Content uploaded by Eric Blumenson
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Eric Blumenson on Aug 23, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
NELLCO
NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository
Suffolk University Law School Faculty
Publications
Suffolk University Law School
12-1-1998
Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden
Economic Agenda
Eric Blumenson
Suffolk University Law School, eblumens@suffolk.edu
Eva S. Nilsen
none
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Suffolk University Law School at NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Suffolk University Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of NELLCO Legal Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact tracy.thompson@nellco.org.
Recommended Citation
Blumenson, Eric and Nilsen, Eva S., "Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda" (1998). Suffolk University Law
School Faculty Publications. Paper 4.
http://lsr.nellco.org/suffolk_fp/4
35
Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s
Hidden Economic Agenda
Eric Blumenson†
Eva Nilsen††
T
ABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.................................................................................... 36
I. The Drug War Dividend ......................................................... 42
A. Federal Aid to Drug Law Enforcement .......................... 42
B. Forfeiture and Asset Distribution .................................. 44
II. The Conflict of Interest Objections to Self-Financing
Police Agencies ....................................................................... 56
A. The Due Process Objection ............................................. 57
B. Policy Objections ............................................................. 76
III. The Accountability Objections to Self-Financing
Police Agencies ....................................................................... 83
A. The Separation of Powers Objection .............................. 83
B. Policy Objections ............................................................. 93
IV. Remedies and Prospects....................................................... 100
Conclusion .................................................................................... 112
† Professor, Suffolk University Law School; J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School.
††Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Boston University Law School; J.D. 1977, Uni-
versity of Virginia Law School; LL.M. 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
We presented an earlier version of this Article at the June 1997 meeting of the Law
and Society Association and at faculty workshops at the Boston University School of Law
and Suffolk University Law School. We are grateful to all participants and to the faculties
at both institutions, who continued to provide thoughtful and valuable advice throughout
the research and writing of the Article. We also thank Lawrence D. Weinberg for research
assistance, and Dan Baum, Brenda Grantland, Eric Sterling, and Karen Tosh for leading
us to much of the obscure but crucial data that appears herein. This research was sup-
ported by a grant from the Open Society Institute’s Individual Project Fellowships Pro-
gram.
36 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Asset seizures play an important role in the operation of
[multijurisdictional drug] task forces. One “big bust” can
provide a task force with the resources to become financially
independent. Once financially independent, a task force can
choose to operate without Federal or state assistance.
Report commissioned by the Department of Justice (Oct 1993)
1
[W]hat reason can there be, that a free people should be ex-
pos’d to all the insult and abuse, . . . and even the fatal con-
sequences, which may arise from the execution of a writ of as-
sistance, only to put fortunes into private pockets. . . . [C]an
a community be safe with an uncontroul’d power lodg’d in
the hands of such officers . . . ?
James Otis, Boston Gazette (Jan 4, 1762)
2
I
NTRODUCTION
The Nixon Administration officially declared the “War on
Drugs” twenty-five years ago.
3
It has continued, at escalating lev-
els, ever since.
4
Today we annually spend $15 billion in federal
1
Justice Research and Statistics Association (“JRSA”), Multijurisdictional Drug Con-
trol Task Forces: A Five-Year Review 1988-1992 9 (Oct 1993).
2
Attributed to James Otis, Article, Boston Gaz (Jan 4, 1762), reprinted in M.H.
Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case 562, 565-66 (California 1978).
3
In 1973, the Administration created the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
to prosecute its “declared[,] all-out, global war on the drug menace.” Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Establish-
ing a Drug Enforcement Administration, HR Doc No 69, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 3 (Mar 28,
1973).
4
President Reagan affirmed his administration’s “unshakable” commitment “to do
what is necessary to end the drug menace” by, among other things, increasing the number
of federal drug task forces. Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and Organized
Crime, 18 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1311, 1313-14 (Oct 14, 1982). Later, President Bush ap-
pointed a drug “czar,” William Bennett, who, among other things, sought the death pen-
alty for drug sellers. Excerpts From News Session by Bush, Watkins and Bennett, NY
Times D16 (Jan 13, 1989); Philip Shenon, Administration Offers a Tough New Drug Bill,
NY Times A21 (May 17, 1990). The Bush Administration also contributed ever more mili-
tant rhetoric and increased federal budgets to the war effort. Its 1991, $10.4 billion Drug
War budget (of which 75 percent was earmarked for drug law enforcement) constituted a
62 percent increase over the 1989 budget, and a tenfold increase over the 1985 budget.
John A. Powell and Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse,
The Constitution, and the Black Community, 24 UC Davis L Rev 557, 567 (1991). The
Clinton Administration in turn has increased the antidrug budget by an additional 25 per-
cent. Joshua Wolf Shenk, The Phony Drug War, The Nation 11, 12 (Sept 23, 1996). During
Clinton’s first term the number of marijuana-related arrests increased by 43 percent, and
more Americans are in prison for such offenses than ever before. Eric Schlosser, More
Reefer Madness, Atlantic Monthly 90 (Apr 1, 1997). The Clinton Administration also has
proposed conditioning teenage drivers’ licenses, parole, and welfare payments on manda-
1998] Policing for Profit 37
funds
5
and $33 billion in state and local funds to finance this
war.
6
Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) crime sta-
tistics report that in 1995 alone there were almost 1.5 million
drug arrests, of which 500,000 were arrests for marijuana posses-
sion.
7
Sixty percent of federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug
offenses.
8
This massive outpouring of money and effort has produced
record numbers of drug seizures, asset forfeitures, and prosecu-
tions.
9
By more meaningful measures, however, the Drug War
has been an extraordinary failure. Drugs are more available—at
higher purity and lower prices—than they were at the start of the
decade.
10
Drug dependence in the inner city
11
and among teenag-
tory drug tests, see Joshua Wolf Shenk, Baring Teeth in the Drug War, NY Times A21 (Oct
30, 1996), and promised federal intervention to nullify effectively the “medical marijuana”
initiatives passed in California and Arizona. Doctors Given Federal Threat on Marijuana,
NY Times A1 (Dec 31, 1996) (reporting Clinton Administration plans to revoke DEA regis-
trations of physicians who recommend or prescribe “medical marijuana,” including exclu-
sion from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs).
5
The fiscal 1997 federal budget allocated $15.3 billion to the drug war, $2 billion
more than the 1995 budget. Christopher S. Wren, Drugs Surge as a Campaign Issue, But
All the Talk Clarifies Little, NY Times A1 (Sept 17, 1996). The comparable figures were
$4.7 billion in 1988, Shenk, NY Times at A21 (cited in note 4), and almost $1 billion in
1980, T.R. Reid, A New Assault Planned Against Formidable Foe; Victories are Elusive in
U.S. War On Drugs, Wash Post A1 (Aug 10, 1986).
6
Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Fight Drugs as
You Would a Disease, Chi Trib C18 (Mar 31, 1996).
7
The FBI estimates that in 1995 there were 1,476,100 arrests for drug abuse viola-
tions, 41 percent more than in 1991 and 65 percent more than in 1986. Arrests for mari-
juana possession totaled 34.1 percent of these arrests, or over 503,000—more than the
combined total number of arrests for murder, manslaughter, robbery, arson, vagrancy,
rape, and all sex offenses including prostitution. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Reports for the United States 1995 207-08 (DOJ 1996).
8
Marc Mauer and Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice
System: Five Years Later 11 (The Sentencing Project Oct 1995) (reporting that in 1993
drug offenders accounted for 60.8 percent of federal prisoners and 22.5 percent of state
prisoners). Regarding the escalating imprisonment rates, see text accompanying notes
172-74.
9
Federal drug prosecutions rose sharply from 1980 to 1992 before reaching a plateau.
In 1981, when President Reagan took office, there were 8,775 federal drug prosecutions.
The Bush and Clinton Administrations have each averaged just under 26,000 drug prose-
cutions a year, with the number rising to 28,585 in the election year 1992. Drug Prosecu-
tions Up Significantly Since ‘81; Enforcement Boost by Reagan Continued Under Bush,
Clinton, Chi Trib C6 (Oct 20, 1996) (reporting research by Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse at Syracuse University).
10
In New York City in 1993, an average milligram of heroin was one-third of the 1979
price—and ten times the purity. Federal Law Enforcement Priorities, Hearings on S 3 and
S 38 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 43, 50 (Feb 14,
1995) (statement of Thomas A. Constantine) (reporting a change from 1979 to 1993 from 6
percent purity to 66 percent purity, and from $1.60 per milligram to $.53 per milligram).
Meanwhile, newly popular synthetic drugs have emerged including fentanyl, MDMA or
“ecstasy,” and methcathinone or “CAT.” Methamphetamine or “speed” has emerged as “the
38 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
ers
12
has increased substantially. And the drug problem continues
to produce massive amounts of crime,
13
$20 billion in annual
medical costs,
14
one-third of all new HIV infections,
15
prisons filled
with drug-related offenders,
16
and the attendant decimation of
most significant dangerous drug problem in terms of domestic clandestine manufacture.”
Id at 48. See also Matt Bai, Colombian cartels pour pure heroin into Boston, Boston Globe
A1 (Sept 4, 1996) (attributing an eighteenfold increase in heroin’s purity per dollar over
five years in part to the fact that the Colombian cartels have become exporters of heroin,
not just cocaine).
According to a Senate Judiciary Committee report, between 1993 and the first half of
1995, “the ability of U.S. forces to seize or otherwise turn back drug shipments . . .
dropped 53 percent. . . . [Annually, as] much as 84 metric tons of additional cocaine and
marijuana could be arriving unimpeded . . . through the Eastern transit zone alone.” This
report, prepared by the Republican majority, attributes this to Clinton interdiction cut-
backs, something the Administration denies. Majority Staff, Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit Drug Use and Na-
tional Drug Policy (1995), in Trends in Youthful Drug Use, Hearing before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 4, 13-14 (Dec 19, 1995).
11
Although “fewer Americans are using drugs . . . those who do have a much more se-
rious problem, and helping them will prove far more difficult than anything that has so far
been attempted.” Michael Massing, What Ever Happened to the ‘War on Drugs’?, NY Rev
of Books 42, 42 (June 11, 1992) (arguing that the War on Drugs has attempted to safe-
guard suburbia while ignoring a progressively worsening inner-city drug problem). The
one success has been a reduction in the total number of drug consumers by roughly half
since the late seventies, to 12.8 million users. Department of Health and Human Services,
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1995 (1997).
12
Deptartment of Health and Human Services, National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse. The survey showed that drug use among teenagers between twelve and seventeen
years of age increased 105 percent between 1992 and 1995, to 10.9 percent of this popula-
tion. Marijuana use increased 141 percent among teenagers during this period. The an-
nual number of new users of marijuana has risen every year since 1991.
13
The best estimate is that one-third of all property crimes, assaults, and murders are
drug related. Hearing on McCaffrey Nomination Before the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 16 (Feb 27, 1996) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey,
Director Designee of the Office of National Drug Control Policy). According to a survey re-
ported by the DEA Administrator, four out of five males arrested in New York and Chi-
cago tested positive for illegal drugs. Federal Law Enforcement Priorities Hearings at 47
(statement of Constantine) (cited in note 10). See also Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pas-
tore, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1993 427, 459-60 (DOJ 1994).
14
Hearing on McCaffrey Nomination at 16 (statement of McCaffrey) (cited in note 13).
General McCaffrey also estimates that from 1990 to 1995, “illegal drug abuse cost America
more than $300 billion and 100,000 dead.” Id.
15
Jeff Stryker and Mark D. Smith, eds, Dimensions of HIV Prevention: Needle Ex-
change vii (Kaiser Forums 1993) (reporting that approximately one-third of HIV infections
derive from shared needles and syringes).
16
The prison population has grown exponentially as ever-larger numbers of drug of-
fenders are incarcerated. From 1983 to 1993, the number of prisoners incarcerated for
drug crimes quintupled. Mauer and Huling, Young Black Americans at 10 (cited in note 8).
For discussion of the increasing reliance on incarceration to solve our drug problem, see
text accompanying notes 172-74.
1998] Policing for Profit 39
inner-city communities.
17
By all accounts, we have thus far been
unable to spend and jail our way out of this problem.
Given these facts, and a general consensus that the Drug
War has been a failure,
18
one might wonder why essentially the
same strategies persist year after year, untouched by the wisdom
of twenty-five years of experience. And why do so few public and
law enforcement officials speak out against this policy? The an-
swer is that the Drug War has achieved a self-perpetuating life of
its own, because however irrational it may be as public policy, it
is fully rational as a political and bureaucratic strategy. Although
the political impetus is well recognized—periodically demon-
strated by the public demise of people deemed “soft on drugs,”
like former Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders, Judge Harold Baer,
and ambassadorial nominee William Weld
19
—the bureaucratic
17
In 1994, almost 7 percent of black adult males were incarcerated, compared to 1
percent of white adult males. Reuters, Nearly 7% of Adult Black Men Were Inmates in ‘94,
Study Says, NY Times A15 (Dec 4, 1995), citing a Department of Justice Report. The
number of black males in their twenties under criminal justice supervision including in-
carceration, parole, or probation stood at 32.2 percent in 1995. Mauer and Huling, Young
Black Americans at 1 (cited in note 8). One response, by high schools in Prince Georges
County, Maryland, has been to invite police to teach classes on how to be arrested, hand-
cuffed, and searched. Brett Pulley, Police Teach Getting Arrested Safely 101, Wall St J B1
(June 16, 1994).
Focusing on drug offenses, blacks comprise 12 percent of the population, 13 percent of
all monthly drug users, 35 percent of those arrested for drug possession, 55 percent of
those convicted of drug possession, and 74 percent of those sentenced to prison for drug
possession. Mauer and Huling, Young Black Americans at 12 (cited in note 8) (compiling
statistics from 1992 and 1993). Mauer and Huling also estimate that blacks and Hispanics
account for almost 90 percent of those sentenced to state prisons for drug possession, and
that the number of black (non-Hispanic) women incarcerated in state prisons for drug of-
fenses multiplied more than eightfold from 1986 to 1991. Id at 1-2, 13. These disparate
conviction rates have all the more impact because drug offenders are sentenced to longer
terms (6.5 years on average) than racketeers or extortionists (5 years). Keith W. Watters,
Law Without Justice, Natl Bar Assoc Mag 1, 23 (Mar/Apr 1996).
18
A 1995 public opinion survey found that only 6 percent of the respondents thought
that drug abuse is less of a problem today than five years ago. The survey notes that 50
percent gave the federal government a grade of “D” or “F” for dealing with the problems of
drug use and addiction. Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy of a Failed User, Legal Times 26
(May 22, 1995). See also Eva Bertram and Kenneth Sharpe, War Ends, Drugs Win, The
Nation 11 (Jan 6, 1997); William F. Buckley, Jr., et al, Symposium, The War on Drugs is
Lost, 48 Natl Rev 34 (Feb 12, 1996); Massing, NY Rev of Books at 42 (cited in note 11);
Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure (Little,
Brown 1996).
19
Then-Surgeon General Elders suggested that drug legalization should be studied as
a possible alternative to urban disorder brought about by the War on Drugs. Stephen La-
baton, Surgeon General Suggests Study of Legalizing Drugs, NY Times A23 (Dec 8, 1993).
Judge Baer suppressed evidence of a large quantity of cocaine and heroin he deemed
seized without probable cause. After attacks by the media, Senator Dole, and President
Clinton, he reversed his ruling. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge
Reverses Decision in Drug Case, NY Times A1 (Apr 2, 1996). Former Governor William
40 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
motive underpinning the Drug War is not. This bureaucratic
stake is financial, deriving from the lucrative rewards available
to police and prosecutorial agencies that make drug law enforce-
ment their highest priority. It operates invisibly, obscured by
moral and policy rationales.
Congress conferred these financial benefits to state and local
law enforcement both directly, through block grants earmarked
for drug law enforcement, and indirectly, through forfeiture pro-
visions authorizing law enforcement agencies to seize “drug-
related” assets, such as a house in which marijuana plants have
been grown, and use the proceeds for their budgetary needs. To-
gether these programs have ensured continued police enthusiasm
for the Drug War by offering financial largess unmatched in any
other area of law enforcement. But they have also transformed
the criminal justice system in two dangerous ways.
First, these programs have distorted governmental policy-
making and law enforcement. During the past decade, law en-
forcement agencies increasingly have turned to asset seizures
and drug enforcement grants to compensate for budgetary short-
falls, at the expense of other criminal justice goals. We believe the
strange shape of the criminal justice system today—the law en-
forcement agenda that targets assets rather than crime,
20
the 80
percent of seizures that are unaccompanied by any criminal
prosecution,
21
the plea bargains that favor drug kingpins and pe-
nalize the “mules” without assets to trade,
22
the reverse stings
that target drug buyers rather than drug sellers,
23
the overkill in
agencies involved even in minor arrests,
24
the massive shift to-
wards federal jurisdiction over local law enforcement
25
—is largely
the unplanned by-product of this economic incentive structure.
Weld found his nomination to be Ambassador to Mexico hijacked by Senator Jesse Helms
on grounds that Weld had supported proposals to allow the medical use of marijuana. See
John F. Harris, Weld Ends Bid to Be Ambassador, Wash Post A1 (Sept 16, 1997). Michael
Tonry argues that “[t]he War on Drugs and the set of harsh crime control policies . . . were
undertaken to achieve political, not policy, objectives. It is the adoption for political pur-
poses of policies with foreseeable disparate impacts, the use of disadvantaged black
Americans as means to achieving politicians’ electoral ends, that must in the end be justi-
fied. It cannot.” Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect—Race, Crime, and Punishment in America
39 (Oxford 1995). For a discussion of the self-perpetuating nature of public policy that
benefits politicians, see Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness
of Public Policy, 103 Yale L J 2593, 2618 (1994) (book review).
20
See Section II.
21
See note 155 and accompanying text.
22
See text accompanying notes 127-36.
23
See text accompanying notes 118-24.
24
See text accompanying notes 137-42 and 293-95.
25
See text accompanying notes 66-69.
1998] Policing for Profit 41
Second, the forfeiture laws in particular are producing self-
financing, unaccountable law enforcement agencies divorced from
any meaningful legislative oversight. There are numerous exam-
ples of such semi-independent agencies targeting assets with no
regard for the rights, safety, or even lives of the suspects.
26
Such
dire results should prompt reform, particularly because a single
measure—one mandating that forfeited assets be deposited in the
Treasury’s General Fund rather than retained by the seizing
agency—would cure the forfeiture law of its most corrupting ef-
fects. But thus far the forfeiture industry has enjoyed an aston-
ishing immunity from scrutiny by lawmakers and the courts.
27
In the following pages, we first describe in more detail how
the Drug War’s financial largess has kept its soldiers in business.
