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Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions
Abstract
This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.
... Brisset and Thomas [12] theoretically investigated the effectiveness of the leniency system in the EU concerning bidrigging in first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions. Their study focused on incentives of members in the cartel mechanism to report to the authorities. ...
... Although their studies are in line with the game theory and auction theory of McAfee and McMillan [2], the model settings and the derived results differ in some points. We summarize these differences in Table 1, including the models of Brisset and Thomas [12] and our model. ...
... 1. We set no leniency in our model in the case in which the authorities' investigation is underway because the leniency systems in Japan and the EU have strict limitations for reduction rates after the authorities' investigation. Notably, Motta and Polo [8] and Brisset and Thomas [12] denied the effectiveness of leniency before the authorities' investigation. 2. We do not set "Prosecution success probability, " which weakens the effectiveness of leniency and decreases the simplicity of analysis because we focus on balancing "carrot" and "stick" following Spagnolo [9]. ...
This study aims to analyze the structure of the emergence and maintenance of the cartel mechanism as an informal organization and the measures to deter bid-rigging. We propose an agent-based bid-rigging norms model and validate it with a mathematical model. We clarify that the auction system primarily used in public procurements has a structure inducing bid-rigging in which meta-norms are unnecessary. We also show that punishment for deviation from bid-rigging plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining it. In addition, we explore the authorities' actions to deter bid-rigging by examining three measures: the flexible setting of reserve prices, the administrative surcharge and leniency system under the Antimonopoly Law, and applying the bid-rigging offense under the Criminal Law. As a result, the study reveals that the administrative surcharge and the leniency system are insufficient to deter bid-rigging, and the adequate measures are the flexible setting of reserve prices and applying the bid-rigging offense. Furthermore, the simultaneous implementation of these three measures more effectively enables deterring bid-rigging.
... Cartels are a form of illegal activity involving a coordinated effort of several parties wishing to restrict competition by means of price fixing, market shares allocation, creating barriers for entry, and so on (Spagnolo, 2008). Collusions increase the equilibrium price at which the market is allocated and give rise to a loss of efficiency and welfare (Brisset & Thomas, 2004). Both the EU and the United States of America emphasize the importance of vigorous cartel busting for fair competition. ...
... 5. The most important cartel investigations concerned international infringements, investigations of which were mostly prompted by or even mirrored investigations by the Antitrust Division (Brisset & Thomas, 2004;Hinloopen, 2003;Stephan, 2008). ...
... Under the EU Leniency Policy, the total private civil liability of the company that comes forward first can waive the fine for actual damages incurred and the costs of legal services whereas under the Corporate Leniency Program, leniency applicants who come forward first need to compensate the aggrieved parties for actual damages incurred and the costs of legal services plus interest. Moreover, the EU Leniency Program offers milder forms of leniency also to the second and third companies to come forward, as opposed to the Corporate Leniency Program, which offers leniency only to the first company to elicit a collusive agreement (Brisset & Thomas, 2004). ...
In spite of the evidence of strong influence on the incorporation of policy provisions from the U.S. antitrust into the recent competition policy reforms in the European Union (EU), few considerable attempts have been made to analyze the influence of U.S. antitrust on EU competition policy in anticartel enforcement policies, antimonopoly regulation, and the regulation of mergers and acquisitions. The purpose of this article is to fill the gap by attempting to link EU competition policy with U.S. antitrust, provide a critical overview of the most important elements of European competition policy reforms, carry out a comparative analysis between EU and U.S. competition policies, detect convergence or divergence, and account for the degree of convergence and for the relevant mechanisms triggering convergence. The main focus is on the analysis of anticartel enforcement policy, antimonopoly policy, and merger control.
