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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695651
Hope, Pride, and Processing During Optimal and Nonoptimal
Times of Day
Lisa A. Cavanaugh
University of Southern California Keisha M. Cutright, Mary Frances Luce, and
James R. Bettman
Duke University
We examine the conditions under which the distinct positive emotions of hope versus pride facilitate
more or less fluid cognitive processing. Using individuals’ naturally occurring time of day preferences
(i.e., morning vs. evening hours), we show that specific positive emotions can differentially influence
processing resources. We argue that specific positive emotions are more likely to influence processing
and behavior during nonoptimal times of day, when association-based processing is more likely. We
show in three experiments that hope, pride, and a neutral state differentially influence fluid processing
on cognitive tasks. Incidental hope facilitates fluid processing during nonoptimal times of day (compared
with pride and neutral), improving performance on tasks requiring fluid intelligence (Experiment 1) and
increasing valuation estimates on tasks requiring that preferences be constructed on the spot (Experi-
ments 2 and 3). We also provide evidence that these differences in preference and valuation occur
through a process of increased imagination (Experiment 3). We contribute to emotion theory by showing
that different positive emotions have different implications for processing during nonoptimal times of
day.
Keywords: emotion, cognitive processing, circadian rhythm, positive mood, hope and pride
Different positive emotions can influence cognitive processing
and performance in very specific ways. For instance, hope and
pride are both common positive emotions associated with common
achievement scenarios. However, these two emotions may create
different effects on later processing because of the unique themes,
appraisals, and behavioral tendencies embodied by each emotion.
Specifically, hope may elicit striving toward desired outcomes,
encouraging a cognitive style that stimulates fluid processing and
imagination, while pride may elicit more self-focused reflection on
accomplishments, creating an opposite style. At times, however,
we seem to inhibit, correct, or control for these effects, disengag-
ing even while hopeful or striving even while feeling pride. What
might account for the presence or inhibition of these specific
effects of positive emotions? We demonstrate that one answer to
this question includes individuals’ naturally occurring time of day
preferences for morning versus evening hours. We use time of day
to manipulate the availability of inhibitory resources (Hasher,
Zacks, May, Gopher, & Koriat, 1999; May & Hasher, 1998) and
therefore the amount of association-based (vs. controlled) process-
ing (Bodenhausen, 1990; May, Hasher, & Foong, 2005). Based on
reasoning about distinct emotion associations, we predict and find
that incidental hope (compared with incidental pride and neutral
states)
1
facilitates fluid cognitive processing during nonoptimal
times of day, resulting in better performance on a fluid intelligence
task and a stronger propensity to find value in relatively novel
goods.
Much emotion research has focused on the effects of positive
affect, mood, and positive versus negative emotional states. Al-
though important strides have been made in understanding the
distinct effects of incidental negative emotions (Lerner & Keltner,
2000, 2001), comparatively little work has been done to distin-
guish the different consequences of specific positive emotions.
Most research involving positive affect and emotion argues that
various positive emotional states have similar effects on behavior
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001; Isen, 2001; for notable exceptions see
Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008; Bartlett &
DeSteno, 2006). A large body of research has suggested that
positive affect universally increases cognitive flexibility (Isen,
2001; Isen & Daubman, 1984) and improves problem-solving
(Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997). Additional research has suggested
that positive emotions function to broaden momentary thought-
action repertoires (Fredrickson, 2001), extend habitual ways of
1
We manipulated emotions via an incidental emotion task (Lerner &
Keltner, 2001). We examine the effects of incidental emotion (i.e., emotion
generated by an initial task that is irrelevant to the focal task, which is the
source of dependent measures) as opposed to integral emotion (i.e., emo-
tion that is relevant to or generated by the focal task).
Lisa A. Cavanaugh, Department of Marketing, Marshall School of
Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California;
Keisha M. Cutright, Mary Frances Luce, and James R. Bettman, Depart-
ment of Marketing, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina.
We thank Barb Fredrickson, Sara Algoe, and the members of the
Positive Emotion and Psychophysiology Laboratory (a.k.a. PEPLab) at the
University of North Carolina for their helpful comments on a draft of this
article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lisa A.
Cavanaugh, University of Southern California, Marshall School of Busi-
ness, Department of Marketing, 3660 Trousdale Parkway, Room ACC
306E, Mail code: 0443, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0443. E-mail:
lisa.cavanaugh@usc.edu
Emotion © 2011 American Psychological Association
2011, Vol. 11, No. 1, 38– 46 1528-3542/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0022016
38
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695651
thinking (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), and build cognitive
resources (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008;
Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). In this article, we
contribute to emotion theory by showing that different specific
positive emotions can differentially influence cognitive flexibility.
Researchers have found that the influence of emotion can be
quite labile. Work on mood freezing (Bushman, Baumeister, &
Phillips, 2001; Hirt, Devers, & McCrea, 2008; Manucia, Baumann,
& Cialdini, 1984) shows that individuals’ beliefs about their emo-
tion can change whether or not the emotion influences behavior.