We then discuss the destructive impact of this economic regime,
marshaling evidence to show that the corruption of law enforce-
ment priorities and wholesale miscarriages of justice can be at-
tributed to the operation of these incentives. Finally, we explore
potential legal and legislative remedies through which law en-
forcement may regain its bearings.
Our investigation focuses on the economic underpinnings of
current drug law enforcement policy. Drug policy also raises an
extraordinarily broad range of moral, health, and criminological
concerns, which we do not discuss except insofar as the financial
incentives we describe have interfered with attempts to address
them. We take no position here on such pivotal issues as legaliza-
tion or decriminalization, but hope to speak to abolitionists and
prohibitionists alike. All sides should be able to agree that, at a
minimum, the law enforcement agenda should not be held hos-
tage to the opportunities for financial self-aggrandizement we de-
scribe herein.
26
See Sections II.A, III.B.
27
See United States v One Parcel of Property, 85 F3d 985, 991 n 3 (2d Cir 1996) (“Only
one Court of Appeals opinion, a dissent, conducted a full Matthews v. Eldridge analysis of
the civil drug forfeiture statute’s probable cause requirement.”) (citations omitted); Wil-
liam S. Genego, Forfeiture, Legitimation and a Due Process Right to Counsel, 59 Brooklyn
L Rev 337, 340, 343, 348-56 (1993) (noting that the Second Circuit has consistently “rub-
ber stamped the government’s exercise of its forfeiture power . . . [unwilling] even to ad-
dress the merits,” and lauding the Second Circuit for having begun a critical reexamina-
tion of forfeiture law beginning in 1992); George C. Pratt and William B. Petersen, Civil
Forfeiture in the Second Circuit, 65 St John’s L Rev 653, 653 (1991) (“Perhaps no area of
the law embodies more legal fictions—and better illustrates their use and misuse—than
does civil forfeiture.”); Steven Wisotsky, Not Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Case of Drugs in
the Courts, 5 Notre Dame J Legal Ethics & Pub Pol 651, 658 (1991) (arguing that courts
have adopted “the operative premise . . . that ‘drugs are bad,’ so bad that almost any law
or law enforcement measure is validated”).
42 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
I. THE DRUG WAR DIVIDEND
Congress continues to pass a new crime bill every few years.
Since the 1980s, these laws have become especially punitive to
drug offenders
28
and increasingly profitable to the law enforce-
ment agencies that pursue them. The latter was accomplished
primarily by rewriting existing federal aid and forfeiture laws
specifically to promote and finance drug law enforcement. We
take each in turn.
A. Federal Aid to Drug Law Enforcement
In 1986, Congress revised the federal aid program, renaming
it the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement
Assistance Program after a New York City police officer who was
shot during a drug arrest.
29
The Byrne Program replaced the fed-
eral block grants previously given to the states by the now-
defunct Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
30
Unlike
the earlier program, Byrne grant recipients are required to use
28
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976, codi-
fied at 18 USC §§ 1 et seq (1994), The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-
473, 98 Stat 2040, codified at 18 USC §§ 1961-68 (1994), and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207, codified at 21 USC §§ 801 et seq (1994), added new
forfeiture laws and new civil penalties, among many stringent provisions. Drug sentences
were ratcheted up fairly continuously; one year’s “get tough” provisions were deemed too
lenient the next. The 1986 Act prescribed some of the harshest sentences in the United
States Code: five-year mandatory minimum sentences for sale of small amounts of drugs,
and mandatory ten-years-to-life sentences for those convicted of possession with intent to
distribute larger quantities of drugs, such as ten grams of LSD. 21 USC § 841(b) (1994).
In 1988, Congress doubled many of the penalties in the earlier law and eliminated
probation or parole in most cases. Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub L No
100-690, 102 Stat 4312, codified at 21 USC §§ 801 et seq (1994). See, for example, 21 USC
§§ 841(d), 848(a). This 1988 Act also increased the penalty for simple possession of crack
cocaine to a minimum five-year prison term. 21 USC § 844 (1994).
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which
included new death penalty offenses and limits on habeas corpus proceedings. Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, codi-
fied at 42 USC §§ 13701 et seq (1994); Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-
322, 108 Stat 1959, codified at 18 USC § 3591 (1994). See also Wisotsky, 5 Notre Dame J
Legal Ethics & Pub Pol at 654, 679 (cited in note 27) (discussing increased enforcement
measures, and lamenting their failure); Michele H. Kalstein, Kirstie A. McCormack, and
Seth A. Rosenthal, Comment, Calculating Injustice: The Fixation on Punishment as Crime
Control, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 575, 575-78 (1992) (discussing the shift from individual re-
habilitation to system-wide “obedience”).
29
This program is authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 as amended in 1988.
Pub L No 100-690, 102 Stat 4329, codified at 42 USC §§ 3750-55 (1994).
30
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided $7.7 billion to state and
local governments between 1968 and its expiration in 1982. What the L.E.A.A. Elephant
Learned, NY Times A22 (Apr 21, 1982).
1998] Policing for Profit 43
these funds to fight the War on Drugs.
31
The Byrne Program is
now the primary federal program that funds state and local drug
law enforcement.
Byrne grants have altered the law enforcement landscape in
numerous ways, most notably in the proliferation of multijuris-
dictional drug task forces (“MJDTFs”),
32
now collectively the larg-
est funding category in the federal aid program.
33
Between 1988
and 1991, the number of Byrne-funded task forces almost doubled
to 904 task forces covering 83 percent of the population,
34
with up
to sixty-three multijurisdictional task forces operating within in-
dividual states.
35
MJDTF drug arrests fluctuated between
220,000 and 280,000 annually during this period.
36
(See Figure 1.)
31
These grants are administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (“BJA”) office “to
assist States and units of local government in carrying out specific programs which offer a
high probability of improving the functioning of the criminal justice system . . . by develop-
ing programs and projects to assist multijurisdictional and multi-State organizations in
the drug control problem and to support national drug control priorities.” 42 USC
§ 3751(a) (1994). The money goes to the requesting state, where it is distributed by the
state’s criminal justice agency to individual or combined units of state or local govern-
ment.
32
A multijurisdictional task force is supposed to enable law enforcement agencies to
collaborate across state, local, and national boundaries on drug investigations, arrests,
seizures, information gathering, and surveillance.
33
Of the twenty-one program areas eligible for federal block grant assistance, multi-
jurisdictional drug task forces have consistently garnered approximately one-third of the
funding each year. Over half of that amount finances the salaries and overtime pay of task
force members. General Accounting Office (“GAO”), War on Drugs, Federal Assistance to
State and Local Drug Enforcement 1, 5 (1993). In 1991, $139 million of Byrne money
funded 881 MJDTFs with amounts allocated to each state from $111,000 to more than $23
million. Id at 5. See also JRSA, Multijuridictional Drug Enforcement Task Forces: A Spe-
cial Analysis Report of the National Consortium to Assess State Drug Control Initiatives 22
(June 1992) (reporting that “approximately 40 percent of BJA formula grant funds were
allocated to establish or enhance drug enforcement task force operations”); James Coldren,
Jr., et al, Multijurisdictional Drug Task Force Operations: Results of a Nationwide Survey
of Task Force Commanders 1 (1993) (reporting that 50 percent of the BJA formula grants
were allocated to MJDTFs).
34
JRSA, Special Analysis Report at 22 (cited in note 33). Ninety-one percent of task
forces were created from 1987 to 1992. “This corresponded to the availability of federal
funds for task forces . . . .” Coldren, et al, Nationwide Survey at 5 (cited in note 33).
35
JRSA, Five-Year Review at 6 (cited in note 1). These statistics include only Byrne
formula grant-funded task forces. There are many other federally funded drug task forces
outside the Byrne grant program as well, such as the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Forces (“OCDETF
”), the DEA task forces, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance dis-
cretion grant funded task forces. Id at 5. Fifty-two localities have both DEA- and Byrne-
funded task forces. See GAO, War on Drugs at 1 (cited in note 33). The DEA also deploys
Mobile Enforcement Teams (“METS”), groups of ten to twelve DEA agents, each assigned
to a local police department. Federal Law Enforcement Priorities Hearings at 51-52
(statement of Constantine) (cited in note 10).
36
JRSA, Five-Year Review at 6-7 (cited in note 1).
44 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Figure 1
37
B. Forfeiture and Asset Distribution
Modern drug forfeiture laws date from 1970, when Congress
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act.
38
The Act included a civil forfeiture provision, 21 USC § 881,
authorizing the government to seize and forfeit drugs, drug
manufacturing and storage equipment, and conveyances used to
transport drugs.
39
This provision was intended to forestall the
spread of drugs in a way criminal penalties could not—by strik-
ing at its economic roots. When criminal prosecution sends a drug
dealer to jail, a subordinate will most likely take his place, but
seizing the means of production and other capital may shut down
the trafficking business for good. In the twenty-seven years since,
the list of properties subject to forfeiture has expanded greatly,
37
JRSA, Five-Year Review at 5 (cited in note 1).
38
Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1242 (1970), codified at 21 USC §§ 801 et seq (1994). Con-
gress passed other major forfeiture legislation in 1970 as well. It inserted forfeiture provi-
sions in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-452, 84 Stat 943, codified at 18 USC §§ 1961-68
(1994).
39
21 USC § 881(a). Criminal forfeiture, covering proceeds or instrumentalities of a
federal drug felony, is governed by 21 USC § 853.
Total MJDTF Arrests, 1988-1992
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Note: States reporting charges are excluded.
Arrests
1998] Policing for Profit 45
and the required connection to illegal drug activity has become
ever more remote. Over the years, Congress expanded the forfei-
ture law to include proceeds traceable to drug transactions
40
and
real property,
41
and in 1986 Congress promulgated a “substitute
assets” law allowing property of equal value to be forfeited in
place of forfeitable assets that are no longer available.
42
Today
cash, bank accounts, jewelry, cars, boats, airplanes, businesses,
houses, and land are all fair game.
This wholesale expansion of targets has produced enormous
confusion as to what kind of nexus to a drug violation will suffice.
The law provides for forfeiture of property that “facilitated” a
drug crime,
43
but courts have developed no clear criteria for defin-
ing facilitation.
44
Some police, prosecutors, and judges construe
40
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-633, 92 Stat 3768, codified at 21
USC § 881(a)(6) (1994). Proceeds are broadly defined to include cash, negotiable instru-
ments, securities, and other things of value. This amendment resulted in a twentyfold in-
crease in the value of DEA forfeitures compared to the previous year. GAO, Asset Forfei-
ture—A Seldom Used Tool in Combating Drug Trafficking 59 (1981). The GAO report also
notes that during the ten years following the enactment of RICO and Continuing Criminal
Enterprise forfeitures in 1970, these forfeiture provisions were used in only ninety-eight
cases. Id at 7.
41
Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2050 (1984), codified at 21 USC § 881(a)(7) (1994) (author-
izing forfeiture of real property used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate a fed-
eral drug felony). There is legislative history suggesting seizable property was conceived
as property actually used in manufacturing drugs. See William Patrick Nelson, Comment,
Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with
Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 Cal L Rev 1309, 1315-16
(1992), citing GAO, Asset Forfeiture at 13, 59 (cited in note 40). However, courts and
prosecutors have interpreted it broadly to include any real property having a connection to
a drug offense punishable by a year in prison. Id.
42
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207-13, codified at 21
USC § 853(p) (1994).
43
21 USC § 853(a)(2). The drug offense must be punishable by more than one year’s
imprisonment to serve as a predicate for forfeiture. 21 USC § 853(a). Only simple posses-
sion crimes fall below this threshold. 21 USC § 844(a).
44
Compare the construction of 21 USC § 881(a)(7) (discussing forfeiture of real prop-
erty that, inter alia, facilitates a narcotics felony) in United States v Santoro, 866 F2d
1538, 1542 (4th Cir 1989) (requiring a substantial connection between the property and
the felony), with that in United States v Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, 903
F2d 490, 493-94 (7th Cir 1990) (affirming forfeiture when property is used “in any manner
or part,” as long as more than “incidental or fortuitous”).
David B. Smith, former Associate Director of the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfei-
ture Office, notes that the various tests used by different courts to define facilitation—
“active aid,” “some substantial connection to” a transaction, making a transaction “less
difficult”—“merely beg the question posed by the statutory language, rather than
answering it.” David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases Release 16 ¶
3.03 at 3-13 to 3-14 n 6 (Matthew Bender June 1995). Is a car forfeitable because it was
used to drive to a preliminary meeting that led to a drug transaction on a later date? See
United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d 421, 423 (2d Cir 1977)
(finding nexus sufficient). Is any quantity of drugs, however minute, sufficient to justify
forfeiture of an automobile? See United States v One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 846 F2d 2, 4-5
46 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
this as a license to proceed on the most tenuous of grounds—for
example, seeking to forfeit a bar for the owner’s failure to stop
drug dealing within,
45
or a house in which the owner’s son sold
drugs,
46
or cash on which some cocaine residue has been found.
47
For prosecutors, the expanding reach of the forfeiture law is
complemented by the great procedural and financial benefits it
offers. Procedurally, two tremendous advantages accrue to the
government from an ancient legal fiction that dominates all for-
automobile? See United States v One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 846 F2d 2, 4-5 (2d Cir 1988)
(finding less than one ounce of marijuana sufficient for forfeiture). Must the government
link the property to a specific drug transaction? See United States v Banco Cafetero Pa-
nama, 797 F2d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir 1986) (answering no, so long as the government can
link the property with drug activity). These rulings are worrisome if the justification for
denying criminal due process rights is that the forfeiture is an action against the guilty
property based on its close relationship to the criminal activity. See Austin v United
States, 509 US 602, 623-27 (1993) (Scalia concurring) (rejecting a claim that forfeiture
constitutes a “punishment” that would bring it under the Eighth Amendment). They are
also troubling, however, because disproportionate, if forfeiture is supposed to be based on
the culpability of the owner, as the majority suggested in Austin. See id at 615 (Forfeiture
rests “on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be mis-
used and . . . is properly punished for that negligence.”).
In Bennis v Michigan, 116 S Ct 994, 1001 (1996), the Court upheld the forfeiture of an
automobile that was the site of an act of prostitution against a claim by the client’s wife.
Finding insufficient nexus and noting that the car fit none of the traditional categories of
goods subject to seizure—contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, or tools of the crimi-
nal’s trade—Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer dissented, and criticized what they
viewed as the Court’s grant of unbridled governmental power to confiscate private prop-
erty with only a tangential relationship to a crime. Id at 1007-08, 1010 (Stevens dissent-
ing). Justice Thomas, concurring in Bennis, noted that the Court has yet to delineate what
it means in the context of forfeiture law for someone to “use” property. He urged that the
limits be strictly construed when the government contemplates taking property from those
it merely suspects of colluding in crime, or from those it does not even suspect. Id at 1002
(Thomas concurring).
45
Judy Rakowsky, State tries to seize Weymouth bar in drug case, Boston Globe C11
(Oct 18, 1996) (reporting the Massachusetts Attorney General’s filing of a civil suit to for-
feit the bar “for allegedly failing to stop drug dealing in the bar”).
46
United States v Real Property at 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F Supp 725 (C D Cal
1994). The court found against the government, holding that in the circumstances of the
case, forfeiture of the father’s home of twenty-two years for the acts of his son was an ex-
cessive fine barred by the Eighth Amendment. Id at 740-42.
47
Police had seized money in the absence of drugs, later confirming through labora-
tory analysis that it contained some residue of cocaine. Although only a small percentage
of paper currency is actually used for packaging and sniffing cocaine, because “the minut-
est trace of the drug will ‘infect’ other bills, much of the currency in the country now tests
positive for narcotics.” David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, NY Times § 6
at 70 (Dec 11, 1994). Courts have split in their treatment of drug-contaminated currency.
Compare United States v US Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir 1994)
(noting widespread contamination of bills, and finding continued reliance on cocaine de-
tection dogs indefensible), with United States v $67,220.00 in United States Currency, 957
F2d 280, 285 (6th Cir 1992) (holding that positive dog identification is evidence of cur-
rency’s connection to drugs).
1998] Policing for Profit 47
feiture cases—that the property is guilty and on trial.
48
This
means, first, that forfeiture can be used even when there is insuf-
ficient evidence for a criminal case or when the defendant is a fu-
gitive. The government need only seize the assets,
49
and it is then
up to the owner to challenge the seizure in a costly and unpromis-
ing hearing.
50
Second, as a “civil action” against the property itself
51
(as in
United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan
52
), few of the
constitutional safeguards imposed on criminal prosecutions ap-
48
The proceedings are instituted against tainted property as a civil in rem proceeding,
based on the idea that the property is guilty and not the owner. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co v United States, 254 US 505, 511 (1921) (calling in rem actions “firmly fixed in
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country”); The Palmyra, 25 US (12 Wheat)
1, 14 (1827) (enforcing a statutory in rem forfeiture of a sailing ship in the absence of a
personal conviction because “the offence is attached primarily to the thing”); United States
v The Little Charles, 26 F Cases 979, 982 (D Va 1818) (enforcing in rem forfeiture even
though “inanimate matter can commit no offence”). The concept was borrowed from Eng-
lish and biblical law and adapted for use in America during the colonial period. In Eng-
land, deodand, which made the instrumentality of someone’s death forfeitable to the
crown, is often cited as a predecessor of civil forfeiture, although the claim is not without
doubt. Compare James Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at
Last?, 62 Cornell L Rev 768, 771-81 (1977) (arguing that in rem forfeitures derive not from
deodand, but from English statutory forfeitures of vessels violating customs and revenue
laws), and Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 416 US 663, 682-83 (1974) (noting
that deodands did not become part of American common law, but that English forfeiture
statutes were enforced by American courts), with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Com-
mon Law 24-34 (Little, Brown 1944) (linking in rem proceedings to principles of early
English deodand law), and Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspec-
tives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Nation of Sovereignty, 46
Temple L Q 169, 182-83 (1973) (analogizing deodands to forfeiture to the Crown).
49
The general rule is that “seizure for purposes of forfeiture is one of those ‘extraordi-
nary situations’ that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing” until after
seizure. Calero-Toledo, 416 US at 677, citing Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67, 90 (1972).
However, an exception is made in the case of real estate because, unlike other assets, it is
not removable, and there are other, less drastic ways to secure it pending a preseizure
hearing. United States v James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 US 43, 57 (1993). There,
the Court applied the three-pronged procedural due process test of Mathews v Eldridge,
424 US 319, 335 (1976), weighing the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation under the process used, and the government’s interest in avoiding more burden-
some procedures. James Daniel Good, 510 US at 53. As the Court noted, one consequence
of having no preseizure hearing is that the magistrate issuing the warrant will not be in-
formed of possible defenses to forfeiture, such as innocent ownership, leading to prolonged,
erroneous deprivation. Id at 55-56.
50
To do so the owner must post a cash bond of 10 percent of the appraised value, up to
$5,000, within twenty days of notification of the intended forfeiture. Law of June 17, 1930,
ch 497, title IV, § 608, 46 Stat 755, codified at 19 USC § 1608 (1994). Ordinarily the owner
will need to retain a lawyer as well.
