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The Importance of Gifts in Marriage

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Abstract

In this article, a new element is introduced into the household production function: gifts. Gifts occur when spouses use their time and/or incomes to produce commodities that usually only have value to their spouse, such as empathy and understanding. The difficulty of identifying a potential mate's capacity to produce gifts prior to marriage and of negotiating for them during marriage is argued as having contributed to the increase in the divorce rate. Evidence is provided that women are the spouses most likely to seek a divorce and part of their motivation is an inadequate receipt of gifts during marriage. (JEL J12) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

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... Recent researchers revealed a couple of times as a marital satisfaction predictor (Dew, 2007) once marriage survival motivated friendship and a couple of time as necessary (Burgess et al., 1971). In this line of studies, how couples spend time together is meaningful to marital satisfaction (Gager and Sanchez, 2003;Parkman, 2004). Dew (2007) acknowledged time as the bridge between a couple's relationship and marital satisfaction, i.e., actions couples spending together in time. ...
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As stated in Engineering Accreditation Council (EAC) manual, the engineering undergraduates are compulsory to undergo minimum of 8 weeks industrial training before graduation. Industrial training programme is a part of university’s curriculum that can give opportunity for students to get exposed in the real workplace and professional practice. In the industry, they are supervised by professional personnel in the certain period based on respective universities. In addition, the students need to follow all the procedures set by faculty in order to pass the industrial training programme. On the other hand, industry can use this time to assess potential employees or new engineers for future employers. This paper discusses about the significant of industrial training programme that is practiced in the universities in Malaysia for engineering faculty. The paper is written on extensive secondary data analysis. It is revealed that industrial training is very important for engineering undergraduates to gain valuable experiences in the industry and at the same time, the skills can be developed effectively.
... This is in the spirit ofParkman (2004), who discussed marital gifts that benefit a spouse. Such gifts may be physical in nature, manifested for instance through physical presents but also of a more psychological kind and include attention given, empathy, affection and communication in time spent together. ...
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Legal structures of divorce settlements are important in how marital division of labour impacts on divorce. They affect not only divorce welfare but also within-marriage allocations. A central question in this context is whether or not intra-marital bargaining is Coasean, where Coasean bargains are characterised by the costless transfer of utility between spouses when property rights are well defined. In Coasean bargains divorces are efficient in the sense that they cannot occur when the joint surplus within marriage is larger than the sum of individual divorcees’ values outside marriage. This is because the spouse with the highest value can always compensate the spouse who wants to leave, and thus persuade her/him to stay. Under non-Coasean bargaining inefficient divorces can occur, due to the absence of costless side-payments. This paper offers a theoretical framework to identify Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour. Whilst an increase in the spouse’s wage always reduces (increases) non-Coasean labour supply (home production), it increases both labour supply and home production under Coasean bargains. Observing labour supply falls after a divorce will again indicate Coasean bargaining. The paper provides a possible explanation for why both males’ preferences for stereotypical work division and females’ preference for non-monetary work aspects persist.
... This analysis is appropriate to the simplistic relationships between users in virtual worlds. In the absence of survival threats, gifting cannot be motivated by primitive concepts of consumption or subsistence, thus emphasizing the relational role of gifts [75,95]. 1 If gifting signals the giver's willingness to invest in a future relationship with the receiver [24,84,87], and assuming that users are motivated to increase their number of social connections [56,76], we expect gifting to be followed by a formalized social connection, designated as a "friend." We argue that, in a world based on social interactions, signals of a user's willingness to give gifts or invest in relationships attract other users to establish connections with the giver. ...
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While profitable business models elude many virtual worlds, sales of virtual products are a potentially lucrative source of revenue. One new addition to this strategy is virtual gifting, whereby users purchase virtual products to give to other users. The monetary value of such virtual good transactions is economically significant but no prior study has examined this phenomenon in a strictly virtual context. We apply theory from the economics literature to examine gifting behavior in a virtual world in which users' social status is reflected in observable social connections (friendships) and interactions (personal messages). We find strong evidence that gifting is associated with future enhancements of the gift giver's social status, consistent with a social status-seeking motivation, thus confirming a theorized behavior that is difficult to study in the real world. Our study has implications for system proprietors and managers because we show that gift giving increases system use continuance. We identify various antecedents of gift giving, which may assist a manager in identifying users who are most inclined to give gifts and enable the manager to signal the social exchange benefits to users as a way of improving their social connections.
... This analysis is appropriate to the simplistic relationships between users in virtual worlds. In the absence of survival threats, gifting cannot be motivated by primitive concepts of consumption or subsistence, thus emphasizing the relational role of gifts [75,95]. 1 If gifting signals the giver's willingness to invest in a future relationship with the receiver [24,84,87], and assuming that users are motivated to increase their number of social connections [56,76], we expect gifting to be followed by a formalized social connection, designated as a "friend." We argue that, in a world based on social interactions, signals of a user's willingness to give gifts or invest in relationships attract other users to establish connections with the giver. ...
Article
Full-text available
While profitable business models elude many virtual worlds, sales of virtual products are a potentially lucrative source of revenue. One new addition to this strategy is virtual gifting, whereby users purchase virtual products to give to other users. No prior study has examined this phenomenon. We apply theory from the economics literature to the virtual context, which obviates the need for many of the restrictive assumptions that have underpinned gift theory in that literature. We examine gifting behavior in a virtual world in which users’ social status is reflected in observable social connections (friendships) and interactions (personal messages). We find strong evidence that gifting is associated with future enhancements of the gift giver's social status, consistent with a social status-seeking motivation, thus confirming a theorized behavior that is difficult to study in the real world. Our study also has implications for system proprietors and managers because we show that gift-giving increases system use continuance. We identify various antecedents of gift-giving, which may assist a manager in identifying users who are most inclined to give gifts and enable the manager to signal the social exchange benefits to users as a way of improving their social connections.
... Una aproximación similar desde la economía, con énfasis en la búsqueda de gratificaciones psicológicas en los matrimonios, cf. Parkman (2004), quien refina los postulados enunciados hace ya más de tres décadas por G. Becker (1973Becker ( y 1974traducción en Becker 1981). ...
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