added task for the herbicide spray squad-
ron. Malathion storage and servicing were made available at
three locations in Vietnam: Bien Hoa Air Base, Cam Ranh
Bay Air Base, and Da Nang Air Base. Responsible units were
the Army's 20
th
Preventive Medicine Unit, the Army's 105
th
Medical Detachment, and the Navy's Preventive Medicine
Unit, respectively. The Navy unit was later replaced by the
Army's 172
nd
Preventive Medicine Unit. Overall control by
the MACV Surgeon General was exercised thru the Army's
67
th
Medical Group and 44
th
Medical Brigade [3].
4 Modification of the UC-123
To distinguish what became popularly known as the 'Bug
Bird' from the herbicide-spraying aircraft of the squadron,
the selected UC-123 was stripped of its camouflage paint
and coated with an alodine compound to guard against the
insecticide's corrosive effects (Fig. 1) [20]. It was hoped that
enemy troops would recognize the benefits provided by the
aluminum-colored UC-123's anti-mosquito mission and
therefore not attempt to shoot down the unarmed and
unarmored obsolete transport, as they did the camouflaged
planes spraying herbicides. Other modifications included
opening the ram air scoop and venting the chemical tank to
the heater exhaust to aid in the removal of the strong mala-
thion fumes from the interior of the aircraft; removing the
unneeded tail spray boom; and installing an electric motor-
driven pump to flush the windshield and thus remove the
spray which accumulated on the windshield during repeated
spray runs. An additional benefit of the tail boom removal
was that the 10-cm tail boom supply line could now serve as
an alternate method of dumping the chemical in an emer-
gency. The spray booms that were mounted under each wing
were fitted with 32 Teejet
®
nozzles that produced a median
spray droplet of less than 50 microns [21,22].
The first Bug Bird was 'Little Devil' (serial number 56-4396).
'Little Devil' was soon replaced by 'Patches' (serial number
56-4362). 'Patches' was one of the first three aircraft that
originally entered South Vietnam in 1961 and got its name
from the numerous hits received from ground fire and the
many metal patches subsequently applied over the damaged
skin areas. By 1967 the plane had taken well over 500 'hits'
during herbicide missions. It had also become the first and
only C-123 to fly completely around the world when, in 1962,
it returned to the United States by way of Afghanistan and
Iran where it assisted in their fight against a plague of locusts.
When once again assigned to Vietnam, the aircraft became a
sentimental (and perhaps superstitious) favorite of the unit
and the airmen hoped to avoid losing the venerable 'Old Lady'
by assigning her to the safer Bug Bird duty [16].
5 Control with the Insecticide Malathion
Malathion initially was scheduled to be dispensed over nine
different major US bases and their adjoining cities in South
Vietnam on a regular basis of every 11–14 days [23]. Ideal
time for spraying was the 1½ hr immediately after dawn
and the 1½ hr just before sunset, when the mosquitoes were
most active. The insecticide was most effective against the
insects when in flight, rather than as larvae. Malathion was
applied at the rate of 0.59 liters/hectare of a 57% concen-
trate, and spray restrictions were the same as for herbicide
application, i.e., maximum winds of 10 knots, maximum
temperature of 30º C, and no rainfall during or for one hour
after spraying [11]. Spraying was conducted at a maximum
of 45 meters above the terrain and at an air speed of 130
knots. The low rate of application enabled one insecticide
sortie to cover about 6,000 hectares [20].