51
As an in rem action, a forfeiture proceeding establishes government title to the
property against all claimants. Criminal forfeitures are in personam actions that deter-
mine the governments rights to the property only against the defendant. Smith, Forfeiture
¶ 2.03 at 2-10 (cited in note 44).
52
548 F2d 421 (2d Cir 1977).
48 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
ply.
53
There is no presumption of innocence, no right to an attor-
ney, and no hearsay objection.
54
The burden of proof is reversed:
once the government establishes probable cause that the property
is subject to forfeiture, the burden shifts to the property owner to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property does
not belong to the government.
55
There is no constitutional re-
quirement that the property owner be at fault,
56
or be prosecuted
53
Some of the procedural inadequacies may be addressed by Congress in the coming
year. See text accompanying notes 271-75. In any event, among the few constitutional
safeguards that apply (in substantially weakened form) are the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination and, as detailed in Section IV, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on exces-
sive fines. See Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 634 (1886) (characterizing civil forfeiture
as “quasi-criminal” for purposes of Fourth and Fifth Amendments). Even here, however,
the rights bear little resemblance to their criminal law cousins. In contrast to a criminal
trial, in a civil forfeiture case the government may be able to rely on a negative inference
from the claimant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See discussion in Smith,
Forfeiture ¶ 10.03 at 10-14 to 10-49 (cited in note 44) (citing conflicting authority and con-
cluding that the question remains open); United States v Property Located at 15 Black
Ledge Drive, 897 F2d 97, 103 (2d Cir 1990) (declining to resolve conflicting authority on
the permissibility of adverse influences in civil forfeiture proceedings, and noting the issue
of parallel criminal charges as “troubling”). As to the Fourth Amendment, the exclusion-
ary rule may apply to seized evidence, see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v Pennsylvania, 380
US 693, 702 (1965), but will not serve to suppress seized items that are themselves subject
to forfeiture. See INS v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1039-40 (1984) (suggesting rule was
already in existence); United States v $12,390, 956 F2d 801, 806 (8th Cir 1992) (following
INS v Lopez-Mendoza); United States v $37,780 in United States Currency, 920 F2d 159,
163 (2d Cir 1990) (same). For a discussion of the troubled relationship between forfeiture
laws and Fourth Amendment protections, see Nelson, 80 Cal L Rev at 1333-45 (cited in
note 41).
54
Lassiter v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 26-27 (1981) (stating presump-
tion that individual has no right to appointed counsel unless his physical liberty is at
stake); United States v Property at 4492 S Livonia Rd, 889 F2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir 1989)
(no hearsay objection); Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 11.03 at 11-13 (cited in note 44) (no presump-
tion of innocence).
55
Act of June 17, 1930, ch 497, title IV, § 615, 46 Stat 757, codified at 19 USC § 1615
(1994). In United States v $12,390, 956 F2d at 810, Judge Beam, dissenting, concluded
that the government’s ability to divest a claimant of title “with a mere probable cause
showing, often established through the use of inadmissible evidence . . . [is] a denial of due
process.” Dicta in some Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit opinions also have questioned
whether shifting the burden of proof to the defendant comports with due process. See
United States v 49,576 US Currency, 116 F3d 425, 428 (9th Cir 1997); United States v One
Parcel of Property Located at 194 Quaker Farms Road, 85 F3d 985, 990-91 (2d Cir 1996).
Regarding the burden of proof, see also United States v Eighty-Seven Thousand Sixty Dol-
lars, 23 F3d 1352, 1354 (8th Cir 1994); United States v $121,100 in US Currency, 999 F2d
1503, 1505 (11th Cir 1993).
56
Goldsmith, 254 US at 513; Calero-Toledo, 416 US at 680. Calero-Toledo held forfei-
ture constitutional against an innocent, nonnegligent owner. However, it left open a possi-
ble constitutional defense for those who have done everything that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property. Id at 689-90. Particularly draco-
nian results flow from the “relation back doctrine” except in those jurisdictions that have
abolished it. Under the doctrine, title to the property passes to the government at the time
1998] Policing for Profit 49
for the underlying criminal activity. Forfeiture may occur even if
the owner is charged and acquitted.
57
(Of course, given the rapid
expansion of forfeitable targets to include homes, money, and
businesses, often the only “taint” on non-contraband property is
its owner’s alleged wrongdoing.
58
In such cases forfeiture is
hardly distinguishable from punishment without trial—“a delib-
erate subterfuge”
59
that has been analogized to Soviet-era pun-
ishment of political offenders under “non-criminal” laws, which
existed to deprive people of their criminal procedural rights.
60
)
of the act, making it subject to forfeiture. It may be years before the government takes any
action against the property or the owner, and in the interim it may have been sold to an
innocent third party. Thus under this doctrine, the government may defeat the claim of a
bona fide purchaser. This doctrine is presumed, but may be altered by specific legislative
enactment, for example, by providing for transfer of title when the property is seized. See,
for example, Motlow v State, 295 US 97, 99 (1935); United States v Stowell, 133 US 1, 12-
18 (1890); Henderson’s Distilled Spirits, 81 US (14 Wall) 44, 56-64 (1871). Congress codi-
fied the relation back doctrine in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, but has also
amended Section 881 to protect the interests of innocent owners in federal forfeitures, The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-690, § 6075, 102 Stat 4324, codified at 21 USC
§ 881(a)(4)(c) (1994), and has further provided an opportunity to mitigate unjust cases
through an administrative remission process. For further discussion of the need to provide
fair proceedings, see also Bennis v Michigan, 116 S Ct 994 (1996), discussed in note 44.
57
United States v One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 US 354, 361-62 (1984) (holding
that acquittal does not estop civil forfeiture action because civil proceedings have lower
burdens of proof). The Supreme Court disposed of any double jeopardy claim against suc-
cessive criminal and forfeiture proceedings or punishments by holding that although in
rem forfeiture is both remedial and punitive in nature, it is not so punitive as to equal a
second punishment. United States v Ursery, 116 S Ct 2135, 2142-49 (1996).
58
See 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F Supp at 737 (“The mere fact that the criminal activ-
ity occurred at the property does not make the property ‘guilty’ of an offense, ‘as could rea-
sonably be argued of [a] distillery . . . or [a] pirate vessel’ . . . .”) (citations omitted); Pratt
and Peterson, 65 St John’s L Rev at 655, 668 (cited in note 27) (“[T]he scope of civil forfei-
ture has been expanded to function as punishment for the property owner’s criminal con-
duct, while the doctrine continues to masquerade as a civil proceeding against property
. . . . Congress has created a draconian punishment that is virtually bereft of constitu-
tional protections.”).
59
Finkelstein, 46 Temple L Q at 252 (cited in note 48). See also United States v All As-
sets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc, 971 F2d 896, 905 (2d Cir 1992) (“We continue to be
enormously troubled by the government’s increasing and virtually unchecked use of the
civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those stat-
utes.”); Boyd, 116 US at 637, in which the Supreme Court rejected the “proposition that
the [in rem] proceeding is not, in effect, a proceeding against the owner of the property, as
well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to estab-
lish the forfeiture, and it is his property which is sought to be forfeited.” In today’s Court,
Justice Stevens is especially critical of the Rehnquist Court’s reliance on the fiction, some-
times called the personification doctrine, that forfeiture is a civil action only against prop-
erty. See Ursery, 116 S Ct at 2160-61 (Stevens dissenting) (calling it a “sleight of hand”
and noting that “formalistic distinctions that obscure the obvious practical consequences
of governmental action disserve . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause”).
60
Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 1.02 at 1-16 to 1-17 (cited in note 44). A Ninth Circuit opinion
notes its wariness of civil forfeiture because it imposes “quasi-criminal” penalties without
affording criminal procedural protections. United States v $191,910.00 in US Currency, 16
50 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Given these inadequate safeguards, it is not surprising that
roughly 90 percent of judicial cash forfeitures are uncontested.
61
Congress handed police and prosecutors a powerful tool, and
law enforcement’s interest in using it accelerated when Congress
enacted two additional amendments to the forfeiture law. One
amendment, part of the 1984 bill, allowed federal law enforce-
ment agencies to retain and use the proceeds from asset forfei-
tures, rather than requiring these assets to be deposited in the
Treasury’s General Fund.
62
The other initiated the federal “equi-
F3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir 1994). See also Juan R. Torruella, The “War on Drugs”: One
Judge’s Attempt at a Rational Discussion, 14 Yale J Reg 235, 256 (1997) (“Some of the
most egregious actions committed by the government have been in the area of forfeitures,
in which courts have allowed abuses which seriously undermine principles of legality and
due process.”). For an early example of punishment in the guise of an in rem, noncriminal
proceeding against property, see Miller v United States, 78 US (11 Wall) 268, 304-06
(1871) (upholding the civil forfeiture of estates of Confederate rebels as constitutional un-
der the power to prosecute war). A dissenting opinion argued that such confiscation was
effectively punishment for treason, which should only be applied after criminal prosecu-
tion. Id at 318-23 (Field dissenting). See also Tyler v Defrees, 78 US (11 Wall) 331, 351-53
(1871) (Field dissenting).
61
GAO, Asset Forfeiture: An Update 7 (Apr 24, 1989) (submitted to the Subcommittee
on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee) (reporting that, in its 1989 analysis of 1,125
Justice Department and Customs forfeitures, 89 percent of judicially forfeited cash was
uncontested, resulting in default judgments for the government). Although a claimant
may also seek mitigation of a forfeiture judgment from the Attorney General, the odds
here are even more daunting: the Justice Department refunded only $13 million of the
$460 million in assets that it sought to forfeit in 1990. Federal Seizure of Illegal Assets
Nets Government $1.5 Billion Since 1985, USLW (Feb 4, 1991). Consequently, the best al-
ternative for most claimants is to seek an agreement with the government to return some
portion of the seized property. While this often occurs, the government has a substantial
advantage in negotiation and the deal struck may instead exchange a prosecutorial com-
mitment not to pursue criminal charges for the claimant’s waiver of rights to all the prop-
erty, or even for a commitment to turn over additional property. At the time the GAO’s
analysis was undertaken, four-fifths of the cases examined were judicial forfeitures, and
less than one-fifth administrative forfeitures, because administrative forfeitures could not
be instituted against real estate or against assets worth over $100,000. GAO, Asset Forfei-
ture: Update at 1, 7. But the ceiling has since been raised to $500,000, resulting in a huge
shift to administrative forfeitures. Eighty percent of federal forfeitures now occur adminis-
tratively. Steven L. Kessler, Civil and Criminal Forfeiture: Federal and State Practice
§ 6.01 at 6-2 to 6-4 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1996).
62
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2052, codified
at 28 USC § 524 (1994). Although the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund was
initially required to deposit to the Treasury’s General Fund all sums in excess of $5 mil-
lion that remained after authorized payments, this ceiling was abolished by a 1986
amendment. Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub
L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207-12, codified at 28 USC § 524(c)(4) (1994). Pursuant to 21 USC
§ 881(e)(2)(A)-(B), whenever money is seized by a purely federal agency other than the
postal service, the agency may keep the expenses related to the seizure, and must transfer
the rest to the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund. This Fund is earmarked for
law enforcement. It may not be used to pay the salaries of United States employees, but
may be used to pay informants for information, or to pay salaries of local police or other
nonfederal employees. 28 USC § 524(c)(1)(F); Directive 90-5, The Attorney-General’s
1998] Policing for Profit 51
table sharing” program, which gave the state and local police
agencies the lion’s share of seized assets even when federal
agents were involved in the arrest.
63
The equitable sharing pro-
gram includes a “federal adoption” procedure, whereby state po-
lice who turn seized assets over to the Justice Department for
“federal forfeiture” receive back up to 80 percent of the assets’
value, to be used exclusively for law enforcement purposes.
64
These amendments have had two rather immediate conse-
quences relevant to our inquiry. First, they have given state and
local police an enormous economic stake in the federal forfeiture
law. At a time when state and local government budgets are
shrinking, equitable sharing offers a new source of income, lim-
ited only by the energy police and prosecutors are willing to
commit to seizing assets.
65
Second, the amendments have pro-
duced a major shift toward federal jurisdiction over local law en-
Guidelines on Seized and Forfeited Property (July 1990), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual
B-541, B-549 to B-551 (Prentice Hall 1994).
63
The Attorney General may share forfeited property with any state or local law en-
forcement agency that participated in any act leading to seizure or forfeiture of the prop-
erty, as authorized by 21 USC § 881(e)(1)(A) and 19 USC § 1616a(c), and, with regard to
money laundering violations, 18 USC § 981(e)(2).
64
Seizures accomplished exclusively by state or local agencies may be “adopted” by the
federal government whenever the conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of fed-
eral law. Directive 90-5, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-545 (cited in note 62). When
the federal government has “adopted” a state forfeiture case, 80 percent of judicially or
administratively forfeited assets are allocated to the state or local agencies for law en-
forcement purposes, and 20 percent remain with the federal government. In joint seizures,
the share is allocated on a case-by-case determination based on the amount of work each
agency performed. 21 USC § 881(e)(3); A Guide to Equitable Sharing of Federally Forfeited
Property for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 7-8 (DOJ Mar 1994). The Justice
Department requires state and local agencies receiving equitable sharing funds to use
them for law enforcement purposes including, but not limited to, payments for law en-
forcement equipment, weapons, salaries and overtime, training, expenses for travel, in-
formant reward money, and detention facilities. Guide to Equitable Sharing at 10-11.
State and local prosecutors also may receive equitable sharing under specified conditions,
which include preparing documents or providing an informant. Id at 8-9. States must re-
quest equitable sharing within sixty days of seizure or, if the seizure was federally
adopted, within sixty days of the date of adoption. Id at 6.
65
For example, the Little Compton, Rhode Island Police Department acquired assets
of more than ten times its annual budget through participation in a single operation.
Steve Stecklow, Big Money for a Tiny Police Force, Phil Inq A1 (Aug 24, 1992). Such indi-
vidual forfeitures in the millions are not uncommon. See, for example, United States v
Cauble, 706 F2d 1322 (5th Cir 1983) (concerning a multimillion dollar RICO forfeiture of
marijuana smuggler’s businesses). The largest forfeitures, however, have emanated from
securities law forfeitures. See Sharon Walsh, Give and Take on the Hot Issue of Asset For-
feiture, Wash Post F7 (Mar 11, 1996) (listing a $222 million forfeiture in the Drexel Burn-
ham case and a $176.3 million forfeiture in the Michael Milken case). For a discussion of
law enforcement’s substantial economic stake in forfeited assets, see text accompanying
notes 100-14.
52 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
forcement, because “federalizing” a forfeiture is now a more prof-
itable course for both state and local criminal justice bureaucra-
cies. For many state and local police departments, federal forfei-
ture allows the retention of a far larger portion of the assets (up
to 80 percent) than they would receive by proceeding under their
own state forfeiture laws, which generally require sharing with
other, non-law enforcement state agencies.
66
Federal adoption is
66
Listed below are the percentages of forfeited assets made available for law enforce-
ment under the various state forfeiture distribution statutes. Most state laws provide the
police with a less favorable percentage of the assets than federal law, or require sharing
the assets with other state agencies. Some states, such as Indiana and Missouri, require
seized assets to be paid into the state’s general fund or some non-law enforcement agency,
with none earmarked for police. Ind Code Ann § 16-42-20-5(e) (West 1997) (All proceeds
from forfeiture in excess of expenses are paid into the common school fund of the state.);
Mo Const, Art IX, § 7; Mo Ann Stat § 513.623 (Vernon Supp 1997) (Proceeds of all forfei-
tures are distributed to the schools.). Under equitable sharing of federally adopted sei-
zures, however, 80 percent of federally forfeited assets may be redistributed to the state
and local law enforcement agencies. 21 USC § 881(e)(3) (see note 64 for percentages). See
also Directive 90-5, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-545 (cited in note 62).
