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Conservation and Society 8(3): 225-240, 2010
Article
Sitting on the Fence? Policies and Practices in Managing
Human-wildlife Conict in Limpopo Province, South Africa
Brandon P. Anthony
a,#
, Peter Scott
b
and Alexios Antypas
a
a
Environmental Sciences & Policy Department, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
b
Shangoni Section Ranger, Kruger National Park, Skukuza, Republic of South Africa;
Current afliation: Tanzania Game Tracker Safaris Ltd., Arusha, Tanzania
#
Corresponding author. E-mail: anthonyb@ceu.hu
INTRODUCTION
Conicts between humans and wildlife are the product of
socio-economic and political landscapes and the institutional
architecture designed to manage these conflicts, and are
controversial because the resources concerned have economic
value and the species involved are often high prole and legally
protected (Treves & Karanth 2003; McGregor 2005). While
humans and wildlife have a long history of co-existence, the
frequency of conicts involving damage-causing animals
(DCAs) has grown in recent decades, mainly because of the
Copyright: © Anthony et al. 2010. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use and distribution of the article, provided the original work is cited.
exponential increase in human populations and consequential
expansion of human activities (Woodroffe 2000; Woodroffe
et al. 2005), expansion of some wildlife distributions
(Breitenmoser 1998; Zedrosser et al. 2001; Bisi & Kurki 2005),
as well as a frequent inability of institutions that are meant to
mediate such conicts to respond effectively.
The investigation of DCAs and their control is important
for a number of reasons. Firstly, attitudes towards Protected
Areas (PAs) are often inuenced by perceived or real damage
caused by wildlife (Els 1995; de Boer & Baquete 1998; Hill
2004; Anthony 2007). Secondly, wildlife damage represents
Abstract
Human-wildlife conicts are the product of socio-economic and political landscapes and are contentious because
the resources concerned have economic value and species are often high prole and legally protected. Within a
governance framework, we detail institutional roles and the effectiveness of policies and practices of controlling
damage-causing animals (DCAs) at Kruger National Park (KNP) and Limpopo Province along KNP’s western
border. Most DCAs originate from the park, signicantly affecting its long-term legitimacy among local
communities. Between 2002 and 2004, over 12% of households within 15 km of the park experienced DCA
damage, with incidents signicantly correlated with being located closer to KNP and having higher numbers of
mammalian livestock. These incidents are affecting opinions concerning KNP, as those who experienced damage
were less likely to believe that the park would ever help their household economically. According to 482 DCA
incident records from 1998 to 2004, the most problematic species are buffalo, lion, elephant, hippo and crocodile.
Limpopo Province utilised professional hunters in DCA control, however, widespread abuses including the direct
luring of lion led to a national moratorium on specic hunting practices. DCA procedures are highly awed due
to ambiguity concerning species and movement of DCAs, poor reporting, inadequate response times, overlapping
responsibilities, and corruption. These are exacerbated by weak and, in some cases, competing institutions. Further,
the controversial issue of undelivered compensation is determining negative attitudes by communities towards
institutions who have historically promised it. Drawing on good governance principles, we offer recommendations
on alleviating DCA conicts in such contexts.
Keywords: compensation, conservation policy, human-wildlife conict, Kruger National Park, Limpopo
Province, poaching, trophy hunting
DOI: 10.4103/0972-4923.73812
226 / Anthony et al.
a very real and tangible threat to livelihoods in terms of
personal injury, crop and livestock losses, and property damage
(Happold 1995; Emerton 2001; Choudhury 2004; Dublin &
Hoare 2004; Hill 2004; Graham et al. 2005). Thirdly, active
persecution by humans based on wild predator threats to
livestock has been identied as an important factor in observed
carnivore declines (Mishra 1997; Woodroffe 2001; Hazzah
et al. 2009). Finally, DCA conicts are potentially socially
corrosive, creating and reecting larger conicts of value and
class and other interests (McGregor 2005). Especially in poorer
countries and countries in transition, such conicts have the
potential to undermine human security and further weaken the
effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions.
As a country that has undergone a transition from one
political system to another, South Africa has initiated rapid
reform of many of its governance institutions since the end of
Apartheid. Reform has not been uniformly effective and should
be seen more as a continuous process rather than a series of
discrete events in which governmental agencies are reorganised
once and then left to do their jobs. This situation reects many
new collaborative and multi-level approaches in PA governance
around the world, in which governance institutions and policies
are required to be exible and innovative in response to rapidly
changing environmental and social conditions (Lockwood
2010). Conict over DCAs along the border of South Africa’s
Kruger National Park (KNP) is, we will argue, the outcome
of a mist between new institutions and old ones, where
responsibility has been diffused, capacities neglected, and in
which learning has been slow to occur. In other words, DCAs
are as much a conict over institutions as over animals. Here,
we draw upon Lockwood’s (2010) seven principles of good
governance for terrestrial PAs, i.e., legitimacy, transparency,
accountability, inclusiveness, fairness, connectivity, and
resilience. Indeed, such good governance “is a prerequisite
for effective management, and is fundamental to securing the
political and community support essential to the development,
indeed the survival, of the global protected area system.”
(Lockwood 2010: 755). This paper aims to provide an analysis
of where the institutional structures and functions now in
place to deal with DCAs break down, and how they can be
reformed, based upon good governance principles, in order
to produce a DCA control regime that is efcient, effective,
and has social legitimacy. We will argue that in this dynamic,
polycentric governance environment, this will require the
creation of hybrid, participatory institutions that draw on the
strengths of the various stakeholders and provide a context
within which they can learn from each other and adapt practices
to new knowledge and changing conditions on the ground. In
short, we will argue that effective and efcient DCA control
requires the creation of inclusive, adaptive, learning institutions
appropriate to the needs and capacities of the stakeholders in
and around KNP.
Despite more than a decade of active engagement between
KNP and its neighbouring communities, little is known about
how those relationships have developed and what factors
inuence their success or failure in fostering cooperation.
The historical background of these communities, which forms
part of the former Gazankulu homeland, is characterised by
a general dissatisfaction with park authorities (Els 1994),
in part due to damage to crops, livestock and property
caused by wildlife (Cock & Fig 2000; Freitag-Ronaldson &
Foxcroft 2003). Incidents of human-wildlife conicts that are
not adequately resolved assure the maintenance of a tense
relationship between the park and communities, which has
undesirable social consequences and poses risks for the park
and its resources in the longer-term. Developing an adequate
response to the problem of DCAs should be a high priority for
park authorities and other governmental bodies.