Moreover, the effect of emotion is often contingent on cognitive
load, which has been shown to affect emotional processing in
different consumption contexts (Rottenstreich, Sood, & Brenner,
2007; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002). These findings suggest that the
magnitude of emotion’s effect can be increased or decreased based
on the availability or perceived availability of an individual’s
resources.
One naturally occurring factor that influences the availability of
resources is an individual’s circadian rhythm. During different
times of day (i.e., morning vs. evening), individuals have been
found to feel and operate at their personal best or not (i.e.,
optimally or nonoptimally) based on their personal circadian
rhythms. Individuals’ circadian rhythms influence cognitive re-
source availability (Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008) and govern cog-
nitive function (Yoon, May, & Hasher, 2000). Thus, one important
factor that may amplify or lessen the effects of emotion is time of
day. Specifically, during nonoptimal times of day resources are
less readily available, and therefore automatic, association-based
processing (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & West,
2002) is more likely (Bodenhausen, 1990; May et al., 2005).
In this article, we investigate whether specific positive emotions
can affect cognitive performance through their unique, learned
associations. We argue that the core relational themes, appraisals,
beliefs, and action tendencies associated with any particular emo-
tion are learned and automatic, serving a “steering function” and
helping to generate emotion-appropriate behavior (Lang, 1994;
Leventhal & Tomarken, 1986). These unique associations have
different implications for processing. Thus, we predict distinctions
among specific positive emotions under conditions that encourage
more automatic and association-based processing.
We contend that association-based emotion mechanisms are
likely to be more prevalent during nonoptimal times of day when
processing resources are reduced and inhibitory control is lower
(Hasher et al., 1999). At these times, associative type processing is
likely to be more prevalent, leading to a greater influence for
specific emotional associations on cognitive task performance
(Stanovich & West, 2002), including the valuation of items. In
summary, although the vast majority of empirical work has treated
positive emotions as an undifferentiated group producing similar
effects for processing, we propose differential effects for distinct
positive emotions under conditions favoring more association-
based processing.
More specifically, in our studies, we contrast the emotions hope
and pride. The unique associations with hope suggest that a valued
goal is possible, while associations with pride suggest a valued
goal has already been achieved. Hope is differentially associated
with concepts such as striving, possibility, effort, or the future,
whereas pride is associated with concepts such as achievement,
fulfillment, or the past. We believe that the distinct set of associ-
ations for each emotion can have important processing implica-
tions, particularly for fluid processing tasks requiring mental ex-
ploration or cognitive flexibility.
Hope and pride were selected as the emotions of interest for this
research not only because they are distinct positive emotions but
also because they both regularly occur in a variety of achievement
contexts across an individual’s life span. Some common situations
that elicit both hope and pride include athletic contests; getting fit
or losing weight; and finding a job. Individuals regularly experi-
ence hope and pride in these contexts, and the same individual is
likely to experience this pair of emotions in succession (i.e., before
and after an important outcome). Because hope and pride often are
intimately linked to desirable important outcomes, both emotions
are likely to be triggered throughout the day by numerous stimuli
that bring valued outcomes to mind. In such situations, an indi-
vidual’s valuation of items may be higher under certain conditions
(i.e., emotional states and times of day).
In sum, we predict that hope versus pride will affect processing
in distinctly different ways during nonoptimal times of day, par-
ticularly for fluid-processing tasks such as construction of valua-
tions. Next, we examine more specifically how different positive
emotions and nonoptimal times might, in combination, influence
processing on specific decision tasks. We then present evidence
from three experiments demonstrating that hope and pride differ-
entially influence fluid processing during nonoptimal times of day.
We show that during nonoptimal times of day hope improves
performance on a fluid intelligence task (Experiment 1) and in-
creases valuation estimates for a task where preferences for novel
objects must be determined in real time (Experiment 2). We further
show that hope impacts preference and valuation through the
process of imagination (Experiment 3).
Positive Emotions
In this article, we focus on the core themes, beliefs, thoughts,
and action tendencies associated with two distinct positive emo-
tions—hope and pride—and suggest some important ways in
which these specific positive emotions may differ. We argue that
these different emotion associations for hope and pride are learned
and automatic, serving a “steering function” (Lang, 1994; Lev-
enthal & Tomarken, 1986) for goal-oriented behavior.
Hope is an emotion characterized by an individual’s “yearning
for better and believing the wished-for improvement is possible”
(Lazarus, 2006, p. 16). Hope signals not only that a “current life
circumstance is unsatisfactory” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 653) but also
that a concrete positive goal is expected (Staats & Stassen, 1985).