The percentage of forfeited assets distributed to law enforcement according to each
state law is as follows: Ala Code § 20-2-93(e) (1990) (Distribution is based on contribution
to seizure.); Alaska Stat § 17.30.122 (1996) (Distribution is at the discretion of the com-
missioner of administration, within specified limits.); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-4315 (Michie
1997) (Balance of forfeiture proceeds are paid into state or local antiracketeering fund, for
reimbursements for forfeiture costs, informants, and injured persons as specified.); Ark
Stat Ann § 5-64-505(k) (1993) (Distribution of up to $250,000 is based on contribution to
seizure, and any excess is to be spent at the discretion of the state drug director.); Cal
Health & Safety Code § 11489(a)(2)(A) (West 1997) (65 percent); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 16-
13-506 (West 1997) (After costs of forfeiture sale, 10 percent goes to judiciary, 10 percent
to state law enforcement, 1.5 percent to the district attorney, and the balance to the seiz-
ing agency.); Conn Gen Stat Ann §§ 54-36h(f), 54-36i(c) (West 1997) (70 percent goes to the
Department of Public Safety and local police departments.); 16 Del Code Ann § 4784(f)(3)
(1995) (100 percent); DC Code Ann § 33-552(d)(4)(B) (1993) (100 percent); Fla Stat Ann
§ 932.7055(3)-(6) (West 1996) (Distribution method varies depending on the seizing
agency, but may not be spent on normal operating expenses of the law enforcement
agency.); Ga Code Ann § 16-13-49(u)(4)(B) (Michie 1996) (Distribution is based on contri-
bution to seizure, except state agencies are capped at 25 percent of proceeds.); Hawaii Rev
Stat § 712A-16(2)(a) (1993) (25 percent up to a maximum of $3 million per year); Idaho
Code § 37-2744(e)(2)(C) (1994) (100 percent); ILCS ch 720, §§ 550/12(g), 570/505(g) (1997)
(Distribution formula under the Cannabis Control Act and the Controlled Substances Act
gives 10 percent to the state police, 25 percent to state’s attorney, and 65 percent to police
narcotics law enforcement fund.); ILCS ch 725, § 175/5(g)-(h) (1997) (Distribution formula
under the Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Act gives 25 percent to the state police, 25 percent to
the state’s attorney, and 50 percent to law enforcement, but if indictment is under the
Statewide Grand Jury Act, 15 percent goes to the state’s attorney, 25 percent to drug edu-
cation, treatment, and prevention programs, and 60 percent to law enforcement.); Ind
Code Ann § 16-42-20-5(e) (West 1997) (All proceeds from forfeiture in excess of expenses
are paid into the common school fund of the state.); Iowa Code Ann §§ 809A.16-809A.17
(West Supp 1997) (Forfeiture is to the state without discussion of distribution.); Kan Stat
Ann § 60-4117(c)-(d) (1994) (100 percent); Ky Rev Stat Ann § 218A.435 (Michie 1995) (10
percent is distributed to the Justice Cabinet for various drug enforcement purposes and 36
percent to the Department of Corrections, but for forfeited coin or currency, 90 percent of
1998] Policing for Profit 53
also profitable for the Department of Justice, which receives a 20
the first $50,000 and 45 percent of any excess goes to the participating law enforcement
agency.); La Rev Stat Ann § 32:1550(k)(1) (West 1989) (60 percent goes to law enforce-
ment, and 40 percent to the criminal courts.); 15 Me Rev Stat Ann § 5821 (Supp 1996)
(Describes what is forfeited, but has no disbursement provision.); Md Crimes and Punish-
ments Code Ann §§ 297(f), 297(k)(3)(v) (1996) (100 percent); Mass Ann Laws ch 94C,
§ 47(d) (Michie/Law Co-op 1995) (50 percent is distributed to prosecutors and 50 percent to
the police, but only since 1984.); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 333.7524 (West 1997) (100 per-
cent); Minn Stat Ann § 609.5315(5) (West Supp 1997) (70 percent is distributed to the seiz-
ing agency and 20 percent to the prosecuting agency.); Miss Code § 41-29-181(2) (Supp
1997) (80 percent goes to the initiating law enforcement agency and 20 percent is divided
among the other participating agencies if any.); Mo Const, Art IX, § 7; Mo Ann Stat
§ 513.623 (Vernon Supp 1997) (Proceeds of all forfeitures distributed to the schools.); Mont
Code Ann § 44-12-206 (1995) (100 percent is distributed to the participating agency, or if
none, to the county in which the property was seized, for the sole purpose of drug enforce-
ment.); Neb Rev Stat §§ 28-431(4), 28-1439.02 (1995) (50 percent of cash forfeited is dis-
bursed to the county drug law enforcement and education fund.); Nev Rev Stat
§ 179.1187(2) (1995) (100 percent, but proceeds must not be used to pay ordinary operat-
ing expenses.); NH Rev Stat Ann § 318-B:17-b(v)(a)(1) (Equity 1995) (45 percent of the
first $500,000); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:64-6(a) (West 1995) (95 percent is distributed based on
contribution to seizure.); NM Stat Ann § 30-31-35(E), § 22-8-32(A)(1) (Michie 1978 & Supp
1992, 1997) (0 percent); 1997 NY Laws 1349(h)(i) (After costs and 40 percent distribution
to the substance abuse service fund, 75 percent of remaining balance to participating law
enforcement agency.); NC Const, Art IX, § 7; NC Gen Stat § 90-112(d)(1) (1993) (0 per-
cent); ND Cent Code §§ 19-03.1-36(5)(b), 54-12-14 (1997) (100 percent, with amounts over
$500,000 distributed to a general fund.); Ohio Rev Code Ann §§ 2933.43(D)(1)(c),
2925.43(B)(4)(c), 2925.44(B)(8)(c) (Baldwin 1992) (100 percent); 63 Okla Stat Ann §§ 2-
503(D)-(F), 2-506(L)(3) (West 1997) (100 percent, solely for enforcement of controlled dan-
gerous substances laws.); Or Rev Stat Notes Preceding ORS 166.05 §§ 10(1)(c)-11(b)(1)(b)
(1995) (same); 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6801(f)-(h) (Purdon Supp 1997) (Proceeds are equi-
tably distributed between the district attorney and the attorney general for purposes of
enforcing the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.); RI Gen Laws § 21-
28-5.04(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp 1996) (After costs, 20 percent is distributed to the attorney gen-
eral for drug-related law enforcement activities and 70 percent to state and local law en-
forcement divided proportionately by contribution to the investigation.); SC Code Ann
§ 44-53-530(e) (Supp 1996) (75 percent is distributed to law enforcement agencies and 20
percent to the prosecuting agency.); SD Cod Laws § 34-20B-89(2) (1994) (100 percent of
proceeds after costs go to the drug control fund.); Tenn Code Ann §§ 53-11-451(d)(4), 53-
11-452(h)(2)(A) (1991 & Supp 1996) (100 percent of proceeds go to the drug enforcement
program of the county in which the property was seized, except if real property, 50 percent
goes to the participating agency and 10 percent to the special drug case investigation
fund.); Tex Crim Pro Code Ann § 59.06(a)-(d), (h) (Vernon Supp 1997) (Distribution is by
local agreement between the state and law enforcement agencies.); Utah Code Ann § 58-
37-13(8)(a) (1997) (Upon request, 100 percent will go to the seizing agency for the en-
forcement of controlled substance laws.); 18 Vt Stat Ann §§ 4244(d), 4247 (Equity Supp
1996) (Distribution is to the state treasurer for unspecified purposes.); Va Code § 19.2-
386.14(A-B) (1995) (90 percent is distributed based on contribution to seizure, and 10 per-
cent to a state fund for law enforcement.); Wash Rev Code Ann §§ 7.43.100, 43.10.270,
69.50.505(f)(i) (West 1992 & Supp 1997) (Upon application, distribution is to law enforce-
ment agency for enforcement of controlled substances law.); W Va Code § 60A-4-403a(g)
(1992) (Distribution is not specified.); Wis Stat Ann § 961.55(5)(b) (West Supp 1997) (Up to
50 percent is distributed for expenses of forfeiture and sale, balance to the school fund.);
Wyo Stat § 35-7-1049(e)-(j) (Supp 1996) (Distribution is at the discretion of the commis-
sioner.).
54 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
percent share of assets with little if any expenditure of federal in-
vestigative or law enforcement resources.
67
Indeed, the Depart-
ment of Justice promotes federalization by providing larger
shares to the state or local agency if it “could have forfeited the
asset(s) on its own,” but agreed to federal adoption instead.
68
The
profit and ease of federal adoption has led to widespread circum-
vention of stricter state forfeiture laws.
69
67
Federal adoptions may occur after seizure of the property or arrest. The local agency
has thirty days after seizure to request the United States Attorney to adopt it as a federal
case. Directive 93-1, Memo from Cary H. Copeland (Jan 15, 1993), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture
Manual at B-584.138-2 (cited in note 62). Alternatively, local police may federalize a sei-
zure by requesting the DEA, FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal
Revenue Service, Postal Inspection Service, or Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
to assist in the investigation, seizure, or arrest. Directive 91-4, A Guide to Equitable Shar-
ing of Federally Forfeited Property for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Dec
1990), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-584.35-36 (cited in note 62).
According to Directive 93-1, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-584.138-71 (cited in
note 62), forfeiture cases should generally be brought in the jurisdiction where the crimi-
nal defendants (if any) are being prosecuted. But massive numbers of forfeitures are being
brought federally, either because an otherwise “local” case is handed to the Justice De-
partment for federal prosecution, or because criminal prosecution is dispensed with.
68
In determining the amount of the equitable transfer for each participating agency,
the following factors shall be considered: (1) whether the seizure was adopted or was
the result of a joint investigation . . . (7) whether the state or local agency could have
achieved forfeiture under state law, with favorable consideration given to an agency
which could have forfeited the asset(s) on its own but joined forces with the United
States to make a more effective investigation.
Directive 90-5, Equitable Sharing, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-553 (cited in note
62). The Department of Justice itself developed the equitable sharing concept. Directive
91-7, Equitable Sharing Information (May 1991), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-
584.73, 81 (cited in note 62).
The Department of Justice also prohibits discontinuation of a federal forfeiture pro-
ceeding in favor of a state proceeding unless the U.S. Attorney personally approves it after
considering the financial consequences to its Assets Forfeiture Fund. Directive 90-5, in
DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-567 (cited in note 62).
69
According to the Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, “[T]he formula
for the distribution of proceeds to law enforcement is a determining factor in motivating
forfeiture-focused investigations and in choosing the forum for conducting forfeiture pro-
ceedings.” Gary Schons, Fighting Drugs with Drug Money, Dicta: The Lawyer’s Magazine
7, 40 (Dec 1988). Journalist Dan Baum has described the impact of this forum shopping in
California as follows:
California . . . allowed 65 percent of assets seized in state or local drug busts to be
paid to the participating police, with the rest going for mental health, district attor-
neys, and informants. But the lawmen of the Golden Bear State still preferred to go
federal. They perfected the art of presenting 100 percent complete cases to the U.S.
attorney for “adoption,” paying the U.S. Justice Department a 10 percent processing
fee and keeping a full 90 percent of the seized assets. “That is, we receive a case
which is in every respect a local case . . . and we put our cover on it,” U.S. [A]ttorney
Joseph Whitely told Congress. . . . When Congressman Larry Smith suggested the
scheme was making the federal government a partner in “subverting” California
1998] Policing for Profit 55
The forfeiture laws were designed to combat drug crime by
attacking the economic viability of drug trafficking enterprises,
and they continue to be billed as the weapon of choice in the Drug
War. The Director of the Department of Justice’s forfeiture unit
testified to a congressional subcommittee that “[a]sset forfeiture
can be to modern law enforcement what air power is to modern
warfare.”
70
But in fact the aggressive use of forfeiture laws in the
last decade has never produced this intended benefit. The $730
million in 1994 federal forfeitures was surely inadequate to stifle
a $50 billion drug trade, although it was more than enough to
reward police and government officials for their efforts.
71
What forfeiture does do well is raise money.
72
Police and
prosecutors argue that 21 USC § 881 enables them to carry out
ordinary law enforcement business and raise money at the same
time—to do well by doing good.
73
Unfortunately, the real impact
laws, Whitely could only agree.
Baum, Smoke and Mirrors at 242 (cited in note 18). See also In Matter of Bly, 456 NW2d
195, 200 (Iowa 1990) (holding that Iowa’s homestead statute prevented the forfeiture of
Bly’s home under the Iowa forfeiture statute); United States v One Parcel of Property Lo-
cated at 1606 Butterfield Road, 786 F Supp 1497, 1503-04 (N D Iowa 1991) (allowing local
authorities to circumvent the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling above by having the forfeiture
“adopted” and proceeding under federal forfeiture laws); J. Bradley Horn, Note, The Reach
of Iowa’s Civil Forfeiture Statute: How Far Is Too Far?, 42 Drake L Rev 661, 673-74 (1993)
(analyzing the Bly case); United States v Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Educa-
tion, 902 F2d 267, 271-73 (4th Cir 1990) (upholding local police retention of federal equi-
table sharing proceeds over a challenge
by a county board of education that it was entitled
to such proceeds under North Carolina forfeiture laws). Congressional efforts to amend
the forfeiture law to prevent such circumventions
have failed, as detailed at text accom-
panying
notes 276-79.
70
Heilbroner, NY Times § 6 at 70 (cited in note 47), quoting the 1992 testimony of
Cary H. Copeland, then-Director of the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Asset
Forfeiture. See also United States v Two Tracts of Real Property, 998 F2d 204, 213 (4th Cir
1993) (“One of the most potent weapons in the government’s war on drugs is its ability to
obtain the civil forfeiture of property that aids violations of the drug laws.”).
71
See Heilbroner, NY Times § 6 at 70 (cited in note 47).
72
This provides the alternative rationale, endorsed by the Supreme Court, that forfei-
tures can buy law enforcement strategies that are effective. According to the Court, the
government’s legitimate interest in forfeiture includes the funding it provides for law en-
forcement operations. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 629
(1989) (“[T]he Government has a pecuniary interest in forfeiture that goes beyond merely
separating a criminal from his ill-gotten gains . . . . The sums of money . . . are substantial,
and the Government’s interest in using the profits of crime to fund these [law enforce-
ment] activities should not be discounted.”) (citation omitted). Only Justice Blackmun
questioned whether pecuniary motive was an appropriate goal of the forfeiture statute in
light of its legislative history. Id at 640 (Blackmun dissenting). See also Calero-Toledo,
416 US at 687 n 26 (“Seizure and forfeiture statutes also help compensate the Government
for its enforcement efforts . . . .”).
73
See Alison Roberts Solomon, Comment, Drugs and Money: How Successful is the
Seizure and Forfeiture Program at Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 Emory
56 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
of forfeiture has not been so benign. In practice, forfeiture laws
have not simply enhanced the ability of law enforcement to do its
job, but rather have changed the nature of the job itself.
74
Both
the crime prevention and due process goals of our criminal justice
system are compromised when salaries, continued tenure, equip-
ment, modernization, and departmental budgets depend on how
much money can be generated by forfeitures.
II. T
HE CONFLICT OF INTEREST OBJECTIONS TO SELF-FINANCING
POLICE AGENCIES
The most intuitively obvious problem presented by the forfei-
ture and equitable sharing laws is the conflict of interest created
when law enforcement agencies are authorized to keep the assets
they seize. It takes no special sophistication to recognize that this
incentive constitutes a compelling invitation to police depart-
ments to stray from legitimate law enforcement goals in order to
maximize funding for their operations. For example, as detailed
below, some police departments now prefer to arrest drug buyers
rather than dealers because buyers are sure to have seizable cash
with them. Although profitable to the agencies involved, this
agenda greatly undermines crime control because arresting buy-
ers rather than sellers does little to reduce the supply of drugs in
a community. It also results in the less culpable suffering more
severe treatment, the antithesis of a just system based on propor-
tional punishment. These destructive priorities are characteristic
of the pervasive distortion of law enforcement policy that flows
from targeting assets rather than crime. In Section II.B, we argue
that no rational crime control program is possible until Congress
repeals the conflict of interest license it has issued to police and
prosecutors. First, however, we consider whether this conflict
rises to a constitutionally objectionable level that might be reme-
died through litigation.
L J 1149, 1161-65 (1993) (critiquing the role pecuniary interest plays in motivating federal
forfeiture law).
74
A Justice Department evaluation noted the potential diversion of law enforcement
policy when it warned that “it is important . . . that task force commanders use [their ex-
pertise in locating assets] for the benefit of the community effort to control drugs.” JRSA,
Five-Year Review at 23 (cited in note 1).
1998] Policing for Profit 57
A. The Due Process Objection
Impartiality is inseparable from justice.
75
This principle is
embedded in the constitutional due process guarantee, which in-
cludes the right to an impartial tribunal in both civil and crimi-
nal cases.
76
The Supreme Court has found this right abridged
whenever a conflict of interest exists that would “offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the bal-
ance nice, clear and true” between the parties.
77
Such a conflict obviously exists when the factfinder has a
personal pecuniary interest in the outcome, as when his compen-
sation is contingent on conviction
78
or the issuance of a search
75
The requirement of impartiality is one aspect of the requirement that just decisions
not be based on arbitrary, nonrelevant factors, such as the identity of the person affected
or of the decisionmaker. We aspire to a “government of laws, not men.” Elsewhere one of
the authors has argued more generally that a distinguishing characteristic of any moral
judgment is its universality, and therefore all those who forsake this requirement,
whether for reasons of corruption or relativist ideology, abandon the tools with which to
make moral decisions. See Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and
Morals, 74 Tex L Rev 523, 531-34 (1996). In recent years, however, scholars have ques-
tioned this view on a variety of grounds—for example, that impartiality is unattainable;
that morality must spring from an ethic of caring or identification rather than neutrality;
or that we would do better to recognize the plurality and positionality of all judges and all
judgments. See, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in
Michael Brint and William Weaver, eds, Pragmatism in Law and Society
127, 134 (West-
view 1991); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial, 76 Va L Rev 1545, 1568-69
(1990); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 58-59 (Cambridge 1989); Patricia
A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S Cal L Rev
1945 (1988).
76
See Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 579 (1973) (holding that “those with substantial
pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes”); In re Mur-
chison, 349 US 133, 136 (1955) (explaining that under the Due Process Clause, a judge
cannot “be a judge in his own case . . . [nor] try cases where he has an interest in the out-
come”); Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510, 523, 532 (1927) (invalidating a conviction on due proc-
ess grounds when criminal defendant was tried by a judge with a personal interest in con-
victing him). An impartial tribunal “safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due
process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of par-
ticipation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process . . . . [I]t pre-
serves both the appearance and reality of fairness, ‘generating the feeling, so important to
a popular government, that justice has been done.’” Marshall v Jerrico, Inc, 446 US 238,
242 (1980), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v McGrath, 341 US 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter concurring).
77
Tumey, 273 US at 532. See also Bracy v Gramley, 117 S Ct 1793, 1797 (1997) (“. . .
the Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal’ . . . before a judge
with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome . . . .”) (citation omit-
ted); Hortonville Joint School District No 1 v Hortonville Education Assocation, 426 US
482, 493-97 (1976) (finding insufficient “stake” to constitute conflict); Pepsico Inc v McMil-
len, 764 F2d 458, 460 (7th Cir 1985) (requiring recusal where counsel in case had consid-
ered employing judge); State v Chinn, 146 W Va 610, 121 SE2d 610, 612 (1961) (due proc-
ess abridged where fines paid judge’s salary), and cases cited in notes 79 and 81.
78
See Tumey, 273 US at 523. In Tumey, the mayor served as municipal judge in pos-
58 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
warrant.
79
But the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
also may disqualify a judge who would receive no direct benefit
from the ruling, as long as his department or agency would. Thus,
in both Tumey v Ohio
80
and Ward v Village of Monroeville,
81
the
Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for a sitting mayor to
preside as a judge and assess fines to be paid to the village treas-
ury, because his responsibility for town finances gave him a mo-
tive to convict and jeopardized his impartiality.
82
The precise cri-
terion is a possible temptation: even a relatively small emolument
may suffice,
83
and the temptation need not have actually influ-
enced the decision at all.
84
session of liquor cases, and was paid expenses from the fines he collected. Id at 520.
Tumey was convicted and fined $100, a judgment that the Supreme Court found in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment because the mayor’s decision might have been clouded
by two conflicts of interest. First, the mayor had “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case” because he was paid an emolu-
ment contingent on the fines he collected ($12 in this case). Id at 523. Second, the mayor’s
role combined inconsistent positions as judge and financial administrator, the latter giv-
ing him a professional interest and motive to convict in order to enhance his town’s
budget. This “necessarily involves a lack of due process of law . . . .” Id at 534.
79
See Connally v Georgia, 429 US 245, 250-51 (1977). Similarly, due process is
abridged when the factfinder is empowered to rule on the professional license of a com-
petitor. See Gibson, 411 US at 579 (holding the due process impartiality requirement vio-
lated when an administrative adjudicatory board of private optometrists adjudicated
charges brought against a competitor).
80
273 US 510, 533-35 (1927).
81
409 US 57, 59-62 (1972).
82
In Ward, the mayor impermissibly occupied two inconsistent positions as judge and
administrator, the latter giving him a partisan motive to convict in order to enhance the
town budget, which necessarily abridged the due process guarantee. Id at 58-62. The
Court noted that “[t]he fact that the mayor [in Tumey] shared directly in the fees and costs
did not define the limits of the principle. . . . Plainly [a] ‘possible temptation’ may also ex-
ist when the mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan
to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.” Id at 60.
