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Die Ökologische Steuerreform in Deutschland – Ein umweltpolitisches Feigenblatt
Abstract
We assess the design of the recent environmental tax reform in Germany. Based on fundamental welfare economics we argue that extensive tax reductions and rebates in favour of energy-intensive industries, as provided by the tax reform, substantially water down its cost-effectiveness. The environmental tax reform essentially boils down to a fiscally motivated fuel tax. From a political economy perspective the exemptions can be explained by voters' low willingness-to-pay for the environment and the sectoral concentration of adjustment costs. With respect to green voters, however, the government does not admit that the environmental objective has effectively been abandoned. We conclude that an honest policy should either give up the environmental tax reform frankly or implement it without exemptions. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002
... Beide Parteien hatten sich in ihren Wahlprogrammen für die Einführung einer Ökosteuerreform ausgesprochen -am 1. April 1999 trat das Gesetz zur Einführung einer ökologischen Steuerreform in Kraft, das bis 2003 in vier weiteren Stufen fortgesetzt wurde. Allerdings enthält die deutsche Ökosteuer zahlreiche Ausnahmeregelungen für die Industrie und wurde aufgrund ihres Abweichens von umweltökonomischen Idealen stark kritisiert(Böhringer/Schwager 2003;Linscheidt/ Truger 2000). Aufgrund dieses Politikergebnisses stellt sich die Frage, ob es sich hierbei dennoch um Politiklernen handelt und welchen Mehrwert der hier angewendete Analyserahmen zur Erklärung des politischen Prozesses bringt?Oberflächlich den Policy-Output betrachtend könnte einerseits eine traditionelle machtund interessenorientierte Analyse argumentieren, dass aufgrund mächtiger Industrieinteressen im politischen Prozess die -gemessen an ökologischen Erfordernissen -relativ schwache Ökosteuerausgestaltung zustande kam. ...
This contribution deals with the question, which role policy-learning approaches play for the explanation of instrument change in environmental policy since the 1980's. After a critical general discussion of the most important policy-learning approaches, an analytical framework is introduced which aims at combining policy-learning with a classic interest-/power-oriented analytical approach. The relevance of this analytical framework is then demonstrated against the background of the discussion on economic environmental policy instruments in Germany using the example of the ecological tax reform which was introduced in 1999. This tax reform is a result of general learning processes about the use of market-based instruments in environmental policy as a new "policy-idea" as well as - in its concrete form - a result of power struggles and the influence of interest groups. The suggested analytical framework is able to adequately integrate both aspects for an explanation of dynamic policy processes.
... Beide Parteien hatten sich in ihren Wahlprogrammen für die Einführung einer Ökosteuerreform ausgesprochen -am 1. April 1999 trat das Gesetz zur Einführung einer ökologischen Steuerreform in Kraft, das bis 2003 in vier weiteren Stufen fortgesetzt wurde. Allerdings enthält die deutsche Ökosteuer zahlreiche Ausnahmeregelungen für die Industrie und wurde aufgrund ihres Abweichens von umweltökonomischen Idealen stark kritisiert(Böhringer/Schwager 2003;Linscheidt/ Truger 2000). Aufgrund dieses Politikergebnisses stellt sich die Frage, ob es sich hierbei dennoch um Politiklernen handelt und welchen Mehrwert der hier angewendete Analyserahmen zur Erklärung des politischen Prozesses bringt?Oberflächlich den Policy-Output betrachtend könnte einerseits eine traditionelle machtund interessenorientierte Analyse argumentieren, dass aufgrund mächtiger Industrieinteressen im politischen Prozess die -gemessen an ökologischen Erfordernissen -relativ schwache Ökosteuerausgestaltung zustande kam. ...
'Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welchen Beitrag Ansätze des Politiklernens für die Erklärung von Instrumentenwandel in der Umweltpolitik seit den 1980er Jahren leisten können. Dazu werden zunächst die wichtigsten Aussagen politikwissenschaftlicher Ansätze dargestellt, die darauf abzielen, Politikwandel durch Lernen zu erklären, bevor ein Analyserahmen vorgeschlagen wird, in dem diese Ansätze mit interessen-/ machtbasierten Annahmen zur Erklärung von Politikwandel kombiniert werden. Die Relevanz dieses Analyserahmens wird dann vor dem Hintergrund der Debatte über marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente in der deutschen Umweltpolitik anhand des Beispiels der 1999 eingeführten ökologischen Steuerreform aufgezeigt: Die Einführung dieser stellt zum einen das Ergebnis von langfristigen grundsätzlichen Lernprozessen über eine neue 'Policy-Idee' dar, ist aber zum anderen in ihrer konkreten Ausgestaltung zugleich das Resultat von Macht- und Interessenauseinandersetzungen. Der vorgeschlagene Analyserahmen erweist sich als tauglich, beide Aspekte für eine Erklärung dynamischer Politikprozesse angemessen zu berücksichtigen.' (Autorenreferat) 'This contribution deals with the question, which role policy-learning approaches play for the explanation of instrument change in environmental policy since the 1980's. After a critical general discussion of the most important policy-learning approaches, an analytical framework is introduced which aims at combining policy-learning with a classic interest-/ power-oriented analytical approach. The relevance of this analytical framework is then demonstrated against the background of the discussion on economic environmental policy instruments in Germany using the example of the ecological tax reform which was introduced in 1999. This tax reform is a result of general learning processes about the use of market-based instruments in environmental policy as a new 'policy-idea' as well as - in its concrete form - a result of power struggles and the influence of interest groups. The suggested analytical framework is able to adequately integrate both aspects for an explanation of dynamic policy processes.' (author's abstract)|
... The reform levied higher taxes on energy use while recycling the additional energy tax yield through a reduction of employer's social security contributions. A central feature of Germany's green tax reform, which can be generalized to green tax reforms in other OECD countries (OECD 2001), are substantial energy tax breaks for energy-intensive firms (Böhringer and Schwager 2003). In our regression analysis, we aim at identifying central determinants of German green taxation. ...
In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups? interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany?s green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design.
... The reform levied higher taxes on energy use while recycling the additional energy tax yield through a reduction of employer's social security contributions. A central feature of Germany's green tax reform, which can be generalized to green tax reforms in other OECD countries (OECD 2001), are substantial energy tax breaks for energy-intensive firms (Böhringer and Schwager 2003). In our regression analysis, we aim at identifying central determinants of German green taxation. ...
I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear.
... In order to promote political feasibility, environmental taxes typically discriminate in favor of energy-intensive industries including -as an extreme case -complete tax exemptions (OECD, 2001). A recent example is Germany's environmental tax reform, where energy-intensive industries are reimbursed tax payments beyond a certain threshold, effectively exempting these sectors (Böhringer and Schwager, 2003). Tax exemptions, however, may turn out as an expensive instrument for alleviating adverse effects of environmental regulation for production and employment in energy-intensive industries because non-exempted parts of the economy have to make up for the environmental target with costly additional measures (Böhringer and Rutherford, 1997). ...
Studies of structural change induced by environmental taxation usually proceed in a perfect-competition framework and typically find structural change to be quite moderate under realistic emission reduction scenarios. By observing that some of the industries affected are likely to operate under imperfect rather than perfect competition, additional mechanisms emerge which may amplify structural change beyond the extent identified as yet. Especially, changes in economies of scale may arise which weaken or strengthen the competitive position of industries over and above the initial cost effect. Using a computable general equilibrium model for Germany to examine the effects of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax, we find that induced structural change is more pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the macroeconomic level, we find that aggregate losses in economies of scale are larger than aggregate gains, implying that the total costs of environmental regulation are higher under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.
Climate protection should use environmental policy instruments that raise revenues, which can be used, for instance, to cut labor taxes to alleviate unemployment in economies suffering from high and persistent unemployment. This paper elaborates the possibilities of an employment dividend of climate policies and shows the potential importance of such a second dividend for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of climate policy. It is argued that national attempts to reap such a double dividend may be bound to fail if resource suppliers can respond in a way that leads to a large-scale international reallocation of environmental rents. Only an internationally coordinated uniform base tax on CO 2 that complements already existing emission trading systems could keep revenues from climate policy in those countries bearing the cost of fighting global warming and thus leave them with the option on a second dividend.
Wir haben in Kapitel 3 gesehen, dass das Coase-Theorem nur unter recht einschränkenden Bedingungen gültig ist. Insbesondere bei Umweltproblemen, an denen viele Akteure beteiligt sind, steigen die Transaktionskosten direkter Verhandlungen sehr schnell an, was kaum hoffen lässt, dass reale Probleme negativer externer Effekte auf dem Wege direkter Verhandlungen internalisiert werden könnten. Letzten Endes wird also doch ein staatlicher Eingriff benötigt, um das Marktversagen zu korrigieren. Die Frage ist: Wie kann der Staat eine Internalisierung externer Kosten erzwingen, und: Ist er in der Lage, eine effiziente Lösung herbeizuführen?