In Limpopo Province, which encompasses the study area,
Environmental Affairs is a branch within the Department of
Finance and Economic Development (DFED/EA), whose
primary role and function is ‘[t]o stimulate, promote and
maintain an enabling environment conducive to sustainable
economic growth, social justice and a decent quality of life
for all’ (Limpopo Provincial Government 2005). DFED/EA
activities are largely governed by the Limpopo Environmental
Management Act (LEMA) No. 7 of 2003, which is consistent
with national legislation. The DFED/EA is operationally sub-
divided into municipal districts that provide conservation
extension services, regulate and monitor the use of natural
resources, and is the lead agency in controlling DCAs outside
KNP in Limpopo Province. In addition to DFED/EA eld
rangers, DCA control involved tenders issued by the province
to professional hunting outtters from 2001 to 2004.
The DFED is an institution that was created by the post-
Apartheid regime as a part of new provisional governmental
structures that were intended to introduce greater democracy
and representativeness to South Africa. Until that time,
Traditional Authorities based upon traditional clan authority
systems were the effective representatives of the communities.
However, the Traditional Authorities cooperated closely with
the Apartheid regime and are thought by some to be tainted
by this association (Hendricks 1990; van Kessel & Oomen
1997). The legal competences of the Traditional Authorities
are ambiguous, because while they are recognised in the
constitution as legitimate centres of authority their actual
rights and responsibilities are not spelled out (Ntsebeza &
Hendricks 1998). Growth of provincial government is usually
viewed by the Traditional Authorities as an incursion upon their
spheres of decision making and discretion (Ntsebeza 1999).
There is therefore an inherent rivalry between the provincial
government, in this case represented by DFED/EA, and the
Traditional Authorities. It is therefore difcult to establish
trust between these two actors, though in DCA cases as well
as other issues cooperation and trust would be required in
order to effectively deal with problems. In order to minimise
conict between stakeholders and maximise conservation
outcomes, progress towards building trust and cooperation
between the various stakeholders will be necessary, a topic
we take up again later.
Further complicating matters from a conservation perspective
is the fact that the environmental authority within DFED is
Sitting on the Fence? / 227
marginalised, and has little inuence on the agenda of the
larger organisation, which is oriented towards development
and economic growth (Anthony 2006). The DFED/EA suffers
from under-funding and under-stafng, and is therefore a weak
actor with little capacity to solve local problems (Anthony
2006), but also an actor that cannot be side-stepped by the local
actors—the park, communities, and Traditional Authorities—
most affected by the problems themselves. Previously KNP
itself was responsible for pursuing DCAs that originated in
the park, but this authority was transferred to DFED/EA in the
late 1990s. Tension and problems are therefore inherent in the
institutional arrangements within which DCAs are dealt with.
The location of our study area (Figure 1) shows that KNP and
some communities are in close proximity, thereby increasing
the incidence of DCAs and creating conicting interests
between the park’s conservation priority, human safety and
agriculture. The areas are demarcated from the KNP by way
of a boundary fence, maintained by the Department of Animal
Health—State Veterinary Service, and originally intended
to control the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. However,
many sections of the fence are dismantled and/or need repair
(Bigalke 2000; SANParks 2000, 2009). A combination of
factors contributes to the poor condition of the border fence:
sub-standard construction; poor maintenance; theft and
vandalism; actions of persons illegally crossing into South
Africa from Mozambique (Anthony 2006); and a growing
KNP elephant population exacerbated by park policies to
decommission articial waterholes in the park (Grant et al.
2008). In the interim between the all-race elections of 1994 and
the present, KNP policies have changed and now incorporate
social dimensions, including a concern with the interests
of neighbouring communities and an attempt to integrate
biodiversity conservation and socio-economic objectives.
Although there have been extensive studies on the
interrelationships between PAs and people regarding wildlife
damage in other areas (Lindsay 1987; Heinen 1993; Fiallo &
Jacobson 1995; Studsrod & Wegge 1995; Emerton & Mfunda
1999; Ineld & Namara 2001; Kaswamila et al. 2007; Warren
et al. 2007), little is known about the dynamics of DCAs and
their control along KNP’s western boundary and how these
inuence interactions between the park and its neighbouring
communities. This paper is based upon innovative research in
which the perspectives, interests, constraints and capacities
of the various stakeholders—the communities, the park, and
governmental institutions—were examined to produce an
analysis that seeks to provide practical, feasible and socially
legitimate solutions to the DCA problem. Finally, we propose
recommendations on alleviating DCA conicts. We apply a
governance framework for addressing the DCA problem along
KNP’s boundary that is adaptable to other cases where parks
and communities conict over DCAs.
METHODS
In order to understand the complexity of the DCA issue, we
utilised a multi-method approach including a face-to-face
Figure 1
(a) Location of Kruger National Park in Southern Africa,
(b) Study area with villages (listed below with associated de jure
Traditional Authorities) [Mhinga TA: Matiyani (1), Josepha (2),
Mhinga (3), Botsoleni (4), Maphophe (5), Maviligwe (6), Makuleke
(7), Makahlule (8); Shikundu TA: Ximixoni (9), Saselemani (10),
Nkovani (11); Bevhula TA: Ntlhaveni D (12), Nkavela (13), Makhubele
(14), Bevhula (15); Magona TA: Nghomunghomu (16), Mashobye
(17), Magona (18); Madonsi TA: Gijamhandzeni (19), Matsakali (20),
Halahala (21), Peninghotsa (22), Govhu (23), Merwe A (24), Shisasi
(25), Jilongo (26); Mtititi TA: Lombaard (27), Plange (28), Altein (29);
Xiviti TA: Mininginisi Block 3 (30), Mininginisi Block 2 (31), Muyexe
(32), Shitshamayoshe (33), Khakhala (34), Gawula (35), Mahlathi (36),
Ndindani (37), Hlomela (38)]
Source: Anthony (2007); reproduced with permission from Cambridge
University Press.
Punda Maria Gate
Punda Maria
Ranger
Section
Luvuvhu River
Vhembe
District
Kruger
National
Park
Shingwedzi River
Shangoni
Ranger
Section
Mopani
District
Mahlengeni
Ranger
Section
Klein Letaba River
10 km0
N
a
b
228 / Anthony et al.
questionnaire, analysis of archival records, and interviews.
Data collection was conducted between February and
November 2004.
Questionnaire
In keeping with KNP’s commitment to involve villages within
15 km of its border in community fora, a household face-to-face
questionnaire was administered to randomly selected households
of 38 villages within seven de jure Traditional Authorities,
extending from the Punda Maria gate, south of the Luvuvhu
river, to the Klein Letaba river (Figure 1). Based on available
village household numbers from Traditional Authority ofces,
simple random sampling was used to obtain a sample of 240
households (sampling error ± 6.28; condence level of 95%).
The questionnaire was administered within 32 days in May–
June 2004, extending from north to south through the study
area. Whenever possible, household heads were surveyed at
each selected household. Data on socio-demographic variables
including age, gender, household income, household size, de
jure Traditional Authority afliation, education level and number
of years the family has resided in the village were collected by
trained local eld assistants to minimise researcher bias inherent
in cross-cultural studies, specically concerning differences
in race and language (Barrett & Cason 1997). A series of both
closed and open-ended questions concerning costs and benets
of the KNP to local communities was also incorporated.