The first operational malathion mission was flown on 6 March
1967. The mosquito suppression task represented a radical
change for the RANCH HAND aircrews. Herbicide missions
had to be flown with multiple spray planes (two to twelve)
accompanied by a Forward Air Controller (FAC) and fighter
escorts. To protect the herbicide aircraft, MACV directives
required target areas to be completely free of all friendly ground
forces and to be authorized as 'free fire' areas for the accom-
panying fighter escorts [23]. Unlike the herbicide missions, the
single insecticide aircraft was not supported by either FAC or
by fighter escort during the low-level flights that lasted for as
much as two hours (low-level exposure during herbicide mis-
Fig. 1: RANCH HAND UC-123 'Silver Bug Bird' of Operation FLYSWATTER
at Bien Hoa Air Base, Vietnam, 1968
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sions seldom totaled more than 10 min). Mosquito missions
were usually preceded by psywar leaflet drops several days
ahead of time describing the benefits of the mission to the
communities, and asking the people not to fire at the silver
aircraft. On the day of the mission a U-10 Helio-Courier
'speaker' aircraft from the 5
th
or 9
th
Air Commando Squadrons
often accompanied the insecticide aircraft, circling overhead
and broadcasting that the malathion was for their own good
and that it posed no threat to people, animals, or crops [24,25].
The effectiveness of these precautions was reflected in the
very low number of hits taken by the bug birds. Only rarely
during the four years of operation did the insecticide crews
receive ground fire, and then usually when spraying long-
held enemy base-camp areas before major Allied ground
assaults. Vietnamese farmers and plantation owners fre-
quently took advantage of a government compensation pro-
gram for accidental herbicide damage to crops by claiming
that drought- or insect-caused injury was the result of spray-
ing by "the big silver plane" [26]. Years later, when the Agent
Orange controversy arose, numerous veterans of the Viet-
nam conflict also would mistakenly credit the insecticide
aircraft as having sprayed them with "Agent Orange" [23].
During the remaining months of 1967 the 'bug bird' aver-
aged 18.3 sorties per month. Total malathion dispensed in
1967 was 451,872 liters, with an average of 2,470 liters per
sortie [25]. Manning the aircraft were volunteers from among
the herbicide crews; insecticide duty broke the normal RANCH
HAND routine since the crews landed at various bases with
frequent overnight stays throughout South Vietnam. Volun-
teers had to be experienced and fully qualified in all phases of
low-level operations since the insecticide missions could last
as long as 2 hr of hazardous tree-top flying [16].
In addition to routine scheduled malathion applications to
the approved base/city list, other insecticide targets origi-
nated at the local level where a malaria problem was present.
Requests were sent to the Office of the MACV Surgeon
General for approval. Approved targets went to the Tactical
Air Control Center (TACC) for their coordination and re-
turned to the MACV Surgeon General's office. MACV then
forwarded the request to the 12
th
Air Commando Squadron
where the Insecticide Flight Commander and sortie navigator
planned and scheduled the target. A 'Priority One' target could
be sprayed within 24 hours after the squadron was notified.
Normally a target was sprayed within one week after the re-
quest was first submitted. Insecticide targets were 'group
fragged' by the TACC since they didn't require the target ar-
eas to be clear of friendly forces like the herbicide missions
did [18,24]. This was another reason for veterans in the fu-
ture to believe they had been sprayed with dioxin-contami-
nated Agent Orange during combat field operations [23].
Insecticide sorties increased in 1968 from 180 to 230, as the
insecticide project proved to be a successful part of the over-
all preventive medicine program in Vietnam. Although the
total number of exposed US Army personnel increased, the
number of man-days lost from duty due to malaria fell by
10%. In 1969 a second unpainted UC-123 was added to the
insecticide mission and a total of 14 bases and adjacent cit-
ies were sprayed every nine days, weather permitting [23].
The insecticide unit was now a separate flight of the 12
th
squadron under command of a major. Many of the replace-
ments to RANCH HAND were newly graduated or inexpe-
rienced lieutenants with less than 400 hours flying time and
no previous experience in other than high altitude jet air-
craft. To give these pilots additional conventional and low-
level navigation experience under at least semi-safe condi-
tions RANCH HAND assigned them to copilot duties on
the 'Bug Birds.' Experienced theater-qualified pilots were
assigned for 30-day tours as the aircraft commanders. The
'good weather' quarter of April-June 1969 saw an insecti-
cide record of 135 sorties spraying 165,000 liters of mala-
thion. However the year-end totals were only 295 sorties
and 378,860 liters.