83
In Tumey, the Court discussed what degree or nature of interest would disqualify a
judge. It reviewed English common law to demonstrate that “the slightest pecuniary in-
terest of any officer, judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter which
he was to decide, rendered the decision voidable.” 273 US at 524. Although the Court did
not go so far, it enunciated the rule that any interest that would “offer a possible tempta-
tion to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the de-
fendant” or otherwise fail to “hold the balance nice, clear and true” requires disqualifica-
tion. Id at 532. Only an interest that is so “remote, trifling and insignificant that it may
fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment” of an average man may be
disregarded. Id at 531, quoting Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 594 (Little,
Brown 7th ed 1903).
84
See Aetna Life Insurance Co v Lavoie, 475 US 813, 823-25 (1986) (finding impermis-
sible “possible temptation” from conflict where judge’s decision increased value of class ac-
tion suit that judge had filed); In re Murchison, 349 US at 136 (observing that because jus-
tice must satisfy the appearance of justice, even judges with no actual bias must some-
times be barred from trial); Tumey, 273 US at 532 (“There are doubtless mayors who
would not allow . . . [the receipt of] $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but
1998] Policing for Profit 59
These precedents should outlaw such forfeiture statutes as
Louisiana’s, which authorizes the criminal court to issue a war-
rant for seizure of the property, order forfeiture, and then allocate
40 percent of the proceeds to its own criminal court fund.
85
But
the more potentially significant question is whether police and
prosecutorial decisions must also satisfy due process standards of
impartiality, and on this issue the constitutional parameters are
yet to be fully developed. At this point, the Supreme Court has
indicated only that (1) the stringent impartiality standard it re-
quires of adjudicatory officials does not apply to prosecuting offi-
cials, but (2) neither is the prosecutor free from all conflict of in-
terest restrictions. Some due process limits on law enforcement
rewards do exist, but where between these poles they may be
found must still be delineated, and likely will be when litigants
focus on the equitable sharing payback law.
What constitutional guidance exists is found primarily in
Tumey and a subsequent case, Marshall v Jerrico, Inc.
86
In Tu-
mey, the Court relied on the mayor’s pecuniary stake in the fine
as reason enough to reverse the conviction, apparently un-
perturbed by the other shares distributed to the prosecution and
police.
87
Without specifically addressing Ohio’s statutory scheme,
the Court allowed that “the legislature of a State may, and often
ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by offering to those
who shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for
thus acting in the interest of the State and the people.”
88
But the
Court did not directly confront whether some law enforcement in-
centives create an unconstitutional conflict of interest until half
of a century later, in Jerrico.
Jerrico upheld a section of the Fair Labor Standards Act that
allowed a division of the Labor Department to retain the civil
the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argu-
ment that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on with-
out danger of injustice.”).
85
See La Rev Stat Ann § 32:1550(K)-(L) (40 percent of proceeds from sale of forfeited
contraband allocated to court); § 32:1550(B) (issuance of warrants for search or seizure of
forfeitable property); § 32:1550(C)(4) (stating that when the defendant is acquitted, a re-
buttable presumption against forfeitability applies unless the court finds a compelling
reason for the forfeiture).
86
446 US 238 (1980).
87
The Ohio statute at issue allocated 15 percent of the fines collected to deputy mar-
shals as compensation for securing evidence in liquor cases, 10 percent to the prosecuting
attorney, 15 percent to the police officers, and the amount of costs to the mayor/hearing of-
ficer. Tumey, 273 US at 518-19.
88
Id at 535. According to the Court, a legislature may also offer rewards or a percent-
age of the recovery to informers. Id at 534-35.
60 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
penalties it assessed for child labor violations as compensation for
the costs of determining violations and assessing penalties.
89
Jer-
rico, Inc was fined $18,500 by the Regional Administrator, ap-
pealed and lost before an administrative law judge, and then
sued in federal district court on grounds that the reimbursement
provisions violated its due process rights by encouraging agency
personnel to seek and impose excessive fines. The district court
granted Jerrico summary judgment, holding that this arrange-
ment created an impermissible risk of bias and noting that:
The more appropriate procedure is simple and constitution-
ally sound: pay all civil money penalty funds directly into the
Treasury of the United States. To allow only the Department
of Labor to deviate from such a clear procedural alternative,
to the detriment of alleged violators, would be to disregard
the fundamental tenets of our legal system.
90
However, the Supreme Court rejected Jerrico’s claims, find-
ing the Tumey rule inapposite because department officials were
performing purely prosecutorial functions.
91
Distinguishing the
conflict of interest prohibitions governing a factfinder, who must
be and appear impartial, from the less stringent limitations on
law enforcement officials, the Court held that prosecutors “need
not be entirely ‘neutral and detached’. In an adversary system,
they are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement
of the law.”
92
But this was far from a blank check for prosecutorial
self-aggrandizement, because the Court simultaneously empha-
sized that prosecutors are bound by at least some due process
limitations on conflicts of interest:
We do not suggest . . . that the Due Process Clause imposes
no limits on the partisanship of administrative prosecutors.
Prosecutors are also public officials; they too must serve the
public interest. In appropriate circumstances the Court has
made clear that traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not
immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which the enforce-
ment decisions of an administrator were motivated by im-
89
446 US at 242-52. See The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Act of June 25, 1938,
52 Stat 1069, codified at 29 USC § 216(e) (1994).
90
Jerrico, Inc v United States Department of Labor, 86 Labor Cases (CCH) ¶ 33,775,
48,679 (D DC 1979).
91
Jerrico, 446 US at 247-48 (stating that the requirements of Tumey and Ward, de-
signed for officials in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, are not applicable to prosecutors,
and noting the wide discretion given to prosecutorial decisions).
92
Id at 248 (citations omitted).
1998] Policing for Profit 61
proper factors or were otherwise contrary to law. Moreover,
the decision to enforce—or not to enforce—may itself result
in significant burdens on a defendant or a statutory benefici-
ary, even if he is ultimately vindicated in an adjudication. A
scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise,
into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or imper-
missible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some
contexts raise serious constitutional questions.
93
In Jerrico, the Court found that the constitutional barrier
had not been crossed because the statute conferred no personal
gain on the Regional Administrator, and the institutional benefit
to the prosecuting department (the Employment Standards Ad-
ministration (“ESA”)) was too small to play a role in decisions
about whom to prosecute and how much to fine.
94
Analyzing the
relevant three-year period, the Court noted that the ESA was not
financially affected by the relatively minimal penalties collected.
The national office of the ESA allocated the penalties among the
regional offices and other departments, and thus a regional office
could not expect to enjoy the proceeds of any penalties it as-
sessed. Finally, the Court found that because any penalties dis-
tributed to a regional office were determined in proportion to of-
fice expenses rather than the amount collected, a regional office
would obtain no benefit by assessing an unjustifiably large pen-
alty.
95
Given this undisputed record, the Court found the claim
that Section 16(e) would bias the decisions of the regional admin-
istrator “too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitu-
tional constraints” on prosecutors.
96
There is no implication here
that the Justices would have tolerated a scheme that, for exam-
ple, paid over traffic fines to the police officer who issued the cita-
tion. Rather, the Court examined three relevant factors—the de-
93
Id at 249-50 (citations omitted). Among the cases cited was Bordenkircher v Hayes,
434 US 357 (1978), the relevance of which is further discussed in note 126. See also Young
v United States, 481 US 787, 807 (1987) (“The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is
consistent with our recognition that prosecutors may not necessarily be held to as strin-
gent a standard of disinterest as judges.”).
94
Jerrico, 446 US at 250-52. “Unlike in Ward and Tumey, it is plain that the enforcing
agent is in no sense financially dependent on the maintenance of a high level of penalties.”
Id at 251.
95
Id at 245-46, 250-51.
96
Id at 243. However, this conclusion can be challenged factually. Nothing in the
Court’s statement of facts excludes the real possibility that the ESA’s national office might
require its regional administrators to seek higher fines because of the potential financial
benefit it could receive in this or future years, regardless of how a particular regional of-
fice might fare.
62 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
gree of institutional financial dependence on the prosecutorial de-
cision, the official’s personal stake, and the penalty distribution
formula—and found that none of them suggested any temptation
toward impropriety.
97
Before applying the Jerrico criteria to the forfeiture laws, we
should note that the Court’s sharp distinction between judicial
and prosecutorial standards is controversial and belies the over-
whelmingly dispositive role of discretionary prosecutorial deci-
sions in a system where few cases ever go to trial: in most cases,
the integrity of the system depends primarily on the fairness of
the law enforcement branch. The Court would have done better to
hold that due process requires law enforcement agencies to re-
main untarnished by any actual or perceived temptation toward
self-aggrandizement.
98
Instead of a bright line rule, however, Su-
preme Court doctrine after Tumey and Jerrico construes the con-
stitutional limitation as a matter of degree, permitting those in-
centives that “stimulate” law enforcement officials to do their job
without distorting or biasing them toward unjust prosecutions or
excessive penalties.
99
Whether a prosecutorial payback provision
violates the Fourteenth Amendment thus necessarily requires a
factual inquiry into the effect of the particular rewards on the
agency. To assess the constitutionality of equitable sharing, we
must take a much closer look at its operation in practice.
What is remarkable about the three empirical factors that
led the Jerrico Court to uphold the child labor prosecution is that
in the case of forfeiture, every one cuts the other way, and to an
extreme degree. One could hardly design an incentive system bet-
ter calculated to bias law enforcement decisions than the present
forfeiture laws. We now consider the Jerrico factors in order.
Financial dependence: The ESA division of the Labor De-
partment obtained no financial benefit from the penalties it as-
sessed: the penalties collected totaled less than 1 percent of the
ESA’s budget, and, because more than this amount was returned
to the Treasury, the penalties had not increased the ESA’s fund-
ing at all. By contrast, numerous law enforcement agencies now
97
Id at 250-51.
98
As the opinion noted, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Id at 243, cit-
ing Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14 (1954).
99
One potential effect of an incentive system is a selective prosecution policy in which
those whose prosecution would most enhance the government’s coffers are targeted. The
Court noted this issue but found it unnecessary on the facts to decide “whether different
considerations might be held to apply if the alleged biasing influence contributed to prose-
cutions against particular persons, rather than to a general zealousness in the enforce-
ment process.” Jerrico, 446 US at 250 n 12.
1998] Policing for Profit 63
rely on forfeitures to fund a significant part of their operations.
The gross amounts are prodigious: by 1987, the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (“DEA”) was effectively paying for itself,
with seizures exceeding its annual budget.
100
Between 1985 and
1991, the Justice Department collected more than $1.5 billion in
illegal assets.
101
Over the next five years, the Justice Department
almost doubled this intake, depositing $2.7 billion in its Asset
Forfeiture Fund.
102
This forfeiture income sometimes is required
to operate the Department, which has regularly exhorted its at-
torneys to make “every effort” to increase “forfeiture production”
so as to avoid budget shortfalls.
103
100
Gary Shons, Asset Forfeiture in California: A Preview of AB 4162, Prosecutor’s Brief
5 (Fall 1988). That year the DEA seized $505 million in Section 881 forfeitures.
101
Seizure Nets $1.5 Billion, USLW (cited in note 61). “$460 million . . . [was] deposited
into the fund in 1990, which was a 28 percent increase over fiscal 1989 and 15 times
greater than the total in 1985, when the fund was established.” Id. The total value of for-
feited cash and property thus represents a growth in asset forfeitures of over 1,500 per-
cent since 1985. See also Department of Justice, Federal Forfeiture of the Instruments and
Proceeds of Crime: The Program in a Nutshell 1 (1990).
102
Walsh, Wash Post at F7 (cited in note 65). The article reports that the federal gov-
ernment has received the following amounts from asset forfeitures in criminal cases: 1986:
$93.7 million; 1987: $177.6 million; 1988: $205.9 million; 1989: $580.8 million; 1990:
$459.6 million; 1991: $643.6 million; 1992: $531.0 million; 1993: $555.7 million; 1994:
$549.9 million. These figures include nondrug-related forfeited assets, particularly from
insider trading cases. Id. During the period of major growth, 1985 through 1990, asset sei-
zures increased at an average annual rate of 59 percent, with the Asset Forfeiture Fund
inventory quadrupling to $1.3 billion. Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 1.02 at 1-23 to 1-24 (cited in note
44), citing Annual Report of the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program 5 (DOJ
1990).
Reports on some U.S. Attorneys’ offices show seizures equal to much or all of their op-
erating budgets. See, for example, Ruth Hawk, Western District Office Pays for Itself and
More, Pa L J 7 (Nov 8, 1993) (According to U.S. Attorney Frederick W. Thieman, “‘The
1993 figures demonstrate that [debt collection and $1.9 million in asset forfeitures] rou-
tinely pay for the operation of the entire U.S. Attorney’s Office [of the Western District of
Pennsylvania] . . . .’ He noted that the combined total—more than $10 million—exceeded
the entire operating budget of his office by about 75 percent.”); Pratt and Petersen, 65 St
John’s L Rev at 671 (cited in note 27) (“In an eight month period during 1989, for example,
the United States Attorney’s office in the Eastern District of New York collected
$37,000,000 from civil forfeitures,” four times its operating budget), citing NY L J 1, 21
(July 27, 1989).
103
In 1990, the Attorney General urged U.S. Attorneys to increase the volume of forfei-
tures in order to meet the annual budget target. “Failure to achieve the $470 million pro-
jection would expose the Department’s forfeiture program to criticism and undermine con-
fidence in our budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income
during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990.” United States v James Daniel
Good Real Property, 510 US 43, 56 n 2 (1993), quoting Executive Office for United States
Attorneys, 38 United States Attorney’s Bulletin 180 (DOJ 1990). Consider also a 1989
memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., which
urged U.S. Attorneys to make forfeiture proceedings a priority: “It is imperative that we
fulfill the commitment that was made to increase forfeiture production.” Directive 89-1,
Processing of Pending Forfeiture Cases 1 (June 21, 1989), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual
64 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Similar concerns motivate state and local officials. A 1991
Justice Department memorandum observed that state and local
law enforcement agencies were becoming increasingly dependent
upon equitable sharing of forfeiture proceeds.
104
(As of 1994 the
Department had transferred almost $1.4 billion in forfeited assets
to these agencies.
105
) Similarly, a study of multijurisdictional
drug task forces participating in the Byrne grant program found
that these task forces had seized over $1 billion in assets between
1988 and 1992,
106
and that many of their commanders “expect to
have to rely increasingly on asset forfeitures for future re-
sources.”
107
Personal interest: The Jerrico Court also stressed the degree
of the prosecutor’s “personal interest, financial or otherwise” in
the matter.
108
Although the Justices found that the ESA Regional
at B-481 (cited in note 62). See also Directive 91-6, 1991 Memorandum from Principal As-
sociate Deputy Attorney General George J. Terwilliger, III, to all U.S. Attorneys, Need for
Increased Emphasis upon Criminal Forfeitures (Apr 22, 1991), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture
Manual at B-584.71 (cited in note 62) (directing U.S. Attorneys to “exert strong manage-
ment direction” by ensuring “that your criminal prosecutors are aggressively focussing
[sic] not only upon the conviction of individuals but also upon the civil or criminal forfei-
ture of their assets . . . .”); Directive 91-12, Memorandum from Director of the Executive
Office for Asset Forfeiture, Cary H. Copeland to all U.S. Attorneys, Need to Expedite Asset
Forfeiture Deposits (July 8, 1991), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-584.138-13 (cited
in note 62) (“Funding of initiatives important to your components will be in jeopardy if we
fail to reach the projected level of forfeiture deposits. . . . Please advise your staff of spe-
cific actions that can be taken to maximize deposits to the [Asset Forfeiture] Fund be-
tween now and the end of the fiscal year.”); Memorandum from Attorney General Janet
Reno, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, and DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine, Asset
Forfeiture Program Activity 1-2 (Feb 12, 1996) (“We are requesting that each United
States Attorney . . . develop ways to make the fullest, appropriate use of the forfeiture
statutes . . . . Forfeiture specialists should be involved early and consulted frequently dur-
ing the investigations and prosecution of criminal cases, including settlement and plea
discussions.”).
104
See Directive 91-14, Memorandum from Director and Chief Counsel of the Executive
Office of Asset Forfeiture Cary H. Copeland, Expediting Delivery of Equitable Sharing
Transfers 1 (Oct 1, 1991), in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-584.138-23 (cited in note
62) (noting that “states and local agencies are increasingly dependent upon sharing pro-
ceeds”).
105
Janet Reno, Foreword, A Guide to Equitable Sharing of Federally Forfeited Property
for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (DOJ 1994).
106
JRSA, Five-Year Review at 10 (cited in note 1). In 1991, the peak year during the
five-year study, multijurisdictional drug task forces seized assets worth more than $346
million, a 147 percent increase over 1988 seizures. Id at 9. These amounts include only
those seizures by task forces receiving federal Byrne grants. They do not include assets
seized by DEA task forces or other task forces, or seizures under state forfeiture laws. Id
at 2, 9.
107
Id at 23. The report provides figures showing an 89 percent increase in asset sei-
zures by task forces between 1988 and 1992, noting that such seizures “provide resources
to task forces that have experienced decreased funding.” Id at 9.
108
446 US at 249.
1998] Policing for Profit 65
Administrators had no personal stake in the penalties they as-
sessed, they did note that constitutional violations might have
arisen had the arrangement injected a personal stake into the
prosecutor’s decisions.
109
The revised forfeiture laws have now
produced such a case: when a police department relies on a
steady stream of forfeiture income to pay for its operations, as
many now do, an officer’s choice of who and what to target may
mean the difference between a paycheck and a pink slip.
110
Any-
one who doubts whether job maintenance qualifies as a personal
stake should read the sociologist Northcote Parkinson’s witty
study on the subject.
111
There are carrots as well, including more
generous working conditions or the use of seized assets from
baseball gloves to automobiles.
112
Some police departments base
evaluations in part on the officer’s success in asset seizures,
113
and at least one city ordinance actually gives individual officers a
personal share of the forfeiture take.
114
The funding formula: Finally, in Jerrico the Court stressed
that the statutory scheme reimbursed regional offices according
to their expenses rather than their collections, providing no rea-
109
Id at 249-50.
110
Indeed, in some departments, police salaries are paid directly from asset forfeiture
funds, so long as the funds supplement rather than supplant budgeted positions. Directive
91-4 at 8, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-584.35-36 (cited in note 67).
111
C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law (Houghton Mifflin 1957). One of Parkin-
son’s laws is that officials seek to make work for each other, even when there is nothing to
do. Id at 4. As illustrations, he points to the British Colonial Office, which expanded expo-
nentially as the British Empire was declining, and British Admiralty officials, who suc-
ceeded in almost doubling their number as ships in commission declined by two-thirds. Id
at 8-11. “The officials would have multiplied at the same rate had there been no actual
seamen at all,” Parkinson concludes. Id at 10.
