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A functionalist account of shame-induced
behaviour
Ilona E. de Hooge a , Marcel Zeelenberg b & Seger M. Breugelmans b
a Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
b Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Available online: 24 May 2011
To cite this article: Ilona E. de Hooge, Marcel Zeelenberg & Seger M. Breugelmans (2011): A functionalist
account of shame-induced behaviour, Cognition & Emotion, 25:5, 939-946
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BRIEF REPORT
A functionalist account of shame-induced behaviour
Ilona E. de Hooge
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Marcel Zeelenberg and Seger M. Breugelmans
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Recent research has shown that shame activates both a restore and a protect motive (De Hooge,
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010), explaining the hitherto unexpected finding that shame can lead
to both approach and avoidance behaviours. In the present article we show a clear difference in
priority and development of restore and protect motives over time. Our experiment reveals that
shame mainly motivates approach behaviour to restore the damaged self, but that this restore motive
decreases when situational factors make it too risky or difficult to restore. In contrast, the motive to
protect one’s damaged self from further harm is not influenced by such situational factors. As a
consequence, the approach behaviour that shame activates may change over time. These findings add
to our understanding of the motivational processes and behaviours following from shame.
Keywords: Shame; Motivation; Restore; Protect; Approach behaviour.
How do people behave when feeling ashamed over
failing on an important task? Are they motivated
to redo the task, reaffirming their capability, or do
they shun performance situations to avoid further
mistakes? The answer to this question is indefi-
nite; some studies show that shame motivates
withdrawal (e.g., Scherer & Wallbott, 1994),
while others show that shame motivates approach
(e.g., De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg,
2008; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996).
We explain how shame can promote such appar-
ently opposing behaviours by focusing on the
motives of shame and on how these develop over
time. Our data reveal that shame is associated with
both restore and protect motives that interact with
the situation to facilitate either approach or
avoidance behaviour.
Shame is ‘‘one of the most powerful, painful,
and potentially destructive experiences known to
humans’’ (Gilbert, 1997, p. 113). It arises mainly
after moral transgressions or incompetence and
gives rise to feelings of worthlessness, inferiority,
and a damaged self-image (Ausubel, 1955;
Tangney, 1999). From the abundance of research
on shame one may conclude that this emotion and
its consequences are thoroughly understood.
Correspondence should be addressed to: Ilona E. de Hooge, Department of Marketing Management, Rotterdam School of
Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: IHooge@RSM.nl
COGNITION AND EMOTION
2011, 25 (5), 939946
939#2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
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Unfortunately, we know little about what beha-
viours shame motivates, because the relevant find-
ings are contradictory. Some studies find shame to
promote avoidance behaviours such as withdrawal
and a willingness to hide (e.g., Scherer & Wallbott,
1994; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). Other
studies find shame to motivate approach beha-
viours such as prosocial behaviour and a willingness
to make amends (e.g., De Hooge et al., 2008;
Tangney et al., 1996). Most shame theories have
been unable to explain this; they generally state that
shame induces avoidance and ignore the possible
activation of approach motivations and behaviours
(e.g., Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1999).
Recently, we provided an explanation for these
seemingly contradictory results (De Hooge et al.,
2010). Our explanation centres around the notion
that the self is the primary object of shame. Having
a positive self-view is a core motive (e.g., Tesser,
1988). People are often motivated to maintain and
defend positive evaluations of the self (Rogers,
1959). A positive self-view can counteract the fears
that arise from an awareness of inevitable death
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, &
Schimel, 2004), and may function as a sociometer
that reflects the extent of people’s inclusion in
social groups (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In
shame, it is exactly this positive self-view that is
threatened.
According to functional approaches to emo-
tions, negative emotions signal a threatened goal or
concern and subsequently motivate behaviours to
deal with this problem (Frijda, 1986; Zeelenberg &
Pieters, 2006). At a social level, emotions coordi-
nate social interactions and relationships to meet
the problems of survival (Keltner & Haidt, 1999)
by informing the person about the specific events
that need to be acted upon and by preparing the
person to respond to problems that arise in social
interactions (Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989;
Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Applying the functional
approach to shame leads us to suggest that the
motivations and behaviours associated with this
emotion are focused on dealing with the threat-
ened positive self-view. This may be done in
two ways (De Hooge et al., 2010). First, people
may show approach behaviour, such as entering
performance-orientated situations or undertaking
reparative actions, aimed at restoring the threa-
tened self. But, when affirmation is difficult or risky
in the sense that additional failure would hurt the
self-view even more, people may turn to avoidance
behaviour in order to protect the threatened self
from further harm.