Hopeful thought reflects a capability to derive pathways to desired
goals and to motivate goal pursuit (Snyder, Harris, Anderson, &
Holleran, 1991). Hope-related cognitions and associations involve
visualization and mental representation of positively valued ab-
stract future situations (Stotland, 1969) as well as tendencies
toward cognitive flexibility and mental exploration of novel situ-
ations (Breznitz, 1986; Snyder, 1994). High-hope individuals also
demonstrate better problem-solving abilities than low-hope indi-
viduals (Chang, 1998). In sum, hope is associated with motivated
goal-striving, problem-solving, and mental exploration of novel
situations. Thus, the associations with hope seem likely to elicit
flexible, goal-oriented behavior in the moment, often leading to
changes in one’s current state.
39
POSITIVE EMOTIONS AND TIME OF DAY
Pride has been characterized as “enhancement of one’s ego-
identity by taking credit for a valued achievement” (Lazarus, 2006,
p. 16) and experiencing enhancement of one’s self, or one’s social
worth, by being credited for a highly valued accomplishment
(Lazarus, 1991). Pride may have evolved to provide information
about an individual’s current level of status and acceptance (Tracy
& Robins, 2007a, 2007b; Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta, 2005). Pride
involves specific self-evaluative processes and thoughts and is
considered a self-conscious emotion (Tangney, Dalgleish, &
Power, 1999). Thus, pride-related cognitions involve internal at-
tributions and self-credit for valued events (Smith & Lazarus,
1993; Weiner, 1985) and reflect experienced success in which an
individual currently feels good about him or herself. In sum, pride
is associated with goal-satiation, achievement, and self-
satisfaction. Therefore, unlike hope, the associations with pride
seem unlikely to motivate goal-oriented behavior aimed toward
making a change in one’s current state.
Circadian Rhythm and Nonoptimal Times of Day
A circadian rhythm is a daily periodicity consisting of an ap-
proximately 24-hour cycle in the biochemical, physiological, or
behavioral processes of living beings. Circadian rhythm influences
cognitive resource availability (Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008) and
governs cognitive function (Yoon, May, & Hasher, 2000). An
instantiation of this rhythm is an individual’s morningness-
eveningness preference, that is, the degree to which an individual
feels and operates at his or her personal best during mornings
versus evenings. This tendency defines an individual’s optimal
versus nonoptimal time of day (Horne & Ostberg, 1976), which in
turn influences cognitive performance across the day (Yoon et al.,
2000).
During nonoptimal times of day, processing resources are less
readily available (Bodenhausen, 1990). Lower levels of processing
resources lead to less use of effortful, controlled, deliberate pro-
cessing and greater reliance on automatic, associative, and affec-
tive processing (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & West,
2002). Moreover, lower levels of processing resources are associ-
ated with reductions in inhibition, influencing the momentary
contents of working memory (Hasher et al., 1999). This lower
inhibition may clutter or enrich contents in working memory (May,
1999; May & Hasher, 1998; Rowe, Valderrama, Hasher, & Len-
artowicz, 2006), with implications for performance that depend on
task demands. For instance, recent evidence suggests that implicit
memory retrieval is likely to be facilitated by more nonconscious,
associative processing and hence be better at nonoptimal times of
day, whereas explicit retrieval is likely to be better at optimal times
of day (May et al., 2005). Thus, during nonoptimal times of day,
inhibition is lower and associative processing is more likely to
affect behavior.
Positive Emotions, Nonoptimal Times, and Fluid
Processing
When processing resources and inhibition are more limited (i.e.,
during nonoptimal times of day), we expect incidental emotion to
have a larger impact on processing. During nonoptimal times of
day, reliance on associative processing should increase, making
the core themes, thoughts, and action tendencies associated with an
incidental emotional experience more accessible. Conversely, dur-
ing optimal times of day individuals will be more likely to correct
for or block out affective information because of heightened in-
hibitory control, particularly if affective information is incidental,
and hence likely to be perceived as irrelevant to the task at hand.
The greater accessibility of and receptivity to affective information
at nonoptimal times should enhance the influence of incidental
emotional associations on subsequent judgments and behaviors.
Thus, during nonoptimal times of day lower inhibition and greater
reliance on associative processing may make the emotion’s asso-
ciated thoughts and tendencies more influential.