Archival Research
Limpopo Province DFED/EA DCA records from October 1998
to October 2004 were compiled from both Mopani district,
which extends from the Shingwedzi river south through the
study area, and Vhembe district, which includes the northern
section of the study area. In addition, relevant records of
the KNP and monthly meeting minutes were reviewed of
the Hlanganani Forum, which has been the primary liaison
between KNP and neighbouring communities in the northern
part of the park since 1994.
Interviews
Informal and unstructured interviews were conducted with
key informants including community leaders, Traditional
Authorities, Hlanganani Forum representatives, and fence
maintenance staff. Secondly, semi-structured interviews were
conducted with staff of the Department of Animal Health, KNP
eld and administrative staff, and DFED/EA managerial and
eld staff.
CURRENT CONDITIONS
DCA Procedures
According to the DFED/EA, Figure 2 illustrates the
procedures to be followed if DCAs exit KNP. Numbered
insertions in the diagram indicate stages in which we argue
the process breaks down or faces specic constraints. We
discuss each numbered point below, showing that current
DCA procedures are caught up in institutional complexity and
procedural ambiguity and inefciency, leading to a situation
in which neither are communities nor is wildlife conservation
well served.
Dierent Procedures Must be Followed Depending on Species
Involved (Figure 2, i)
The procedures involving buffalo and other cloven-hoofed
animals are governed by a different process as KNP senior
rangers and/or Department of Animal Health can bypass
DFED/EA in controlling these animals outside the KNP to
minimise disease transfer, including foot-and-mouth disease.
When multiple species exit the KNP concurrently (e.g., buffalo
and lion), then two sets of procedures apply, leading to the
necessity for clearly dened roles and responsibilities, indeed
enhanced cooperation, in controlling the DCAs.
Wildlife Has res nullius Status (Figure 2, ii)
Regarding DCAs and neighbouring communities, a quandary
exists. As wildlife has res nullius
1
status in South Africa
(Gibson 1977), the Limpopo Province is the legal entity
responsible for controlling DCAs outside the park. Until the
late 1990s, KNP section rangers had authority to deal with
DCAs themselves, but currently their agreement with DFED/
EA stipulates that the park can only assist in DCA control
after rst obtaining permission from the Limpopo Province
government in each case. To complicate matters, the border
fence is under the responsibility of the Department of Animal
Health, which is obliged to maintain it in order to prevent
transmission of disease from wild animals to domestic stock
(Figure 3). Furthermore, the communal lands where most
of the DCAs are reported are owned by the Department of
Land Affairs and have yet to be ofcially returned to the
communities under the Communal Land Rights Act (No. 11 of
2004). Confusion in current land tenure and potential wildlife
custodianship in lieu of its res nullius status has far-reaching
implications for current and future wildlife use, including
DCA control.
Not All Animals Exiting KNP Cause Damage (Figure 2, iii)
Although animals that exit KNP and those that naturally reside
outside the park have the potential to cause damage, not all do.
Thus, dening both DCAs, and the damage they could cause,
should be at the forefront of any policy being formulated to
control DCAs. For example, the DCA procedures make no
accommodation for leopards which may traverse back and
forth between the park and neighbouring areas, yet not cause
damage whilst outside the park.
Not All DCA Damage Is Discovered (Figure 2, iv)
A DCA may damage crops, but the damage may be so minimal
that it is never detected. In the case of livestock, a DCA may
Sitting on the Fence? / 229
DCA exits Kruger NP
Wildlife has res nullius status, therefore animal
now ‘owned’ by Province.
DCA damages livestock, crops, persons
or property.
Livestock owner or community reports
DCA/incident to DFED/EA.
DFED/EA team attends (~70 % of
cases). DFED/EA may request assistance
from authorised Kruger NP section
rangers and/or utilisation of park
helicopter.
Tendered pro hunter accompanied by DFED/EA officer and
PDI (‘black’) hunter(s) attend (~30 % of cases).
Hunter/outfitter pays license fee to local DFED/EA office
before hunt.
if DFED/EA and/or Kruger NP attend, entire raw carcass (excluding
elephant ivory, diseased animals and crocodile meat and skull) given to
affected community via TA after all DFED/EA and Dept. of Animal
Health regulations met.
if pro-hunter, then s/he has rights to entire carcass, but usually keeps
‘trophy’ and gives meat and/or hide to community via TA after all
DFED/EA and Dept. of Animal Health regulations met. Only
trophy
animals hunted; non-trophy animals left.
Tender amount per animal collected by local DFED/EA. This revenue is to
be distributed
to affected communities but, to date, has never been
disbursed.
if attended by pro hunter, DFED/EA
retain license fee, but do not receive
tendered amount.
DFED/EA bears cost of DCA control
outside park, including authorised
use of park helicopter; Kruger NP
bears cost of any DCA control inside
the park.
Affected communities receive nothing.
DCA returns or is chased back to park:
Kruger NP becomes lead agency and must first
positively identify DCA, and control with or
without DFED/EA assistance.
DCA remains outside park:
DFED/EA remains lead agency
in control of DCA.
DFED/EA informs a) local TA and b) Kruger
NP if rhino or elephant (special protection)
and/or if close to border fence.
DCA not found. DCA found & killed.
ii
iii
iv
vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
v
i
Figure 2
DCA procedures (excluding buffalo and other cloven-hoofed animals)
230 / Anthony et al.
destroy a domestic animal but the carcass may never be found
and the owner may be left to speculate as to its fate. In such
cases, a DCA has caused damage but the damage itself is
undetected.
Not All DCAs Are Reported (Figure 2, v)
When respondents in the household survey were asked ‘What
should someone do if they experience a DCA?’ a total of 245
responses were elicited (respondents could provide more than
one answer). Twenty six different responses were provided,
including 24 separate channels of reporting. These include
up to three levels of information ow and seven different
institutions (Figure 4).
Based on these results, respondents who indicated that an
institution must be notied when encountering DCAs believed
that in 53.9% of the cases, action is taken to control DCAs
at the rst level of reporting. This is followed by 42.9%
after information reached a second institution and 3.2%
after reaching the third. It is believed that KNP takes action
to control DCA in 53.9% of cases, followed by Traditional
Authorities (17.5%), DFED/EA (15.7%), South African Police
Services (4.6%), Hlanganani Forum (1.8%), civics (0.9%),
‘those in charge’ (5.1%), and self (0.5%). Moreover, it is
noteworthy that no respondents believed that the KNP passes
DCA report information on to another institution, including the
DFED/EA, the primary agency responsible for DCA control
outside the park.
