The authors present theories of corruption taking into consideration the typology of Arnold J. Heidenheimer, who divided the corruption theories into those which concentrate on the public official and concern the breaking of the rules of the law and those according to which corruption is a particular kind of market phenomenon. In the first part of the text there are presented non-economical formulations of the problem of corruption and thus such which can be placed within the two first categories of Heidenheimer's typology. In accordance with the perspective adopted in the article it is an attempt to present non-economic, institutional conditions of corruption. In successive parts of the article corruption is defined as a contract referring to the works of Susan Rose-Ackerman, Edward Banfield, Gary Becker and Gary Stigler. The structure of the corruption contract and the conditions on which it is concluded were subjected to analysis. On the basis of this analysis the authors indicate that an essential influence on the scale and structure of corruption is exerted on the one hand by agency structures of the administration and on the other hand cultural conditions.