In this article, we focus on the differential effects of hope versus
pride during nonoptimal times of day. Specifically, we show how
hope and pride differentially influence judgment in contexts re-
quiring fluid processing. Both fluid processing and fluid intelli-
gence refer to the ability to reason and solve new problems
independently of previously acquired knowledge and are critical
for a wide variety of cognitive tasks (Cattell, 1971; Jaeggi, Busch-
kuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008). Fluid processing requires open-
ness and the ability to let in information or inputs and is associated
with abstract reasoning and mental exploration. We expect that
emotional states that engender greater cognitive flexibility and
mental exploration (e.g., hope) will facilitate performance on prob-
lems or tasks requiring fluid processing more than emotional states
that do not (e.g., pride), particularly during nonoptimal times of
day. It is important to note that we do not expect emotional states
to impact performance on tasks requiring crystallized intelligence
(i.e., tasks that require skills and knowledge from past experience),
even at nonoptimal times. Research suggests that highly practiced
responses (i.e., elements of crystallized knowledge) are invariant
across the day; however, attentional regulation over incoming
information and outgoing responses that are not highly practiced
(i.e., fluid intelligence) is particularly vulnerable to time of day
effects (Hasher, Goldstein, & May, 2005). We argue that this more
contingent nature of fluid, versus crystallized, tasks will extend to
the impact of emotional associations. Thus, we hypothesize that
hope will increase fluid processing (relative to pride) during non-
optimal times of day.
Experimental Overview and Hypotheses
We test our hypothesis in three different experimental task
contexts. The first experiment uses an established paradigm from
the literature on circadian rhythm and involves fluid versus crys-
tallized intelligence measures with clear performance criteria. Pre-
vious research has shown that individuals perform better on fluid
intelligence tasks during their own optimal time of day (Goldstein,
Hahn, Hasher, Wiprzycka, & Zelazo, 2007). In contrast, individ-
uals’ performance on crystallized intelligence tasks requiring ac-
cess to and production of well-learned or familiar responses is
unaffected by time of day (May, 1999). In the first experiment, we
replicate this established time of day effect in a neutral emotional
state (Goldstein et al., 2007) and then extend these findings by
showing that positive incidental emotion moderates the relation-
ship between nonoptimal time of day and performance on fluid
intelligence tasks. The second experiment examines the fluid pro-
cessing phenomenon in the context of preference assessment, a
fundamental psychological process which involves determining
one’s personal estimate of an object’s worth. Recent views of
40 CAVANAUGH, CUTRIGHT, LUCE, AND BETTMAN
preference assessment (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Kahne-
man, Knetsch, & Thaler, 2005; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein,
2004), especially for nonfamiliar items, have argued that it is a
constructive process (Bettman et al., 1998) and hence requires
fluid processing. That is, preferences may often be determined on
the spot at the time of assessment rather than being retrieved or
based on preexisting estimates. We show that two different posi-
tive emotions (hope and pride) differentially influence individuals’
willingness to pay during nonoptimal times of day (see Cryder,
Lerner, Gross, & Dahl, 2008, for influences of sadness on buying
prices). The third experiment replicates our effects for preference
and valuation and provides direct evidence for the process by
which hope has its effects (i.e., increased imagination and mental
exploration).
We hypothesize that during nonoptimal times of day hope will
promote more fluid processing, that is, more mental exploration and
generation of possibilities, than pride. In Experiment 1 we use an
intelligence task where fluid processing appears to facilitate genera-
tion of possible solutions and ultimately performance. In Experiments
2 and 3 we use two different preference valuation tasks where fluid
processing seems likely to facilitate generation of possible or potential
uses for considered items. As a result, we expect hope, but not pride,
to increase performance on measures of fluid problem-solving (Ex-
periment 1) and valuation of items in assessing preferences (Experi-
ments 2 and 3) during nonoptimal times of day.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. A total of 103 adults (78 women and 25 men)
ranging in age from 20 to 74 (M⫽43.3 years, SD ⫽13.09)
completed the computer-based study in a laboratory or online.
Participants were recruited through email requests and online
postings. The sample included university employees recruited
from the campus community and general population adults pro-
vided by a national online data provider (Greenfield Online). All
participants completed a pretest online and then were asked either
to report to the behavioral lab or to log on to a Web site to
complete the main study during a randomly assigned window of
time. As the results reported below do not differ between these two
groups, the data were collapsed.
Procedure and materials. Experiment one consisted of a 2
time of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal) ⫻3 emotion induction (hope,
pride, neutral) between subjects factorial design.
Task 1 (prescreener). Approximately 1 week before partic-
ipating in the main experiment, participants were asked to com-
plete the Horne and Ostberg (1976) Morningness-Eveningness
Questionnaire (MEQ), a validated individual measure of when
people reach their functional peak during the day (i.e., “optimal
time of day”). Participants were categorized as morning-types or
evening-types based on established scoring procedures (see
Bodenhausen, 1990; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008) and then ran-
domly assigned to take the main experiment in the morning (7:00
a.m.–9:30 a.m.) or the evening (4:00 p.m.–6:30 p.m.). Thus,
participants were randomly assigned to take the study at their
“optimal” time of day or “nonoptimal” time of day.