Due to experiencing ineffective action or inaction by
provincial rangers, a number of key informants from the
neighbouring communities and KNP indicated that they
simply do not report DCAs to the DFED/EA. These include
Maviligwe village members whose behaviour was affected by
Figure 3
Male elephant stepping from communal area on right (DFED/EA
responsibility), over border fence (Department of Animal Health
responsibility) into KNP (KNP responsibility)
‘take matters
into own hands’
(1)
‘do nothing’
(3)
DCA incident
‘don’t know’
(25)
KNP
(35)
DFED/EA
(21/20)
KNP
(7)
KNP
(75/75)
DFED/EA
(17/14)
TA
(5/2)
SAPS
(3/2)
‘those in charge’
(11/11)
TA
(93/36)
SAPS
(17/8)
Civic
(23/2)
HF
(15/4)
Trust
(1/0)
Figure 4
Information ow for DCA reporting [frequency of information to institution / frequency that institution controls DCA (N=245)].
KNP=Kruger National Park; DFED/EA= Department of Finance and Economic Development – Environmental Affairs; TA=Traditional Authority;
SAPS=South African Police Services; HF=Hlanganani Forum
Sitting on the Fence? / 231
the broken promise by a provincial ranger to return to kill a
lion after he had been shown partly eaten cattle. In the end he
didn’t return, the lions ate the rest of the cattle, and nothing
was done. A second case includes a KNP ranger who, after
repeatedly attempting to locate damage causing lions who
had returned to the park, stated that a provincial ofcer had
phoned him to ask, “What should we do about these lions?”
The ranger was furious and stated that he had been out for ve
nights trying to get the lion and was “wondering what on earth
the province is doing about it outside.” The ofcer replied
that they had tried for one night. The KNP ranger further
stressed that he is “sick of the province’s unwillingness and
lack of dedication to deal with these problems”, and now
“only rarely reports DCAs to the province.” Finally, one
professional hunter operating in the study area remarked
that “Many locals do not even report DCAs to the DFED/
EA anymore, because in the past, there was such a poor
response from the province.” He believes this is why many
locals were using snares to handle the problem themselves.
In addition to snares, carcasses have often been laced with
poison to indiscriminately kill lions and hyenas, which has
had lethal consequences for other species, including vultures,
which are specially protected in Limpopo Province (LEMA
No. 7 of 2003; Schedule 2).
Despite this under-reporting, of 482 available reports of
DFED/EA DCA incidents or DCAs being destroyed in Mopani
district from October 1998 to October 2004, 16 taxa were
involved (Table 1). DCA reports were handwritten and largely
incomplete, therefore the values indicated in Table 1 may be
gross underestimates, i.e., reports often include more than
one animal (indicated only by the plural form of the word,
not exact numbers) and may be multi-species. Conversely,
sometimes more than one report may have been recorded
for the same animal(s), especially if reports were temporally
and spatially proximate. There are also cases where the data
were not available (e.g., all of 2000), either because they
were never transcribed or not centrally compiled at DFED/EA
ofces. From the data that were available, however, species
most frequently reported (91.2%) were buffalo, lion, elephant,
hippopotamus, and crocodile.
Although records were incomplete, an increasing number
of DCA incidents were reported to the DFED/EA over the
six years, with over 115 reports from January to October
2004 alone. However, reports of DCAs being destroyed have
not signicantly increased relative to the number of reports,
especially since 2001. Similar to Mopani district, Vhembe
district records are largely incomplete, limiting interpretation
and analyses. However, compared to Mopani district, Vhembe
district to the north appears to have either fewer DCA incidents
or less reporting, or both. Moreover, the success of attending
to and destroying buffalo appears to be greater than that of
other DCA species reported.
Not All DCA Reports Are Communicated Between Relevant
Parties (Figure 2, vi)
According to the procedures outlined above, when a DCA
is reported or encountered, all relevant parties should be
contacted and informed on the course of action to be followed.
However, in practice, this doesn’t always occur. Examples
include lack of, or poor, communication between DFED/EA
and a) other DFED/EA staff, b) local communities, c) local
Traditional Authorities, and d) relevant KNP staff.
Prior Permission Required Before Aending To Any DCA
Incident (Figure 2, vii)
Success in hunting DCAs is partially associated with the speed
in attending to incidents. With the observed practice, eld
rangers accompanying professional hunters are required to
rst obtain licenses from eld ofces before a hunt. Moreover,
DFED/EA district staff require authorisation from the head
Table 1
Mopani District DFED/EA DCA reports from October 1998 to October 2004
English name Latin name Incident report Report of animal(s) destroyed
Buffalo
Syncerus caffra
152 55
Lion
Panthera leo
83 23
Elephant
Loxodonta africana
56 8
Hippo
Hippopotamus amphibius
41 5
Crocodile
Crocodilus niloticus
20 1
Snake
Serpentes suborder
12 2
Leopard
Panthera pardus
6 1
Honey badger
Mellivora capensis
3 1
Zebra
Equus burchelli
3 -
Hyena
Crocuta crocuta
2 -
Monkey
Cercopithecus aethiops
2 -
Honey bee
Apidae family
2 -
Rhino
Ceratotherium simum
1 -
Baboon
Papio ursinus
1 -
Impala
Aepyceros melampus
1 -
Duiker
Sylvicapra grimmia
1 -
Total (16 taxa) 386 96
232 / Anthony et al.
ofce in Polokwane (Pietersburg) prior to controlling any
DCA. This time consuming process has often prevented
resolution of DCA incidents.
Not All DCA Reports Are Aended To (Figure 2, viii)
Due to a number of factors, including lack of staff and
transport, inaccurate reporting, poor response time and tracking
abilities, even when reports are received by DFED/EA, not all
of these are attended to. Capacity constraints within DFED/EA
were highlighted as early as 1994 when the Gazankulu Nature
Conservation (GNC) (predecessor of DFED/EA) admitted to
the KNP that they “could not attend to every DCA report.”
More recently, a Mopani district DFED/EA staff member
emphasised that “DCAs take up about 70% of our staff’s time.
To compound problems with understafng and poor transport,
3–4 staff are needed for each DCA reported… We sometimes
do not attend to DCA complaints because the people do not
give us enough information, the damage is days old, or we
must attend another complaint.” Not surprisingly, this has led
to negative attitudes and practices from many local Traditional
Authorities and community members, including ‘taking
matters into their own hands’ and admitting to destroying the
animal(s) themselves.
Not All DCAs Remain Outside the Park (Figure 2, ix)
Not all DCAs that cause damage outside KNP remain
outside the park. Rangers from both DFED/EA and KNP, and
Department of Animal Health fence maintenance staff stated
that animals, especially lion and elephant, will venture outside
the park during the night but return by dawn. Professional
hunters who were unsuccessful in nding individual animals
also echoed this observation. One hunter expressed his
frustration that “Elephants, lions and buffalo often return to
Kruger by the time we get the report and are able to get there.”
