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Governing Insecurity: Contingency Planning, Protection, Resilience

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Abstract

How should we understand the politics of security today? This article addresses this question from one particular perspective, that of 'biosecurity'. It examines contemporary strategies for managing biorisks in three European states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We suggest that the framing of threat and response differs, even within Europe, and that one can identify three different configurations: contingency planning, protection and resilience. Each of these embodies a significantly different way of reconciling fundamental imperatives for those who would govern a liberal society today - the imperative of freedom and the imperative of security.
Governing insecurity:
contingency planning,
protection, resilience
Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose
Abstract
How should we understand the politics of security today? This article addresses this
question from one particular perspective, that of ‘biosecurity’. It examines
contemporary strategies for managing biorisks in three European states: France,
Germany and the United Kingdom. We suggest that the framing of threat and
response differs, even within Europe, and that one can identify three different
configurations: contingency planning, protection and resilience. Each of these
embodies a significantly different way of reconciling fundamental imperatives for
those who would govern a liberal society today the imperative of freedom and the
imperative of security.
Keywords: security; insecurity; biosecurity; risk; threat; bioterrorism; biological
weapons.
security
I. The condition of being secure.
1. a. The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety.
b. The safety or safeguarding of (the interests of) a state, organization, person,
etc., against danger, esp. from espionage or theft; the exercise of measures to this
Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose, BIOS Centre, London School of Economics, Houghton
Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Copyright #2009 Taylor & Francis
ISSN 0308-5147 print/1469-5766 online
DOI: 10.1080/03085140902786611
Economy and Society Volume 38 Number 2 May 2009: 230254
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end; (the maintenance of) secrecy about military movements or diplomatic
negotiations; in espionage, the maintenance of cover. Hence (with capital initial),
a department (in government service, etc.) charged with ensuring this. (This
sense tends towards ‘the condition of making secure’.)
2. Freedom from doubt; confidence, assurance. Now chiefly, well-founded
confidence, certainty.
3. Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom
from or absence of danger. Formerly often spec. (now only contextually) culpable
absence of anxiety, carelessness. ...
II. A means of being secure.
...
5. Something which secures or makes safe; a protection, guard, defence.
Insecurity
The quality or condition of being insecure; the opposite of security.
1. The condition of not being sure; want of assurance or confidence; (subjective)
uncertainty.
(Oxford English Dictionary Online)
How should we understand the politics of security today? Many authors
suggest that concerns about terrorism have led some countries towards a
whole-scale programme of securitization: border controls, regimes of surveil-
lance and monitoring, novel forms of individuation and identification, notably
those based on biometrics, preventive detention or exclusion of those thought
to pose significant risks, massive investment in the security apparatus and
much more. Have the political rationalities of advanced liberal democracies
been displaced by new rationalities and technologies of government animated
by the telos of security?
In this article we want to explore some facets of this question in relation to
‘bioterrorism’, or the deliberate spread of disease in civilian populations.
1
Across the twentieth century, many countries have sought to develop biological
weapons, including Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada,
France, the Soviet Union, Iraq and South Africa, although, with one exception
2
none of these programmes ever led to the use of biological weapons in war
(Guillemin, 2005; Wheelis, Ro
´zsa & Dando,2006). Indeed, the limited
historical examples available to us show that biological pathogens are difficult
to weaponize and use with precision and with large-scale effects. Aum
Shinrikyo, for example, spent US$20 million over a four-year period to
develop its chemical and biological weapons programme, which included a
dedicated biological weapons laboratory and production facility with a dozen
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well-educated scientists and technicians, yet, despite seven attempts at
disseminating its anthrax weapons in Tokyo, no cases of disease or death
resulted and the programme failed to produce any kind of workable biological
weapon (Leitenberg, 1999). However, to use Mary Douglas’s term, the ranking
of potential threats or dangers in the ‘risk portfolio’ of individuals, groups or
cultures at any one time bears little relation to the actual probabilities of harm or
injury from different sources (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). And today, in many
countries, the risk of bioterrorism certainly ranks high (Lentzos, 2006).
After some preliminary remarks on security, we examine contemporary
strategies for managing biorisks in three European states. We suggest that the
framing of threat and response differs, even within Europe, and that one can
identify three different configurations: contingency planning, protection and
resilience. We do not want to suggest that each of the states we examine
France, Germany and the United Kingdom represents one pure or ideal
type; indeed each is diverse and there are important crossovers and overlaps
between the strategies they have adopted. But nonetheless we suggest that it is
possible to identify, within this heterogeneity, different ways of reconciling the
two fundamental imperatives for those who would govern a liberal society
today the imperative of freedom and the imperative of security.
Freedom and insecurity
Faced with the contemporary socio-political salience of security, some have
turned to Michel Foucault’s reflections recently published as Security,
territory, population (Foucault, 2007). In these lectures, given some thirty
years ago, Foucault distinguishes between a ‘centripetal’ disciplinary mechan-
ism and a ‘centrifugal’ security mechanism. A centripetal mechanism, he
suggests, circumscribes a closed space for its operations, and isolates and
concentrates its technologies, trying to regulate everything within that space,
establishing norms, operating according to the principle of the permitted and
the forbidden, and taking up the smallest infraction and trying to control it. In
a ‘centrifugal’ mechanism of security, however: ‘New elements are constantly
being integrated: production, psychology, behavior, the ways of doing things of
producers, buyers, consumers, importers, and exporters, and the world
market. Security therefore involves organizing, or anyway allowing the
development of ever-wider circuits’ (2007, p. 45). Security, in such centripetal
logics, does not classify phenomena according to a fixed grid of good and evil,
does not try to control and eliminate all infractions, but regards variations as
inescapable in natural phenomena. This logic does not operate according to the
binary of permitted and forbidden, does not judge a variation as evil in itself,
but tries to grasp the reality of the ‘natural’ phenomena that it addresses, to
understand the way in which various components function together, to manage
or regulate that complex reality towards desired ends.
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Security, for Foucault, is intrinsically linked to liberal notions of freedom,
for: ‘The game of liberalism ... basically and fundamentally means acting
so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to
the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality itself ’ (2007, p. 48). And, he
continues:
this freedom, both ideology and technique of government, should in fact be
understood within the mutations and transformations of technologies of power.
More precisely and particularly, freedom is nothing else but the correlative of
the deployment of apparatuses of security. An apparatus of security ... cannot
operate well except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense
[the word] acquired in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and
privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place,
and processes of circulation of both people and things.
(Foucault, 2007, pp. 4849)
These early formulations contain many of the elements that Foucault later
framed in terms of ‘governmentality’. Indeed security, here, describes the form
of governmental reason that underpinned actually existing liberalism across
the nineteenth century and as it developed into the social government of the
twentieth century, which had ‘social security’ as its central element. Indeed
social government is essentially government of a certain type of ‘social’
insecurity accident, illness, old age, unemployment in the name of ‘social’
security, and as the underpinnings of a certain kind of freedom embodied in
social citizenship. As Franc
¸ois Ewald has argued, these insurantial logics
are based on the presupposition that risk is calculable according to a logic
of probability, that it is collectivized across a social space and that it is
compensatable in the form of capital (Ewald, 1991).
As we know, social government, with its social logics for securing security,
was problematized in the last decades of the twentieth century in favour of a
different notion of freedom and a different set of mechanisms for securing
security that one of us has termed ‘advanced liberal’ (Rose, 1999; Miller &
Rose, 2008). The styles of governing that took shape in many ‘Western’
democracies in the last decades of the twentieth century, endeavoured to
govern without governing ‘society’ to govern through the responsibilized
choices of autonomous entities, whether these be organizations, enterprises,
hospitals, schools, community groups or individuals and their families. Within
these rationalities, security was to be secured in different ways, not all of which
had ‘the state’ as their ultimate guarantor or ‘the social’ conceived of as a
circumscribed national territory as their locus of operation. New technologies
were invented or deployed which sought to govern through the activities of
multiple quasi-autonomous agencies, from those responsible for regulating
financial services and prisons to those charged with the tasks of neighbourhood
security or food safety. In this new ‘regulatory’ strategy for securing security,
new links were formed between offices and departments of state, quasi-public
agencies and private and corporate entities that were in business to calculate,
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advise and provide various kinds of security. This involved a reconfiguration of
the agencies and expertise of security. It also involved a novel way of framing
the relations between freedom, security and government, in which freedom,
understood in the sense of the autonomization and responsibilization of actors,
was to become the governing principle which had to be aligned in new ‘post-
social’ ways with the imperatives of security.
But, if freedom remained, in Foucault’s terms ‘the possibility of movement,
change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things’, this
was exactly the zone that was to be rendered problematic in the configurations
for governing security in the early twenty-first century.
3
How can openness,
movement, circulation be made compatible with security? How can such
freedom be secured in an open society, without destroying the possibility for
these flows of persons and things in the very process of seeking to defend
them? How can responsible autonomy of those mobile individuals and entities,
including the devolution of responsibility for security, be reconciled with the
reciprocal maintenance of the security of the population on which that
depends? What aspects of the liberty of each can be maintained, and what must
be restricted, in the interests of the security of all.
For many, the focus on security reactivates the dream of discipline
everything is to be known, everything is to be rendered visible and subject
to calculation: a surveillance society, a Big Brother State or a ‘state of
exception’ where sovereign power over each and all is reasserted in a modern
version of raison d’E
´tat (cf. Lyon, 2007, for a helpful overview). Contemporary
rationalities of security certainly seek to grid the spaces of existence with
technologies for collecting and collating information, with algorithms for its
analysis, criteria for judgement and strategies for coercive intervention. Yet
they differ from discipline in a number of ways.