The current paper presents two important
extensions of De Hooge et al. (2010). The first
extension is the replication of our previous
findings*based on studies using a scenario
approach*in a study on actual behaviour in a
lab experiment. Many emotion theories concern
the interplay between emotions and actions, but
hardly any empirical research directly tests these
relationships. We previously tested this relation-
ship for shame using a scenario approach, which
had the advantage of experimental control (i.e., a
situation can be created that resembles daily life
and all irrelevant factors can be held constant), but
the disadvantage that people may not always
be accurate in assessing their own behaviours.
A replication of our findings in a lab-experiment
would attest to the robustness of the effects.
The second extension concerns the develop-
ment of shame motives over time. De Hooge et al.
(2010) showed shame to activate a restore motive
as well as a protect motive, which jointly predicted
behaviour. We predict that the strength of these
motives changes over time. Shame initially acti-
vates a restore and a protect motive. However,
restoring the self may not be without risks in the
sense that it could result in an additional failure.
Therefore, when restoring the self appears to be
too difficult or risky in a particular situation, the
restore motive will diminish in strength and
approach behaviours become less apparent. In
contrast, protecting the self does not involve risky
endeavours. For that reason, the protect motive
should not be affected by situational influences.
As a consequence, the relative strength of the
restore and protect motives will change, and
approach behaviours will become less apparent.
We tested our hypothesis in a lab experiment in
which shame was induced and subsequently ap-
proach behaviour was measured by giving partici-
pants the possibility of choosing between two tasks
DE HOOGE, ZEELENBERG, BREUGELMANS
940 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (5)
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in the lab. After measuring the restore and protect
motives with self-report scales, information about
the task difficulty was introduced to test the
hypothesised situational influence. Participants
then again decided what task they wanted to
engage in and indicated their motives underlying
their choice. We expected and found shame to
initially activate a restore and a protect motive, and
a preference for the achievement task (reflecting
approach behaviour). Because the restore motive
declines when approach behaviour is too difficult
or risky, we hypothesised the restore motive and
subsequently preference for the achievement task
to decline only in the shame condition where the
achievement task was presented as difficult. We
also hypothesised that the protect motive would
not change over time or differ across shame
conditions.
METHOD
Participants and design
One hundred fifty students at Erasmus University
(86 males and 64 females, M
age
19.78, SD
1.65) participated in a series of unrelated studies
in partial fulfilment of a course requirement. They
were randomly assigned to the conditions of a
2 (Emotion Condition: shame vs. control)
2 (Task Difficulty: easy vs. difficult) between-
subjects design with Restore, Protect, and Perfor-
mance choice as dependent variables.
Procedure and variables
Participants entered the laboratory in groups of
eight to twelve participants. They were seated in
separate cubicles and informed that the hour
consisted of multiple, unrelated studies. Emotions
were induced via an autobiographical recall proce-
dure (cf. De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans,
2007). In the Shame condition, participants
reported a personal experience in which they felt
very ashamed, while in the Control condition
participants described a regular weekday.
Next, participants could ostensibly choose their
subsequent task. They could choose between one
that was related to one’s performance and abilities
(abilities task) and another that was totally
unrelated to performance and abilities (opinion
task). Participants were told that the ‘‘abilities
task’’ tested one’s performance on academic
knowledge and skills; a higher score indicated
better performance and superior knowledge and
skills. The ‘‘opinion task’’ consisted of giving one’s
opinion about different subjects; no right or wrong
answers could be given and scores were not
indicative of academic knowledge and skills at
all. Participants indicated which task they wanted
to do (Task choice time 1) and answered ten items
about the motivation for their choice. Motivation
items were adopted from De Hooge et al. (2010)
and consisted of a Restore scale (5 items, Restore
time 1,a.90) and a Protect scale (5 items, Protect
time 1,a.92). Examples for the Restore scale
are: ‘‘I wanted to improve my self-image’’ and
‘‘I wanted to ensure myself that I am competent’’,
and for the Protect scale are: ‘‘I wanted to avoid
more damage to my self-image’’ and ‘‘I wanted to
protect myself’’. Participants indicated the extent
to which each motive had influenced their choice
(1not at all,7very strongly).