While the herbicide mission prepared for phase out in early
1970 due to adverse publicity and international protest, the
insecticide flight was busier than ever. From 80 sorties spray-
ing 94,075 liters of malathion in the first quarter, require-
ments jumped to 110 sorties and 123,920 liters in the April-
June quarter. The 'Bug Birds' were also tasked with some-
thing new in May 1970. Using both aircraft, 7
th
Air Force
decided to try insecticide spraying a 'high threat' area of
active combat at Landing Zone Baldy and Fire Base Ross in
I Corps approximately 32 km south of Da Nang. The spray
planes would be supported by Army helicopter gunships and
1
st
Marine Air Wing fighters. Psywar activities would be
used to notify the enemy that the target was mosquitoes, a
benefit to both sides. After arriving in Da Nang on 20 May
to make final preparations, one of the 'Bug Birds' flew an
unopposed survey flight over Landing Zone Baldy on the
morning of 21 May. Unfortunately, the following morning,
the aircraft encountered intense ground fire and were forced
to abort the mission. At 7
th
Air Force's direction the two
UC-123s attempted to spray Fire Support Base Ross on 29
May. Again heavy ground fire drove the mission off target.
Although the eleven hits on the spray planes had caused no
major structural damage or personnel casualties, further at-
tempts to spray high threat areas were abandoned and the
'Bug Birds' returned to their more routine duties.
6 Termination of the Program
In July 1970 the RANCH HAND squadron was deactivated
and the remaining spray planes became 'A' Flight of the 310
th
Tactical Airlift Squadron, based at Phan Rang Air Base. This
presented problems for the insecticide planes because Phan
Rang had no insecticide re-servicing capability, forcing the
planes to fly extra sorties to load malathion from the stocks
at Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, or Da Nang. Other changes
took place in July when the Army's 172 Preventive Medi-
cine Unit assumed responsibility for malathion operations
at Da Nang and when the spray nozzles on the insecticide
planes were changed to allow a finer spray of a 95% insec-
ticide concentration to be dispensed in place of the original
57% solution. In spite of the changes and distractions, the
'Bug Birds' flew a record 146 productive sorties dispensing
85,085 liters of malathion during the quarter. For the year
the totals were 486 sorties and 387,735 liters, respectively.
With the withdrawal of United States' combat forces from
South Vietnam Operation FLYSWATTER was terminated in
December 1971. The 'mosquito war' flew over 1,300 indi-
vidual missions and dispensed more than 1.76 million liters of
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malathion concentrate, about one-half the total insecticide
dispensed by all forces during the conflict [23]. The mosquito
control program had significantly contributed to the reduc-
tion of US Army man-days lost due to malaria from 228,000
in 1965 to 168,000 in 1970 despite the huge manpower in-
crease during the same period [5]. Most of the aircraft and
ground equipments assets were turned over to the South Viet-
namese Air Force as part of the 'Vietnamization' program.
'Patches' returned to the United States and eventually was re-
tired to the USAF Air Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio.
The venerable 'old Lady' of the spray squadron was forced to
remain in 'outside' display for several years due to the reeking
smell of malathion, despite a number of unsuccessful attempts
to 'deodorize' the aircraft. Not until 2005 was the former Bug
Bird finally moved to honorable retirement in an inside dis-
play scenario, a memorial to war against one of mankind's
oldest and most persistent enemies, the mosquito.
NOTE. On 9 September 2005, three specially-equipped C-130 trans-
ports of the 910
th
Airlift Wing, Aerial Spray Flight, from Youngstown,
Ohio, were deployed to help control mosquito infestations in the Gulf
Coast disaster areas of Louisiana and Texas following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Flying low-level missions across the stricken areas,
the men of the US Air Force once again had been called to assist in
the continuing war with disease-carrying insects, renewing the tradi-
tional efforts of the Langley Special Aerial Spray Flight and Operation
FLYSWATTER in Vietnam [27].