112
See, for example, Russell Carolo and Doreen Marchionni, Seizure Laws Have Been
Wheels of Fortune for Tacoma Police, [Tacoma] News Trib A1 (June 20, 1994) (reporting
that the Tacoma Police Department had acquired and retained more than fifty vehicles
through forfeiture); Russell Carolo and Doreen Marchionni, Above the Law: Seized or Sto-
len, [Tacoma] News Trib A1 (June 19, 1994) (reporting seizure and use of microwave ov-
ens, baseball gloves, televisions, and automobiles).
113
See J. Mitchell Miller and Lance H. Selva, Drug Enforcement’s Double-Edged
Sword: An Assessment of Asset Forfeiture Programs, 11 Justice Q 313, 319 (1992) (citing
one such policy in Southern California, and quoting a drug enforcement agent there as
saying, “my supervisor made it extremely clear that big money cases were a lot more fa-
vorable for your overall evaluation than big dope cases”).
114
See Cops in Utah City Will Get a Commission on Drug Busts, Associated Press (Jan
31, 1995), quoting Mayor Mike Dalpiaz, author of the Helper, Utah Forfeiture Incentive
Resolution, as promising that “[I]f the city gets a house through a drug forfeiture, and we
put it on the market and sell it for $50,000, then by God the guy who made the bust is go-
ing to get a nice bonus check for his work . . . .” This ordinance raised community concerns
about the risk of police planting drugs on people in order to seize their property. See also
Brian McGrory, Only Cops Seem to Like Town’s Plan to Offer Cut of Drug Forfeiture
Funds, Phoenix Gaz A29 (Mar 3, 1995).
66 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
son for regional offices to seek unreasonably large penalties.
115
No
such restraint exists in the asset retention statutes; the larger
the seizure, the higher the reward for each participating office.
* * *
The three factors just discussed were dispositive in Jerrico
because they were strong indicia that prosecutors were unaf-
fected by the ESA’s negligible financial stake in their penalty as-
sessments. In the forfeiture case the same factors point in the op-
posite direction, strongly tempting a law enforcement agency to
tailor its decisions to enhance institutional funding. Have law en-
forcement decisions actually been influenced and corrupted by
this temptation? To answer this question, we need not merely ex-
trapolate from the Jerrico indicia, or invoke economic models,
116
or rely on conjecture at all. We can instead directly examine the
recent history of law enforcement activity. This record shows that
the forfeiture-reward system has done far more than stimulate
zealous enforcement: It has grossly distorted police and prosecu-
torial priorities, infecting virtually every phase of the criminal
justice system. The consequence is an often counterproductive,
sometimes pernicious law enforcement agenda.
At this point we focus only on those corrupted decisions that
might be found to abridge the constitutional due process guaran-
tee. We shall assume that this requires proof not only that the
prosecution is contaminated by a significant conflict of interest,
but also that the defendant or claimant suffers some legally cog-
nizable prejudice as a result—for example, that she would not
115
See 446 US at 251.
116
For an economist, asset forfeitures are one type of “consumer good” purchased by
law enforcement agencies, along with neighborhood patrols, homicide investigations, fo-
rensic tests, and all other law enforcement activities. The pricing of these various goods af-
fects how much total enforcement the agency will buy, and how it allocates its purchases
among alternative enforcement activities.
When Congress channeled most forfeited assets back to the agency that seized them,
the cost of asset seizure fell substantially, producing both an “income effect” (lower prices
effectively increased the budget of the law enforcement agency) and a “substitution effect”
(asset seizure became a more attractive purchase for law enforcement relative to alterna-
tive purchases as its price declined). The income effect should ultimately result in a larger
quantity of law enforcement purchases (including asset seizures and excluding only some
“inferior goods” which are, like Spam, purchased only when more attractive alternatives
are not affordable). The substitution effect, however, is our focus, because it predicts that
the forfeiture laws should powerfully alter law enforcement priorities, increasing asset
seizures at the expense of other law enforcement activities. See David M. Kreps, A Course
in Microeconomic Theory 58-62 (Princeton 1990). On price elasticity generally, see William
F. Samuelson and Steven G. Marks, Managerial Economics, 85-93 (Dryden Press 2d ed
1995).
1998] Policing for Profit 67
have been targeted, or treated as harshly, in the absence of the
agency’s financial interest.
117
Consider first police investigations. The shift in law enforce-
ment priorities, from crime control to funding raids, is perhaps
best revealed by the advent of the “reverse sting,” a now common
police tactic that rarely was used before the law began channel-
ing forfeited assets to those who seized them.
118
The reverse sting
is an apparently lawful version of police drug dealing in which po-
lice pose as dealers and sell drugs to an unwitting buyer. The
chief attraction of the reverse sting is that it allows police to seize
a buyer’s cash rather than a seller’s drugs (which have no legal
value to the seizing agency).
119
According to one reverse-sting par-
ticipant, “This strategy was preferred by every agency and de-
partment with which I was associated because it allowed agents
to gauge potential profit before investing a great deal of time and
effort. [Reverse stings] occurred so regularly that the term reverse
became synonymous with the word deal.”
120
Whether the suspects
were engaged in major or trivial drug activity, and whether the
strategy actually placed more drugs on the street, were of little, if
any, importance. Even if a sting targeted a drug dealer, the police
might defer the operation until the dealer sold some of the drugs
to other buyers in order to make the seizure incident to arrest
117
See text accompanying note 126.
118
The most recent convert to this tactic is the New York Police Department, which in-
augurated its first reverse sting effort in October 1997 with the arrest of seventy-two
marijuana buyers in Washington Square Park. Mayor Giuliani announced that such re-
verse stings would henceforth be instituted throughout the city. Norimitsu Onishi, Mayor
Unveils Sting Strategy Against Drugs, NY Times B1 (Oct 29, 1997).
119
See Miller and Selva, 11 Justice Q at 320 (cited in note 113). Reverse stings are also
attractive to police officers because they can be executed with little investigation, while
great expenditures of time and manpower are usually necessary when the targets are
drug dealers. This is not to say that reverse stings are always illegitimate. In some cases,
they may help shut down open air drug markets by deterring buyers, or apportion pun-
ishment to include the suburban buyers who enter and help “corrupt” some inner city
neighborhoods. But in ordinary circumstances, arresting buyers rather than sellers tar-
gets the less culpable and less dangerous individuals while neglecting the more serious
crimes, and involves the police in activity which may easily degenerate into a program of
wholesale entrapment.
120
Id at 325. The participant, Mitchell Miller, worked as a police officer for one year
while attending a graduate school program in sociology. He reports that the officers he
worked with preferred arresting a buyer with a bankroll and a good car to a trafficker
with a large quantity of drugs and no cash, and concludes that the forfeiture laws give law
enforcement a powerful incentive to “allow the illegal drug market to continue. In this
market, the drug enforcers and the drug traffickers become symbiotic beneficiaries of the
‘War on Drugs.’” Id at 324, 333. See also Associated Press, State Finds Room for Improve-
ment in Drug Team, Louisville Courier-J 1B (Sept 5, 1993), citing a state report on a Pa-
ducah, Kentucky multijurisdictional task force that criticized the task force for making re-
verse stings “standard operating procedure.”
68 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
more profitable.
121
Alternatively, law enforcement agencies might
select their targets according to the funding they could provide
rather than the threat they posed to the community. A Depart-
ment of Justice report proposed precisely this approach to multi-
jurisdictional task force commanders, suggesting that as asset
seizures become more important, “it will be useful for task force
members to know the major sources of these assets and whether
it is more efficient to target major dealers or numerous smaller
ones.”
122
A similar motivation may underlie the otherwise baffling pol-
icy adopted in 1986 by both the New York City and Washington,
D.C. police departments. Invoking 21 USC § 881(a)(4), the policy
directed police to seize the cash and cars of persons coming into
the city to buy drugs.
123
The consequence of this strategy was that
the drugs that would have been purchased continued to circulate
freely. Patrick Murphy, formerly the Police Commissioner of New
York City, explained the origin of this policy to Congress. Police,
he said, have
a financial incentive to impose roadblocks on the southbound
lanes of I-95, which carry the cash to make drug buys, rather
than the northbound lanes, which carry the drugs. After all,
seized cash will end up forfeited to the police department,
while seized drugs can only be destroyed.
124
For prosecutors as well, funding exigencies have preempted
other considerations. One Department of Justice manual govern-
ing racketeering prosecutions, for example, suggests that prose-
cution may be contingent on the presence of forfeitable assets,
rather than forfeiture being an incident of prosecution.
125
Conse-
quently, prosecutors have become expert at discovering the pres-
ence and value of assets in cases under investigation, and check-
ing for liens on such assets. The Supreme Court will eventually
have to decide whether this is the kind of prosecutorial discretion
that, in Jerrico’s formulation, must not be immune from judicial
121
See Miller and Selva, 11 Justice Q at 328 (cited in note 113).
122
JRSA, Five-Year Review at 23 (cited in note 1).
123
Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 1.02 at 1-11 to 1-12 (cited in note 44).
124
Richard Miniter, Ill Gotten Gains, 25 Reason 32, 34 (Aug/Sept 1993).
125
See the Department of Justice manual concerning racketeering forfeitures, which
notes that a “preliminary investigation to determine what property would be subject to
forfeiture may be required simply in order to obtain Departmental authorization for a
RICO or CCE prosecution.” David B. Smith and Edward C. Weiner, Criminal Forfeitures
Under the RICO and Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statutes 7 (DOJ 1980).
1998] Policing for Profit 69
scrutiny because “the enforcement decisions of an administrator
were motivated by improper factors . . . .”
126
126
Jerrico, 446 US at 249. In the situations described above, prosecutorial discretion is
influenced by two related, arguably improper factors: the assets of the potential defendant
and, more directly, the prosecutor’s financial stake in bringing the prosecution. Targeting
suspects according to these factors may violate the due process right to an impartial
prosecutor enunciated in Jerrico. But prosecutorial treatment based on the wealth of the
defendant also implicates a different line of cases based on the equal protection guarantee.
We take each constitutional claim in turn.
The due process right to an impartial prosecutor. There are three questions that a
court must address in order to resolve a due process challenge to prosecutions motivated
by the financial rewards available through forfeiture: (1) Is financial self-interest constitu-
tionally barred from prosecutorial consideration? (2) Must a defendant selected on this ba-
sis show prejudice in order to obtain a remedy? (3) If so, what constitutes such prejudice?
On the first issue, Jerrico’s reasoning makes clear that prosecutions selected according
to the prospect of law enforcement enrichment may constitute an improper factor biasing
the charging decision if they do not merely “stimulate officials to do their job” but bias
them towards unjust prosecutions or excessive penalties. Jerrico, 446 US at 249-50. As the
Supreme Court noted in its strong admonition in Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88
(1935), “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all . . . .” We note, however, that the Supreme Court has af-
forded prosecutors substantial deference in its charging decisions; for example, in Borden-
kircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 363-65 (1978), the Court upheld harsher prosecutorial
treatment in response to the defendant’s rejection of a plea bargain. Bordenkircher al-
lowed prosecutors broad discretion, while noting that there are constitutional limits upon
its exercise. Id at 364-65. While the plea bargaining tactics at issue did not cross these
limits according to the Court, the same should not be said of prosecutions selected accord-
ing to the financial advantages they offer the prosecuting attorney’s office, which are tied
neither to the defendant’s culpability nor to any exigencies of the criminal justice system.
Second, must the defendant show he suffered prejudice from the corrupted decision?
Suppose a defendant clearly establishes that the prosecutor stood to benefit financially
from her conviction. If she would have been prosecuted anyway and suffered the same dis-
position, and if she is guilty of the charges, does her lack of prejudice preclude a due proc-
ess claim based on this conflict? It would seem that the conflict must have played some
role in prosecutorial decisionmaking in order to constitute an “impermissible factor” at all.
Against this one might argue that not all “factors” are necessarily dispositive, so a defen-
dant who would have been treated the same absent the conflict should still have a claim;
or that the language from Jerrico, quoted above, conspicuously does not enunciate a re-
quirement of prejudice; or that the bright line rule applied to some conflict situations
should be applied here, because of the practical difficulties in tracking agency decision-
making and acquiring proof that a potentially corrupting factor was actually considered.
Third, assuming a showing of prejudice is required, what constitutes sufficient preju-
dice? If a guilty defendant would not otherwise have been prosecuted or treated as
harshly, this should be entirely sufficient to meet any prejudice requirement. Although
the Bordenkircher opinion held that the prosecutor has broad discretion as to whom to
prosecute, it did acknowledge that some factors are impermissible even where probable
cause to indict exists. Id at 363, citing Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456 (1962). The Borden-
kircher and Jerrico decisions clearly contemplate that certain arbitrary or vindictive
prosecutorial decisions cannot be immunized by the fact that, absent the factor, the defen-
dant could have been properly prosecuted. See Bordenkircher, 434 US at 363; Jerrico, 446
US at 249. Thus, any loss of even-handedness in prosecutorial treatment should be found
to entail cognizable prejudice, whether in investigation, charging, plea bargaining, grant-
ing of immunity, challenging evidence at trial, or other exercise of discretionary power.
70 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Consider also forfeiture’s corrupting influence on the disposi-
tion of criminal cases. Ironically, as the Drug War was escalating
during the 1980s and 1990s, major efforts were underway to re-
move corrupt influences and unjust disparities from criminal sen-
tences. The federal government and many states sought to ac-
complish this by rewriting their sentencing laws to specify the
sentence that fit each crime and the criminal history of each of-
The equal protection right against selective prosecution. The right to equal protection
of the laws, rooted in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, provides a distinct challenge
based not on the prosecutor’s conflicting interests but on his selecting defendants accord-
ing to their assets. Imagine a prosecutorial policy that mandates targeting only asset-rich
defendants, or a policy (equally forfeiture-driven, but at a different stage of prosecution)
targeting poor defendants by mandating more lenient plea bargains for those wealthy de-
fendants who agree to forfeit their assets. Would such selective prosecutions violate the
equal protection guarantee?
The equal protection right applies not merely to the laws as written but to their en-
forcement, Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373-74 (1886), and therefore provides a de-
fense to selective prosecutions. But because prosecutors with scarce resources are neces-
sarily selective in whom they prosecute, the salient question is whether the prosecutor
strayed beyond constitutional bounds in exercising his discretion. Equal protection cases
have required defendants to show that other equally culpable violators have not been
prosecuted and that this disparate treatment was “deliberately based on an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler, 368 US at 456.
Where a prosecutor has selected targets according to their wealth and the resulting group
does not constitute a “suspect class” entitled to strict scrutiny, a court will have to decide
whether this classification is arbitrary or whether it “rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute invidious discrimination . . . .”
San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 17, 26 (1973). See also
Cleveland v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 446 (1985) (finding that the retarded do
not constitute a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny, but must show that the classifica-
tion is not “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose”). As the facts above
show, a court would have more than sufficient grounds to rule that: (1) fund raising may
not be the overriding objective of prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute, and (2)
selection by wealth is not rationally related—and perhaps is inversely related—to other,
clearly legitimate objectives of law enforcement, such as deterrence or retribution.
As with the due process challenge, any equal protection claimant confronts the judici-
ary’s reluctance to review prosecutorial decisions, Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607-
10 (1985), and must rebut a presumption that prosecutors have properly discharged their
official duties. See United States v Armstrong, 116 S Ct 1480, 1486 (1996), citing United
States v Chemical Foundation, Inc, 272 US 1, 14-15 (1926). Some courts have nevertheless
proven receptive to arguments that particular enforcement policies or decisions could not
be related to a legitimate law enforcement purpose. See Esmail v Macrane, 53 F3d 176,
179 (7th Cir 1995) (holding that selective enforcement against an individual, where moti-
vated by personal malice, may violate equal protection); Olshock v Village of Skokie, 541
F2d 1254, 1260 (7th Cir 1976) (finding equal protection abridged when policemen were
disciplined differently depending on whether they were represented by counsel); United
States v Robinson, 311 F Supp 1063, 1065-66 (W D Mo 1969) (finding the enforcement of a
privacy statute against private detectives but not public officials is impermissibly arbi-
trary); People v Acme Markets, Inc, 37 NY2d 326, 372 NYS2d 590, 593-94 (1975) (finding
equal protection abridged when Sunday closing laws were enforced based upon complaints
that reflected private motives).
1998] Policing for Profit 71
fender.
127
But these sentencing reform laws have been largely un-
done in the drug area.
128
Forfeiture laws promote unfair, dispa-
rate sentences by providing an avenue for affluent drug “king-
pins” to buy their freedom.
This is one reason why state and fed-
eral prisons now confine large numbers of men and women who
had relatively minor roles in drug distribution networks, but few
of their bosses.
129
127
See, for example, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat
2017, codified at 28 USC §§ 991-98 (1994). This law abolished parole and established a
Sentencing Commission with the mandate of promulgating sentencing guidelines. The
Sentencing Commission then removed the traditionally broad sentencing discretion from
the trial judge, substituting a precise grid by which a determinate sentence is calculated.
For example, the Guidelines provide particular points, corresponding to time to be served,
for robberies committed with the use of a gun (plus six), § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B); with an express
death threat (plus two), § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F); that was designed to obtain a controlled sub-
stance (plus one), § 2B3.1(b)(5); and so on. These aggravating factors increase the base
level of the robbery offense, and will increase the punishment. Roger W. Haines, Kevin
Cole, and Jennifer C. Woll, eds, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Handbook 146-47
(Shepard’s/McGraw Hill 1994).
128
Drug cases are theoretically subject to assorted mandatory minimum sentences
promulgated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and by the parallel incarceration peri-
ods mandated by the Guidelines sentencing grid. However, if the prosecutor wishes to
evade these sentences in service of an appealing plea bargain, he may obtain a much lower
sentence in one of two ways. He may file a motion pursuant to 18 USC § 3553(e), allowing
the court to reduce the sentence for a defendant who has provided “substantial assistance”
in the prosecution of others; or he may tell the federal probation department that the de-
fendant’s crime involved a lesser quantity of drugs than was actually the case. The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1989, codified at 18 § USC 3553(e)
(1994).
129
According to Eric Sterling, Director of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, “only
11 percent of drug offenders in federal prison are high-level traffickers, while more than
50 percent are low-level.” Derrick Z. Jackson, Our Fraudulent War on Drugs, Boston Globe
A27 (Sept 13, 1996). First Circuit Chief Judge Juan Torruella has noted that in his ex-
perience, “penalties for drug trafficking are imposed on individuals other than those most
culpable . . . . The ‘big fish,’ if caught at all, are able to work out deals with the govern-
ment which may leave them with light sentences or even without any prosecution. This
result . . . is essentially an immoral outcome which tarnishes our entire judicial system.”
Torruella, 14 Yale J Reg at 256 (cited in note 60).