Once inside KNP, the park becomes the lead agency in nding
the animal(s), and must decide whether it needs to be destroyed.
Conversely, fence breakages facilitate the movement of not
only wild animals in and out of the park, but also of domestic
livestock. KNP rangers stated that due to fence breakages,
stray and unattended cattle were entering the park and posing
a major risk in terms of disease transfer between domestic and
wild animals. In some cases, rangers were chasing cattle out
of the park on a weekly basis.
Not All DCAs Are Found or Destroyed (Figure 2, x)
Even if a DCA causes damage, is reported to the DFED/EA and
attended to, the animal is not always found and/or destroyed.
This has repercussions for repeated incidents, especially with
lions which may habituate to taking cattle as prey, and for
potential DCA compensation schemes. Interviews with eld
rangers and others show that this drawback is not only a result
of poor communication and slow response time in getting to the
scene, but also due to poor tracking and shooting capabilities of
eld rangers and/or professional hunters. In some cases, DCAs
were shot and wounded outside the park, and later wandered
back into the park and died.
Community Reactions (Figure 2, xi)
Community perceptions of DCAs are an important aspect of
KNP’s interaction with its neighbouring communities, and have
great potential in shaping attitudes towards the park and its
objectives. Based on the questionnaire, 12.1% of respondents
claimed that they had experienced DCA damage within the
previous two years. A negative and signicant relationship
(r=0.170, p<0.01, N=240) exists between distance from the
park border and the incidence of damage caused by DCAs in
the adjacent areas.
Distance values were divided into three bands for further
analyses (0–3 km, 3.1–7.0 km, and 7.1–15 km). Percentage
of sampled households experiencing DCA damage was then
calculated for each of these bands, and multiplied by the total
number of households within the bands in the study area
(Figure 5). Within 3 km of the park’s border, almost 1 in 5
households claimed to have suffered DCA damage within the
past two years. If extrapolated to the entire population within the
study area’s 0-3 km band, this would amount to approximately
1,100 households. If one considers all households in the study
area, an estimated 2,216 households have suffered some DCA
damage within the previous two years.
Logistic regression analysis revealed that households that
had higher numbers of mammalian livestock (B=0.109,
p<0.001) and are closer to the park (B=0.231, p<0.01) could
predict occurrences of DCA damage. Moreover, those who had
suffered DCA damage were signicantly less likely to believe
that KNP would ever help their household economically
(χ
2
=7.295, df=2, p<0.05).
According to the Mopani district DFED/EA Environmental
Manager, if an animal is destroyed by the DFED/EA, then the
following process for each species is carried out:
• Lion: skin and meat is given to the community via the
Traditional Authority. Historically, the skins of all lions
killed by KNP rangers were treated/cured within the
park, and the money generated when sold was paid to the
communities via the Hlanganani Forum.
• Elephant: tusks are retained by DFED/EA; carcass is given
to community.
19.1 10.0 5.6 12.1
1102
701
314
2216
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
0
10
20
30
40
50
0-3 3.1-7 7.1-15 0-15
Households
% of households
Distance band (km)
Figure 5
Percentage (bars) and total households (▲) experiencing DCA damage
within last two years within three distance bands from KNP (N=240)
Sitting on the Fence? / 233
• Buffalo: head and hooves (foot-and-mouth disease) and
lungs (bovine tuberculosis) are removed by the Department
of Animal Health and returned to KNP for disposal. After
certication by Department of Animal Health ofcials,
carcass is given to communities for consumption. If
diseased, carcass is incinerated on the spot.
• Hippo: after certication by Department of Animal Health
ofcials, carcass is given to communities for consumption.
If diseased, carcass is incinerated on the spot.
• Crocodile: usually captured and relocated. If and when
animal is destroyed, meat and skull (brains considered
poisonous by local communities) is taken by DFED/EA
to be incinerated or buried. Community receives the hide.
However, discussions with both Traditional Authorities
and allegations during Hlanganani Forum meetings revealed
that meat from destroyed DCAs is not always given to the
communities as promised. As early as 1998, a Forum meeting
reported that “There is concern from forum members that the
province only attends to DCAs when they are buffaloes and
not lions”. This may be due to the high risk of disease transfer
between buffalo and cattle, which warrants increased efforts
and, thus, a greater incentive for control. More recently, a
Gawula Traditional Authority representative remarked that the
DFED/EA are “not trustworthy; however, villagers are bound
by the law to report all DCAs to them. When provincial rangers
do come and kill DCAs, they leave the meat, although there are
occasions when they themselves have left with buffalo meat
[assumed to be of greater protein value].”
DFED/EA DCA records from 2001 to 2004 were organised
monthly to determine if signicant temporal patterns exist
across all species or between species. Within this time frame,
data were missing for: June (2002), November (2001, 2004),
and December (2001, 2002, 2004). Nevertheless, a total of 315
incident reports for the ve most problematic species were
recorded including 137 buffalo, 72 lion, 55 elephant, 33 hippo,
and 18 crocodile. Total monthly incident reports combined for
all years for each species are shown in Figure 6.
Documented DCA incidents from 2001 to 2004 primarily
occur during the wet summer months, and are less frequent
in winter. Species-specic data show that incidents of hippo
and crocodile are distributed relatively evenly throughout the
year. However, there are peaks for both buffalo and elephant
in March which, at least for elephant, is likely associated with
the local marula (Sclerocarya birrea caffra) harvesting season,
and raiding of other mature crops (Hoare 1999; Jacobs &
Biggs 2002; Ferguson 2009), which increases the likelihood
of conicts with local communities. High reports of buffalo
in the late wet season may be explained by the fact that herds
are expanding their ranges at this time due to increased water
availability, or simply due to the state of the fence. Concurrent
herd movements and calving may also explain slightly higher
incidents of lion during this period, although determining these
relationships were beyond the scope of our research.
Only ‘Trophy’ Animals Hunted by Professional Hunters
(Figure 2, xii)
According to records obtained from the Mopani district DFED/
EA ofce, one formal and four informal professional hunting
Table 2
Trophy hunting tenders issued to control DCA with tender prices (in USD)
for species and sex between August 2001 and August 2004 by Limpopo Province
Informal tenders Formal tenders
Species/sex 23 August 2001 –
31 October 2001
16 November 2001 –
31 January 2002
22 April 2002 –
20 July 2002
4 April 2003 –
4 July 2003
11 May 2004 –
11 August 2004
Elephant 13,199 13,665 15,839–18,634 11,646–26,630 15,839
Buffalo/M 4,658 6,988 6,988
Buffalo/F 4,658 6,366–6,988 6,211
Lion/M 5,435 3,494 2,717–12,578 17,391 9,084
Lion/F 5,435 3,494 2,717–12,578 6,988 5,590
Hippo 4,037 3,882 1,863
Crocodile 3,261 932
Table 3
Species-specic statistics for tenders issued to control DCAs in Limpopo Province between August 2001 and August 2004
Species Licenses issued Animals
successfully hunted
% of hunts
successful
Total tender
payments (ZAR)
Mean price paid
per animal
a
(ZAR)
Mean price paid
per animal (2004
rate: USD)
Lion 40 14 35.0 439,000 39,909 6,197
Elephant 20 13 65.0 1,320,000 110,000 17,081
Buffalo 18 7 38.9 296,000 42,286 6,566
Hippo 5 4 80.0 89,000 22,250 3,455
Crocodile 2 1 50.0 21,000 21,000 3,261
Total 85 39 45.9 2,165,000 61,857 9,605
a
One tender payment was not paid for a successful elephant hunt. A second case exists in which three excess lions were shot apparently for no tender cost. Thus,
mean prices are calculated for animals hunted where a payment was received.