First, they do not operate in the closed space of institutions, but across the
many planes of movement of persons, commodities, knowledge, communica-
tions within and between nations. Second, because of this plurality of planes
and vectors, and the plurality of agencies and forces involved, strategies of
security cannot be those of a single, all-seeing and all-controlling State: they
must give a high priority to mechanisms of coordination, the linking together
of very diverse agencies, involving the invention of novel ways of thinking,
calculating, acting and intervening. Third, the norms of security are no longer,
as with discipline, fixed criteria for judging infractions of conduct, but neither
are they the vicissitudes of natural phenomena. They are the patterns and
regularities in flows across these planes, patterns that can be identified
statistically, codified epidemiologically, rendered into probabilities, from which
stochastic variations can be extracted that match patterns previously identified
as suspicious. Fourth, strategies of security are as our epigraph suggested
not simply addressed to states of affairs but also to beliefs, affects, feelings
that is to say, to ‘[t]he condition of being protected from or not exposed to
danger; safety’. One must not simply seek to safeguard the interests of a
state, organization, person, etc., against danger, but also to produce a state of
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‘freedom from doubt’, of ‘confidence’ (preferably well-founded), of ‘assurance’
and ‘freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension’; thus, paradoxically, the need
to govern security through insecurity, by using and indeed intensifying
subjective states of doubt, anxiety, apprehension and the like, with the aim
of making individuals responsible for key aspects of security, that is to say, by
ensuring the vigilance, preparedness and pre-emption required to secure
security. Fifth, strategies of intervention are no longer focused on compensa-
tion after the event, but are those of anticipation, precaution and pre-emption.
We want to focus on this fifth dimension. How are those in authority to
bring potential undesirable futures into the present in order to pre-empt them?
Preparedness has become the watchword, especially in the United States
following the criticisms of policies prior to the attacks of September 2001 and
the furore over disaster management in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in
August 2005. The language of preparedness has spread from disaster
preparedness, through preparedness for epidemic diseases, to preparedness
for individual survival in an emergency.
4
Indeed, this language has become so
widespread in the United States that it is much parodied.
5
But preparedness is
not merely American.
In July 2007, the European Commission issued its Green paper on bio-
preparedness (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). The paper
highlights the potential challenge of bioterrorist attack, its relatively low risk
but its potentially devastating consequences (2007, p. 2). It uses ‘preparedness’
in a generic way covering all aspects such as prevention, protection, first
response capacity, prosecution of criminals/terrorists, surveillance, research
capacity, response and recovery. The term will also cover the steps taken to
minimise the threat of deliberate contamination of the food supply through
biological agents ... and to protect against biological warfare.
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 3)
And it argues for a
biological all-hazards approach generic preparedness within overall crisis
management capability. Indeed, such an approach aims at taking into
consideration all potential risks, from a terrorist attack, other intentional
releases, accidents or naturally occurring diseases, so as to be prepared to handle
all crisis situations relating to food supply chain protection.
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 3)
Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff, in their studies of biosecurity in the
US, have coined the term ‘distributed preparedness’ to recognize the multiple
levels, agencies and actions that are to be brought together in such strategies,
and the links established between preparations relating to naturally-occurring
pathogens, accidental releases and deliberate attack.
6
But, as the Green paper
itself recognizes, this imperative of preparedness is not new: it builds on a
framework of laws, procedures, safety guidelines, diverse agencies with their
own areas of responsibility and mechanisms of inter-agency coordination,
Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose: Governing insecurity 235
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emergency and disaster preparation and planning and more that has been
established in modern nation-states over many decades.
7
So what is specific
about today?
Some suggest the key to understanding the specificity of our present lies in
the distinction between risk and uncertainty (for the classical treatment of this
distinction, see Knight, 1921). Risk thinking, from this perspective, implied a
future that could be acted upon in the present because it could be calculated
about in the present the futures that were to be acted upon pre-emptively
were law-like, their likelihood could be inferred in various ways by means of
the laws of probability (Hacking, 1990). In fact, as Ericson and Doyle have
demonstrated, much more was involved in insurance than merely an ‘objective’
actuarial calculation of risks: uncertainty which they define as ‘the lack of
secure knowledge about an unwanted outcome’ involving a way of calculating
about the future that is ‘overlain with non-probabilistic reasoning that is
aesthetic, emotional and experiential’ was ever present (Ericson and Doyle,
2004, pp. 45). Perhaps then what has changed, if anything, is the
configuration of modes of calculation employed in rendering the future into
the present. Contemporary logics of security are certainly attuned to uncertain
and multiple potential futures that do not operate according to statistical,
probabilistic or epidemiological rules. But, while it is true that their attention
to uncertainty poses problems for rationalities of risk management, nonetheless
these uncertain futures must be rendered thinkable, prepared for and pre-
empted or mitigated. Those who must undertake this task must certainly
do more than simply calculate risks using algorithms derived from the
past. However, this does not entail a resort to ‘non-rational’ ways to bring the
future into the present, but rather requires the use of different modes of
rationalization (cf. O’Malley, 2003, 2004). Thus one sees the development of
multiple technologies of futurity, most of which seek to ‘model’ potential
futures, notably ‘scenario planning’ construed as a part of strategic planning
that seeks to develop the tools and technologies for imagining potential futures
and then managing their consequences.
8
Such endeavours must not remain
simply paper games: hence the need to model them ‘on the ground’ with
exercises that simulate a variety of different potential attacks or threats and test
capacities to cope with them. Such ‘exercises’ preparing for eventualities
through simulated events are not themselves new: they have formed a part of
military planning, and of the planning of health and medical services, since
the middle of the twentieth century. But their centrality to contemporary
rationalities of futurity is more evident than ever, as is shown by the fact that,
since the 1960s, rationalities of scenario planning, contingency management
and so forth have spawned a new market for commercial consultancy and
insurance. Uncertainty, too, can be capitalized and compensated.
Let us turn to examine some current strategies in the area of bioterrorism
and biosecurity to see the extent to which they exemplify novel strategies and
technologies for framing and responding to biothreats. We make use of an
excellent recent review of national and multilateral biodefence efforts Sergio
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Bonin’s International biodefence handbook (Bonin, 2007) to describe the
rationalities of biodefence taking shape in France, Germany and the UK. Our
aim is to see what can be learned from these examples about emerging
rationalities and technologies for governing insecurity. But, first, let us briefly
turn to the United States.
National configurations of biosecurity
The United States can function as a useful point of comparison for European
developments.
9
The Bush administration considered building a biodefence
capacity a critical national priority. In the words of George Bush: ‘Bioterrorism
is a real threat to our country. It’s a threat to every nation that loves freedom.
Terrorist groups seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states already
have them. It’s important we confront these real threats to our country and
prepare for future emergencies.’ The Homeland Security Presidential
Directive of April 2004 describes the Bush administration’s biodefence
strategy. This document is classified, but the non-classified version, Biodefense
for the 21st century (White House, 2004), spells out its commitment to
biodefence: ‘The United States will continue to use all means necessary to
prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons attacks perpetrated
against our homeland and our global interests.’ In addition to its vast array of
threat and vulnerability-assessment exercises, prevention-and-protection ef-
forts, surveillance-and-detection programmes and response-and-recovery
initiatives, the administration has been developing and expanding the
biodefence infrastructure, where efforts are primarily focused on a nationwide
group of institutions collectively described as the Homeland Security
Biodefense Complex (HSBC). Its centrepiece is the Department of Homeland
Security’s National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC), but it also includes the Plum Island Animal Disease Control
Center, the Biodefense Knowledge Center at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, ten newly-established university-based Regional Centers
of Excellence for Biodefense and a number of high-containment laboratories
still under construction. One estimate of US biodefence expenditure since
2001 is that $50 billion have been spent or allocated among eleven federal
departments and agencies, and for fiscal year 2009 the Bush administration was
proposing an additional $9 billion in bioweapons-related spending (Center for
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2008).
10
In comparison with the US, European responses look rather different.
France, Germany and the UK each operates within a general concern to
enhance ‘bio-preparedness’, and there are many overlaps and similarities
between the strategies they have developed. Yet, despite the undoubtedly
heterogeneous form of each strategy, and the no doubt messy and contingent
processes that have been involved in assembling the strategies, it is possible to
use this comparison for heuristic purposes, to draw out three slightly different
Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose: Governing insecurity 237
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rationalities for governing bio-insecurity today, each of which has a rather
different logic and rather different implications.
France
A classified strategy to counter bioterrorism has been developed in France.
Following the Amerithrax letters in the US, thousands of suspected anthrax
letters circulated in France in October of 2001, and, while all of these turned
out to be hoaxes, their appearance together with experiences of SARS
prompted the evaluation and improvement of French biodefence capacities.
The result was the ‘Biotox plan’. Part of a series of intervention plans
collectively entitled ‘Vigipirate’ and including a chemical incidents plan
(the Piratox plan) and a nuclear and radiological incidents plan (Piratome
plan), the Biotox plan covers: the prevention of biological terrorism, including
the possibility of deliberate contamination of drinking-water supply networks,
as well as of the food and pharmaceutical supply chains; principal agents that
can potentially be used as biological weapons; the strategic stockpiling of
vaccines, antibiotics and antidotes; surveillance and alert mechanisms; the
mandatory communication of infectious diseases; the network of microbiolo-
gical and toxicological laboratories, including the assignment of reference
laboratories; and response plans to various scenarios.
The plan was developed by the General Secretariat of National Defense
(SGDN), directly subordinated to the prime minister and tasked with the
elaboration of the government’s contingency plans for major risks and crises.