Relatively harsher penalties for the “mules” often result because they usually have
neither forfeitable assets nor useful information to trade for prosecutorial leniency. There
are other factors as well, however. For example, in the drug area passions run high
enough to taint the sentencing laws themselves, not merely their application. One well-
noted example is the disparity between crack and cocaine mandatory sentences (100 to 1),
Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1 at 198 (cited in note 127), despite the fact that
crack and cocaine are identical chemically and probably possess the same addictive and
abusive potentials. Because black Americans are more likely to use crack, and white
Americans cocaine, the effect of this has been to place huge numbers of the blacks in jail
while equally culpable whites remain unincarcerated. Noting these facts, Attorney Gen-
eral Reno and “Drug Czar” Barry McCaffrey have urged that this disparity be reduced to
10 to 1 by invoking the five-year minimum mandatory sentence on defendants possessing
either 25 grams of crack (instead of the current 5 gram threshold) or 250 grams of powder
cocaine. Christopher S. Wren, Reno and Top Drug Official Urge Smaller Gap in Cocaine
72 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
As investigations in several jurisdictions have documented,
criminal defendants with the most assets to forfeit routinely
serve shorter prison sentences and sometimes no prison sentence
at all. In New Jersey, for example, a defendant facing a “drug
kingpin” indictment (twenty-five years to life) obtained a dis-
missal of that charge and parole eligibility in five years on a
lesser conviction, by agreeing to forfeit over $1 million in as-
sets.
130
In Massachusetts, a recent investigation by journalists
found that on average a “payment of $50,000 in drug profits won
a 6.3 year reduction in a sentence for dealers,”
131
while agree-
ments to forfeit $10,000 or more bought elimination or reduction
of trafficking charges in almost three-fourths of such cases.
132
The
Massachusetts prosecutors who were investigated have a compel-
Sentences, NY Times A1 (July 22, 1997). Another critic of the 100 to 1 disparity, Suffolk
County, Massachusetts District Attorney Ralph Martin, says that it has “encouraged fed-
eral law enforcement officers to treat street-level crack dealing as a major offense, drain-
ing resources away from major drug kingpins.” Adrian Walker, The Drug War: Two
Wrongs to Right, Boston Globe E1 (July 27, 1997).
130
The forfeited assets were then distributed among the prosecutor’s office and partici-
pating law enforcement agencies. Martin Haines, Prosecutors and Criminals Sharing
Wages of Crime, NJ L J 17 (Oct 19, 1992).
131
Dick Lehr and Bruce Butterfield, Small Timers Get Hard Time, Boston Globe Metro
1 (Sept 24, 1995).
132
Dick Lehr and Bruce Butterfield, Accused’s Assets are Key Chips in Plea Bargains,
Boston Globe Metro 1 (Sept 25, 1995). These articles were parts of a four-part series titled
Criminal Justice/Overdosing on the Drug War, published by the Boston Globe from Sept
24 through Sept 27, 1995.
The investigation, by Boston Globe reporters, included a comprehensive examination
of prosecution records from the four largest Massachusetts counties, as well as numerous
case studies comparing defendants who were similarly situated except for their assets. For
example, one defendant who sold cocaine to lower-level dealers was able to reduce a
“mandatory” fifteen-year sentence to two and a half years served; another defendant—less
culpable in that undercover agents ran him through five relatively small drug buys before
arrest in order to reach a level of quantity that would qualify him for a ten-year sen-
tence—received the full ten years. The difference was that the first defendant had
$460,000 in forfeitable bank deposits to offer in lieu of hard time. Id at Metro 1.
In another, more celebrated case brought in Florida, the defendant escaped a life sen-
tence by forfeiting yachts, his home, and millions of dollars in cash. See Mireya Navarro,
When Drug Kingpins Fall, Illicit Assets Buy a Cushion, NY Times A1 (Mar 19, 1996); John
Gibeaut, F. Lee Bailey’s New Digs, ABA J 24 (May 1996) (discussing United States v
Duboc, unpublished district court opinion (N D Fla 1994)). This case attracted substantial
attention, initially because attorney F. Lee Bailey was incarcerated for failing to turn over
client properties the government claimed as its own. But a byproduct of the media’s inter-
est was that the public was given “a rare look at the usually secretive world of plea bar-
gaining in big drug cases, . . . [opening] a window on a growing controversy in narcotics
prosecutions in Florida and across the nation: how rich defendants like Mr. Duboc use the
proceeds of their crimes to bargain for lighter sentences.” Navarro, NY Times at A1. One
former prosecutor said that the case “gives forfeiture a bad name. The point of forfeiture is
to strip assets from the bad guys, not to make money for the government.” Gibeaut, ABA J
at 25.
1998] Policing for Profit 73
ling reason to recalibrate the scales of justice in this way because
12 percent of their budgets are financed through forfeiture in-
come.
133
And the Supreme Court has facilitated this practice by
finding no right to a judicial inquiry as to whether property relin-
quished pursuant to a guilty plea is properly subject to forfei-
ture.
134
As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, “it is not unthinkable
that a wealthy defendant might bargain for a light sentence by
voluntarily ‘forfeiting’ property to which the Government had no
statutory entitlement.”
135
But these distorted, disparate plea of-
fers remain untested under the due process right to an impartial
prosecutor, and the most hopeful challenge may come from the
asset-poor defendants who suffer the most in plea bargaining
from the government’s conflict of interest.
136
To illustrate the extent of a suspect’s stake in uncorrupted
law enforcement, we present a final example: the enlightening
and appalling case of Donald Scott. Scott was a sixty-one year-old
wealthy recluse who owned a two hundred acre ranch in Malibu,
California adjacent to a large recreational area maintained by the
National Park Service. In 1992, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (“LASD”) received an informant’s report that Scott
was growing several thousand marijuana plants on his land. The
LASD assembled a team—including agents from the Los Angeles
Police Department, the DEA, the Forest Service, the California
Air National Guard, the Border Patrol, and the California Bureau
133
Lehr and Butterfield, Accused’s Assets, Boston Globe at Metro 1 (cited in note 132).
134
See Libretti v United States, 116 S Ct 356, 362-63 (1995). Libretti refutes one claim
that is sometimes made, that prosecutorial conflicts are not dangerous because so long as
there is an impartial tribunal down the line, any abuses can be corrected. So does the Jer-
rico opinion, only more explicitly. See Jerrico, 446 US at 249-50 (“[T]he decision to en-
force—or not to enforce—may itself result in signficant burdens on a defendant . . . even if
he is ultimately vindicated in an adjudication.”); Ward, 409 US at 61-62 (opportunity for
trial de novo does not obviate the need for an impartial tribunal at the first hearing).
135
Libretti, 116 S Ct at 370 (Stevens dissenting). Justice Stevens continued, “No matter
what a defendant may be willing to pay for a favorable sentence, the law defines the outer
boundaries of a permissible forfeiture. A court is not free to exceed those boundaries solely
because a defendant has agreed to permit it to do so. . . . Were a court to do otherwise, it
would permit the parties to define the limits of its power.” Id at 370-71.
136
Although wealthy defendants may be targeted in the investigatory stage, in the plea
bargaining context the ultimate losers are the defendants without assets to trade for time.
The harsher treatment they receive is a direct result of the prosecutor’s conflicting finan-
cial interest, and thus should be cognizable under the Due Process Clause. An additional
argument stems from the recent, unanimous Supreme Court decision in Bracy v Gramley,
117 S Ct 1793 (1997), which held that a corrupt judge’s favoritism toward other defen-
dants who bribed him may have violated the petitioner’s right to an impartial trial by giv-
ing the judge a motive to camouflage his lenient treatment with a conviction: it would vio-
late due process if the judge “was biased in this . . . compensatory sense . . . to avoid being
seen as uniformly and suspiciously ‘soft’ on criminal defendants.” Id at 1797.
74 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
of Narcotic Enforcement—to investigate the tip, largely through
the use of air and ground surveillance missions. Despite several
unsuccessful efforts to corroborate the informant’s claim,
137
and
despite advice that Scott posed little threat of violence,
138
the
LASD dispatched a multijurisdictional team of thirty law en-
forcement officers to conduct a military-style raid. On October 2,
1992 at 8:30 am, the officers descended upon the Scott ranch to
execute their search warrant. After knocking and announcing
their presence, they kicked in the door and rushed through the
house. There they saw Scott, armed with a gun in response to his
wife’s screams. With Scott’s wife watching in horror, they shot
and killed him. There were no marijuana plants anywhere on the
land, and no drugs or paraphernalia in the house.
Following Scott’s death, the Ventura County District Attor-
ney’s Office conducted a five-month investigation of the raid. The
seventy-page report found no credible evidence of present or past
marijuana cultivation on Donald Scott’s property.
139
As for the
search warrant, the report found that much of the information
supporting the warrant was false, that exculpatory surveillance
evidence was withheld from the judge, and that the LASD know-
ingly sought the warrant on legally insufficient information.
140
The search warrant “became Donald Scott’s death warrant,” the
report concluded, and Scott was unjustifiably, needlessly killed.
141
The targeting of Donald Scott, with its massive multijurisdic-
tional police presence, cannot be explained as any kind of crime
control strategy. Rather, as the Ventura County District Attor-
ney’s report concluded, a purpose of this operation was to garner
the proceeds from the forfeiture of Scott’s $5 million ranch.
137
Report on the Death of Donald Scott 37-41 (Office of District Attorney, Ventura
County, Cal, Mar 30, 1993). Aerial photographs of the ranch did not show any marijuana
plants. But Charles Stowell, a federal DEA agent, took another flight over the ranch and
made the claim, hardly plausible under the circumstances,
that he was able to identify
about fifty marijuana plants by their “distinct color.” (Stowell viewed the ranch from an
altitude of one thousand feet without binoculars. The usual procedure of photographing
the suspect patch was not followed. Nor did the patch’s relatively small size conform to the
informant’s report.) Then the Border Patrol conducted two ground reconnaissance mis-
sions onto the Scott property. These searches—which could not be justified under the Bor-
der Patrol’s mandate to enforce federal immigration laws—found no evidence of marijuana
cultivation.
138
Id at 11-12.
139
Id at 37-41.
140
The report found that the supporting affidavit asserted falsely that ground surveil-
lance had confirmed the presence of the plants and that the agent had used binoculars,
failed to reveal the unfavorable surveillance results, and that the affidavit contained nu-
merous other misleading statements. Id at 42.
141
Id at 62.
1998] Policing for Profit 75
Among the documents distributed to some of the officers at the
pre-raid briefing were a property appraisal of Scott’s ranch, a
parcel map of the ranch with a reference to the sales price of a
nearby property, and a statement that the ranch would be seized
if fourteen marijuana plants were found.
142
Egregious cases like Donald Scott’s underscore the difference
between the statutory provision upheld in Jerrico and laws that
encourage law enforcement agencies to finance themselves
through aggressive, potentially violent police actions—a differ-
ence that threatens liberty and even life in ways that no one can
mistake for “due process of law.” Moreover, for a court to find oth-
erwise would betray one of the central concerns that led to the
founding of our constitutional order. Financial incentives promot-
ing police lawlessness and selective enforcement, in the form of
the customs writs of assistance, were among the key grievances
that triggered the American Revolution.
143
Writs of assistance au-
thorized customs officers to seize suspected contraband and to re-
tain a share of the proceeds, often a third, for themselves and
their informants.
144
From the viewpoint of the Crown, this incen-
tive helped to ensure that goods landing in American ports were
taxed or, if prohibited, confiscated. But for the colonists, it was an
outrage that brought with it corrupt officials,
145
lawless sei-
142
Id at 16. Although the ranch was situated in Ventura County, the report noted that
the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department was not included in the investigation or the
raid, perhaps in order to avoid sharing the proceeds with it. Id at 50-52.
143
John Adams, a student of the writs of assistance cases, wrote that public outcry
against the writs of assistance was one of the sparks leading to American independence,
as discussed in Smith, The Writs of Assistance at 251-56 (cited in note 2). For discussion
and additional authorities on this point, see Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S Cal L Rev 1, 15-25 (1994).
144
See Smith, The Writs of Assistance at 13 (cited in note 2) (“[T]he acts of navigation
and trade gave one-third each to the king, the governor of the particular colony, and the
customs man.”). Informants were commissioned by customs officers; newspaper adver-
tisements seeking informants promised that they would be “handsomely rewarded, and
their Names concealed . . . .” Id at 128. Condemnations were extremely profitable for both,
not least because, rather than reveal their identities, smugglers chose not to challenge the
seizures. Id at 13. See also Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the US Constitution 57 n 24 (Da Capo 1970), quoting Lieutenant Governor
Thomas Hutchinson’s remark that Massachusetts Governor Bernard “was very active in
promoting seizures for illicit trade, which he made profitable by his share in the forfei-
tures.”
145
Writs of assistance were sought by people in need of money, and disreputable men
were hired as informants. See Smith, The Writs of Assistance at 128 (cited in note 2). Be-
cause seized contraband was unlikely to be disputed in court, customs officers could often
falsify the inventory of seized items, or as the Boston Gazette reported on Feb 16, 1761,
“goods [were] inventoried by false names in order that another disposition of them might
be made.” Id at 170. For discussion on analogous problems today, see text accompanying
notes 238-55.
76 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
zures,
146
selective enforcement,
147
fabricated evidence,
148
extor-
tionary agreements from subjects with no effective legal re-
course,
149
“and even the fatal consequences, which may arise from
the execution of a writ of assistance, only to put fortunes into pri-
vate pockets.”
150
From these complaints “the child Independence
was born.”
151
The same fundamental grievances are now lodged
against our present forfeiture laws. What court can read such
formative concerns out of the Constitution?
B. Policy Objections
There are many issues in the criminal justice arena that set
the constitutional rights of suspects against the security of the
general population. The Drug War’s economic incentive structure
is unusual in that it threatens the due process of drug suspects
and hinders effective law enforcement at the same time. For ex-
ample, when police target drug buyers rather than sellers in or-
der to advance their own financial interest they brazenly ignore
the public interest in both just, proportional punishment and
drug reduction. Bad policy may not be unconstitutional, but it
does demand reform—in this case, obvious reforms that could be
easily legislated if there were the political will to do so.
152
146
Otis, Article, in Smith, The Writs of Assistance at 562-63 (cited in note 2) (delivering
tirade against lawless searches under the writ). For discussion on the analogous problem
today, see text accompanying notes 244-55.
147
The laws were enforced selectively, with custom officers leaving alone their close
merchant associates. See Smith, The Writs of Assistance at 101 (cited in note 2).
148
Id at 563. An earlier English analogue, the “Reward Statutes” of 1692, which paid
informants for information leading to convictions, was discontinued in 1754 after several
innocent people were executed on false information provided for the reward money. See
John H. Langbein, Shaping the 18th Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U Chi L Rev 1, 106-14 (1983).
For discussion on the analogous problem today,
see note 254 and accompanying text.
149
The procedural advantages the Crown enjoyed resemble those confronting modern
day forfeiture claimants. If the property was used in commerce, then each day spent fight-
ing to establish a claim was another day’s business lost. Consequently in colonial admi-
ralty court, officials and property owners struck deals that placed the owner in the pecu-
liar position of paying the state for the return of property. (Because colonial juries were
unsympathetic, the Crown had transferred jurisdiction to admiralty judges in 1696.)
There is one case of a subject who, having made such a bargain to get back his ship and
cargo, sued under common law trespass for damages and prevailed. See Smith, The Writs
of Assistance at 181 (cited in note 2). For discussion on similarly coercive plea bargains en-
forced today, see text accompanying notes 130-36.
150
Otis, Article, reprinted in Smith, The Writs of Assistance at 565 (cited in note 2)
(capitalization omitted).
151
Lasson, Fourth Amendment at 59, quoting John Adams (cited in note 144).
152
This is particularly so because the most obvious legislative reform, which is requir-
ing forfeited assets to be deposited in the general fund rather than funneling them to the
1998] Policing for Profit 77
Imposing this conflict of interest on law enforcement endan-
gers the public welfare in four critical areas. First, encouraging
police to target assets undermines drug law enforcement strate-
gies. Nominally, forfeiture provides a way to remove contraband
from circulation. But when fundraising prospects lead police to
defer arrests until after drug sales,
153
when police prefer to target
the least culpable offenders,
154
when prosecutors give leniency to
those dealers with the largest assets, and when 80 percent of the
people whose assets are seized are never charged,
155
we should
suspect that the forfeiture payback provision is having the oppo-
site effect. Virtually all drug enforcement decisions are subject to
this economic temptation; heroin distribution may demand more
enforcement, for example, but perhaps targeting cocaine dealers
would be more profitable.
156
One commentator concluded that
“forfeiture is shaping the core goals and policies of the [Drug
War]. . . . Asset forfeitures have become a legitimate alternative
policy goal for law enforcement[,] . . . an end in themselves.”
157
The forfeiture incentive exerts all the more influence because
no clear drug control priorities have ever been formulated that
might act as a restraint on single-minded fundraising. Because
questioning any Drug War campaign can be political suicide, its
priorities have rarely been subject to rational public debate.
seizing agency, would eliminate the destructive incentives we have described. Addition-
ally, it would not reduce whatever benefits the forfeiture law can deliver—whether meas-
ured in terms of drug enterprises shut down, contraband seized, drug dealers deterred, or
even the conversion of drug proceeds into government revenue. We address this and other
potential legislative reforms in Section IV.
153
See text accompanying note 121.
154
Although forfeiture may have been intended for prosperous kingpins and large en-
terprises, many law enforcement agencies have decided that it is most advantageous to
pursue the more numerous low-level dealers or users. See, for example, Inequity Seen in
Drug Forfeiture Law, NY Times A17 (Sept 3, 1993) (reporting that 94 percent of the six
thousand forfeiture cases filed by San Jose prosecutors in 1992 involved less than $5,000).
Small seizures have two advantages: the forfeiture opportunities are virtually endless,
and claimant challenges to them are impractical because they would cost more than the
amounts involved. See also JRSA, Five-Year Review at 23 (cited in note 1) (suggesting task
force members consider “whether it is more efficient to target major dealers or numerous
smaller ones”).
155
Andrew Schneider and Mary Pat Flaherty, Drug Law Leaves Trail of Innocents, Chi
Trib C1 (Aug 11, 1991) (reporting on a nationwide survey of forfeitures over a ten-month
period). Another investigation of Volusia County, Florida forfeitures found that no charges
were filed in three out of four forfeitures. Jeff Brazil and Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or
Easy Money?, Orlando Sent Trib A1 (June 14, 1992).
156
See Miller and Selva, 11 Justice Q at 314-16 (cited in note 113) (concluding that the
funds available through asset forfeiture caused police to concentrate on less serious cases
and did not result in diminishing the quantity of drugs on the street).
157
Nelson, Comment, 80 Cal L Rev at 1327 (cited in note 41).