Lenkungssteuern können die Nachfrage nach gesundheitsgefährdenden oder umweltbelastenden Güter effektiv verringern. Die Steuern treffen jedoch Konsumenten mit geringerem Einkommen oft stärker und werden häufig durch den Konsum von geringer besteuerten Alternativen oder den Bezug aus illegalen Quellen umgangen. Durch Förderungen gesunder oder umweltschonender Alternativen und die Kombination mit anderen Maßnahmen kann die Wirkung von Lenkungssteuern verstärkt werden. Als alternative Methode zur Verhaltenslenkung ohne finanziellen Zwang können Nudges eingesetzt werden. Durch die gezielte Präsentation von Entscheidungssituationen, etwa durch Hinweise oder Voreinstellungen, sollen Menschen zum erwünschten Verhalten „sanft angestupst“ werden.
Energie- und Stromsteuern stellen neben dem EU-Emissionshandelssystem ein wichtiges Instrument zur Einpreisung externer Umwelteffekte der Energieerzeugung dar, spielen in der Debatte um die instrumentelle Umsetzung der Energiewende aber eher ein Schatten-Dasein. 2011 legte die EU-Kommission zwar einen umfassenden Reformvorschlag zur europäischen Energiesteuerrichtlinie vor, eine Umsetzung ist derzeit aufgrund politischen Widerstands in den Mitgliedsstaaten aber nicht in Sicht. Vor dem Hintergrund der Energiewende ist es jedoch notwendig zu diskutieren, inwieweit die Steuerwirkungen der gegenwärtigen Energie- und Stromsteuern mit Zielen wie Klimaschutz, Energieeffizienz und dem Ausbau Erneuerbarer Energien konsistent sind, und welche Rolle sie künftig im energie- und klimapolitischen Instrumentenmix spielen könnten. Zur Klärung dieser Fragen nimmt dieser Beitrag eine ökonomische Analyse der Förderwirkungen des bestehenden Energie- und Stromsteuerregimes auf die genannten Energiewendeziele vor, und diskutiert Weiterentwicklungsperspektiven. In ihrer aktuellen Ausgestaltung erzielen Energie- und Stromsteuern lediglich eine indirekte Lenkungswirkung auf das Klimaschutzziel, indem Anreize für Energieeffizienz und den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien gesetzt werden. Diese bleiben hinsichtlich ihres Umfangs und ihrer Effektivität jedoch begrenzt; zudem ergeben sich Effizienzprobleme. Die Bestandsaufnahme der Förderwirkungen zeigt demnach erheblichen Weiterentwicklungsbedarf auf, wenn die Energiebesteuerung eine signifikante und konsistente Rolle bei der Realisierung der Energiewendeziele einnehmen soll. Vor dem Hintergrund konfligierender Politikziele, multipler Marktversagenstatbestände und Wechselwirkungen mit außersteuerlichen Instrumenten scheint eine umfassende Reform hin zu einer verzerrungsfreien, verwendungs- und energieerzeugnisübergreifend einheitlich gestalteten Besteuerung gegenwärtig weder politisch durchsetzbar noch ökonomisch sinnvoll. Eine praktikablere Weiterentwicklungsperspektive bestünde darin, eine schrittweise Reduktion von Verzerrungswirkungen zunächst innerhalb einzelner Verwendungsbereiche (Strom, Wärme, Verkehr) anzustreben. Empfehlungen hinsichtlich der konzeptionellen Ausrichtung der Energie- und Stromsteuern lassen sich dabei unter Beachtung des jeweils vorhandenen, sektoralen Instrumentenverbunds ableiten. Abstract Energy and electricity taxes represent an important instrument for putting a price on the external environmental effects of energy production. However, in the debate about the implementation of the German energy transition, they do not play a prominent role. The European Commission published a proposal for a comprehensive reform of the Energy Tax Directive in 2011, but due to member states’ opposition it is unlikely to be implemented any time soon. In the energy transition context, it is nonetheless necessary to discuss whether the incentives set by current energy taxation are consistent with the aims of climate change mitigation, energy efficiency and renewable energy expansion, and what future role energy and electricity taxes could play in the energy and climate policy mix. This article addresses these questions by undertaking an economic analysis of the incentive effects of current German energy taxation on the mentioned energy transition aims and by discussing future development perspectives. In their present design, energy and electricity taxes only have an indirect effect on climate change mitigation, by setting incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy use; these incentives, however, are of limited scope and (cost-) effectiveness. Consequently, substantial reforms are needed if energy taxation is to play a significant and consistent role in the realization of the energy transition’s aims. Reforms which aim at creating a distortion-free energy taxation based on a homogenous tax base seem neither politically feasible nor economically reasonable, because of the existence of conflicting policy aims, multiple market failures and interactions with other non-tax instruments. A more practical development perspective would be a gradual reduction of allocative distortions within individual energy utilization sectors (electricity, heating, transport). Recommendations regarding the conceptual role for energy taxes in these sectors can be derived under consideration of the existing sectoral policy mixes.