However the lead authority for Biotox is the General Directorate of Health
(DGS). DGS is responsible for the overall coordination and evaluation of
French public health policy in general, and part of its role is consequence
management of deliberate, accidental or natural outbreaks of infectious
diseases and communicating related information to the public. As part of
the Biotox plan the DGS has elaborated response plans for anthrax, plague,
tularaemia and smallpox outbreaks. It is also responsible for managing the
kind, quantity and storage of vaccines, and organizing their distribution and
the vaccination of first responders. In the summer of 2003, the French minister
of health appointed a ‘Biotox coordinator’, located within the DGS, who is
responsible for coordinating the plan within and between ministries. A major
exercise of the Biotox plan took place in 2004.
More than forty distinct agencies and institutions, some formally part of the
State, others semi-autonomous, are involved in aspects of biodefence and the
Biotox plan.
11
While there are undoubted differences between the approaches
of these multiple bodies, we suggest that we can observe an integrating
rationale at work that we term ‘contingency planning’. Contingency planning
can be said to operate in terms of the following logic: assume that novel,
natural or artificial threats will always be occurring; enumerate the potential
threats no matter how unlikely some may seem; characterize each threat,
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paying particular attention to its development over time from and distance
from the immediate aftermath to the period of recovery; allocate agencies to
each potential threat, bearing in mind the timeline and the need to re-establish
critical functions first; develop guidelines; plan coordination; train personnel;
test the plan in a situation closely resembling a real incident; enhance methods
of early detection of threats and procedures for rapid assessment and
implementation of contingency plans; prepare for rapid response; keep plans
under regular review.
Contingency planning of this sort is nothing new. Thus while the French
strategy is certainly elaborate, seeking to ensure preparedness, to model
responses and to achieve coordinated responses, the reaction to the threat of
biological terrorism has been to strengthen existing technologies designed for
the detection and mitigation of non-terrorist incidents, rather than radically to
reformulate governmental strategies in the name of a new logic of securitization.
Germany
A large number of fake anthrax letters also circulated in Germany in the wake of
the Amerithrax letters. Those reflecting on this period highlight a lack of
preparedness and coordination of first responders as well as insufficient
laboratory capacity for the identification of biological agents. Alongside the
September 11 attacks in the US and the 2002 flooding of the river Elbe, this
prompted a reconsideration of civil threats and risks, and gave rise to new
strategic thinking on civil protection and disaster management, formalized in
June 2002 through the ‘New Strategy for Protecting the People of Germany’.
Previously, disaster preparedness and relief had been the individual
responsibility of the sixteen federal states (or La¨
nder), with the federal
government assuming responsibility for civil emergency planning only during
wartime. There is now stronger cooperation between federal and state officials
on disaster management of national significance like natural or industrial
hazards, epidemics and international terrorism. The main organizational
change has been the establishment of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and
Disaster Assistance (BBK). The BBK operates the German Joint Information
and Situation Centre (GMLZ) and the German Emergency Preparedness
Information System (deNIS), which provide new instruments for coordinating
information, communication and resource management between the federal
and state levels in case of large-scale events. The BBK also operates the
Satellite-Based Warning System (SatWaS), established in October 2001
to provide an alert system and to enable hazard information and crisis
communication to be disseminated to the population via the media.
The BBK’s Center for Civil Protection Research develops methods,
procedures and technologies in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
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(CBRN) protection including CBRN reconnaissance vehicles, decontamina-
tion vehicles and personal CBRN protection equipment. Its Center for Disease
Medicine provides medical support to the population in emergency situations
and is involved in the development of emergency plans, including medical
concepts for CBRN incidents. Its central training centre, the Academy for Crisis
Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ), offers
courses on the management of CBRN incidents, including biological risks and
ways of handling them. The BBK aims to develop a comprehensive and
coordinated nationwide framework for the emergency management of large-
scale biological incidents, covering detection, diagnostics, clinical capacities, risk
communication, decontamination and personal protective equipment.
Further, the Koch Institute (RKI) has been given federal responsibility for
disease control and prevention, tasked primarily with epidemiological and
medical monitoring and analysis of public health in Germany and with the
evaluation of dangerous or widespread diseases. In terms of biodefence, it is
charged with the identification and prevention of attacks involving biological
agents or natural disease outbreaks. It has elaborated national contingency
plans for pandemic influenza and smallpox and it maintains an Outbreak
Investigation Team that assists and coordinates the work of the La
¨nder at their
request and similar teams at the regional level in case of an infectious disease
outbreak. It has also established a Centre for Biological Safety (ZBS) which
focuses on the diagnostics of infectious agents, scenario modelling and the
coordination of national and international programmes for biological safety
and security. The centre also maintains the Federal Information Centre for
Biological Safety (IBBS) which cooperates with civil defence sections at other
federal ministries, with the La
¨nder and their local authorities, and with
European and international institutions, and teaches a training course on the
Advanced Medical Management of Bioterrorist Incidents and Threats
(AMBIT), targeted towards public health officers and physicians in order to
raise their awareness and preparedness as first responders.
In addition to these institutes under the overall umbrella of the BBK, at
least thirty-five other state and non-state organizations or institutions are
engaged in the work of governing bio-insecurity.
12
The logic that underpins
these arrangements does involve contingency planning as in France, but it is
perhaps best captured by the notion of ‘protection’ as in the very name of the
strategy for ‘Protecting the German People’.
Protection, as the dictionary definition indicates, suggests a rationale of
care, providing shelter or defence. And in the German situation, in response
to the perception of threat, risk, hazard and disaster, the State and its agencies
enunciated their obligation to place the population under a kind of guardian-
ship or patronage designed to secure each and all from the threat of harm or
danger.
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The United Kingdom
‘Protect and Survive’ was the title of a civil defence programme of public
information produced by the British government in the 1970s to advise the
civilian population on how to protect themselves in event of a nuclear attack
(Home Office, 1976).
13
The programme was much ridiculed, not merely for
the seeming inadequacy of the measures it suggested, but also for the fatalistic
tone this implied that attack was impending and that significant casualties
were inevitable, but nonetheless people should not be alarmed and should be
prepared to resume their normal duties within a few days (Thompson &
Smith, 1980; Smith, 1980). In response, a review of ‘civil preparedness for
home defence’ was announced, though its results were not made public.
Preparations appeared to consist of allocation of responsibilities to local
authorities to make contingency plans, and the creation of hardened bunkers to
act as seats of regional government after nuclear attack. A number of exercises
were conducted to test out these arrangements, but with the end of the Cold
War, in the 1990s, these plans appeared redundant. How, then has the UK
construed the new risks and threats, and how has it responded?
The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the hoax anthrax letters that also
followed in the UK do not appear to have had the same impact on British
biosecurity policy as they did in France and Germany.
14
A few months before
the September 11 attacks the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) at the
Cabinet Office was established, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. CCS
is responsible for emergency planning and for assessing, anticipating and
preventing future crises. Its aim is to improve UK ‘resilience’ that is to say,
the ability to handle any disruptive challenges that can lead to, or result in,
crisis (not just terrorism but also eventualities like flood and fuel crisis). It does
this primarily through the Capabilities Programme, which concentrates on
ensuring that a robust infrastructure is in place to deal rapidly, effectively and
flexibly with the consequences of conventional or non-conventional disruptive
activity. The programme consists of a total of eighteen capability ‘work-
streams’, one of which is on CBRN Resilience.
Led by the Home Office, the CBRN Resilience workstream aims to ensure a
quick and effective response from all parties concerned in the event of a
terrorist incident to save lives and minimize the impact on property and the
environment. To this end, the Home Office has provided: mobile decontami-
nation units for nationwide use by ambulance and emergency departments;
personal protection suits for key health workers and high performance gas-
tight suits for fire-fighters; stockpiles of emergency medical equipment,
strategically stored around the country and available within twenty-four hours;
special training for police officers to deal with CBRN incidents. The Home
Office also runs a programme of major exercises that specifically deal with
terrorist scenarios. It simulates three full-scale ‘live’ terrorist attacks and
twelve to fifteen ‘tabletop’ or workshop exercises each year, the results of
which feed into the UK counter-terrorism contingency manual (2003) a
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classified document used by everyone involved in responding to terrorism
incidents. The biggest CBRN exercise was Exercise Horizon, consisting of
three separate exercises carried out in 2004 and 2005.
Another key institution is the Health Protection Agency (HPA). The HPA
provides a comprehensive service in support of health protection for all types
of emergencies, regardless of whether they are natural, accidental or deliberate,
and irrespective of whether they are conventional or involve a release of CBRN
substances. This includes preventing and controlling infectious diseases;
reducing the adverse effects of chemical, microbiological and radiological
hazards, and preparing for potential and emerging threats. The HPA is also
responsible for: providing training in preparedness and response to potential
bioterrorist incidents and in the diagnosis and recognition of symptoms of
unusual dangerous micro-organisms; carrying out and coordinating exercises
at the local and national levels with the National Health Service (NHS), local
authorities and the emergency services to improve national preparedness in the
event of major bioterrorist incidents; maintaining surveillance of potential
threats both nationally and internationally. In addition to this, the HPA is the
sole manufacturer of the UK’s licensed anthrax vaccine, it is responsible for
the delivery of the Food, Water and Environmental Microbiology Testing
Service and it maintains the National Collection of Type Culture. Institutions
under the responsibility of the HPA include the Communicable Disease
Surveillance Centre (CDSC), the Centre for Infections (CfI), and the Centre
for Emergency Preparedness and Response (CEPR).