Acknowledgement. We thank the officers and men of former Opera-
tions RANCH HAND and FLYSWATTER for their cooperation and will-
ingness to dredge up old memories, both good and bad, of events in a
foreign country more than forty years ago. We also want to thank the
personnel of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama, and, in particular, Ms. Anne O'Conner, for as-
sistance in locating the official records and reports of a little-known
part of American involvement in Southeast Asia.
References
Except as otherwise noted, the information for this commentary was obtained
from the historical records of the Special Aerial Spray Flight (SASF), 309
th
Air
Transport Squadron (later, Air Commando Squadron); 12
th
Air Commando
Squadron (later, 12
th
Special Operations Squadron); and SASF, 310
th
Special
Operations Squadron (later, 310
th
Tactical Airlift Squadron); October 1965 thru
December 1971, in annexes to Department of the Air Force, History of the 315
th
Air Commando Wing (later, 315
th
Special Operations Wing and 315
th
Tactical
Airlift Wing), K-WG-315-HI, Quarterly Reports, Air Force Historical Research
Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA.
[1] Shanks D, Karwacki JJ (1991): Malaria as a Military Factor in South-
east Asia. Military Medicine 156 (12) 684–686
[2] Canfield CJ (1972): Malaria in US Military personnel, 1965–1971.
Proceed Helminth Soc Wash 39, Special Issue: 15–18, Armed Forces
Pest Management Board Library, Accession # 78589
[3] US Army 44
th
Medical Brigade (1970): Vietnam Preventive Medicine
Orientation. Manual GR 70-200-1-1, Department of Preventive Medi-
cine, US Army Medical Field Service School, US Army, Vietnam, US
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Armed Forces Pest Manage-
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[4] Kiel FW (1968): Malaria in Vietnam. Pathology Annual 3, 1–27
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OnlineFirst: December 18th, 2007
EXHIBIT A
... In late 1966, the United States Air Force (USAF) modified a few RANCH HAND UC-123 aircraft to an insecticide-spray configuration. Operation FLYSWATTER commenced on 6 March 1967 [20]. From that date through February 1972, from one to three UC-123 aircraft and crews were used to spray malathion, an organo-phosphate insecticide, for mosquito and malaria control [3,20]. ...
... Operation FLYSWATTER commenced on 6 March 1967 [20]. From that date through February 1972, from one to three UC-123 aircraft and crews were used to spray malathion, an organo-phosphate insecticide, for mosquito and malaria control [3,20]. The low-flying insecticidespraying aircraft were commonly called the 'Silver Bug Birds' because they normally were not camouflaged [20]. ...
... From that date through February 1972, from one to three UC-123 aircraft and crews were used to spray malathion, an organo-phosphate insecticide, for mosquito and malaria control [3,20]. The low-flying insecticidespraying aircraft were commonly called the 'Silver Bug Birds' because they normally were not camouflaged [20]. These RANCH HAND aircraft routinely sprayed insecticide over military and civilian installations, as well as in areas where military operations were in progress, or about to commence [20]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Confusion and misinformation are common when discussing Agent Orange, a tactical herbicide used in the Vietnam War. This is partially the result of inaccurate news coverage or false information that is purposely spread to deceive veterans. Sensationalized reporting has frequently left the public with a distorted view of what occurred in Vietnam and of the minimal risks related to the use of herbicides in an operational combat environment. However, such a discrepancy between perceived risks and actual risks has also been enhanced by a public policy where historical records and science have been ignored while favoring a policy of "presumptive" compensation promoted by the Agent Orange Act of 1991. The Act has resulted in a narrow focus on tactical herbicides as the key factor in explaining the health risks of Vietnam veterans, ignoring other important risk factors that occurred in the war in Vietnam, namely, widespread endemic tropical diseases and parasites, psychological and physiological impacts of war, and health and lifestyle. Thus, it is not surprising that the controversies surrounding the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam have raged for 40 years. Indeed, more than a million United States veterans and billions of dollars have been spent by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs in providing compensation and health care for unrelated diseases where the vast majorities are not deployment-related health problems or related to herbicide exposure, but rather to aging and quality of life issues.