... Les mesures de clémence proposées , en consé - quence , doivent être très attractives , ce que montrent encore un certain nombre de contributions spéci - fiques à l ' analyse des programmes de clémence ( Spa - gnolo , 2000 ; Brisset et Thomas , 2004 ; Motchenkova , 2004 ) , et ce qui n ' était pas le cas dans les premières dispositions américaines et européennes . Des modi - fications ont été effectuées dans ce sens , en 1993 aux États - Unis 4 et en 2002 au niveau communautaire 5 . ...
... Ce point joue défavorablement sur la stabilité de la collusion . En outre , plus les incitations à recourir à la clémence sont fortes , plus la stabilité de la collu - sion en sera affaiblie , ce qui conduit à envisager des systèmes d ' immunité totale , voire des systèmes de ré - munération du dénonciateur ( Spagnolo , 2000 , 2004 ; Brisset et Thomas , 2004 ; Aubert et al . , 2005 ) . ...
Les nouveaux instruments dont se sont récemment dotées les autorités de concurrence, particulièrement en France, s'inscrivent dans la recherche d'une efficacité allocative accrue, soit en simplifiant les procédures, soit en permettant une lutte plus efficace contre les pratiques anticoncurrentielles - et c'est là l'objectif des programmes de clémence. L'objet de ce travail est d'analyser quelle peut être leur efficacité économique. Nous envisageons à cet effet la question de la détection des cartels et donc, par corollaire, celle de l'attractivité des mesures de clémence, mais aussi leur influence, plus mitigée, sur la stabilité des ententes. La problématique est ensuite mise en perspective en incluant dans le raisonnement les périodes qui précèdent et qui suivent le recours aux procédures de clémence, c'est-à-dire en étudiant les effets potentiels de la clémence sur la formation des ententes et les stratégies de représailles qui pourraient être adoptées à l'issue de la procédure.
... 3 Article 81 EC also deals with the prohibition of cartels in sales and earning sales for preventing efficiency and welfare of the state. 4 The state cartel 5 , diamond cartel, oil cartel 6 , steel cartel 7 , etc. are the unique form of cartels which significantly harm the economy of a country. Sections 1 and 2 of the US Antitrust Legislation (i.e., Sherman Act, 1890) also talks about the prevention of anti-competitive conduct and promotion of consumer welfare for maintaining the balance of demand in the market. ...
... 3 Article 81 EC also deals with the prohibition of cartels in sales and earning sales for preventing efficiency and welfare of the state. 4 The state cartel 5 , diamond cartel, oil cartel 6 , steel cartel 7 , etc. are the unique form of cartels which significantly harm the economy of a country. Sections 1 and 2 of the US Antitrust Legislation (i.e., Sherman Act, 1890) also talks about the prevention of anti-competitive conduct and promotion of consumer welfare for maintaining the balance of demand in the market. ...
... On the other hand, leniency programs can cause collusion to desist by expanding the set of future states for which the cartel collapses. Because the seminal paper of Motta and Polo (2003), this is a vast literature that includes Brisset and Thomas (2004), Spagnolo (2005), Aubert et al. (2006) Harrington (2008, Lefouili and Roux (2012), Chen and Rey (2013), Emons (2020), among others. ...
A recent debate on leniency policies is the interplay between the public and the private competition law enforcement. The lack of a well-established set of rules regarding damage claims may be harming the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program, either by discouraging the wrongdoers from applying for leniency in already formed cartels or by not being threatening enough to deter the cartel formation. The paper objective is to analyze the best policies for leniency applicants regarding the damage liability in Brazil. We conclude that the optimal policy is providing immunity to the leniency applicant, and after that the damage claim lawsuits can be encouraged with no undesirable effects. Extensions confirm the following: the immunity is even more effective when there is risk of betrayal; the immunity is the best policy in the case of ex-post leniency; the immunity is the optimal policy when there is no bankruptcy, otherwise the applicant liability should be the minimum necessary to avoid the bankruptcy; immunity regarding criminal sanctions for individuals is the optimal policy; for international cartels, the optimal policy is a combination of immunity regarding damage claims in all jurisdictions.