234 / Anthony et al.
tenders to control DCAs were issued by the DFED from August
2001 to August 2004, representing approximately 36% of the
period (Table 2).
These tenders were generally for two to three month periods
and, in addition to 90,900 ZAR (2004 rates: 14,115 USD) in
license fees, generated 2,165,000 ZAR (~336,180 USD) in
tender payments for successful hunts (Table 3). As a broad
estimate, this represents approximately 62,000 ZAR/animal
hunted (~9,627 USD). These records also show that 78.7%
of the hunters involved were foreigners, 14.8% were South
African, and the rest unknown. The recorded hunts were
successful in slightly less than half (45.9%) of the occasions.
The challenges of trying to satisfy the demands of trophy
hunters in DCA control was voiced by a professional hunting
outtter, who was awarded one of the tenders to control DCAs.
When asked why he terminated his tender, he stated that “The
bottom line is that it was just not protable. This is because my
overseas clients want trophy animals and most of the DCAs
are not trophy animals. Only about 20% of problem lions are
trophy animals. I clocked over 20,000 km on my vehicle, often
just trying to investigate problems for the DFED/EA guys.”
To rectify the situation, he believes that “It’s just impossible
to involve pro hunters if they can only shoot trophy animals.
I know that there are many local South African hunters would
be willing to pay a lower price for a non-trophy animal but
cannot afford the full trophy fees. In these cases, more DCAs
would be dealt with and communities would be able to get
more meat.” Overseas hunters also voiced their frustration
in the low success rate, claiming that the problem with many
DCAs is that “they are not trophy animals, i.e., they are too
small or the wrong sex.” They also believed that constraints in
communication and licensing inhibited their success, declaring
“by the time we could attend to the report, in 70-75% of the
cases, the animals were long gone. There were also occasions
where the supposed lion problem turned out to be hyena.”
The need to supply professional hunters with trophy animals
has also led to unethical and illegal activities of a related
nature. Accusations, supported by over 90 documented cases
and photographic evidence, have surfaced of professional
hunting outtters with permanent camps located along the KNP
border luring lions out of the park with recordings, by cutting
the fence and/or using bait, including donkeys, and poached
zebra (Figure 7). According to the Manager of Terrestrial
Biodiversity and Wilderness Management at KNP, lion luring
is a man-induced population sink, which “may have an effect
on biodiversity over the long-term.” Although he believes
that this activity can be worrying on a localised scale, it has
minimal impact over the park as a whole. On the other hand,
he added that lions may develop a change of prey preference
if they have increased cattle-killing opportunities (see also van
Dyk & Slotow 2003).
The incorporation of professional hunters in controlling
DCAs by the Limpopo Province has been vehemently criticised
by the KNP and the Panel of Experts (PoE) on Professional
month
FEB
JAN
APR
MAR
JUN
MAY
AUG
JUL
OCT
SEP
DEC
NOV
FEB
JAN
APR
MAR
JUN
MAY
AUG
JUL
OCT
SEP
DEC
NOV
month
report
report
0
10
20
30
0
10
20
30
buffalo lion
elephant
crocodile
hippo
Figure 6
Temporal variation of DCA reports for buffalo, lion, elephant, hippo, and crocodile in Mopani District (2001-2004)
Sitting on the Fence? / 235
and Recreational Hunting in South Africa. On 6 April 2005,
the Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism appointed a
PoE to review existing professional and recreational hunting
activities in South Africa and recommend guiding principles
for the drafting of national norms and standards for the hunting
industry. The impetus for this initiative was driven in part by
media reports of hunting practices adjacent to KNP, ‘canned
hunting’
2
, and the recognition that the draft norms and standards
for the sustainable use of large predators gazetted in February
2005 were insufcient. The ndings and advice of the PoE
were informed by both public input and commissioned research
and resulted in the PoE’s Final draft report to the Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (25 October 2005). The
Executive Summary of the PoE’s Report emphasises that the
hunting industry is currently regulated on a provincial basis and
‛every province has its own legislation and policies resulting in
a complex and fragmented system resulting in gaps, loopholes,
and use of provisions that are outdated.’ They further recognise
low capacity at the provincial level, and that some provinces
are struggling to manage, administer, monitor and enforce their
own hunting regulations. The PoE believes that DCAs should
be totally decoupled from commercial hunting due to abuses
by provincial systems to manage DCAs with private operators.
Further, it strongly recommends that ‛…DCAs, which is a
provincial wildlife management issue, be dealt with under a
separate policy process, and that no DCA should be hunted
or be dealt with through a commercial hunting agreement.’
These recommendations have also led to developing national
Norms and Standards for the Management of Damage-Causing
Animals, a process which is still ongoing.
These DCA procedures result in a piecemeal approach to
controlling DCAs in communal areas. The process is fraught
with gaps and loopholes that result in increased opportunities
for corruption and illegal activity. Moreover, it demonstrates
the need for an improved and streamlined system of control
that minimises risk and damage. Currently, the process results
in the following institutional outcomes:
• KNP: bears cost in terms of biodiversity loss, manpower
and other resources required in searching for DCAs inside
park, and deteriorating relationships with neighbouring
communities.
• Department of Animal Health: bears cost in terms of fence
maintenance, increased disease transfer risk, and poor
public image.
• DFED/EA: bears cost in terms of manpower and other
resources required to search for DCAs outside park,
increased conict with neighbouring communities; yet
has received revenue from tenders issued to professional
hunting outtters.
• Communities: bear cost in terms of loss of life and limb,
crops and livestock, psychological damage, increased
conflict with conservation agencies, and receive no
compensation except occasional meat.
Compensation
In addition to DCA control, compensation for damage caused
by DCAs continues to be a controversial and sensitive topic.