To manipulate Task difficulty, participants
were then provided with several reactions that
previous participants had given after having
undertaken the ‘‘abilities task’’. After reading the
reactions, they could make their final choice
between the ‘‘abilities task’’ and ‘‘opinion task’’
(Task choice time 2). Participants in the Easy
condition read: ‘‘I really liked the abilities task a
lot. The questions were not very difficult and
I think I may have a high score’’,‘‘That capacities
test is easy man! I believe it is almost impossible to
fail’’, and ‘‘Did that test. Such easy questions. Can’t
imagine that you won’t make it’’. In the Difficult
condition, participants read: ‘‘I really didn’t like
the abilities task. The questions were difficult and
I think I may have a low score’’,‘‘That capacities
test is difficult man! I believe it is almost
impossible to succeed’’, and ‘‘Did that test. Such
difficult questions. Can’t imagine that you would
make it’’. After choosing a task, participants again
answered the Restore and Protect scales (Restore
time 2,a.92, Protect time 2,a.93).
MOTIVATIONS OF SHAME
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (5) 941
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Participants continued by doing the task of
their choice. In reality, this task was the same task
in all conditions. Participants first answered fifteen
general-knowledge questions (adopted from Van
Harreveld, Van der Pligt, Nordgren, & Claassen,
2008) and then ten items that tested English-
language skills. Upon completion, participants
were given the possibility of writing down their
own opinion concerning the general-knowledge
questions and the English-language questions.
Finally, as a manipulation check, participants
re-read the shameful event or the normal weekday
that they had described and indicated how small
they felt, how alone they felt, how much they felt
that all attention was drawn towards them, how
much they did not want others to know about the
described event, and how much they were worried
about what others would think of them. These
items have been described in the emotion litera-
ture as basic elements of experiences of shame
(Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006; Barrett, 1995).
Participants also indicated how much shame,
satisfaction, embarrassment, pride, guilt, regret,
relief, anger, and happiness they felt in the
situation (0not at all,10very strongly). After
the experiment participants were thanked and
debriefed.
RESULTS
Emotion manipulation check
The shame induction worked: Shamed partici-
pants scored significantly higher on all basic
elements of shame compared to Control partici-
pants, all ts(148)6.54, all psB.01, all h
2
s.22.
They also felt significantly more shame (M
8.07, SD1.10) than Control participants
(M1.23, SD1.97), t(148)26.29, pB.01,
h
2
.82, and felt significantly more shame than
other emotions, all ts(74)2.95, all psB.01, all
h
2
s.11.
Time 1 motives and performance
The findings supported our hypotheses (see
Table 1): Shamed participants reported a higher
Restore motive (M4.25, SD1.23) and a
higher Protect motive (M2.86, SD1.51)
than Control participants (M2.95, SD1.36
for Restore and M2.06, SD1.16 for Pro-
tect), t(148)6.16, pB.01, h
2
.20 for
Restore, t(148)3.60, pB.01, h
2
.08 for
Protect. In addition, more Shamed participants
wanted to engage in the abilities task (71%
in the Shame condition, 51% in the Con-
trol condition), x
2
(1, N150)6.29, p.01.
There was no difference in preference for the
abilities task between the Easy-Shame condi-
tion and the Difficult-Shame condition at this
point (72% in the Easy-Shame condition, 69%
in the Difficult-Shame condition), x
2
(1, N
75)0.05, p.82. In both the Shame condi-
tion and the Control condition there was
no correlation between Restore and Protect at
time 1, r.10, p.37, and r.20, p.09,
respectively.
1
Time 2 motives and performance
Repeated-measures analyses supported our
hypotheses: results showed that only Restore but
not Protect changed over time dependent on the
emotion and on the difficulty of the task.
A repeated-measures analysis with Emotion
condition and Task difficulty as independent
between-subjects factors and Restore as dependent
within-subjects factor showed no main effect of
time, F(1, 146)0.05, p.82, h
2
B.01, no main
effect of Task difficulty, F(1, 146)0.40, p.53,
h
2
B.01, and a significant main effect of Emotion
condition, F(1, 146)36.66, pB.01, h
2
.20.
More importantly, the results showed a significant
three-way interaction, F(1, 146)5.92, p.02,
h
2
.04. Shamed participants in the Difficult
condition wanted to restore less at time 2 than
Shamed participants in the Easy condition,
1
A closely related emotion to shame is guilt (Tangney, 1999). However, guilt could not explain the effects on the restore or
protect motives: in all analyses, adding reported guilt as a covariate showed non-significant effects, while the effects of reported
shame remained significant.
DE HOOGE, ZEELENBERG, BREUGELMANS
942 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (5)
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t(146)2.75, p.01, h
2
.05. They also wanted
to restore less than at time 1, t(35)3.27, p.01,
h
2
.23. Their motivation to restore at time 2 was
still somewhat higher than the restore motive of
Control participants in the Difficult condition,
t(146)2.17, p.03, h
2
.03. The restore
motive of Shamed participants in the Easy condi-
tion did not decrease: They still wanted to restore
more than Control participants in the Easy condi-
tion, t(146)5.09, pB.01, h
2
.15. They even
wanted to restore more at time 2 compared to time
1, t(38)2.73, p.01, h
2
.16. There were no
differences on Restore time 2 between the Easy-
Control condition and the Difficult-Control con-
dition, t(146)0.22, p.83, h
2
B.01.