JEL codes: L13; L41; L44
... Do these procedures only lead to dismantling only poorly efficient cartels? Should it be necessary to grant a monetary reward to the cartel member who reports a cartel agreement before any investigation (Brisset and Thomas 2004)? Considered at the legal point of view, how to consider the capacity of a cartelist, possibly the initiator of the cartel, to escape at any sanction after a breaching of competition laws? ...
... Do these procedures only lead to dismantling only poorly efficient cartels? Should it be necessary to grant a monetary reward to the cartel member who reports a cartel agreement before any investigation (Brisset and Thomas 2004)? Considered at the legal point of view, how to consider the capacity of a cartelist, possibly the initiator of the cartel, to escape at any sanction after a breaching of competition laws? ...
... The main result is that the impact of leniency clauses is highly dependent on whether a reward or a reduction in fine is granted to the denunciating firm. Programs that reward denunciation, called " bonus " leniency, are recognized to be well suited to fight collusion (Aubert, Kovacic & Rey, 2005, Brisset & Thomas, 2004). Ambiguous effects however arise in the case of a " moderate " leniency program, designed as a fine discount. ...
In this paper, the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability. Since this probability is strictly lower than one, this Bertrand curse could account for the fact that models focusing on individual incentives to evade overpredict evasion (often called the "tax evasion puzzle"). We thereafter assess whether denunciation could solve the Bertrand curse. Allowing firms to denunciate competitors' evasion in fact provides a credible threat against price cuts, hence fostering illegal work. As a result, reducing the cost of denunciation through leniency clauses appears as an highly counter-productive device against underground work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms those predictions.
... Hinloopen showed that it is highly unlikely for a cartel member to report information to the AA unless the probability of detection and/or a fine are unrealistically high. Brisset and Thomas (2004) obtained very similar results in the simplified first price auction settings. Compared with the European leniency program, Spagnolo (2000) proved that courageous leniency programs, which give rewards to self-reporting firms, may deter collusion completely and costlessly. ...
This paper describes how people play a zero sum game with different private information. Apparently more informed players
earn more than less informed players do. What happens however if people buy and sell speculatively in the future market? Those
who are better informed seem to have greater chance to earn money, while those who have no information may expect zero profit
because they seem to have equal chance to make money (to buy a commodity whose price will increase or to sell a commodity
whose price will decrease) and to lose money (to sell a commodity whose price will increase or to buy a commodity whose price
will decrease). Yet the sum of all traders is zero. If the most informed player earns profit and the lest informed player
expects zero profit, some modestly informed players must suffer loss.
... Hinloopen showed that it is highly unlikely for a cartel member to report information to the AA unless the probability of detection and/or a fine are unrealistically high. Brisset and Thomas (2004) obtained very similar results in the simplified first price auction settings. Compared with the European leniency program, Spagnolo (2000) proved that courageous leniency programs, which give rewards to self-reporting firms, may deter collusion completely and costlessly. ...
Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition policies based on economic analysis. Recently an anti-cartel policy called a “leniency program” has been introduced in many countries as an effective policy to dissolve cartels. In this paper, we studied several kinds of leniency programs through laboratory experiments. We experimentally controlled for three factors: 1) cartel size: the number of cartel members in a group, small (two-person) or large (seven-person), 2) fine schedule: the number of firms that are given leniency, and 3) degree of leniency: a partially reduced fine, a fully reduced fine, or a reward is given to self-reporting firms. The experimental results showed that (1) an increase in the number of cartel members in a group increased the number of cartels dissolved, (2) changing the fine schedule had no significant effect both in the two-person group size and in the seven-person group size, and (3) positive enforcement such as giving a reward for a self-reporting firm in a courageous leniency program has great impact on dissolving cartel activities.
... Hinloopen showed that it is highly unlikely for a cartel member to report information to the AA unless the probability of detection and/or a fine are unrealistically high. Brisset and Thomas (2002) obtained very similar results in the simplified first price auction settings. ...