In addition, more than thirty other state, quasi-state and non-state bodies
have some responsibilities in this domain.
15
It would be mistaken to try to
draw too clear a distinction between the logics underpinning the biosecurity
strategy in the UK and that in France and Germany. But if one was to seek a
single term to characterize it in the UK, this would be ‘resilience’. UK
Resilience is the name of the website which links together all the various
governmental initiatives aiming to ‘reduce the risk from emergencies so that
people can go about their business freely and with confidence.’
16
It brings
together information on high-profile risks such as avian influenza, on
emergency preparedness, response and recovery, on the civil contingencies
initiative and much more, linking together procedures for addressing severe
weather, flooding, drought, human health, terrorism, transport accidents,
animal and plant diseases, public protest and industrial action, international
events, industrial technical failure, structural failure, industrial accidents and
environmental pollution.
What, then, is a logic of resilience? Initially an act of rebounding, recoiling
or springing back: in the nineteenth century the term became applied to the
capacity of a property or a structure to regain its initial shape after
compression, and then, later, to the mental state of being able to withstand
stress or adverse circumstances or to recover quickly from their effects, and,
later still, to the capacity of systems, structures or organizations to resist being
affected by shock or disaster, and to recover quickly from such events.
17
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Significantly, resilience, today, has become something that can be engineered
into systems, organizations, perhaps nations and persons. In the words of the
Resilience Engineering Network:
The term Resilience Engineering represents a new way of thinking about safety.
Whereas conventional risk management approaches are based on hindsight and
emphasise error tabulation and calculation of failure probabilities, Resilience
Engineering looks for ways to enhance the ability of organisations to create
processes that are robust yet flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and to use
resources proactively in the face of disruptions or ongoing production and
economic pressures. In Resilience Engineering failures do not stand for a
breakdown or malfunctioning of normal system functions, but rather represent
the converse of the adaptations necessary to cope with the real world complexity.
Individuals and organisations must always adjust their performance to the current
conditions; and because resources and time are finite it is inevitable that such
adjustments are approximate. Success has been ascribed to the ability of groups,
individuals, and organisations to anticipate the changing shape of risk before
damage occurs; failure is simply the temporary or permanent absence of that.
(from http://www.resilience.org)
A logic of resilience, then, is not merely an attitude of preparedness; to be
resilient is not quite to be under protection nor merely to have systems in place
to deal with contingencies. Resilience implies a systematic, widespread,
organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and
material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate
disturbances in complex worlds without collapse, to withstand shocks, and to
rebuild as necessary. Perhaps the opposite of a Big Brother State, a logic of
resilience would aspire to create a subjective and systematic state to enable each
and all to live freely and with confidence in a world of potential risks.
The logics of biosecurity
Of course, the internal national arrangements that we have described are only
one element within the novel strategies for governing bio-insecurity that are
taking shape in a context of transnational threat and risk management. France,
Germany and the UK have all signed and ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol
banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in war and the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention banning weapons, equipment and means of
delivery designed to use biological agents for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict as well as the development, production and stockpiling of biological
agents that have no justification for peaceful purposes. All three countries are
members of the Australia Group and participating states in the Wassenaar
Arrangement networks of states focusing on export controls to prevent
would-be proliferators from obtaining materials for, among other things,
biological weapons.
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Further, a whole set of transnational strategies are being set in place. As Kofi
Annan, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, noted in his address
to the Biological Weapons Convention review conference in 2006:
18
In the five years since the last review conference, global circumstances have
changed, and risks evolved. We see today a strong focus on preventing
terrorism, as well as renewed concern about naturally occurring diseases such as
SARS and avian flu ... Over the same period, advances in biological science
and technology continued to accelerate, promising enormous benefits for human
development, but also posing potential risks. These changes mean that we can
no longer view the Convention in isolation, as simply a treaty prohibiting States
from obtaining biological weapons. Rather, we must look at it as part of an
interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems.
Certainly, we need to deal with disarmament and non-proliferation in the
traditional sense. But we must also address terrorism and crime at the non-state
and individual levels, with responses encompassing public health, disaster relief
and efforts to ensure that the peaceful uses of biological sciences and technology
can safely reach their potential.
The ‘interlinked array of tools’ Annan spoke about has been the subject of
numerous local, national and international conferences on the management of
the threat of biological weapons, as well as the subject of several high-profile
reports and initiatives, many led by the United States.
19
Some of the key
international organizations involved are the International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Interpol has created a dedicated unit focused on bioterrorism (with funding
from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the US State Department), to build
national and international capacity to counter the threat of bioterrorism. Its
programme will: raise awareness of the threat; develop police training
programmes; strengthen efforts to enforce existing legislation; promote the
development of new legislation and encourage inter-agency co-operation on
bioterrorism, as well as develop a resource base on bioterrorism.
20
The World
Health Assembly, operating within a similar logic of preparedness, passed a
resolution in May 2002 on the global public health response to the natural
occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical
agents or radio-nuclear material that affect health. Responding to this
resolution the WHO strategy encompasses four main areas: international
preparedness; global alert and response; national preparedness; preparedness
for selected diseases/intoxication.
21
It has established the Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network (also with US funding) to provide:
an operational framework to link the expertise and skills needed to keep the
international community constantly alert to the threat of outbreaks and ready to
respond. In the event of the intentional release of a biological agent, WHO’s
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global alert and response activities and operational framework together with the
technical resources of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network would
be vital for effective international containment efforts in responding to potential
use of biological agents.
The WHO aims to strengthen national preparedness and response strategies,
laboratory capacities, and procedures for biosafety and biosecurity, and to
strengthen ‘surveillance systems leading to national plans of action for
strengthening surveillance and early warning systems for epidemic-prone
diseases, including those associated with deliberate use’. The ICRC’s initiative
on biotechnology, weapons and humanity appeals to governments, the scientific
community, the military and industry to recognize the risks of biotechnology
being used for hostile purposes, and urges recognition of responsibilities under
international humanitarian law.
22
And the OECD is working towards develop-
ing global oversight mechanisms for biosecurity and hosts high-profile
meetings bringing together individuals from industry, academic, public research
organizations, scientific societies, science publishing and government.
23
However, as we have seen, the national level has not been effaced in strategies
for governing security. And, while we have focused on differences in our earlier
analysis, we can identify many significant similarities in the strategies adopted in
different European nation-states. Each has a more or less unified response to
biological incidents whatever their origin, be they deliberate, accidental, or
natural outbreaks of infectious diseases. The threat of bioterrorism is not singled
out, but addressed within general strategies for combating threats posed by
biological pathogens, whether naturally-occurring or used as weapons. Second,
we can note the sheer number of institutions involved in various aspects of
biodefence the same is true for the other countries studied in the report on
which we have drawn (Bonin, 2007).
24
Further, whatever the fragmentation and
autonomization of agencies that is apparent here, and however many
responsibilities are devolved to different agencies for their specific role in
biodefence, in each of the countries that we have examined the State remains the
coordinator of last resort. However state planning does not take the form
imagined in popular representations of totalitarian societies: neither in reality
nor in the dreams of the programmers is there a single all-seeing eye, a single
all-powerful controller, a Big Brother State. Nor does this new configuration
partake of the market logics characteristic of the reform of public-sector
management of the late twentieth century. And there is no sign here of the
declaration of a state of exception predicted by so many theorists indeed the
operation of all these agencies and bodies happens within the routines of
bureaucracy and to the extent that it ever describes a reality the ‘rule of law’.
In the emerging assemblages for governing insecurity, the political apparatus of
the nation-state functions as more than an animator to use the term of Jacques
Delors (1992) yet it is less than a sovereign manager of such endeavours. These
multiple bodies of expertise engaged in governing (in)security are not totalized
into a single plane of surveillance. Indeed the empirical evidence whether from
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the intelligence community or from attempts to develop a unified system of
biometrics or border control suggests that, even where such unification is a
programmatic aspiration, it is an aspiration that is ‘congenitally failing’.
25
What we can see here is a limited ‘de-differentiation’ of ‘internal’ and
‘external’ security issues (Bigo, 2006, p. 14), as national agencies rely for their
capacities on the links and associations that they can form with and between a
multitude of forms of expertise, research and knowledge production, dispersed
widely across national and international space, and embodied in many semi-
autonomous institutions. And, while a ‘dream of a common and consensual
epistemic community ... haunts the imaginary of [many] professionals’ (Bigo,
2006, p. 20), the reality is that of a heterogeneous complex that requires a
continual, and potentially fragile, labour of coordination among diverse
agencies, a transactional space between national and transnational agencies
and personnel, involving relays of intelligence, expertise, technique and strategy,
and an interpenetration of scientific expertise, police, health management and
intelligence agencies not so much a single programme, but the attempt to shape
networks that will bring together a whole variety of diverse entities upon what is
perceived as a common threat (Bigo, 2006).
26
No doubt this space is traversed
and fractured by inter-agency rivalries. But, while strategies seek to flatten it, to
make relays possible and effective, they do not seek to unify it or merge all into a
single structure or apparatus dispersal here functions as a strategic advantage,
not a handicap, and coordination displaces integration as the watchword and,
of course, as the locus of many problems and problematizations.
Nonetheless, within this complex, and despite similarities among European
states, differences remain in the ways in which issues of biosecurity are framed
and addressed. These concern not merely the perceptions of the nature,
proximity and seriousness of the threat of bioterrorism, but the immanent
logics underpinning the preparations being put into place for governing
insecurity. We have identified three distinct, if related, logics at work that of
contingency planning (France), of protection (Germany) and of resilience (UK).