2
Task 2 (emotion induction). Upon arrival for the main exper-
iment, participants were randomly assigned to an emotion induction
condition (hope, pride, neutral). Following Lerner and Keltner’s
(2001) procedure, participants in the hope or pride conditions were
asked to (1) think about three to five things that make them most
hopeful (proud) and (2) describe in more detail “one situation that
makes you, or has made you, feel most hopeful (proud).” The remain-
ing participants (neutral condition) were asked to write about their
own regular daily routine. A series of linguistic (Pennebaker, Booth,
& Francis, 2007) and content analyses were conducted on each
participant’s writing sample to ensure that the emotion induction had
its intended effect.
3
The total amount of time participants spent on the
emotion induction was recorded by the computer. The amount of time
spent on the emotion induction was included as a covariate in all three
studies to ensure time spent on task or depletion did not account for
our results.
Task 3 (intelligence tasks). Next, participants were asked to
complete two measures of intelligence. The first task was a mea-
sure of fluid intelligence called “Matrix Reasoning,” taken from
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI 1999; see
Goldstein et al., 2007). This task involved a series of 20 pictures.
In each picture there was a missing piece and participants were
asked to choose which of five possible options would best com-
plete the picture. Next, participants were asked to complete a test
of crystallized intelligence consisting of 20 vocabulary questions
(Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2005, see Goldstein et al., 2007) using
analogies and sentence completion taken from a GRE preparation
booklet (Green & Wolf, 2003).
Results
The focal dependent measure in this study was performance on
the fluid intelligence picture task, which was measured as the
number of questions answered correctly (out of 20). Similarly,
performance on the crystallized vocabulary task was measured as
the number of questions answered correctly (out of 20).
Replication of basic time of day effect. We first report
replication of the basic effect that participants in a neutral
emotional state perform better on fluid, but not crystallized,
intelligence measures at optimal times. For the neutral condi-
tion only, an ANOVA revealed a main effect of time of day on
the picture task, F(1, 31) ⫽4.03, p⬍.05, with better perfor-
mance at optimal times (M
optimal
⫽16.6, SD ⫽1.39) than at
nonoptimal times (M
nonoptimal
⫽15.0, SD ⫽2.81). There was
no effect of time of day on crystallized intelligence, that is, the
vocabulary task (F⬍1). In testing the main hypotheses below,
2
Participants recruited at the university reported to the lab at their
assigned time and participants recruited online were allowed to sign-on and
take the main experiment only in their assigned time slot. No-show rates
did not differ by optimal versus nonoptimal times of day in Study 1 ( p⬎
.5), Study 2 ( p⬎.3), or Study 3 ( p⬎.3).
3
Linguistic (LIWC2007) and content analyses show that hope and pride
were significantly higher than neutral on all measures of affective process-
ing (i.e., total affect, positive emotion, and negative emotion). Hope and
pride were equal in positive emotion and total affect in Studies 1 and 3;
hope was higher than pride in Study 2. Hope and pride were equal in
negative emotion and anxiety in all three studies. Hope and pride were also
equal in word count and words per sentence.
41
POSITIVE EMOTIONS AND TIME OF DAY
the vocabulary score was included as a covariate to control for
differences in verbal ability.
4
Main hypothesis. The primary purpose of Experiment 1 was
to understand the effect of emotion on fluid task performance at
optimal versus nonoptimal times of day. To this end, we conducted
an ANOVA with emotion condition and time of day (optimal vs.
nonoptimal) as predictors, fluid intelligence (picture task) perfor-
mance as the dependent variable, and vocabulary performance and
total time on the emotion induction as covariates. As expected,
results revealed a 2-way interaction of emotion condition and
time of day, F(2, 95) ⫽3.27, p⫽.04; see Figure 1. In probing
this interaction, we first analyzed the impact of emotion at
nonoptimal times of day using planned contrasts. As predicted,
hope led to better performance than pride at nonoptimal times
of day; F(1, 95) ⫽4.51, p⬍.04; M
hope nonoptimal
⫽16.94
(SD ⫽2.41), M
pride nonoptimal
⫽15.21 (SD ⫽3.87). Hope also
led to better performance than neutral at nonoptimal times of
day; F(1, 95) ⫽4.43, p⫽.04, M
hope nonoptimal
⫽16.94 (SD ⫽
2.41), M
neutral nonoptimal
⫽15.00 (SD ⫽2.81). Results revealed
no difference between neutral and pride (F⬍1). Next, we
analyzed the impact of emotion at optimal times of day. As
predicted, the difference between emotions did not impact
performance at optimal times of day (hope vs. pride, F⬍1;
hope vs. neutral, F(1, 95) ⫽1.69, p⫽.20; neutral vs. pride F⬍
1). It is interesting to note that within the hope condition,
participants at their nonoptimal time of day actually performed
better than their optimal counterparts (F(1, 95) ⫽3.69, p⫽.06;
M
hope optimal
⫽15.44 (SD ⫽2.71), M
hope nonoptimal
⫽16.94
(SD ⫽2.41).