Antitrust authorities of many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition policies based on economic analysis. Recently an anti-cartel policy called a "leniency program" has been introduced in many countries as an effective policy to dissolve cartels. In this paper, we studied several kinds of leniency programs through laboratory experiments. We experimentally controlled for two factors: 1) cartel size: the number of cartel members in a group, small (two-person) or large (seven-person), 2) schedule of reduced fine: the number of firms that are given reduced fines. The experimental results showed that (1) an increase in the number of cartel members in a group increased the number of cartels dissolved, (2) changing the coverage of reduced fine had no significant effect both in two-player case and in seven-player case.
... The reason is that if the cartel is formed, then leniency induces cartel members to self-report after any defection from agreed collusive strategies, thereby strengthening the punishment for defections of an amount equal to antitrust fines, much like in the models just discussed. 32 Brisset and Thomas (2004) analyze the effect of leniency programs on a ring's ability to exchange private cost information to organize a bidding ring in a first price sealed bid auction. Focussing on coordination while assuming enforcement they find that also from a coordination point of view, a poorly designed "low powered" leniency program may not have the desired deterrence effects while it may act as a threat that facilitates information exchanges within ring members. ...
The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical economic analyses, and discusses the empirical and experimental evidence available, also looking briefly at related experiences of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law enforcement. It concludes with a list of desiderata for leniency and whistleblower reward programs, simple suggestions how to improve current ones, and an agenda for future research. The issues discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs exploit.
This experiment shows how different levels of fines in three antitrust policies—no leniency (NL), standard leniency (LP), and amnesty plus (AP)—can deter multimarket cartels. With a low fine, AP significantly increases multimarket cartels and leads to higher prices. With a high fine, it has the same effect on collusion as do other policies. With regard to one-market cartels, AP decreases cartel stability relative to LP. With a high fine, it leads to more reporting than does LP, before any investigation and after a first cartel conviction. Higher fines also lead to higher prices in NL and LP, but not higher than in AP.
In response to cartel formation, competition lawyers and policymakers in nine Asian jurisdictions have experimented with leniency programmes. This mechanism allows firms to come forward with information in relation to their illegal cartel participation in return for a reduction of or immunity from a sanction. The experimentation plays out across three different dimensions: the revision of early adopted leniency programmes, the introduction of newly written leniency programmes, and the decision – deliberate or otherwise – not to create a leniency programme. This volume is the first to analyse the empirical evidence across a number of countries to determine how effective these measures have been, and how they have been amended in response to problems encountered. In this volume, local experts from key Asian jurisdictions, together with international experts, offer an introduction to this fast-developing field, and explore the theoretical, international and regulatory contexts of leniency programmes.
Cette expérience en laboratoire compare les programmes de clémence américain et européen concernant la lutte contre les cartels multimarchés. La clémence consiste à accorder à une entreprise, membre d’un cartel illicite, une réduction ou une annulation d’amende si elle coopère et apporte les preuves de ce cartel à l’Autorité de la concurrence. Lorsque ces cartels concernent plusieurs marchés, les États-Unis ont renforcé cette clémence pour inciter les membres d’un premier cartel condamné à en révéler d’autres. Comparé au programme européen, ce programme nommé Amnesty Plus peut encourager davantage la formation de cartels par réduction du coût espéré d’une condamnation. Nos résultats ne confirment pas cet effet procollusif mais montrent que l’incitation à dénoncer est significativement plus élevée sous Amnesty Plus, avant et après qu’un premier cartel a été détecté.