... prohibited movement of troops into sprayed areas after a mission due to the possible presence of unexploded ordnance [11, 12]. Anecdotal reports of direct spraying of troops in Vietnam likely reflected the RANCH HAND mission spraying insecticides for mosquito control at regular intervals from March 1967 through 1972 [21]. ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
The Department of Veterans Affairs' Compensation Service has previously challenged a source of misinformation that is repeatedly cited by the news media and blogs until it has become accepted as historical fact. Thus, this report is part of an effort by the Department of Veterans Affairs to correct an oft repeated assumption that the dioxin levels in Agent Orange were not only extremely higher than commercial products of that period, but also that these levels were manipulated to be higher, even with the intent of deliberately impacting the health of those supposedly exposed to dioxin laden Agent Orange. In a 1988 letter sent to a Member of Congress by a former Air Force scientist allegations were made: that the Department of Defense was aware as early as 1967 that chemical defoliation was of limited effectiveness in Vietnam; that scientists in the Department of Defense in the 1960s were capable of manipulating and thus increasing the dioxin concentrations in the ‘military formulations’; that the Department of Air Force was already aware in the 1960s of the potential for damage (presumably soft tissue sarcomas and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma) due to dioxin contamination in the herbicide, and thus, knew that Agent Orange was far more hazardous to the health of humans than anyone would admit at the time; and, that the Department of Defense had intended Agent Orange to be only used on the “enemy”, not on our own troops, but our troops had been frequently sprayed. A review of the historical records and scientific information surrounding the selection and use of Agent Orange in Vietnam disproved each of these allegations.
... None of the tactical herbicides were approved for these uses. The insecticides used in Operation FLYSWATTER (the aerial application of insecticides to control mosquitoes in Vietnam) were under the Military's Disease Prevention Program and were recommended and approved by the AFPCB [29]. Maryland. ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
There continues to be much confusion among Vietnam and Vietnam-era veterans, non-governmental organizations, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and others as to the differences between the uses of military “tactical herbicides” versus the military use of “commercial herbicides” during the Vietnam War. Thus, this report is part of an effort by the Department of Veterans Affairs to clarify the intent of the Agent Orange Act of 1991 to focus on those herbicides used in Vietnam in support of the United States and Allied Military Forces in combat operations occurring “outside” base installations. The intent is to distinguish the use of tactical herbicides from the use of the commercial herbicides that were used “inside” base installations. The selection of commercial herbicides and their recommendations for use on military installations was the responsibility of the Armed Forces Pest Control Board, while tactical herbicides were the responsibility of the US Army Chemical Corps. Tactical herbicides differed from commercial herbicides in the development and testing of formulations, regulatory oversight, use guidelines, purchase specifications, toxicological evaluations, shipment requirements, and military record keeping. Thus, there were technical, administrative, and legal differences between tactical and commercial herbicides used by the Department of Defense.
... These RANCH HAND aircraft routinely sprayed insecticide over military and civilian installations, as well as in areas where military operations were in progress, or about to commence (Figure 1.4). By 1970, malathion treatment was being applied to 14 airbases and their adjacent South Vietnamese cities, and the re-spray interval had been reduced from every fourteen days to every nine days [Cecil and Young, 2008]. Between 1966 and 1972, more than 3.5 million liters of malathion insecticide were sprayed on approximately 6 million hectares of Southern Vietnam [Young, Cecil, and Guilmartin, 2004]. ...