The issue of compensation is grossly confused at all levels, and
across the relevant institutions. This confusion concerns unmet
promises, differing expectations, and the lack of clear and
coherent policy. Examples of KNP social ecologists promising
compensation, and later the DFED, to affected livestock
farmers that never materialised have had serious repercussions
in the study area. These include village withdrawals from the
Hlanganani Forum (Anthony 2006), and an increasing belief
by the Forum and a number of Traditional Authorities that the
Limpopo Province is deliberately and illegally withholding
money from affected livestock owners. Concerns are also rising
internally within the DFED. An internal document from the
DFED Auditor (dated March 2004) indicates that some 319,000
ZAR (~49,534 USD) were received from 1 April - 19 July
2003 from DCA control. The auditor is concerned as to why
communities have not received this money, and questions why
the Province is not assisting communities to become organised
and collect nances.
On the other hand, DFED/EA District Managers allege
that confusion exists as to whom compensation should be
channeled through. According to the Mopani District Manager,
the Hlanganani Forum Executive met with the DFED in
Figure 7
Use of poached zebra carcass to lure lions from KNP
236 / Anthony et al.
2003, at which time the Executive was asked to produce an
audited nancial statement. They couldn’t produce one, nor
could they adequately address the DFED’s concerns regarding
their representativeness. The Vhembe District Environmental
Manager added in a Forum meeting on 6 August 2004 that it
is still unclear as to who should be compensating; the DFED,
the Hlanganani Forum, or KNP as ‘they are the owners of the
animals’, and what amounts should be assigned for various
types of damages. He stated that the provincial government
is unlikely to forward money to the Hlanganani Forum as
it has serious concerns about the Forum’s legitimacy and
representativeness, and there are other institutions in the area
wanting the same money vis-à-vis community trusts.
The General Manager of Parks, Tourism and Community
Environment Development stated that all disbursement
of government funds must adhere to the Public Finance
Management Act (1999) which has regulations regarding
how funds can be dispensed. Revenues from tenders utilising
professional hunters to control DCAs (Table 3) have been
placed into a separate government account, but the DFED ‘are
still formalising a foolproof mechanism to allow for equitable
distribution.’ The challenge is to know whom to pay, and for
what. There is still concern over community institutions (e.g.,
trusts, forums, Traditional Authorities) and how they might
be able to handle such transactions and subsequent nancial
management. The General Manager admitted that communities
are frustrated with the lack of compensation, and added that the
DFED should work on a proper and coherent policy and benet-
sharing model to disburse funds to the ‘relevant structures’ in
the communities. To date however, this has not materialised.
The confusion about whom to pay and the lack of a
coherent compensation policy is also exacerbated by changing
legislation regarding land ownership. The Department of Land
Affairs Director of Public Land Support Services, when asked
about the long-term strategy for DCA control, stated that once
the communal areas are legally titled to the communities and
they become the true landowners under the Communal Land
Rights Act (2004), they will be able to handle control of DCAs
themselves, including tendering out professional hunters and
having their own DCA control associations. Until such time,
however, they must abide by the current practices of the
provincial government.
Meanwhile, DCA victims and Hlanganani Forum members
cannot understand the lengthy delay, with one village
representative exclaiming that “we are sick and tired of the
talk about procedure and are angry that the province and the
park are delaying the compensation.” He cannot understand
why they must “suffer so much to get back such a relatively
small amount of money.”
THE WAY FORWARD
Mhaka a yi bori. / A Case Does Not Rot
(Meaning: When a matter has been raised, it won’t vanish until
it has been properly settled.)
As this local Tsonga proverb illustrates, the very serious
problem of DCAs, their control, and the need for compensation
identied in this research demands a solution in order to
improve relationships between communities and management
institutions, and to arrive at better outcomes for communities
and conservation alike. Fostering communication and trust,
demonstrating effort and a willingness to address the issue,
and following through can lead to improved governance
(Lockwood 2010) and have a positive effect on the attitudes
and actions of people in conict with wildlife (Madden 2004).
However, with such a complex issue, one cannot rely on any
one solution alone but is more likely to succeed by employing
a battery of exible instruments and policies. Based on our
study, we suggest that in order to manage human-wildlife
conict more effectively in such contexts, four components
of the conflict must be addressed: a) baseline research,
b) evaluation of damage, c) conict management, and d)
evaluation of control.
Baseline Research
Understanding local perceptions of affected communities, and
the ecology of ‘problematic’ species, including their life histories
and propensity for causing damage should be at the forefront
of any research designed to minimise human-wildlife conict.
Knowledge on the spatial and temporal variation of conicts,
as well as the behaviours of involved individuals/institutions is
a critical rst step in planning any intervention (Treves et al.
2006). Where this is lacking, research capacities and efforts need
to be increased, not only in culturally-sensitive social science
research on and with neighbouring communities (Pollard et al.
2003), but also in the areas of livestock and crop depredation
(Bauer & Karl 2001; Macandza et al. 2004; Kolowski &
Holekamp 2006), and DCA deterrent measures (Newmark et
al. 1994; Ogada et al. 2003; Sitati & Walpole 2006).
Evaluation of Damage
Systematic and effective reporting and monitoring, record
keeping, and quick responses are required to ensure that the
human-wildlife conict is being tracked, comprehended, and
adequately addressed (Treves et al. 2006). Both the design
and implementation of policies formulated to manage human-
wildlife conict are dependent on the availability of current,
accurate, and long-term information on the problem. In the
absence of good information, the scale and nature of human-
wildlife conict becomes a matter of personal opinion (Anthony
& Wasambo 2009). Conict between people and wildlife is an
emotional issue and, as a result, reports and opinions can be
biased, creating a false impression of the size of the problem.
The systematic and objective gathering of information allows
stakeholders to put the problems and threats caused by human-
wildlife conict into context and perspective with other problems
faced by local communities. It also ensures that resources are
correctly directed, that is, at solving the real issues rather than
the perceived problems (Mishra 1997).
Sitting on the Fence? / 237
In cases where record keeping is unsystematic and
attending to incidents is hampered by overlapping and/or
weak institutional arrangements, valuable data concerning the
nature and extent of damage can be left wanting. Consequently,
measures to minimise real or potential loss of life or livelihoods
will remain unrealised and negative attitudes towards PAs from
affected communities will persist (Anthony 2007; Hazzah et al.
2009), and may include retaliatory killings as evidenced in our
case, and elsewhere (Mishra 1997). Appropriate new, existing,
or traditional systems and institutions need to be developed
or empowered locally, and be evidence-based to ensure good
management (Madden 2004; Thirgood & Redpath 2008). Such
a system, we believe, must be mutually agreed upon and be
clearly and broadly communicated to the relevant institutions,
including local communities.