O artigo examina o programa de leniência na Lei Anticorrupção brasileira, sob uma perspectiva comparativa e empírica. Programas de leniência assim entendidos como conjunto de normas que permitem que infratores evitem ou reduzam as punições que receberiam em troca de confissão e colaboração no processo de apuração conduzido pelas autoridades competentes, são adotadas em ordenamentos estrangeiros desde 1978. O recém adotado programa de leniência na lei anticorrupção brasileira (Lei nº 12.846/2013) apresenta distinções significativas do programa de leniência antitruste (Lei nº 12.529/11). O programa funda-se na Teoria da Dissuasão. O programa de leniência anticorrupção brasileiro apresenta como principais características: admitir apenas a leniência parcial; aparentemente limitam o acesso à leniência aos aplicantes que primeiro se apresentarem às autoridades (não obstante a realidade observada no caso da Operação Lava-Jato); seu pedido pode ser formulado ex post; inexistindo restrições à aplicação ao líder da conduta ilícita. Não obstante seja um importante avanço, já é possível apontar questões que devem ser mais bem tratadas de forma a possibilitar o efetivo combate à corrupção.
Palavras-chave: Leniência, Anticorrupção, Controle, Administração
The paper examines the leniency program in the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Law, from a comparative and empirical perspective. Leniency programs, understood as a set of standards that allow offenders to avoid or reduce the punishments they would receive in exchange for confession and collaboration during the assessment process conducted by the competent authorities, are adopted in foreign legal systems since 1978. The recently adopted leniency program in Brazilian anti-corruption law (Law No. 12,846 / 2013) shows significant distinctions of antitrust leniency program (Law No. 12.529 / 11). The program is founded on the Theory of Deterrence. The Brazilian anticorruption leniency program has the following main characteristics: admit only partial leniency; apparently limits access to the applicants who first present themselves to the authorities (despite the reality observed in the case of Operação Lava-Jato); can be requested ex post; there are no restrictions on application to the leader of the illicit conduct. Although being an important advance, it is possible to identify issues that should be better handled in order to enable the effective fight against corruption.
Keywords: Leniency, Anti-corruption, Control, Administration
This paper investigates the effectiveness of offering rewards for self reports as a means of combating collusive bribery. Rewarding self reporting theoretically sows distrust between parties tempted to exchange bribes and may reduce bribery even where authorities are otherwise ineffective in uncovering corruption. We test regimes where both the client and official may self-report and regimes where only one party may self report. We find that enabling both parties to self report is highly effective in deterring bribes being exchanged and corrupt favours being granted. Permitting only one party to self-report does not significantly deter corruption. The effect is most pronounced when agents are uncertain of whether they will interact with one another in future.
Leniency programs have shown to be an important tool to fight cartels. By reducing
fees or guaranteeing immunity against criminal prosecution, leniency programs
provide incentives to cartelized firms to reveal the cartel activities. We reveal the
recent literature on leniency programs as well as some real world experiences. Then
we introduce corruption of the antitrust authorities into Motta and Polo’s (2003)
model and analyse its effects. We show that in order for the government to implement
some parameters associated with leniency programs, it has to spend some
money too to reduce corruptibility. Such spending may not always pay.
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits cartels and other antitrust agreements that reduce or eliminate competition between firms. Leniency programs are an important investigative tool which give cartel’s members incentives to report their cartel activity and cooperate with competition authorities. We present their main objectives, their development in different countries, their direct and indirect effects and how these programs could be improved.
The article provides a critical overview of the most important elements of EU competition policy reforms and presents a comparative analysis between EU and U.S. competition policies. The main focus is on the analysis of cartel enforcement policy, monopoly policy, and merger control.
We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions in more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate this undesirable effect, but also reduces the probability of conviction in the first product investigated.
The Evolution of Leniency Procedures
Leniency programs have become a central tool in the fight against cartels. Since they were supposed to deter cartel formation and detect existing cartels, authorities expected a great success. However, economic literature and facts have shown that leniency programs have many failures and drawbacks. That is why many modifications were operated in order to improve the efficiency of these procedures. The question is : did these modifications actually improve the leniency procedures ? If we refer to the existing and growing literature on this subject, the answer seems to be more negative than positive.