Thus, the results of Experiment 1 show that two different positive
emotions, hope and pride, affect processing differentially at nonopti-
mal times of day. Specifically, hope increases fluid processing and
improves performance during nonoptimal times of day compared with
pride and a neutral emotional state. We argue that individuals expe-
riencing hope during nonoptimal times of day are guided by hope-
related associations and are more likely to engage in mental explora-
tion, that is, visualizing shapes and generating solutions, when solving
matrix reasoning problems, improving task performance. In Experi-
ment 2, we examine the implications of facilitating fluid processing in
a task in which preferences are determined in real-time (i.e., construc-
tive preferences).
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. A total of 117 university students (74 women
and 43 men) ranging in age from 18 to 29 (M⫽21 years, SD ⫽
1.68) were recruited to take a decision-making study in the uni-
versity’s behavioral lab.
Procedure and materials. The research design was a 2 time
of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal) ⫻3 emotion induction (hope,
pride, neutral) between subjects factorial design. The time of day
and incidental emotion manipulations were accomplished exactly
as in Experiment 1. After the emotion induction, participants were
asked to indicate how much they would be willing to pay for a
variety of items; willingness to pay is one standard approach for
assessing an individual’s preference for an item (Bettman et al.,
1998). Seven items were adopted from Vohs and Faber (2007),
designed to reflect items for which participants would have little
repeat-purchasing experience (e.g., stove or fine jewelry as op-
posed to repeat-purchase items such as food or rent) and thus little
crystallized knowledge to draw from in constructing their willing-
ness to pay estimates. We believe that in this task the fluid
processing associated with hope will facilitate generation of usage
possibilities for relatively unfamiliar items, potentially leading to
increased willingness to pay.
Results
We conducted an ANOVA with emotion condition and time
of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal) as predictors, the total amount of
money that a participant was willing to pay for the collection of
items as the dependent variable, and total time spent on the
emotion induction as a covariate. Results revealed a 2-way inter-
action of emotion condition and time of day, F(2, 110) ⫽3.14, p⫽
.05 (Figure 2). To test the hypothesis that hope would lead to
greater valuation of items than pride in the nonoptimal condi-
tion, we ran a contrast, F(1, 110) ⫽7.01, p⬍.009 that
confirmed the prediction; M
hope nonoptimal
⫽$4,113.71 (SD ⫽
5,212.89), M
pride nonoptimal
⫽$1,410.36 (SD ⫽428.26). We also
ran a contrast to test the hypothesis that hope would lead to
greater valuation than neutral in nonoptimal conditions (F(1,
110) ⫽4.49, p⫽.04; M
hope nonoptimal
⫽$4,113.71 (SD ⫽
5,212.89), M
neutral nonoptimal
⫽$2,391.63 (SD ⫽1,518.16).
Results revealed no difference between neutral and pride, F(1,
110) ⫽.79, p⫽.38, although pride was directionally lower.
Further, as predicted, the emotion inductions did not signifi-
cantly impact performance at optimal times of day (all Fs⬍1).
Although not predicted, for the pride condition, participants in
the nonoptimal condition were willing to pay significantly less
than their counterparts in the optimal condition, F(1, 110) ⫽
4.80, p⫽.03; M
pride optimal
⫽$3,420.70 (SD ⫽2,594.31),
M
pride nonoptimal
⫽$1,410.36 (SD ⫽428.26). Within the hope
condition, participants at their nonoptimal time of day were
willing to pay directionally more than their optimal counter-
4
Neither the emotion condition ( p⬎.8) nor the interaction of emotion
condition and time of day ( p⬎.8) influenced performance on the vocab-
ulary task.
Figure 1. Mean picture scores in Experiment 1 as a function of emotion
condition and time of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal).
42 CAVANAUGH, CUTRIGHT, LUCE, AND BETTMAN
parts, F(1, 110) ⫽1.84, p⫽.18; M
hope optimal
⫽$2,811 (SD ⫽
2,944.64), M
hope nonoptimal
⫽$4,113.71 (SD ⫽5,212.89).
Thus, Experiment 2 again demonstrates that two different positive
emotions, hope and pride, affect processing differentially at nonopti-
mal times of day. Specifically, hope increases individuals’ willingness
to pay for items with which they have little prior knowledge or
experience compared with pride and a neutral condition during non-
optimal times of day. We argue that individuals experiencing hope
during nonoptimal times of day are guided by hope-related associa-
tions, resulting in greater mental exploration when constructing will-
ingness to pay estimates. We argue that this increased mental explo-
ration (e.g., visualizing possible uses for the products) increases
individuals’ preference assessments, that is, the valuation placed on
the items. In Experiment 3, we directly test this process.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. A total of 88 university students (31 women
and 57 men) ranging in age from 18 to 26 (M⫽19.6 years, SD ⫽
1.64) were recruited to take a decision making study on campus.
Experiment 3 was administered via laptop computers brought to an
undergraduate dormitory.