Conict Management
As discussed, the distribution of competencies between KNP
and the DFED/EA as well as the tense relationship between
the Traditional Authorities and the DFED/EA undermine the
legitimacy of the latter and hamper efforts to control DCAs
and promote goodwill and conservation in the region. We
recommend that a system be created that, at least insofar as
the issue of DCAs is concerned, helps establish the credibility
and legitimacy of the DFED/EA and decreases the sense of
competition between DFED/EA and the Traditional Authorities
while at the same time improving response to DCAs. In order
to achieve these objectives the authority to control DCAs in
such cases should be decentralised following the subsidiarity
principle, in which ‘the goal is to have as much local solution
as possible and only so much government regulation as
necessary’ (Berkes 2004). In our case, this may also offer
opportunities for local South African hunters to legitimately
hunt valuable wildlife. Decentralisation of authority should
also include allowing joint teams of KNP and DFED/EA
rangers to be permanently stationed at strategic border points
with the authority to respond to DCA activity as the need
arises. Ranger teams should also be authorised to respond to
DCAs that do not originate from the park in order to meet the
primary objective of protecting human life and property. These
measures would go a long way in ironing out the procedural
and practical difculties rangers now encounter in responding
to DCAs under the current institutional framework.
We believe that in contexts where overlapping and/or
competing institutions have a shared goal in mitigating,
alleviating and eventually minimising human-wildlife conict,
these changes, in combination, will create a situation in
which inherent institutional rivalries will be minimised due
to cooperation on the ground as well as shared responsibility
for oversight and low-level policy adjustments. A process of
social learning in which the various stakeholders understand
the viewpoints of others and take some responsibility for
meeting the core interests of their partners is likely to lead
to greater mutual sympathy, a decrease in conict, and more
effective management in the long term.
In addition to these basic institutional arrangements, we
recommend a number of other measures be taken, which
are more unique to our case. These include steps that KNP
can take unilaterally to improve relations with neighbouring
communities, such as maintaining and upgrading the fence
along the entire western boundary of the park. The fence
is viewed by communities as essential in protecting their
interests by keeping both disease carrying and/or damage
causing species in the park and away from livestock, people,
and property. It is also important for KNP to reduce damage
caused by elephants. This is currently being pursued within
the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and
South African National Parks, and has direct relevance to
the park’s relationship with its neighbours. The initial steps
to understanding this issue and exploring options involved
stakeholder forums in 2004-2005 and the production of a
scientic assessment for elephant management in South Africa
(Scholes & Mennell 2008).
Evaluation of Control
Monitoring and adaptive management is imperative to evaluate
the effectiveness of interventions to minimise conict (Curtin
2002). To ensure performance improvement and provide
a forum for timely feedback, an ‘audit committee’ of all
relevant stakeholders should review DCA cases on a monthly
or bi-monthly basis and recommend changes in practice, if
necessary. However, institutional improvements must also
be accompanied by a functioning compensation scheme for
damage caused by wild animals (Nyhus et al. 2003; Graham et
al. 2005; Schwerdtner & Gruber 2007; Ogra & Badola 2008).
Although compensation schemes are generally not a good long-
term solution as they may create continuing nancial burdens
and increase expectations (Crawshaw Jr. 2004; Graham et al.
2005) and be counter productive to conservation by stimulating
agricultural expansion (Bulte & Rondeau 2005), the legitimacy
of institutions may be enhanced where following through on
long-standing promises are made. Again, the Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and South African National
Parks are developing such a scheme but, to date, have not
implemented it. Until this is in place, the current situation will
continue to foster resentment within the affected communities.
CONCLUSION
DCAs on the border of KNP represent a signicant threat to
the lives and property of local communities, undermining
livelihoods and damaging relations between the communities
and the park. Conicts between the park and communities
can be signicantly reduced by addressing the weaknesses of
the institutional structures within which DCAs are controlled.
The current system, in which DFED/EA bears primary
responsibility for controlling animals but lacks the capacity
to do so effectively in many cases while KNP shoulders the
blame but cannot act upon its greater capacities, can and
should be remedied in the near-term. Putting into place a
238 / Anthony et al.
sustainable, adaptive system of DCA control composed of
baseline research, damage evaluation, conict management,
and control evaluation would be a signicant innovation and
may evolve into a model that can be adapted and applied in
other settings where DCA conicts occur. While the response
teams that we propose are meant to enhance efciency with
which authorities can respond to the problem, the system of
research, management, evaluation and ultimately adaptation is
meant to enhance the overall effectiveness of the DCA control
regime by facilitating communication, information exchange,
and learning among the stakeholders.
The system we propose is based on the principles of good
governance (Lockwood 2010). It is transparent insofar as
information is disseminated to all stakeholders and the multi-
stakeholder audit committee oversees practices on the ground.
Legitimacy is enhanced through the development of more
reliable information and greater responsiveness on the part of
authorities, as well as the inclusiveness of the audit committee,
where accountability between the stakeholder institutions is
enhanced through regular consultations and review of practices
on the ground. Linking KNP and DFED rangers creates
the kind of on-the-ground institutional connectivity that is
needed in the region to ensure consistency and effectiveness
of response. Fairness is enhanced by giving local people more
direct access to management level decision making through
the participation of the Traditional Authorities on the audit
committee, which ensures that their concerns will be heard. It
is expected that this system will be more resilient and adaptable
because of the added information feedback loops, which are
linked to the capacity of the rangers to act on the ground.
Human-wildlife conict is signicant and growing with
the increase of human populations and encroachment of
settlements into once uninhabited areas. DCAs pose threats
to people and property as well as conservation, as community
attitudes towards PAs can be signicantly shaped by the
real or perceived dangers from wildlife, and may result in
retaliation by people against wildlife that threaten local
livelihoods. Conicts between conservation professionals and
local people over DCAs may also exacerbate existing social
conicts as well as conicts with PAs over other issues. Our
study shows that managers and decision makers must not
only work with local communities to measure the impacts
of DCAs, but should also investigate and be sensitive to how
local people perceive the adequacy of the responses by the
authorities to DCA incidents. Only with this knowledge can
managers and decision makers shape appropriate institutions
that effectively control DCAs and mitigate or prevent
conicts between people and PAs over DCAs. Designing
institutions that meet the criteria for good governance
for PAs is a challenging process that requires signicant
investments of time and resources for knowledge production
and stakeholder cooperation. In a world in which biodiversity
is under increasing pressure from human encroachment and
increasing populations, and in which people’s rights to justice
and secure livelihoods must be respected, such investments
should be treated as mandatory.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank the Central European University for funding, local
communities for allowing us into their homes, and Traditional
Authorities, DFED/EA, Department of Animal Health and KNP staff
for giving us their time to discuss these issues. We also thank Dan
Brockington and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
Notes
1. This means that no wild animal in a free-roaming state has a legal owner,
i.e., belongs to no one in particular but to everyone in general. The state
therefore acts as a custodian to all wild animals in the best interest of
the public.
2. Canned hunting is dened by the Panel of Experts on Professional and
Recreational Hunting in South Africa as ‘the hunting of species that
are not self-sustaining (meaning they are unable to feed themselves
and produce healthy offspring), or are not able to exercise their natural
escape mechanisms (as reected in the fair chase principles)’.
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