The objective of a leniency program is to reduce sanctions against collusion if a participant voluntarily confesses his behavior or cooperates with the public authority’s investigation. Constructing a model in which the detection probability varies over time, Harrington (2008) pointed out that there are three channels through which the leniency program can affect the collusion amount; furthermore, he presented a sufficient condition under which the maximum leniency is optimal. After extending the model by endogenizing the degree of collusion as well as equilibrium selection in the self-reporting stage, we revealed that the Race to the Courthouse effect disappears and that the maximum reduction is always optimal.
We experimentally study repeated procurement auctions with leniency programs. Leniency programs give immunity from fines to cartel firms which report to the antitrust authorities about their illegal activities. In our experiments, subjects can freely communicate before bidding, through an online chat system. We investigated whether introducing leniency programs is more effective at deterring cartels than an institution which only imposes a fine against bid rigging. Our results show that leniency programs are only as effective at deterring cartels as the institution with the fine. In addition to that, our results show that leniency programs may be effective to dissolve pre-existing collusions and make the contract price lower, but they are not powerful enough to dissuade firms from forming a new cartel and raising the transaction price.
Resumo O Programa de Leniência é um mecanismo usado para anistiar as firmas que denunciarem cartéis, mas seus resultados são ainda questionáveis. Portanto, o presente artigo objetivou analisar os determinantes da denúncia, bem como encontrar as condições de efetivação do Programa, utilizando-se uma modelagem game-theoretic. Os resultados indicam que quando mais a sociedade precisa que o Programa seja bem sucedido em detectar colusão, ele é menos efetivo. E os efeitos barreira e detenção do Programa não podem ser conciliados no que diz respeito ao impacto dos parâmetros de política sobre os incentivos de coludir e de denunciar a infração à legislação antitruste. Abstract The Leniency Program gives amnesty to the whistle blowing firms, but its results are still passive of doubts. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyze the determinants to denounce as well as to find the conditions of its effectiveness, using a game-theoretic model. The results indicate that when the society needs most of the Leniency Program, it is less effective. And the barrier and deterrence effects of the Program can't be conciliated in terms of the impact of each policy parameters under the collusive and denouncement incentives.
In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries.
These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and
German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible
with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors
under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a
potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically
privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency
policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal
evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.
Leniency programs have shown to be an important tool to fight cartels. By reducing fees or guaranteeing imunity against criminal prosecution, leniency programs provide incentives to cartelized firms to reveal the cartel activities. We reveal the recent literature on leniency programs as well as some real world experiences. Then we introduce corruption of the antitrust authorities into Motta and Polo's (2003) model and analyse its effects. We show that in order for the government to implement some parameters associated with leniency programs, it has to spend some money too to reduce corruptibility. Such spending may not always pay.
We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under conditions of Bertrand competition with differentiated products. This model is then used to analyse the effects of "Leniency Policy" on the cartel. We find that in some market situations introducing Leniency Policy causes the cartel to cease to be viable and competition results. However, in other cases the policy only serves to raise cartel prices and profits. This latter result seems to occur in precisely those circumstances where cartels are most damaging.
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise. The reduced sanctions for firms that self-report provide the otherwise missing credible threat necessary to discipline collusive agreements: they ensure that if a firm unilaterally deviates from collusive strategies, other firms find it convenient to punish it by reporting information to the Antitrust Authority.
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under leniency programs, which give reduced fines to firms that reveal information to the Antitrust Authority. Leniency programs make enforcement more effective but they may also induce collusion, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We show that in the optimal policy the former effect dominates, calling for leniency programs when the Antitrust Authority has limited resources. We also show that these programs should apply to firms that reveal information even after an investigation is started.
in this situation, each firm uses a mixed strategy with distribution G n (b) = (1 − References Ellis, What Doesn't Kill us Makes us Stronger: An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Policy
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