In contrast, the motivation to protect one’s self
did not decrease over time. A repeated-measures
analysis with Emotion condition and Task
difficulty as independent between-subjects factors
and Protect as dependent within-subjects fac-
tor showed a significant main effect of time,
F(1, 146)7.62, pB.01, h
2
.05, no main
effect of Task difficulty, F(1, 146)0.15, p.70,
h
2
B.01, and a significant main effect of Emo-
tion condition, F(1, 146)11.95, pB.01, h
2
.08. More importantly, the results showed no
significant three-way interaction, F(1, 146)
0.09, p.76, h
2
B.01. Shamed participants in
the Difficult condition wanted to protect as much
as Shamed participants in the Easy condition at
time 2, t(146)0.09, p.93, h
2
B.01. They also
wanted to protect equally at time 2 compared to
time 1, t(35)1.78, p.08, h
2
.08. Just like at
time 1, Shamed participants in the Difficult
condition wanted to protect themselves more
than Difficult-Control participants, t(146)
2.28, p.02, h
2
.03. Shamed participants in
the Easy condition also wanted to protect equally
at time 2 compared to time 1, t(38)1.66, p
.11, h
2
.07. In addition, they wanted to protect
themselves more than Control participants in the
Easy condition, t(146)2.03, p.04, h
2
.03.
There were no differences on Protect time 2
between the Easy-Control condition and the
Difficult-Control condition, t(146)0.30, p
.76, h
2
B.01.
Subsequently, Shamed participants in the
Difficult condition lowered their preference for
the abilities task. At time 2, 92% of the Shamed
participants in the Easy condition wanted to do
the abilities task, compared to only 63% of the
Shamed participants in the Difficult condition,
Table 1. Motivation and performance means (and standard deviations) as a function of emotion and task difficulty
Shame condition Control condition
Easy
condition
Difficult
condition
Easy
condition
Difficult
condition
Dependent variables M (SD)M(SD)M(SD)M(SD)
Restore motive
Time 1 4.22 (1.30) 4.28 (1.17) 2.81 (1.28) 3.07 (1.43)
Time 2 4.66 (1.19) 3.73 (1.61) 2.93 (1.39) 3.00 (1.61)
Protect motive
Time 1 2.91 (1.46) 2.80 (1.59) 2.11 (1.26) 2.02 (1.07)
Time 2 2.62 (1.38) 2.59 (1.64) 2.01 (1.16) 1.92 (0.93)
Abilities choice
Time 1 72% 69% 54% 48%
Time 2 92% 63% 69% 63%
Notes: Motivation scores could range from 1 (not at all)to7(very strongly), and Abilities choice could range from 0% (no participant preferred
the abilities task) to 100% (all participants preferred the abilities task). There are no significant differences between means separated by an
‘‘’’ sign, with all tsB0.84, all ps.40, or with x
2
sB0.34, all ps.56. Means separated by ‘‘’’ or ‘‘B’’ signs differ significantly with
t(146)2.75, pB.01, or with x
2
(1, N75)9.01, p.01.
MOTIVATIONS OF SHAME
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (5) 943
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x
2
(1, N75)9.01, p.01. There was no
difference in preference for the abilities task
between the Easy-Control condition (69%) and
the Difficult-Control condition (63%), x
2
(1, N
75)0.30, p.58. Indeed, Shamed participants
in the Difficult condition now had the same
preference for the abilities task as Control parti-
cipants in the Difficult condition, x
2
(1, N
76)0.01, p.90, while Shamed participants
in the Easy condition still had a higher preference
for the abilities task than Control participants in
the Easy condition, x
2
(1, N74)9.78, p
.01.