Each represents a slightly different strategy for reconciling liberty and security
without destroying the intensified and extended mobility, flow and circulation
of persons and things upon which contemporary freedom is seen to depend.
Of course, in this article we have addressed only one dimension of the
emerging rationalities and technologies for governing insecurity. A wider
analysis would need to locate the specific ways in which the insecurities around
bioterrorism are being governed within a wider governmental complex and to
explore the other dimensions that we have noted earlier. First, we would need
to explore the techniques being brought into play to govern the many planes of
movement of persons, commodities, artefacts, knowledge, communications
across and between nations, the problem now being, not of halting circulation,
but of managing, monitoring and regulating it.
27
This entails multiple
endeavours to redefine spaces and the relations between them, and to reclassify
the entities that circulate, in order to differentiate the permitted, the suspicious
and the prohibited without destroying those flows upon which globalized
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liberty depends: for example, developments such as e-borders, advance
passenger information and computerized watchlists with their algorithms of
suspicion.
28
Second, we would need to say more about the forms of assemblage
that are linking and coordinating the various entities involved in governing
insecurity: analysis here would build upon the elegant mapping of the dynamic
field of forces, agencies, contests and transactions involved in the political and
professional definition and management of the forms and sources of insecurity
and unease being undertaken by Didier Bigo and his colleagues (Bigo, 2006).
Third, we would need to identify the new norms that are being set into place
the genesis and characteristics of the algorithms being used to identify
suspicious persons and activities: these algorithms and their problems have
been much discussed in the United States in the context of controversies over
the non-identification of the perpetrators of the attacks on 11 September
2001.
29
Fourth, we would need to examine more carefully the means of
governing through insecurity the ways in which the subjective state of
insecurity and apprehension is both the means of extending and legitimating
government through the instrumentalization of anxiety and the objective of
many of the technologies being installed that seek to intensify and utilize the
subjective states of alertness, suspicion and the monitoring of the daily conduct
and attitudes of others as the means of extending or appearing to extend
the reach of security into the interstices of everyday existence.
30
Only then
would we be able to identify with any precision the new forms of freedom and
unfreedom that are being presupposed and constructed by these new
rationalities for governing insecurity.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at a workshop on Security, Risk and
Technologies of the Political organized by Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero
at Keele University in November 2007. A German translation of an earlier and
rather different version is published in Patricia Purtschert, Katrin Meyer, Yves
Winter (Eds) (2008) Gouvernementalita
¨t und Sicherheit. Zeitdiagnostische Beitra
¨ge im
Anschluss an Foucault. Thanks to all those who have given use helpful suggestions
for revision, including three anonymous reviewers of this journal.
Notes
1 Although the term ‘bioterrorism’ may also incorporate the deliberate spread of
disease in plants/crops and animals, the focus of this article is primarily on the spread
of disease in humans. See Hinchliffe and Bingham (2008) for an analysis of different
forms of biosecurity, and the other articles in the themed issue of Environment and
Planning A 40(7) for examples.
2 From 1939 to 1945, the Japanese Imperial Army spread plague and cholera in China
under the guise of natural outbreaks.
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3 Others have also noted the centrality of the problematization of regulated circulation
in the contemporary management of biosecurity as we were preparing this article for
publication we were made aware of the discussion of this issue in a forthcoming paper
by Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) reported in Hinchcliffe and Bingham (2008).
4 The characteristics of rationalities of preparedness have been at the centre of the
analyses conducted by those associated with the Berkeley Anthropology of the
Contemporary Research Collaboratory and the Vital Systems Security collaboration
see Lakoff (2007), Collier and Lakoff (2008), Collier (2008) as well as forthcoming
publications and working papers available at http://anthropos-lab.net/vss/
5 See, for example, the Zombie Preparedness Initiative: ‘a knowledge base provided by
a community of citizens concerned about the impending zombie invasion and the
imminent disaster that is sure to follow. We are not claiming to be experts on anything,
we are merely doing what we can to gather knowledge and share the acquired
information with the public. By doing this, we hope to help people prepare for the very
real threat that we shall face when zombies show up and governments have not taken the
time to prepare. We are working to do what we can to help people find others in their
area that are interested in fighting against the zombies so that when the time comes
there can be safe locations all around the world.’ http://ww2.zombieinitiative.org/
6 See the working papers cited above, available at http://anthropos-lab.net/ and
http://www.gpia.info/faculty/Collier.html
7 We can trace the idea of preparedness at least to the eighteenth century (Roosevelt,
1900).
8 Stephen Collier (2008) has recently used the term ‘enactment’ to characterize these
new rationalities, focusing specifically on those that seem to estimate the likelihood and
consequences of potentially catastrophic future events.
9 For a good analysis of US developments, see the work of Collier and Lakoff cited
above. Note that we have followed national usage for the alternative spellings of
‘defense’ and ‘defence’, ‘Center’ and Centre’, etc.
10 Available at http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/media/fy2009_bw_budget.pdf
11 These include: the National Institute for Public Health Surveillance (InVS) and its
Departments of Infectious Disease, of Environmental Health, of Occupational Health,
and of Training and Documentation, and its Alert Coordinating Unit; the Directorate
of Hospitalisation and Organisation of Care (DHOS) which evaluates and ensures the
preparedness of hospitals and other health institutions by elaborating crisis guidelines;
the Urgent Medical Services (SAMU) responsible for emergency medical assistance
and the pre-hospital medical response to major crisis; the Health Products Safety
Agency (AFSSAPS) which issues recommendations on the treatment of people exposed
to biological agents; the National Institute of Research and Security (INRS) which
collects information on the use of dangerous biological substances and assesses potential
risks, as well as providing an inventory of laboratories carrying out biological analyses
and an overview of theoretical and practical aspects of biological exposure monitoring;
the BSL3 and BSL4 research centre Laboratory Jean Me
´rieux administered by the
French National Institute of Health and Medical Research (INSERM); the Institut
Pasteur, which among other efforts collaborates with relevant military actors and assists
the national defense authorities in obtaining an effective bank of microbiological strains,
and the Institute’s Pathogenesis Department which developed tools to detect and
identify pathogens and therapeutic and prophylactic strategies to fight them, and its
Emergency Biological Intervention Unit (CIBU) which provides resources for
emergency measures in the event of an epidemic or a bioterrorist attack; the General
Directorate of Alimentation (DGAL) and its Sub-Directorate of Animal Health and
Protection (SDSPA); the Food Safety Agency (AFSSA); the Directorate for the
Prevention of Pollution and Risks (DPPR); the National Institute of the Industrial
Environment and Risks (INERIS); the Directorate of Civil Defense and Security
(DDSC), in charge of the preparation, coordination and implementation of civil defence
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and emergency preparedness measures, and its Sub-Directorates for the Management
of Risks (SDGR), for Fire-Fighters and Security Actors (SDSPAS) and of Operational
Services (DDSC); the National Police and the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance
(DST), the General Intelligence Directorate (DCRG), the Central Intervention
Detachment (DCI), the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT) and the Central
Criminal Investigation Directorate (DCPJ) and its National Anti-Terrorist Division
(DNAT); the French National Gendarmerie, its specialized CBRN unit (‘Cellule
NRBC’) and the Intervention Group of the National Gendarmerie (GIGN); the
General Directorate of External Security (DGSE) responsible for counterterrorism and
counterespionage outside of France; the Interministerial Committee for the Fight
against Terrorism (CILAT); the French Armed Forces’ specialized CBRN unit the
‘2nd Dragoons Regiment’, its ‘1st Medical Regiment’ which maintains CBRN-
protected field units, its Center for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense
(CDNBC), its Arms Procurement Agency (DGA) and its Le Bouchet Research Center
(CEB), and the Research Center of the Armed Force’s Health Service (CRSSA).
12 These include: the Permanent Working Group of Centres of Expertise and
Treatment (StAKoB) which holds expertise in the handling of highly contagious and
dangerous diseases and maintains special negative-pressure isolation wards; the Federal
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA) and its Board for Biological
Substances (ABAS), which elaborates rules and best practices for activities involving
hazardous biological substances; various civilian research institutes and laboratories
including the Bernhard Nocht institute (BNI), the Institute for Virology at the
University of Marburg, the national Reference Centers (NRZ) and Consultant
Laboratories, the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (FhG), and the Federal Research Centre
for Nutrition and Food (BfEL); the Paul Ehrlich Institute (PEI) for sera and vaccines;
the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV) which
maintains the national crisis centre for infectious animal diseases, monitors and assesses
the situation of animal diseases in Germany and abroad, and coordinates defensive
measures in case of an outbreak, and its affiliated authority the Federal Research
Institute for Animal Health (FLI); the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food
Safety (BVL) responsible for managing risks to consumer health and its Central
Commission for Biological Safety (CCBS) and the Federal Institute for Risk
Assessment (BfR) responsible for actually assessing the risks to consumer health and
providing scientific advise to federal ministries and the BVL; the Federal Environment
Agency (UBA) and the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN); the Federal
Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) which oversees the export of
commodities of strategic importance, mainly weapons, armaments and dual-use items;
the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) which is establishing local NBC
Rescue Units that allow the agency to carry out its duties, such as rescuing victims or
evacuation of large areas, in a contaminated environment; the Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution (bfV), the domestic intelligence service, whose duties
include combating all forms of extremism in Germany and preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, as well as counterintelligence and counter-sabotage
activities; the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), one of whose tasks it is to monitor
relevant developments and research activities on CBRN weapons as well as suspicious
procurement attempts and transfers of know-how; the Federal Criminal Police Office
(BKA) and its Research Institute on Terrorism/Extremism (FTE) established in 2003;
the Joint Terrorism Defense Centre (GTAZ) bringing together the BKA and the BfV to
foster daily information exchanges and common analyses and threat assessments, as well
as to coordinate concrete counter-terrorism activities between the two bodies; the
Bundeswehr, or the Ger man armed forces, its NBC Defense Units trained and
equipped to detect and cope with an attack involving nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons, its NBC- and Self-Protection School (ABC/SeS), its Medical Service with
medical CBRN protection expertise, its Medical Agency’s Institute for Microbiology
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entirely devoted to biodefence and tasked with the development of methods for the
prevention, detection, treatment and alleviation of the consequences of a biological
agents release, its Central Institutes of the Medical Service in Koblenz and Munich, its
Armed Forces Scientific Institute for Protection Technologies and NBC Protection
(WIS), and its Center for Verification Tasks.