Chapter
Full-text available
For almost four decades, controversy has surrounded the tactical use of herbicides in Southeast Asia by the United States Department of Defense. Few environmental or occupational health issues have received the sustained international attention that has been focused on Agent Orange and its associated dioxin contaminant. However, the breadth of that controversy has spanned the gamut from alleged military use of chemical weapons, to ecological damage and public health impacts, and to social and political concerns. This spectrum of controversy has represented the crossroads of science and society, i.e., where the significance of the science is “filtered” by the perceptions of the society. Only now that much of the acrimony from that military conflict has subsided can we revisit the military’s use of tactical herbicides in Vietnam and the subsequent actions that have occurred since their use. Indeed, today the legacy issues of Agent Orange remain as one of the last contentious issues with the veterans of that war, and between the United States and Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
... The tactical herbicides were NOT approved for these uses. The insecticides used in Operation FLYSWATTER (the aerial application of insecticides to control mosquitoes in Vietnam) were under the Military " s Disease Prevention Program and were approved by the AFPMB [Cecil and Young 2008]. ...
Chapter
Full-text available
Since 1980, controversy has persisted over the locations at which the Department of Defense (DOD) may have used, tested or evaluated, the herbicides containing 2,4,5-T and its associated dioxin, and “other herbicides” used in the Vietnam War. Adding to the controversy is the confusion by the public, Vietnam veterans, and by the Department of Veterans Affairs as to the distinction between “commercial herbicides” purchased by the DOD and “tactical herbicides” developed by the DOD. Contrary to historical records, many individuals thought that commercially available herbicides were purchased directly from the chemical companies and deployed to the battlefields in Vietnam. However, the use of commercial herbicides was under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Pest Control Board (subsequently the Armed Forces Pest Management Board), Forest Glen Station, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland. The uses and application of commercial herbicides were the responsibilities of the Base Civil Engineers, while tactical herbicides were under the control of special military units (e.g., Army Chemical Corps, and the 7th Air Force’s 12th Special Operations Squadron) specifically trained to handle and apply them in hostile military environments. The history of the military development and use of tactical herbicides dates to World War II. The lead agency in developing and testing these tactical herbicides was the US Army Chemical Corps Research Laboratories at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This Chapter describes the development and procurement of the tactical herbicides used in Vietnam.
Chapter
In 1962, the United States Air Force began using chemical herbicides as a tactical weapon in South Vietnam. The tactic lasted only 10 years, but controversy has continued. Flying unarmed, obsolescent aircraft at slow speeds and at tree-top level, the 1261 volunteers, under the code name “Operation RANCH HAND”, attacked the enemy’s environment again and again, while taking shots and hits from enemy groundfire more frequently than any other Air Force unit in the Vietnam War. At its peak in 1969, the Squadron consisted of 33 aircraft and performed a three-fold mission of defoliation, crop denial, and insect suppression. This chapter recounted the stories of Operation RANCH HAND in Vietnam as told by the men who flew the defoliation missions, and to the memory of those men who died during those missions. Within this chapter is also a summary of Operation RANCH HAND prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Cecil, author of Herbicidal Warfare: The RANCH HAND Project in Vietnam. In 1980, the men of RANCH HAND volunteered to participate in a 20-year Air Force Health Study of the impact of Agent Orange exposure on their health. The results of the A 20-year epidemiologic study did not provide evidence of diseases in the RANCH HAND veterans caused by their elevated levels of exposure to Agent Orange or the associated dioxin contaminant.
Chapter
The prospect of exposure to TCDD from Agent Orange to ground troops in Vietnam seemed unlikely because of the environmental dissipation of TCDD, little bioavailability, and the properties of the herbicides and circumstances of application that occurred. Photochemical degradation of TCDD and limited bioavailability of any residual TCDD present in soil or on vegetation suggested that dioxin concentrations in ground troops who served in Vietnam would have been small and indistinguishable from background levels even if they had been in recently treated areas. Laboratory and field data reported in the literature provided compelling evidence on the fate of the herbicide and TCDD in the environment. The evidence of the environmental fate and poor bioavailability of TCDD from the spraying of Agent Orange was consistent with the observation of little or no exposure in the veterans who served in Vietnam. Appreciable accumulation of TCDD in veterans would have required repeated long-term direct skin contact of the type experienced by the US Air Force RANCH HAND and US Army Chemical Corps personnel who handled or otherwise had direct contact with liquid herbicide, not from incidental environmental exposure under field conditions where Agent Orange had been sprayed.