Procedure and materials. The research design was a 2 time
of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal) ⫻2 emotion induction (hope vs.
pride) between subjects factorial design. The time of day and
incidental emotion manipulations were accomplished exactly as in
studies 1 and 2. After the emotion induction, participants were
shown pictures and descriptions of three innovative, new products
with which they had no prior experience.
5
To directly test the
proposed mechanism by which hope and pride differentially affect
individuals’ mental exploration, participants were asked to indicate
how well they could imagine situations in which they could use
each product (where 1 ⫽very difficult to imagine and 9 ⫽very
easy to imagine). Next, in order to capture individuals’ overall
assessments of the products, we asked participants to indicate how
interested they would be in trying each product (where 1 ⫽not at
all interested and 9 ⫽very interested) and how much they would
be willing to pay for each item. Finally, to control for participants’
chronic attitudes toward trying new things, participants were asked
to rate their agreement with nine statements designed to measure
their chronic attitudes toward new product risk (e.g., I am the kind
of person who would try any new product once; Raju, 1980) on a
7-point Likert scale (where 1 ⫽completely disagree and 7 ⫽
completely agree;␣⫽.76). This measure was not affected by the
emotion or time of day manipulations ( ps⬎.15).
Given that participants were shown products that were quite novel,
they had little crystallized knowledge to draw from in constructing
their product assessments. Accordingly, the fluid processing associ-
ated with hope was expected to facilitate participants’ ability to
imagine uses for the products, and thus enhance their preference and
valuation, particularly at nonoptimal times of day.
Results
In order to test our hypothesis that the effect of hope and
pride differentially impacts product assessments at nonoptimal
(but not optimal) times of day, we conducted an ANOVA with
emotion condition and time of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal) as
predictors, and total time on the emotion induction and chronic
attitude toward new product risk (Raju, 1980) as covariates. The
dependent variable, designed to capture individuals’ overall
product assessments, was a standardized index including both
the total amount of money that participants were willing to pay
for the set of items and their mean rating of their interest in the
new products.
6
Results for this index revealed a 2-way inter-
action of emotion condition and time of day, F(1, 82) ⫽3.97,
p⫽.05 (Figure 3). To test the hypothesis that hope would lead
to a more positive assessment of items than pride in the non-
optimal condition, we ran a contrast, F(1, 82) ⫽5.86, p⬍.02
that confirmed the prediction; M
hope nonoptimal
⫽.36 (SD ⫽.93),
M
pride nonoptimal
⫽⫺.17 (SD ⫽.68). As predicted, the hope and
pride emotion inductions did not significantly impact assess-
ments at optimal times of day (F⬍1).
Having established that the effect of emotion on product assess-
ment depends on time of day optimality, we sought to test the
mechanism for our hypothesis, that is, why hope leads to more
positive assessments than pride during nonoptimal times of day. We
argue that individuals experiencing hope during nonoptimal times of
day exhibit increased mental exploration and imagination for using
the products.
7
Thus, we followed the steps recommended by Muller et
al. (2005) for establishing mediated moderation. First, as indicated
above, the effect of emotion on product assessment is moderated by
time of day, ⫽.32, t(82) ⫽1.99, p⫽.05. Second, results reveal that
the effect of emotion on individuals’ reported ability to imagine using
5
Products included: Pure shots of oxygen (O
2
) from small aluminum
canisters to give energy; a mobile library the size of a cell phone that reads
books to you and acts as a scribe; a cell phone with unlimited reach, even
in remote areas across the world, with several weeks of battery life. We
thank Dave Alexander for sharing stimuli with us.
6
The willingness to pay estimate and interest ratings were significantly
correlated (r⫽.30, p⬍.005).
7
We also coded the writing samples for evidence of other potential
intervening processes (e.g., certainty, complexity, distraction, emotion
intensity) suggested by reviewers as alternative mechanisms. When in-
cluded in the analyses, these variables were not significantly related to our
dependent measures.
Figure 2. Mean willingness to pay estimates in Experiment 2 as a
function of emotion condition and time of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal).
43
POSITIVE EMOTIONS AND TIME OF DAY
the products depends on time of day optimality, ⫽.39, t(82) ⫽2.45,
p⫽.02. Third, the partial effect of the ability to imagine using the
products on product assessment is significant, ⫽.62, t(80) ⫽5.14,
p⬍.0001, when controlling for emotion condition, time of day
condition, the interaction of emotion and time of day conditions, and
the interaction of the ability to imagine and time of day (as well as the
two covariates used in each model: total time on emotion induction
and chronic attitudes toward new product risk). It is important to note
that the original interaction of interest—emotion by time of day
optimality—is no longer significant when the imagination mediator is
included, ⫽.08, t(80) ⫽.59, p⫽.56, indicating full mediated
moderation.