Explaining the choice of instruments in environmental policy is an important research question for political science. Especially the fundamental change in the use of environmental policy instruments since the late 1970s in different countries needs explanations: as alternatives to command-and-control instruments, other instrumental forms (e.g., market-based or cooperative forms of governance) have been discussed and successively implemented in different countries. This paper aims – against the backdrop of German ecological tax reform – to develop an analytical framework to explain the choice of environmental policy instruments better than the most important traditional approaches (naïve instrumentalism and public choice). By using the analytical framework presented here, it is possible to study processes of environmental policy instrument choice without overestimating or underestimating factors that support and limit instrument change.
Wir haben in Kap. 3 gesehen, dass das Coase-Theorem
nur unter recht einschränkenden Bedingungen gültig ist. Insbesondere bei Umweltproblemen, an denen viele Akteure beteiligt
sind, steigen die Transaktionskosten
direkter Verhandlungen sehr schnell an, was kaum hoffen lässt, dass reale Probleme negativer externer Effekte auf dem Wege
direkter Verhandlungen internalisiert werden könnten. Letzten Endes wird also doch ein staatlicher Eingriff benötigt, um das
Marktversagen
zu korrigieren. Die Frage ist: Wie kann der Staat eine Internalisierung externer Kosten erzwingen, und: Ist er in der Lage,
eine effiziente Lösung herbeizuführen?
This paper discusses fundamental aspects of the European emissions trading system which has been implemented in January 2005. We show how institutional features set by the EU Commission and the required subsidiary decisions by the respective Member States are potentially in conflict with the objectives of efficiency, compensation and competition neutrality. Inefficiencies can emerge from the decisions on the number of emission allowances and the way in which they are allocated. These problems are intensified by pressure from political interest groups. We argue that costs from recurring political debates and decisions on the National Allocation Plans could be avoided by using truly lump-sum-free allocation rules or moving towards auctioning off emission allowances.
It is a hardly disputable fact that one can get scientific reports in favour of (and against) nearly every policy a government
wants to perform. One of the reasons for this is that economic theory is in many relevant cases so weak that it is possible
for different economists to defend pretty contrary positions with the claim of scientific truth. This makes empirical research
necessary. However, using the ecological tax reform as an example, it is shown that researchers can often easily obtain their
‘esired’ empirical results without (obvious) violations of the rules of scientific work. To detect such manipulations, a critical
discussion of theoretical approaches and empirical results is necessary. Finally, we discuss how it is possible that despite
all these problems the process of policy advice may lead to something like ‘objectivity’, why even economists who are not
corrupt in most cases promote the objectives of their clients, and why economic policy advice is demanded at all.
Climate change is widely recognised as a ‘wicked’ policy problem. Agreeing and implementing governance responses is proving
extremely difficult. Policy makers in many jurisdictions now emphasise their ambition to govern using the best available evidence.
One obvious source of such evidence is the evaluations of the performance of existing policies. But to what extent do these
evaluations provide insights into the difficult dilemmas that governors typically encounter? We address this question by reviewing
the content of 262 evaluation studies of European climate policies in the light of six kinds of dilemma found in the governance
literature. We are interested in what these studies say about the performance of European climate policies and in their capacity
to inform evidence-based policy-making. We find that the evaluations do arrive at common findings: that climate change is
framed as a problem of market and/or state failure; that voluntary measures tend to be ineffective; that market-based instruments
tend to be regressive; that EU-level policies have driven climate policies in the latecomer EU Member States; and that lack
of monitoring and weak enforcement are major obstacles to effective policy implementation. However, we also conclude that
the evidence base these studies represent is surprisingly weak for such a high profile area. There is too little systematic
climate policy evaluation work in the EU to support systematic evidence-based policy making. This reduces the scope for sound
policy making in the short run and is a constraint to policy learning in the longer term.
Climate protection should use environmental policy instruments that raise revenues, which can be used, for instance, to cut labour taxes to alleviate unemployment in economies suffering from high and persistent unemployment. This paper elaborates the possibilities of an employment dividend of climate policies and shows the potential importance of such a second dividend for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of climate policy. It is argued that national attempts to reap such a double dividend may be bound to fail if resource suppliers can respond in a way that leads to a large-scale international reallocation of environmental rents. Only a internationally coordinated uniform base tax on CO2 that complements already existing emission trading systems could keep revenues from climate policy in those countries bearing the cost of fighting global warming and thus leave them with the option on a second dividend.