13 Details of this programme can be found at http://www.cybertrn.demon.co.uk/
atomic/ which also has some helpful details on the history of UK civil defence. In fact,
the programme of civilian defence using this rationality emerges in the years
immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, for example advising
families how to protect themselves in the event of air raids.
14 For some of these details, see the UK Working Paper on ‘Emergency Preparedness
and Response’ submitted to the BWC Meeting of Experts, 1 September 2003, BWC/
MSP.2003/MX/WP.64
15 These include: the Department of Health (DH), which has issued specific
guidance to the National Health Service (NHS) on responding to a deliberate release of
biological agents and increased its preparedness by stockpiling medical equipment,
antidotes, antibiotics and vaccines, and the DH’s Emergency Planning Coordination
Unit (EPCU), which coordinates contingency planning to maintain the NHS’s state of
readiness to respond to major incidents involving infectious diseases; the National
Institute for Biological Standards and Control’s (NIBSC) divisions on Bacteriology and
Virology, both actively engaged in research and standardization projects concerned with
vaccines against potential biological weapons; the Biotechnology and Biological
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) which funds a significant amount of basic and
enabling research in the biosciences that relates to prevention of bioterrorism, the
Medical Research Council (MRC) which funds basic research on the effects of
pathogens on human issue and how to counteract them, and the Natural Environment
Research Council (NERC) which concentrates on responses to biological contamination
of the natural environment; the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), its CBRN experts
which provide technical advice to support planning for, response to and recovery from
emergencies (especially, but not exclusively, events that involve major industrial hazard
sites), and the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP); the Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Exotic Disease and Emergency
Preparedness Programme, the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA), the Government
Decontamination Service (GDS), the Environment Agency (EA), and the Food
Standards Agency (FSA); the Export Control and Non-Proliferation Directorate
(XNP) and its Export Control Organization (ECO) which processes applications for
licenses to export controlled military and dual-use goods and technologies from the
UK; the Fire and Resilience Directorate (FRD) which produces guidance on
counteracting the effects of CBRN incidents on buildings and infrastructures; the
Local Resilience Forums and the first responders; the Home Office’s National Mass
Fatalities Working Group; the Emergency Planning Society’s (EPS) CBRN Profes-
sional Interest Group; the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS or MI6), and the Security Service (MI5), which investigates and seeks
to disrupt attempts by countries of concern to acquire material, technology or expertise
in the UK that could be relevant to a mass casualty weapons programme, and its
International Counter Terrorism branch which monitors the threat from international
extremist groups and their potential to acquire weapons of mass destruction; the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), created in 2003, which analyses all-source
intelligence on the activities, intentions and capabilities of international terrorist
groups that may threaten UK and allied interests, and sets threat levels; the Counter-
Terrorism and Intelligence Directorate (CTID) which develops policy and provides
security measures to combat the threat from terrorism; the National Counter Terrorism
Security Office (NaCTSO) which coordinates a nationwide network of specialist police
advisors known as Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs), and the Police
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National CBRN Centre which provides CBRN training to the national police services;
the British Armed Forces’ ‘Joint CBRN Regiment’ and the Defence CBRN Centre
providing CBRN defense training; the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
(DSTL) which provides a science and technology platform to assess, manage, monitor
and control biological hazards, conducts R&D of sensor and detection systems for
biological agents, develops medical countermeasures to biological agents and provides a
facility for testing suspected biological material.
16 http://www.ukresilience.info/
17 Interestingly, resilience, as a mental, psychological or neurobiological capacity, has
recently become the subject of considerable research in the 1990s, especially in the
United States: this research turned away from the usual focus on the reasons why
individuals exposed to various forms of ‘traumatic events’ from childhood abuse to
military conflict suffered unpleasant psychological consequences, to concentrate instead
upon the reasons why some, subjected to those same conditions, do not.
18 Available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/BEDC339
6280025B3C125722C003A6459/$file/BWC-6RC-Statement-061120-UNSG.pdf
19 Some of the key events, reports and initiatives include: UNOG (2006) Final
Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological
Weapons Convention BWC/CONF.VI/6; OECD (2006) Chairman’s Summary of
Workshop on Biosecurity of Microbial Biological Resources Complementing
Innovation; OECD (2004) Chairman’s Summary of Workshop on Promoting
Responsible Stewardship in the BioSciences: Avoiding Potential Abuse of Research
and Resources; World Health Organisation (2006) Biorisk Management: Laboratory
Biosecurity Guidance WHO/CDS/EPR/2006.6; International Committee of the Red
Cross (2004) Preventing Hostile Use of the Life Sciences: From Ethics and Law to Best
Practice; Interpol (2005) National Laws and Measures: Counter-Terrorism Regulation
of Biology; Journal Editors and Authors Group (2003) Statement of the Journal Editors
and Authors Group on Scientific Publishing and Security; National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (2007) Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life
Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research
Information; UK Health and Safety Executive Advisory Committee on Dangerous
Pathogens (2005) Biological Agents: Managing the Risks in Laboratories and
Healthcare Premises; UK Health and Safety Executive Advisory Committee on
Dangerous Pathogens (2001) The Management, Design and Operation of Micro-
biological Containment Laboratories; Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research
Council, Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust (2005) Managing Risks of
Misuse Associated with Grant Funding Activities: A Joint BBSRC, MRC and
Wellcome Trust Policy Statement; National Academies of Sciences (2006) Globaliza-
tion, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences; National Academies of Sciences
(2005) Workshop on Education and Raising Awareness: Challenges for Responsible
Stewardship of Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences; National Research Council
(2004) Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access and Genome Databases; National
Research Council (2004) Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism; Royal Society
(2005) The Roles of Codes of Conduct in Preventing the Misuse of Scientific Research
RS policy document 3/05; Royal Society and Wellcome Trust (2004) Do No Harm:
Reducing the Potential for the Misuse of Life Science Research RS policy document
29/04; Royal Society (2004) The Individual and Collective Roles Scientists Can Play in
Strengthening International Treaties RS policy document 5/04; Royal Society (2000)
Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological Weapons; Royal Society (1994)
Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons; American Medical Association
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs Report 9 A-04 Guidelines to Prevent
Malevolent Use of Biomedical Research adopted at the 2004 AMA Annual Meeting;
British Medical Association (1999) Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity and (2004)
Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity II.
Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose: Governing insecurity 251
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20 http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/default.asp
21 http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/en/
22 http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/bwh
23 http://www.biosecuritycodes.org/
24 Bonin lists 434 institutions in the seven countries and five international
organizations that are studied in the report cited earlier.
25 We take this notion from Rose and Miller (1992, p. 190).
26 Bigo suggests that we can observe the for mation of a novel dispositif, an apparatus
that works under a new logic that he terms a ‘ban-opticon’; however, we prefer to
emphasize interconnections among heterogeneous rationalities and apparatuses that are
lashed together in diverse ways.
27 Of course, the tactic of halting mobility can be deployed in emergencies, but only
for very limited periods as occurred in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 11
September 2001.
28 http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/managingborders/technology/eborders/
See also the debate between US Secretary of Homeland Security and Members of
the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of European Parliament on
14 May 2007, where Chertoff explicitly poses the question in terms of the trade-off
between liberty and security: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_118062704
1914.shtm. Our thinking on these issues has been greatly assisted by the ongoing
research of Mathew Kabatoff at LSE’s BIOS Centre.
29 See, for example, the 2005 report by the US Office of the Inspector General which
notes that: ‘On September 16, 2003, the President signed Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6), requiring the establishment of an organization to
‘‘consolidate the Government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the
appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Infor mation in screening processes.’’ Specifically,
the Attorney General was directed to create a new organization to consolidate terrorist
watch lists and provide twenty-four-hour, seven-day-a-week operational support for
federal, state, local, territorial, tribal and foreign government as well as private sector
screening across the country and around the world ... As a result of this presidential
directive, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was created. As of the end of fiscal year
(FY) 2004, the TSC was a $27 million organization with approximately 175 staff.’ The
report, which is available in redacted form on the Internet, audited the Terrorist
Screening Centre and its efficacy, including the algorithms that it used: http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0527/exec.htm. Some of the issues are helpfully
discussed by Paul Rosenzweig and Jeff Jonas in a paper for the Heritage Foundation
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/lm17.cfm. More
recently, the technical details of the various algorithms were explored at the 2008
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers conference on ‘Technologies for
Homeland Security’, which was held on 1213 May 2008: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
xpl/tocresult.jsp?isnumber4534402&isYear2008.
30 Rose (1999, 2000) has analysed some of these mechanisms in relation to changing
strategies of control. See also the discussion by Jeff Huysmans (2006).