In sum, Experiment 3 further demonstrates that different posi-
tive emotions, hope and pride, differentially affect processing at
nonoptimal times of day. Specifically, hope enhances individuals’
assessments of new items with which they have little prior knowl-
edge or experience relative to pride during nonoptimal times of
day. We further demonstrate that this effect is mediated by an
enhanced ability to imagine uses for products. These findings
support our hypothesis that hope-related associations facilitate
greater mental exploration, which in turn, increases individuals’
preference and valuation assessments, during nonoptimal times of
day.
General Discussion
Our findings demonstrate that different positive emotions can
have different effects on task performance at nonoptimal times of
day. For tasks requiring crystallized knowledge or experience,
performance is invariant with respect to emotion or time of day.
However, in the case of tasks requiring fluid processing, emotion
and time of day combine to determine performance. In particular,
the effects of hope and pride diverge during nonoptimal times of
day. Experiment 1 shows that hope facilitates fluid processing and
improves performance on a fluid intelligence task with clear per-
formance criteria during nonoptimal times of day. Experiment 2
shows that hope increases fluid processing and valuation estimates
in a context where preferences are constructed on the spot during
nonoptimal times of day. Experiment 3 shows that hope increases
preference and valuation by increasing imagination and mental
exploration during nonoptimal times of day. Together these exper-
iments suggest that fluid and constructive processing styles can be
differentially influenced by the goal orientations and associations
linked with different positive emotions in predictable situations,
that is, during nonoptimal times of day. We suggest that these
effects occur because of lower inhibition during nonoptimal times
of day. Our findings are consistent with previous work emphasiz-
ing the importance of understanding thoughts and behavioral ten-
dencies associated with specific emotions (Han, Lerner, & Keltner,
2007). Experiment 1 offers evidence that lower inhibition can lead
to better performance for hope as opposed to pride. However, there
may be situations when lower inhibition and greater mental ex-
ploration are undesirable. Thus, an important question for future
research is under what conditions and for what tasks might hope
improve versus degrade judgment quality at nonoptimal times of
day.
Our work contributes to emotion theory by addressing the
question of when different positive emotions motivate and facili-
tate different types of behaviors. Most research has suggested
relatively undifferentiated positive affect and emotion mechanisms
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, 2001).
However, we identify an important condition (nonoptimal time of
day) under which distinct positive emotions differentially motivate
and facilitate unique behaviors. Thus, our work points to differ-
ential effects of distinct positive emotions that may coexist with
more generalized mechanisms such as broaden and build.
Our work also expands on prior work on circadian rhythm
demonstrating that fluid intelligence is degraded under nonoptimal
times of day but further shows that associations with hope actually
seem to reverse this effect. Our findings are consistent with a view
of fluid intelligence task performance as relatively labile and
subject to influence from a wide array of cognitive and emotional
factors. Our work is also consistent with other recent research
(e.g., see Rowe et al., 2006) indicating that, for some task contexts,
performance under nonoptimal times of day might actually be
better than performance during optimal times or nonemotional
conditions (Levens & Phelps, 2008). We argue this may be par-
ticularly true when experiencing specific emotions (in our exper-
iments, hope). In the case of hope in our first study, it appears that
lowered inhibitory control under nonoptimal times of day allowed
positive, goal-striving associations with hope to have stronger
effects, ultimately resulting in better performance on a fluid intel-
ligence task.
Our research identifies time of day as an important member of
a class of moderators impacting when individuals are more or less
likely to be influenced by their emotions. Thus, optimal versus
nonoptimal time of day may be a useful methodological tool for
researchers interested in isolating or manipulating emotion-based
effects. In addition, previous research has shown that older adults
demonstrate superior cognitive performance for emotional infor-
mation (relative to nonemotional information) and that these ef-
fects are most evident when emotional content is positively va-
lenced (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). It is interesting to note that
older adults also show less inhibition (Hasher et al., 1999). Based
on these findings, our emotion specific effects for fluid processing
during nonoptimal times of day may be more pronounced for older
adults. This would also suggest that emotion-association effects on
processing (e.g., which we demonstrate with nonoptimal time of
day) may be more prevalent with age.
Figure 3. Standardized assessments of new products in Experiment 3 as
a function of emotion condition and time of day (optimal vs. nonoptimal).
44 CAVANAUGH, CUTRIGHT, LUCE, AND BETTMAN
Finally, it is worth noting that we demonstrate our effects using
incidental emotions (i.e., emotions not directly relevant to the task
at hand). For emotions directly relevant to the focal task (i.e.,
integral emotions), correction processes may be more likely. Fu-
ture research should further examine how emotion type (e.g.,
integral vs. incidental), specific emotions (e.g., hope vs. pride),
resource availability, and task constraints combine to shape task
performance.
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Received February 2, 2009
Revision received April 26, 2010
Accepted July 30, 2010 䡲
46 CAVANAUGH, CUTRIGHT, LUCE, AND BETTMAN
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