This paper investigates the economic impacts of environmental tax reforms designed to reach given emission reduction targets for the German economy. Our focus is on the efficiency and employment implications of alternative schemes for emission tax differentiation between the production sector and the household sector. We point out that strong tax discrimination in favor of the production sector may cause substantial excess costs. Differences in the emission tax base and the respective ease of emission mitigation across the production sector and the household sector are shown to play a crucial role for explaining our results.
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets.
Seit ihrer Einführung im Jahre 1999 wird die ökologische Steuerreform in Deutschland kontrovers diskutiert. Das Buch stellt eine erste systematische und modellgestützte Analyse der Auswirkungen dieser Reform vor. Untersucht werden die Folgen für das Wirtschaftswachstum, den Arbeitsmarkt und die Einkommensverteilung sowie die Wirkungen auf den Energieverbrauch und die CO2-Emissionen. Dazu werden zwei gesamtwirtschaftliche Modelle sowie ein Mikrosimulationsmodell eingesetzt. Sensitivitätsanalysen erlauben einen Test der Robustheit der Ergebnisse und des Einflusses unterschiedlicher Annahmen und analytischer Methoden auf das Ergebnis. Die Studie zeigt auf, inwieweit die ursprünglichen Ziele der ökologischen Steuerreform erreicht werden können, unerwünschte Nebenwirkungen auftreten und politischer Handlungsbedarf entsteht.
If some, but not all, countries are cooperating to reduce CO2 emissions, one could make the following argument: a high carbon tax for carbon intensive tradeable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors, and therefore CO2 emissions, in the cooperating countries. However, this will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries that have no climate policy. And since it is only total CO2 emissions from all countries that are relevant for the climate, there is no point in a policy that simply relocates CO2 emissions from the cooperating countries to the countries that have no climate policy. According to this line of reasoning, carbon intensive tradeable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy.This paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy, provided one can use import and export tariffs on all traded goods. It is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods. However, informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are likely also to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors.
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner’s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached.
There has been considerable debate as to whether the revenue-neutral substitution of environmental taxes for ordinary income taxes might offer a double dividend: not only (1) improve the environment but also (2) reduce certain costs of the tax system. This paper articulates different notions of double dividend and examines the theoretical and empirical evidence for each. It also connects the double-dividend issue with principles of optimal environmental taxation in a second-best setting.
A weak double-dividend claim-that returning tax revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes leads to cost savings relative to the case where revenues are returned lump sum-is easily defended on theoretical grounds and (thankfully) receives wide support from numerical simulations. The stronger versions contend that revenueneutral swaps of environmental taxes for ordinary distortionary taxes involve zero or negative gross costs. Theoretical analyses and numerical results tend to cast doubt on the strong double-dividend claim, although the theoretical case is not air-tight and the numerical evidence is mixed.
Effective management of international environmental resources requires cooperation, and in practice cooperation is usually codified in international environmental agreements (IEAs). The essential feature of IEAs is that they cannot be enforced by a third party. This paper explores the properties of self-enforcing IEAs using two models. In one, the number of signatories, the terms of the agreement, and the actions of nonsignatories are determined jointly. In the other, the IEA is modeled as an infinitely repeated game, but one which is renegotiation-proof. Both models indicate that IEAs can do little to improve on the noncooperative outcome when the number of countries that share the resource is large. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
Sectoral exemptions from environmental regulation are applied in many countries to avoid adverse adjustment effects in specific industries. The problem with exemptions is that they can make environmental policy more costly. Our paper analyzes the welfare costs of exemptions in environmental policy together with the issue of unilateral carbon taxes in an open economy. Several countries within the EU have introduced or contemplated unilateral taxes to reduce anthropogenic CO2emissions. Taxes which are unilaterally imposed in an open economy can have significant impacts on production and employment of energy- and export-intensive industries. To save jobs by maintaining “international competitiveness” most CO2taxation schemes include exemptions for energy- and export-intensive industries as a compromise between environmental objectives and employment in these sectors. This paper shows that such compromises are costly: as the tax base narrows, the dead-weight loss increases. Our calculations illustrate this point in the framework of a static general equilibrium model for West Germany calibrated to 1990 data. We evaluate the excess costs of exemptions as a means of saving jobs in specific industries relative to an alternative instrument, a uniform carbon tax cum wage subsidy which achieves an identical level of national emissions and employment at a fraction of the cost.
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