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Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose: Governing insecurity 253
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Filippa Lentzos is a Senior Research Fellow in the BIOS Centre of the
London School of Economics and Political Science focusing on biosecurity and
the range of social, ethical, political, legal, economic and geographical issues
associated with it. She is especially interested in the social shaping of risks and
threats, and in the social organization and deployment of evidence, facts and
knowledge. In addition to her research post she is the Managing Editor of
BioSocieties, an interdisciplinary journal for the social studies of life sciences.
Nikolas Rose is Martin White Professor of Sociology and Director of the
BIOS Centre for the Study of Bioscience, Biomedicine, Biotechnology and
Society at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The main
focus of his current research is on the social implications of developments in
the new brain sciences, but he also works on the regulation of biomedical
research, biosecurity and synthetic biology. His most recent books are The
politics of life itself (Princeton, 2006) and Governing the present (with Peter
Miller, Polity, 2008.)
254 Economy and Society
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... Resilience to flooding is a relatively new idea, grafted onto the body of debates around flood risk management (Werritty, 2006). The move away from traditional approaches and towards policies based on resilience is not restricted to flood risk management but rather part of a widespread policy transformation embraced in the UK and the Western world more generally (Lentzos and Rose, 2009;Joseph, 2013b). The shift draws heavily on ideas about natural and social systems and adaptation to climate change. ...
... Resilience-as-neoliberalism has been arguably the most voluminous critique of resilience: the suggestion that the concept is a strategy that seeks to further embed neoliberalism (Joseph, 2013b;Walker and Cooper, 2011;Evans and Reid, 2013;O'Malley, 2010;Kaufmann, 2013;Lentzos and Rose, 2009). As stated above, it is crucial to highlight that the association of resilience with neoliberalism is advanced on the ontological terrain, occupied by problems of complexity, non-linearity and surprises (Walker and Cooper, 2011). ...
... Other events in the year 2000, such as flooding and the UK Fuel Blockade crisis, helped generate a widespread conviction that reforms to emergency planning were needed. A few months before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) was established to take responsibility for emergency planning and for overall management of future crises (Lentzos and Rose, 2009). The main goal of CCS is to 'improve UK 'resilience', that is to say, the ability to handle any disruptive challenges that can lead to, or result in crisis (not just terrorism but also eventualities such as flood and fuel crises) (Lentzos and Rose, 2009, p. 241 The resilience areas and forums are what, in the view of the Civil Contingencies Act, makes the multiagency emergency response consistent and coherent, rather than patchy as before the Act. ...
Thesis
This thesis is concerned with what it means to govern through resilience, with emphasis on flood governance. Resilience has become a pervasive idiom of global governance and has grown in popularity over the last decade in UK policy making. It is increasingly seen as a policy ideal, a benign attribute whose fostering appears appropriate for dealing with many contemporary predicaments. While many academic contributions agree that resilience is a policy ideal that needs fostering, others regard it as politically problematic. Resilience is said to represent a neoliberal strategy that seeks to responsibilise individuals, away from state-centred forms of protection. However, I contend that these contributions, while welcome, are general interpretations of the meaning and uses of resilience, derived mostly from official documents and rhetoric. This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge by analysing a full length policy initiative centred on resilience, from policy design to implementation. As resilience gradually moves from high-level official rhetoric to actual policy, there is a need for critical investigations to shift from theoretical pronouncements of what resilience ‘is’, to what it ‘does’, or fails to do in practice. I argue that, in practice, the implementation of resilience is characterised by failure points and breakdowns, which signify severe disconnects between the goals of the policy and its mechanisms for implementation. These failure points challenge the substantiality of the argument that resilience is a form of neoliberal strategy. In fact, the findings of the research suggest that if resilience is to be produced at all on the ground, it requires substantial orchestration ‘from above’, by ongoing authority. Overall, I argue that the content of resilience policies is vacuous, and if resilience is to be transformed in more productive directions, the work needs to begin with an acknowledgement that resilience policies present themselves as a hollow shell.
... Evidencing the political resonance with which the term is now loaded, community has proven pivotal for engendering the spatial redistribution of governmental responsibilities promoted across resilience discourses. An emphasis on community, for example, has figured as crucial in attempts to enhance resilience by affording an array of dispersed local and national actors more agency in making decisions about how emergencies should and could be governed (Collier and Lakoff, 2008a, Grove et al., 2020, Lentzos and Rose, 2009, Smirnova et al, 2021. The prominence of community in these debates, furthermore, has accompanied a new operational dynamic for emergency governance when conceived through resilience. ...
... Under command and control, centralised agencies, often operating remotely, coordinate the response to emergencies. Replacing command and control, decentralised governmental arrangements, characterised by coordination across various agencies and actors distributed disparately through space and acting within localities, have risen to prominence (Amoore, 2009, Collier and Lakoff, 2008a, Grove, 2018, Lentzos and Rose, 2009. ...
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Full-text available
How has the idea of community featured in attempts to build resilience to emergencies? The paper explores this question by presenting evidence from interviews with emergency responders across the world in the midst of the early and uncertain phases of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although reflecting different contexts, we discern two ways in which the notion of community featured in authorities’ narrations of their efforts to respond to the pandemic. Firstly, we demonstrate how community was deployed as a discursive mechanism that offered a particular framing of the vulnerabilities the pandemic instigated. Departing from accounts that reduce people’s identities to demographic categories, the deployment of community stressed that the pandemic’s effects should be understood by the different, yet coexistent, vulnerabilities it brought to the surface for people. Such renditions of vulnerability paved the way for styles of governance that prioritised adapting to the pandemic’s uncertain and indeterminate unfolding in the absence of prepared plans. Secondly, addressing a register of collective social life between individuals and the state, an emphasis on community engendered the decentralised arrangement of emergency governance with which resilience has become synonymous. Here, community proved pivotal in temporarily expanding resources to deal with an emergency whose effects threatened to exceed governments’ pre-existing capabilities. We substantiate this claim through examining how allusions to community worked to enrol non-state based efforts at response into a broader public security apparatus. Enveloped within the broader politics of emergency resilience, community shaped how the pandemic’s effects were understood whilst also ensuring adequate provisions for its governance.
... Scenarios are nowadays used within a multiplicity of fields, institutions and organizations-including business companies and governments (Ogilvy and Smith 2004), and in policy (Volkery and Ribeiro 2009), energy (Benedict 2017), environmentalism (Wodak and Neale 2015), and crisis management (Moats et al. 2008). In addition, in recent years, scholars within sociology, anthropology, geography and critical security studies have opened up a discussion on new modes of governing the future, and as part of this growing discussion have examined the use of scenarios as a specific technique within broader non-probabilistic or non-calculative modes of governing that are based on concepts such as precaution, pre-emption and premediation (Amoore 2013;De Goede 2008a2008bDe Goede et al. 2014;Opitz and Tellmann 2015;Tellmann 2009); resilience (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015;Lentzos and Rose 2009);preparedness (Samimian-Darash 2016;Collier 2008;Lakoff 2007Lakoff , 2008and anticipation (Anderson 2010). In these various studies, scenarios have been treated as a tool for imagining unknown futures (Aradau and Van Munster 2011;Krasmann 2015)-a practice that is distinct from that of trying to know the future-in order that such futures might be practised (through planning and preparations) in the present. ...
... When approaching scenarios as a form of governing, many discussions have made comparisons with risk-based technologies, following Michel Foucault's analysis of governmentality (Foucault, [2004(Foucault, [ ] 2007. Lentzos and Rose (2009), for example, have examined how, in the light of uncertain futures that cannot be addressed through risk calculations, new strategies for managing biorisks are developed. Within such new ways of thinking about, preparing for and pre-empting future events, scenarios appear as a 'technology of futurity' that is used within strategies that work to imagine potential futures and manage their consequences. ...
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The coronavirus pandemic has revived scholarly engagement with the concept of biopolitics, with interpretations diagnosing either the widespread adoption of a classic biopolitical regime or the full‐blown emergence of totalitarian repression (or both of these simultaneously). Relying on a close analysis of different interventions taken by Israeli authorities in response to the pandemic, this article argues that, rather than classic biopolitical strategies, such governmental interventions are better understood in relation to a problem of actual uncertainty. The case of Israel demonstrates how state apparatuses responded to actual uncertainty with technologies that are linked to different rationalities and how these technologies enabled the creation and management of a new milieu. The article further argues that, in making and intervening upon this milieu, state apparatuses employed a particular normalisation strategy that is tied to a form of power that we term encapsulation.
... Predstavlja spremnost upravljačkih struktura da u kriznim situacijama donose odgovarajuće odluke koje rezultiraju sposobnošću organizacije da reaguje brzo, efikasno i efektivno. Ova sposobnost organizacije (Lentzos & Rose, 2009) ciljno je usmerena na minimiziranje pretnji usmerenih na ljudsko zdravlje, bezbednost (individualnu i/ili organizacijsku), smanjenje štetnih posledica krize (na javnoj ili imovini organizacije), kao i smanjivanju negativnog uticaja na nastavak poslovanja (normalne organizacijske dinamike). Krizni menadžment se može posmatrati i kao skup funkcija čiji je zadatak identifikacija, izučavanje i predviđanje mogućih kriznih situacija. ...