Chapter
The first Allied combat, combat advisory, and support forces arrived in South Vietnam in January 1962. Over the next 10 years, almost 3 million military personnel from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Thailand engaged in combat or support operations in the Vietnam War. The deployment of major combat forces into South Vietnam found them unprepared for the disease ridden and environmental conditions they encountered. Beyond the possibilities of injury and death during combat, military men and women were exposed to many diverse agents that may have affected their health, and thus causing injury and disease while in service or after discharge. RANCH HAND flew its last sorties in South Vietnam with tactical herbicides on 7 January 1971. The United States, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea have conducted extensive health studies of their Vietnam veterans. At least 24 morbidity studies and 19 mortality studies have been published by the four nations. The results of the morbidity and mortality studies of Vietnam veterans illustrated the impact of the “Vietnam Experience”, which had no relationship to environmental exposures to Agent Orange/TCDD or other tactical herbicides. The 30-year follow-up of Army Vietnam veterans and the 20-year Air Force Health study reconfirmed that Agent Orange was not associated with the results of these two studies. For those US Army Chemical Corps veterans who sprayed herbicides, the odd ratios for diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, and chronic respiratory condition were significantly elevated (P > 0.05). However, Chemical Corps personnel were significantly exposed to other chemical and environmental sources than just tactical herbicides.
Chapter
Full-text available
Almost every aspect of the War in Vietnam has been controversial. It was a war that generated bitter emotions, and for the men and women who served in that War, regardless of where they were from, the memories of their experiences have lingered. Thus, the idea of returning to Vietnam by the US Government had by necessity required that many issues from that War be resolved before re-establishing diplomatic relations. Much has happened in the past 14 years. President Richard M. Nixon ordered the embargo of the “Republic of Vietnam” on April 30, 1975. President William Clinton dropped the embargo on February 3, 1994. In January 1995, the United States and Vietnam signed agreements on those claims related to the War, absolving both nations of damages incurred. On July 15, 1995, President Clinton announced normalization between the US and Vietnam and stated: “The time has come to move forward and bind up the wounds from War.” On August 5, 1995, the US Embassy was opened in Hanoi, and on April 10, 1997 Douglas “Pete” Peterson, a former POW, became the first Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Thus, the normalization and building of relationships between the United States and Vietnam has all essentially occurred in just over a decade. But when did Agent Orange become an issue between the two nations?
Article
The U.S. military currently faces serious difficulties in training medical personnel in peacetime for the tasks of war. The military beneficiary population comprises fit young service men and women, their dependents, and retirees. Their peacetime care, although vital, does little to prepare military medical personnel for war. Medical commanders have instituted an array of training programs to compensate for this shortfall, but there remains a large gap between operational medical needs and training opportunities in peacetime. The military has begun to examine whether simulation can fill this gap. An array of commercial, off-the-shelf technologies are already being used with varying degrees of success, and major initiatives are under way in both academia and industry, supported by the military, to develop virtual reality products for combat medical training. Even as the military exploits emerging technology and begins to articulate a simulation strategy, there is a growing interest in civilian medicine in the potential for simulation to affect patient safety—how medical simulation might mitigate the injuries and deaths caused by medical errors—and how it might also improve the quality of medical education and training.
Article
A unified concept of aerial spraying has been developed based on existing Air Force doctrine. The main elements of this concept are centralization, mobility, flexibility, and integral technical monitoring. The selection of aircraft types, design of equipment and development of techniques have been in accordance with these principles. In practice, this allows the United States Air Force to bring a tailored aerial spray force to bear anywhere for any purpose within 7-10 days. This appears to have been a successful application of the known, tested, principles of air power and military management to what is, for the military, an esoteric field.