2
To summarise, the data revealed that shame
initially motivates restore and protect motives as
well as approach behaviours aimed at restoring the
self. When this option appears to be too difficult
or risky, the restore motive and approach beha-
viour decline. The motive to protect the self from
further possible harm is not influenced by situa-
tion characteristics.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our study supports a detailed and parsimonious
account of the seemingly complex ways in which
shame motivates behaviour. Shame is associated
with two motives: a restore motive to affirm
a positive self and a protect motive to avoid
further damage to the self. Shame primarily
activates approach behaviour to restore the self,
but when affirmation is too difficult or risky, the
restore motive diminishes while the protect
motive remains unaffected by these situational
influences. Consequently, the relative balance
between restore and protect motives shifts, and
approach behaviour becomes less apparent. Our
research clarifies how shame can activate both
avoidance and approach behaviours, something
that could not be explained by contemporary
shame theories. In addition, it extends our earlier
findings (see De Hooge et al., 2007, 2008, 2010)
in two important ways. First, our experiment
replicated the finding that shame stimulates
both restore motives and protect motives with
other research methods. Second, our experiment
showed that shame motives and behaviours can
change over time depending on the opportunities
to restore the self. These findings illustrate the
robustness of findings across different research
methods and contexts.
Our research also illuminates the distinction
between shame and guilt. Shame and guilt are
thought to be very similar emotions (Tangney
& Dearing, 2002), for which a difference can be
found in the ensuing behaviours. Theoretically,
shame is associated with avoidance behaviours
while guilt is associated with approach behaviours
(e.g., Barrett, 1995; Tangney, 1999), but empiri-
cal research has cast doubt on this distinction by
showing that shame may activate approach beha-
viours (De Hooge et al., 2008; Tangney et al.,
1996). Our data suggest that the psychological
origins and motivations of shame and guilt are
actually very different. Guilt signals a damaged
relationship partner and activates approach beha-
viour to maintain and enhance the relationship
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). In
contrast, shame signals damage to one’s self-view
and activates approach behaviour to restore and
protect this view. Shame and guilt may thus both
activate approach behaviour, but for very different
reasons.
The current study is also important for studies
on the interplay between emotions and actions.
Many emotion theories have elaborated upon
this relationship between emotions and behaviour
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Haidt, 1999;
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006), but there is hardly
any empirical evidence to corroborate such the-
ories. As such, our study can be considered as one
of the first to directly address the question of how
emotions lead to behaviours.
Our work has several practical implications.
First, it may help people who are struggling with
2
The effects of our manipulation on Restore, Protect, and on Task choice cannot be explained by other emotions than shame.
Regression analyses with the reported emotions satisfaction, embarrassment, pride, guilt, regret, relief, anger, and happiness as
predictors and Restore, Protect, or Task choice as dependent variables showed no significant effects.
DE HOOGE, ZEELENBERG, BREUGELMANS
944 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2011, 25 (5)
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shame feelings in everyday life. Shame is a
negative feeling and people may have a hard
time in dealing with negative feelings. Our study
suggests that negative feelings need not have
negative consequences. Shame may help to moti-
vate recovery of one’s damaged self-view, for
example by engaging in social activities or deve-
loping a new skill, as long as the new undertaking
does not make self-affirmation too difficult or
risky. Second, our work provides suggestions for
audiences to help others overcome their shame
experiences. Audiences can help ashamed people
by providing an approach situation in which the
shamed person can affirm the self without
difficulties or risks. Only when such easy and
riskless solutions are not available, might it be
better to provide a setting where the shamed
person can protect the self from further possible
harm.
There are two methodological remarks con-
cerning our study. First, one might suggest that
mediational analyses with reported shame as a
mediator is necessary to further support our
hypothesis. A mediational model usually stands
as additional evidence for the causal role played by
shame at the person level. However, in our
experiment the effects of shame on motivations
and on approach behaviour were manipulated at
the situational level. Due to the successful manip-
ulations, there are strong ceiling effects in the
shame ratings. Consequently, there is hardly any
variance on the relevant factors, which media-
tional analyses need to determine relationships
between factors. Thus, reported shame cannot
mediate motivations and approach tendencies
within the conditions of our experiment.
A second remark concerns the use of self-
report measures. Self-report scales enable mea-
surement of factors that are not measurable with
other methods such as physiological instruments.
This certainly applies to factors such as motiva-
tions or action tendencies experienced after an
emotional event. Although participants may not
always be equally good in estimating their moti-
vations or future behaviour, we have no reason to
assume that we would find different results by
using methods other than self-report measures in
our studies.
Applying a functional approach has helped us to
develop a better understanding of how shame elicits
motivations and behaviour over time. It is now
possible to predict and understand what people do
when experiencing shame: they try to satisfy the
motive of having a positive self-view by engaging in
restorative behaviour, but change this strategy to
more protective actions when affirmation is too
difficult or risky. With this new knowledge, it
appears that time has come to develop a more
positive, and less ugly view of shame.
Manuscript received 28 September 2009
Revised manuscript received 10 June 2010
Manuscript accepted 15 June 2010
First published online 28 October 2010
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