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Istraživanje efekata programiranog trenažnog rada tematika je istraživanja mnogih studija. Osnovni cilj ovog istraživanja je utvrđivanje efekata tromjesečnog programiranog rada na transformaciju (promjene) morfoloških karakteristika mladih košarkašica uzrasne dobi 13 – 15 godina koje redovno treniraju u ŽKK „Ljubuški“ iz Ljubuškog. Uzorak za istraživanje obuhvatio je 88 ispitanica-mladih koarkašica uzrasne dobi 13-15 godina koje aktivno treniraju košarku u ŽKK „Ljubuški“ iz Ljubuškog. U istraživanju je primijenjen set od 12 varijabli za procjenu morfoloških karakteristika mjerene prema uputama Internacionalnog biološkog programa (IBP). Mjerenje morfoloških varijabli izvršeno je u dvije vremenske tačke, prije realizacije programa (inicijalno) i poslije realizacije programiranog rada (finalno). U cilju utvrđivanja efekata tromjesečnog programiranog rada na transformaciju (promjene) morfoloških karakteristika mladih košarkašica primijenjena je faktorska analiza (metod kongruencije). Rezultati faktorske analize pokazuju da je pod utjecajem tromjesečnog programiranog rada došlo do strukturalnih promjena morfoloških karakteristika kod tretiranog uzorka ispitanica. U odnosu na inicijalno mjerenje gdje su izolovane četiri latentne dimenzije u finalnom mjerenju došlo je do kvalitenijeg grupisanja primijenjenih varijabli te su izolovane tri latentne dimenzije, odnosno došlo je do sužavanja hiperkonusa projekcije izolovanih glavnih komponenti u finalnom mjerenju u odnosu na inicijalno mjerenje. Dobiveni rezultati istraživanja ukazuju da dobro osmišljen i programiran trenažni rad može efikasno doprinjeti željenim promjenama morfoloških karakteristika u pravcu rasta i razvoja mladih košarkašica.
... Predstavlja spremnost upravljačkih struktura da u kriznim situacijama donose odgovarajuće odluke koje rezultiraju sposobnošću organizacije da reaguje brzo, efikasno i efektivno. Ova sposobnost organizacije (Lentzos & Rose, 2009) ciljno je usmerena na minimiziranje pretnji usmerenih na ljudsko zdravlje, bezbednost (individualnu i/ili organizacijsku), smanjenje štetnih posledica krize (na javnoj ili imovini organizacije), kao i smanjivanju negativnog uticaja na nastavak poslovanja (normalne organizacijske dinamike). Krizni menadžment se može posmatrati i kao skup funkcija čiji je zadatak identifikacija, izučavanje i predviđanje mogućih kriznih situacija. ...
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The aim of this study was "application of different passing techniques in basketball". The aim of the study was to present ways of passing in basketball based on the analysis of selected matches. Based on the sample of matches and the application of descriptive statistics, conclusions were drawn: that the players are in all positions in the team, ie. the defenders mostly applied the addition from the chest with two hands - directly, then the addition with one hand from the chest - directly. The players on the wing position, like the defenders, mostly used the two-handed pass from the chest - directly, then the two-handed pass over the head. The players in the center position also mostly applied passing from the chest with two hands - directly, then passing with one hand from the chest - directly. It can be concluded that adding is one of the most important technical elements in basketball. Therefore, adding a lot of time and attention should be devoted to basic training in working with children. This data, which was obtained, can help in further work with children, coaches and physical education teachers
... Predstavlja spremnost upravljačkih struktura da u kriznim situacijama donose odgovarajuće odluke koje rezultiraju sposobnošću organizacije da reaguje brzo, efikasno i efektivno. Ova sposobnost organizacije (Lentzos & Rose, 2009) ciljno je usmerena na minimiziranje pretnji usmerenih na ljudsko zdravlje, bezbednost (individualnu i/ili organizacijsku), smanjenje štetnih posledica krize (na javnoj ili imovini organizacije), kao i smanjivanju negativnog uticaja na nastavak poslovanja (normalne organizacijske dinamike). Krizni menadžment se može posmatrati i kao skup funkcija čiji je zadatak identifikacija, izučavanje i predviđanje mogućih kriznih situacija. ...
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... The potential of reef safe havens Contingency planning is a proactive management tool that outlines actions managers need to take to respond to events that may or may not happen [147,148]. Contingency planning has been suggested to help manage (or mitigate) the risk associated with pandemics [149], drought [150], and environmental disasters [151]. It is a Adapted from [153], a consideration of the balance of these three components can help inform the level of suitable intervention. ...
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Reducing the global reliance on fossil fuels is essential to ensure the long-term survival of coral reefs, but until this happens, alternative tools are required to safeguard their future. One emerging tool is to locate areas where corals are surviving well despite the changing climate. Such locations include refuges, refugia, hotspots of resilience, bright spots, contemporary near-pristine reefs, and hope spots that are collectively named reef ‘safe havens' in this mini-review. Safe havens have intrinsic value for reefs through services such as environmental buffering, maintaining near-pristine reef conditions, or housing corals naturally adapted to future environmental conditions. Spatial and temporal variance in physicochemical conditions and exposure to stress however preclude certainty over the ubiquitous long-term capacity of reef safe havens to maintain protective service provision. To effectively integrate reef safe havens into proactive reef management and contingency planning for climate change scenarios, thus requires an understanding of their differences, potential values, and predispositions to stress. To this purpose, I provide a high-level review on the defining characteristics of different coral reef safe havens, how they are being utilised in proactive reef management and what risk and susceptibilities they inherently have. The mini-review concludes with an outline of the potential for reef safe haven habitats to support contingency planning of coral reefs under an uncertain future from intensifying climate change.
... Ovaj pristup otpornosti primjenjuje se u ekologiji, tehničkim znanostima, računarstvu i politologiji (npr. Nathan, 2003;Lentzos & Rose, 2009;Walker & Cooper, 2011;Omer, Mostashari & Lindemann, 2014;Sterk, Van de Leemput & Peeters, 2017). U ovim se istraživanjima otpornost definira kao sposobnost sustava da se vrati u stanje ravnoteže nakon što je pod utjecajem različitih čimbenika izbačen iz ravnoteže. ...
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Otpornost se na individualnoj razini promatra kao sposobnost pojedinaca da se oporave od nepovoljnih okolnosti, odnosno kao proces prilagodbe nepovoljnim okolnostima. Cilj je ovog rada testirati mjernu ljestvicu za mjerenje otpornosti na narušavanje online privatnosti potrošača. U radu se analizira psihometrijska prikladnost mjerne ljestvice te je procijenjena njezina pouzdanost, konvergentna valjanost te dimenzionalnost. Podaci su analizirani izračunom Cronbachova alfa koeficijenta te eksplorativnom i konfirmativnom faktorskom analizom. Rezultati istraživanja upućuju na zaključak o potrebi skraćivanja originalne mjerne ljestvice na način da se zadrže samo pozitivne tvrdnje u ljestvici. Skraćena verzija originalne ljestvice ima zadovoljavajuće psihometrijske karakteristike jer posjeduje svojstva pouzdanosti i konvergentne valjanosti, a dimenzionalnost ljestvice u skladu je s konceptualiziranom dimenzionalnošću.
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Internal forced displacement is a current social problem in Colombia. Although this phenomenon has been studied extensively, the purpose of this article is to analyse the administration of this crisis under the grille interprétative of humanitarian government during the presidential term of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-18). My argument is that humanitarian government functions as a biopolitical assembly that amalgamates two elements: resilience-a fundamental element of psychosocial attention to the displaced-and the language of compassion used publicly by President Santos. Finally, I will try to underline that this logic operates as a condition of possibility to normalise this phenomenon and hide the functioning of the violence that unequally distributes the compassion between lives considered valuable and those whose lives and problems simply appear to be not valuable at all.
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This article is devoted to the analysis of environmental trends in the leading countries of the world. Insufficient capacity to objectively assess countries' performance in the field of environmental policy poses a serious threat to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The purpose of this study is to study, using a systematic approach, the latest trends in the implementation of environmental policy in leading countries: the United States, China and Great Britain. To solve the problem of a comprehensive assessment of the environmental policy of states in the study, a systematic approach was used with the allocation of three main levels: assessment of the qualitative variability of environmental measures within the framework of the implementation of the SDG programs; study of the involvement of various representatives of society: government, private sector; analysis of project financing.
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We live in an age of increasing doubt about whether our institutions and technologies can provide security against risks, many of which they themselves have created. Uncertain Business is an unprecedented inquiry into insurance industry practices and what they tell us about risks and uncertainties in contemporary society. The core of the book is ethnographic studies in distinct fields of insurance: premature death, disability, earthquake, and terrorism. These studies reveal that uncertainty pervades different fields of insurance, the very industry that is charged with transforming uncertainty into manageable risk. Scientific data on risk are variously absent, inadequate, controversial, contradictory, and ignored. Insurers impose meaning on uncertainty through non-scientific forms of knowledge that are intuitive, emotional, aesthetic, moral, and speculative. Nevertheless, the nature of uncertainty and the response to it varies substantially across the fields studied, showing how contemporary society is characterized by competing risk logics. Insurers’ perceptions and decisions about uncertainty-with potential for windfall profits as well as catastrophic losses-create crises in insurance availability and provoke new forms of inequality and exclusion. Hence, while the insurance industry is a central bulwark against uncertainty, insurers also play a key role in fostering it.
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The book critically engages with theoretical developments in international relations and security studies to develop a fresh conceptual framework for studying security.Contents 1. Politics of insecurity, technology and the political2. Security framing: the question of the meaning of security3. Displacing the spectre of the state in security studies: From referent objects to techniques of government4. Securitizing migration: Freedom from existential threats and the constitution of insecure communities5. European integration and societal insecurity6. Freedom and security in the EU: A Foucaultian view on spill-over7. Migration, securitization and the question of political community in the EU8. De-securitizing migration: Security knowledge and concepts of the political9. Conclusion: the politics of framing insecurity