Article
One of aviation's more unusual military applications occurred in Southeast Asia, where American and Vietnamese planes sprayed large areas of Vietnam and Laos with herbicides in an effort to deny covery and concealment to the enemy, and to destroy his food supply. This book is a model study of the process by which military policy was made in the Southeast Asia War. Major Buckingham relates the intense controversy, both within the government and among the public, over the military, political, and ecological effects of the program. He connects policy to the operations, showing how pressure from scientists and disagreements among government policymakers and military leaders imposed limitations on the spraying program. He explores the technical difficulties in using herbicides: the right chemical agents had to be delivered in sufficient quantity at the optimal time of the growing season, only against certain crops and categories of vegetation, and only in areas where the destruction provided harm to the enemy and no danger to friendly or neutral populations. In April 1975, President Ford formally renounced the first use of herbicides by the United States in future wars. As long as this policy stands Major Buckingham writes, no operation like Ranch Hand could happen again.
Article
Malaria remains a major cause of military casualties in Southeast Asia. The numerous conflicts in the region have been greatly affected by malaria. Besides guerrilla warfare, refugees and other civilian movements across international borders contribute heavily to the continuing problem of multiple drug-resistant malaria. Drug resistance is an increasing problem with few available prophylactic options. The malaria threat to any potential deployment of United States military forces remains unsolved.
Article
This paper compares the malaria rate of Marines in the Que Son Mountains of Vietnam during the last four months of 1969 with that for the same period in 1970, and attempts to explain the reasons for the differences between these two periods. The factors which influence malaria rates are discussed, and a model is demonstrated for the relation between malaria rates and the use of personal protective measures. The use of insect repellent and other personal protective measures would appear to have had a limited effect on the overall malaria rate. It is suggested that the differences in the malaria rates were problably caused primarily by differences in the amount of contact with the enemy soldier, the primary reservoir for falciparum malaria.
Article
Malaria occurring in the U. S. A. among Army troops who returned from Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 was investigated epidemiologically and clinically. The incidence of malaria among returnees in the U. S. A. varied from 0.11 to 4.66% per year; rates of hospitalization for malaria for the same troops during their service in Vietnam varied from 2.3 to 4.8% per year. Infections with Plasmodium falciparum were rare in the U. S. A. but frequent in Vietnam. Clinically manifest vivax infections occurred significantly less often in Negro than in white men, which appeared to be due to natural resistance of the Negro. The 8-week CP regimen (300 mg chloroquine base plus 45 mg primaquine base once a week for 8 weeks), when used under field conditions as radical cure treatment of clinically manifest vivax malaria acquired in Vietnam, was associated with a 22.3% relapse rate. The disappointing results were due, at least in part, to failure of patients to complete the regimen. A significantly lower relapse rate (7%) was achieved with the easily supervised regimen of 15 mg primaquine base daily for 14 days. The secondary exoerythrocytic forms of Vietnam strains of Plasmodium vivax appear less susceptible to primaquine than those of Korean strains but more susceptible than those of the Chesson strain.
Article
The U.S. military currently faces serious difficulties in training medical personnel in peacetime for the tasks of war. The military beneficiary population comprises fit young service men and women, their dependents, and retirees. Their peacetime care, although vital, does little to prepare military medical personnel for war. Medical commanders have instituted an array of training programs to compensate for this shortfall, but there remains a large gap between operational medical needs and training opportunities in peacetime. The military has begun to examine whether simulation can fill this gap. An array of commercial, off-the-shelf technologies are already being used with varying degrees of success, and major initiatives are under way in both academia and industry, supported by the military, to develop virtual reality products for combat medical training. Even as the military exploits emerging technology and begins to articulate a simulation strategy, there is a growing interest in civilian medicine in the potential for simulation to affect patient safety--how medical simulation might mitigate the injuries and deaths caused by medical errors--and how it might also improve the quality of medical education and training.