78 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Shrill political demands that everything be accomplished imme-
diately reduce to a directionless program in which nothing takes
precedence. The euphemistic label attached to this abdication is
the “zero tolerance policy,” formally adopted by the National
Drug Policy Board on March 21, 1988.
158
This “policy” has author-
ized virtually any law enforcement activity that has even the
most tenuous connection to drug violations—effectively a license
to engage in unlimited asset seizures. Pursuant to this policy, the
Customs Service and the Coast Guard have seized assets regard-
less of whether the owner was innocent or possessed merely a de
minimis quantity of drugs. In May 1988, for example, the Coast
Guard seized a yacht valued at $2.5 million because it contained
one-tenth of an ounce of marijuana.
159
Similarly, the Reagan “Just
Say No” campaign equated casual, recreational marijuana use
with the most desperate forms of drug addiction, making any and
all law enforcement choices acceptable.
160
Second, by linking police budgets to drug law enforcement,
both forfeiture laws and Byrne grants induce police and prosecu-
tors to neglect other, often more pressing crime problems.
161
From
the examples in the preceding section, it should be evident that
law enforcement officials now make business judgments that can
only compete with, if not wholly supplant, their broader law en-
forcement goals. The Department of Justice has periodically
made this practice official policy, as in 1989 when all U.S. Attor-
neys were directed to divert resources to forfeiture efforts if nec-
essary to meet their commitment “to increase forfeiture produc-
tion”:
158
Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 1.02 at 1-12 (cited in note 44) (calling the policy “indiscriminate
and overzealous”). See also Representative Charles B. Rangel, Reagan’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ is
a Zero Drug Policy, Newsday 66 (June 28, 1988).
159
The yacht was later returned to its absentee owner. See Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 1.02 at
1-12 n 17 (cited in note 44).
160
Some have criticized the Drug War as geared to protecting suburbia and the middle
class while failing to address the more destructive problem in the inner cities. Robert
Stutman, formerly head of the DEA New York office, notes that “[b]efore 1966 we concen-
trated purely on heroin and nobody paid attention. The predominant attitude among most
Americans, and certainly most agents, was, ‘Who cares who sells it as long as only black
people are using it?’ . . . [But then drugs began] leaving the ghetto, so all of a sudden they
were becoming understood as a truly American problem.” Robert M. Stutman and Richard
Esposito, Dead on Delivery: Inside the Drug Wars, Straight from the Street 67-68 (Warner
1992). Stutman and Esposito bemoan the emphasis on law enforcement to the exclusion of
treatment, education, and other non-criminal approaches.
161
See, for example, Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to
the Bill of Rights, 38 Hastings L J 889, 898 (1987) (concluding that drug enforcement is
now the “top priority, indeed the organizing focus” of the federal criminal justice system).
1998] Policing for Profit 79
If inadequate forfeiture resources are available to achieve
the above goals, [U.S. Attorneys] will be expected to divert
personnel from other activities or to seek assistance from
other U.S. Attorneys’ offices, the Criminal Division, and the
Executive Office for United States Attorneys.
162
The asset retention law compounds already existing incen-
tives that promote an inordinate emphasis on drug enforcement.
For example, personal rewards often accrue to those police offi-
cers who most zealously enforce the drug laws. Because drug de-
tail generally reaps large numbers of nighttime arrests and day-
time court appearances for the arresting officer,
163
it is an avenue
to both overtime pay (sometimes equaling base salary) and better
evaluations (which are often linked to arrest rates).
164
This both
channels officers into drug enforcement and pits their personal
interest against noncriminal, community-based alternatives to
arrest.
Police forces desperately pursuing drug offenders are, of
course, just the beginning of a spiral that is spinning out of con-
trol. To complete the picture, one must also examine the non-drug
162
Directive 89-1 at 2, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-584.71 (cited in note 103).
See also Directive 91-7 at 9, in DOJ Asset Forfeiture Manual at B-567 (cited in note 68)
(“The Attorney General has made asset forfeiture one of the Department of Justice’s high-
est law enforcement priorities.”).
163
The reason for this lies in the nature of drug law enforcement, much of which occurs
at night. Officers may time arrests to coincide with the end of a shift in order to generate
overtime pay for processing the arrest. Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police
Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Practices of the Police Department, City of New York,
Anatomy of Failure: A Path for Success 39 (July 7, 1994) (“Mollen Commission Report”).
Moreover, because there are few triable issues when a suspect is caught selling or possess-
ing drugs, most drug cases are disposed of quickly by plea bargain, Mollen Commission
Report at 37, and the officer may be able to claim a day’s overtime pay for a brief appear-
ance in court. See, for example, Mark Bowden and Mark Fazlollah, Rogue Cops: Officers
Rode Roughshod, Got Away with It, Phil Inq A1 (Sept 11, 1995) (part two of a three-part
series).
164
Bowden and Fazlollah, Phil Inq at A1. Bowden and Fazlollah report that “every col-
lar on the night shift afforded the opportunity of overtime pay. A day in court could mean
$100 to $200 in extra earnings. That year [Officer Baird]. . . earned nearly half again as
much in overtime . . . .” Id. As the authors explain, “with pressure from all quarters to do
something about drugs, things like arrest totals and conviction rates offer at least paper
proof that the battle is being waged.” Id.
The benefits that flow from high arrest rates have been condemned for encouraging
false arrests, and sometimes perjury as to the identity of the arresting officer (“trading col-
lars for dollars”). Mollen Commission Report at 39 (cited in note 163); Richard Emery, The
Even Sadder New York Police Saga, NY Times A31 (Dec 12, 1987) (concerning New York
transit police arrest quotas). They also promote incarceration over treatment, prevention,
and other problem-solving approaches. See generally Andrew Schneider and Mary Pat
Flaherty, Government seizures victimize innocent, Pittsburgh Press (Aug 11-16, 1991) (six-
part series).
80 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
crimes that go unprevented or uninvestigated, the court hours di-
verted from other kinds of cases,
165
the rejection of non-criminal
approaches to dealing with the drug problem, and much more.
Unfortunately, Congress has diligently avoided examining these
issues.
This brings us to a third casualty of the funding methods we
have described: the subversion of any serious legislative debate
on our drug policy, and particularly on how heavily it should rely
on law enforcement as the solution rather than alternative non-
criminal strategies. There is, for example, an enormous body of
research to show that treatment is several times more effective in
reducing drug consumption than interdiction and other polic-
ing.
166
Yet from the beginning, national drug policy overwhelm-
ingly has emphasized law enforcement rather than treatment,
education, or other noncriminal approaches. Out of approxi-
mately $15 billion in annual federal Drug War funds, approxi-
mately two-thirds are dedicated to law enforcement and interdic-
tion.
167
Meanwhile the slim budgetary allotment for the Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Administration’s prevention
and treatment programs was cut by 60 percent in 1996.
168
The
165
For example, between 1980 and 1990 the number of federal drug convictions rose
more than 300 percent, almost ten times the increase in nondrug convictions. Douglas C.
McDonald and Kenneth E. Carlson, Federal Sentencing in Transition, 1986-90 4 (DOJ
1992). See also Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts 12 (Dec 1995) (noting that from 1972 to 1994, federal drug prosecutions rose from
18 percent to 40 percent of the federal criminal dockets); Dan Baum, The Drug War on
Civil Liberties, The Nation 886, 887 (June 29, 1992) (reporting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist chastised the Justice Department for burdening federal courts with petty drug
cases); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 Hastings L J 1135, 1150-58 (1995) (concluding that mushrooming federal drug
prosecutions are overwhelming the federal courts).
166
See, for example, Treatment: Effective (But Unpopular) Weapon Against Drugs, 19
RAND Research Rev 3, 3 (Spring 1995) (reporting RAND study concluding that treatment
is seven times more cost-effective than supply-control programs in reducing cocaine con-
sumption).
167
Of the federal funds allocated to the drug war, the fraction devoted to law enforce-
ment and interdiction generally has hovered around two-thirds. Compare the Bush ad-
ministration statistics, reported in Massing, What Ever Happened to the ‘War on Drugs’?,
NY Rev of Books at 45 (cited in note 11) (“[T]wo-thirds, or more than $8 billion goes for
law enforcement and interdiction . . . .”), citing the White House, National Drug Control
Strategy, Budget Summary 2 (Jan 1992), with the Clinton 1998 proposed budget, reported
in Robert Dreyfuss, Hawks and Doves, Rolling Stone 42, 42 (Aug 7, 1997) (reporting that
66 percent of Clinton drug budget will go towards law enforcement and military interdic-
tion).
168
Wren, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 5) (reporting that funding for the Department
of Health and Human Service’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration drug
prevention program, and for Administration’s treatment programs, were cut in 1996 to
$89 million for each—a cut of about 60 percent from 1995, which resulted in the closing of
1998] Policing for Profit 81
forfeiture incentive—along with Byrne funding, the additional
monetary and career rewards that flow to police officers who
make drug arrests,
169
and a mushrooming prison-dependent eco-
nomic sector
170
—assures the existence of a powerful lobby to
maintain this imbalance.
171
As we demonstrate in Section IV, this
lobby has been able to soundly defeat the few congressional ef-
forts to divert some drug law enforcement funding to other uses.
While this law enforcement emphasis has not diminished our
drug problem, it has produced a prison problem of staggering
proportions. With a fivefold increase in the number of incarcer-
ated drug offenders over the last decade,
172
the Drug War has
given us the second most incarcerated population in the industri-
alized world, after Russia.
173
Over ten years, we have doubled our
prison population to 1.6 million inmates, requiring the addition of
1,600 new prison beds each week.
174
None of this has affected the
seventy-nine prevention programs and thirty-three treatment programs).
169
The monetary and career benefits that flow to officers from high arrest rates have
been condemned for promoting incarceration over treatment, prevention, and other prob-
lem solving approaches. Like forfeiture except at a more directly individual level, this in-
centive juxtaposes the officer’s self-interest against non-criminal, community-based alter-
natives to arrest.
170
The prison-dependent economic sector also includes businesses that will share in the
$10 billion to be spent in prison construction over the next five years pursuant to the
Crime Control Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321-19 (1996), codified at 42
USCA § 13708(a)(1) (West 1997).
171
For example, a survey revealed that an unsurprising 90 percent of task force com-
manders thought task forces should be a top priority for funding; 64 percent said they
should have priority over education or treatment programs, compared to 17 percent who
thought they should have less priority. Coldren, et al, Multijurisdictional Task Force Op-
erations at 10 & exh 6 (cited in note 33). See also Dreyfuss, Rolling Stone at 46 (cited in
note 167), quoting the former police chief of Kansas City, Missouri, Joseph McNamara, as
saying that he long ago concluded that the Drug War “is irrational, racist, un-American
and unsuccessful” and wrote a dissertation that “was so critical of our drug policy that I
never published it. If I had, I never would have had a career in law enforcement.”
172
Mauer and Huling, Young Black Americans at 10 (cited in note 8). Between 1986
and 1991 there was an 828 percent increase in black, non-Hispanic females incarcerated
for drug offenses in state prison. Id at 20. In California, the growth rate of incarcerated
drug offenders was even higher: 1500 percent during the 1980s. Franklin E. Zimring and
Gordon Hawkins, Prison Population and Criminal Justice Policy in California 32-35 (Ber-
keley 1992).
173
Mauer and Huling, Young Black Americans at 23 (cited in note 8). The authors re-
port that the average length of time served by drug offenders increased 50 percent be-
tween 1986 and 1992, from twenty-two to thirty-three months. Id at 11. They also note
that a drug arrest in 1992 was four times more likely to result in incarceration than in
1980. Id at 10.
174
Michael Sniffen, Incarceration Rate Doubled in 10 Years, Charleston Gaz 1A (Aug
19, 1996), relying on the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics Report of Aug
18, 1996. The same report also indicated that 1 of every 167 Americans is incarcerated,
compared with 1 in 320 a decade earlier. 5.3 million people, almost 3 percent of the adult
population, are now in prison, on parole, on probation, or otherwise supervised by a crimi-
82 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
spread of serious addiction among school dropouts, gang mem-
bers, and the poor, except by siphoning away funds that might be
used for drug education, treatment, or the amelioration of hard-
ships that make drug abuse look attractive to the disadvantaged.
Fourth and finally, the economic rewards offered by both the
forfeiture and Byrne grant laws are so large that some police are
tempted to pursue them illegally when necessary.
175
A recent fed-
eral civil rights case brought against several task force officers
strikingly illustrates the corrosive operation of these incentives.
In United State v Reese,
176
the Ninth Circuit described a task force
criminally deformed by its dependence on federal drug money.
Existing as a separate unit within the Oakland Housing Author-
ity, the task force operated, in the words of one member, “more or
less like a wolfpack,” driving up in police vehicles and taking
“anything and everything we saw on the street corner.”
177
Accord-
ing to the court, the commander, Daniel Broussard,
regularly exhorted Task Force officers to keep their arrest
numbers up. All the officers were aware that the federal
grant that funded their unit, and on which their jobs de-
pended, was good for only eighteen to twenty-four months.
Broussard warned that they would need statistics to show
that the federal money was well spent and thus to secure an-
other grant. On more than one occasion, he sent the Task
Force out to begin a shift with comments like, “Let’s go out
and kick ass,” and “[E]verybody goes to jail tonight for every-
thing, all right?”
178
Oakland’s drug task force is far from unique. Reporters and
investigators have documented numerous other instances where
police departments engaged in illegal searches, threats, and other
lawless conduct in search of forfeitable cash. After viewing video-
tapes of approximately one thousand highway stops, two Florida
nal justice agency. DOJ, Press Release: Probation and Parole Population Reaches Almost
3.8 Million (1996).
175
Byrne grants do not pose the same conflict of interest problems that forfeiture laws
do. When Byrne-funded task forces target drug offenders they are not redefining their
goals for financial self-interest; drug enforcement is the goal that Congress has assigned
to them. However, as the discussion of United States v Reese, 2 F3d 870 (9th Cir 1993),
will demonstrate, providing soft money for drug law enforcement creates incentives that
similarly divert police officers from the proper execution of their jobs.
176
2 F3d 870 (9th Cir 1993).
177
Id at 874.
178
Id. Broussard also told his men that “a lot of ‘dirty’ drug money would be passing
through their hands, and that it would not really matter if they kept some of it for them-
selves” because the suspects would be in no position to complain. Id.
1998] Policing for Profit 83
reporters found that police had used traffic violations as a pretext
to confiscate “tens of thousands of dollars from motorists against
whom there [was] no evidence of wrongdoing,” commonly taking
the money without filing any criminal charges.
179
Other police de-
partments treat significant cash on hand as a sign of presumptive
guilt.
180
A Los Angeles Sheriff ’s Department employee reported
that deputies routinely planted drugs and falsified police reports
to establish probable cause for cash seizures.
181
According to news
reports, Louisiana police engaged in massive pretextual stops,
with the seized money diverted to police department ski trips and
other unauthorized uses.
182
Many of these police undertook such
lawlessness not to acquire illicit personal income, but to further
their agency’s financial well-being. As we note below, the Drug
War also has fostered the more traditional kinds of police corrup-
tion and private graft that particularly thrive in the surrepti-
tious, informant-laden world of anti-drug operations.
183
III. T
HE ACCOUNTABILITY OBJECTIONS TO SELF-FINANCING
POLICE AGENCIES
A. The Separation of Powers Objection
We turn now to a second fundamental problem with self-
financing law enforcement agencies: inadequate accountability.
Agencies that can finance themselves through asset seizures need
179
Brazil and Berry, Tainted Cash, Orlando Sent Trib at A1 (cited in note 155). Blacks
and Hispanics constituted more than 80 percent of the drivers searched, but only a small
fraction of the drivers on the patrolled highway. Jeff Brazil and Steve Berry, Color of
Driver is Key to Stops in I-95 Videos, Orlando Sent Trib A1 (Aug 23, 1992).
180
See, for example, Heilbroner, NY Times § 6 at 70 (cited in note 47). Heilbroner re-
ports that police in the small town of Sulphur, Louisiana seized about $5 million in four
years, more than the entire New Orleans police force. “Typically, a speeder is pulled aside.
When a lot of cash is found on him and his explanation is suspect, a drug dog is sum-
moned. If the dog smells narcotics, the police seize the money.” Id. As detailed in note 47,
most paper currency is now contaminated and tests positive for cocaine.
181
Kenneth Reich and Victor Merina, Ex-Sergeant Sentenced, Alleges Misconduct, LA
Times B1 (Apr 13, 1993), quoting LA County Sheriff
’s Sergeant Robert Sobel, “The falsifi-
cation of police reports is rife. . . . These seizures [were] legal street robberies.” Id. Sobel
made these accusations after pleading guilty in a corruption probe.
182
See Dateline NBC, Probable Cause?: Policemen in Louisiana harass motorists and
seize their property for no apparent reason, 1997 WL 7754554 (Jan 3, 1997). Although such
traffic stops were pretexts for forfeiture fund-raising, a recent Supreme Court decision
largely excludes ulterior motives from Fourth Amendment analysis by holding that the ex-
istence of probable cause renders such motives irrelevant. Whren v United States, 116 S Ct
1769, 1776 (1996) (rejecting as irrelevant defendants’ claim that vehicle stops targeted
blacks). For a critique of the Court’s analysis, see Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 Vand L Rev (forthcoming Mar 1998).
183
See notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
84 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
not justify their activities through any regular budgetary process.
As a Department of Justice report notes, “one ‘big bust’ can pro-
vide a task force with the resources to become financially inde-
pendent. Once financially independent, a task force can choose to
operate without Federal or state assistance.”
184
When this happens, the predictable consequence is a degree
of police secrecy and independence that brings with it some of the
risks civil libertarians associate with the term “police state.” We
do not mean to imply that police now exercise unlimited power in
the United States, but we do believe that the escalating presence
of this new kind of police agency will prove increasingly danger-
ous to our nation’s liberty if left unchecked. The longer we ignore
this problem, the more entrenched and intractable it will become.
As with the conflict of interest problem in the preceding sec-
tion, police unaccountability invokes both constitutional and pol-
icy objections. We explore the latter concerns in Section III.B. In
this Section we argue that independent, self-financing law en-
forcement agencies violate both the Appropriations Clause and
the separation of powers framework that the clause was designed
to support.
Under Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution, Con-
gress is vested with exclusive appropriations power.
185
Along with
supporting statutes—including the Miscellaneous Receipts Act
(which requires all funds collected to be deposited in the public
treasury, subject to few exceptions
186
), the Anti-Deficiency Act
(which bars a government employee from authorizing or incur-
ring an obligation without a congressional appropriation
187
), and
the prohibition against augmentation (which bars an agency from
exceeding the amount appropriated with third-party funding
188
)—
184
JRSA, Five-Year Review at 9 (cited in note 1).
185
This clause provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Re-
ceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
186
Government funds coming into the hands of an officer or agent of the United States
must be paid “as soon as practicable” into the Treasury. Pub L No 97-258, 96 Stat 948
(1982), codified at 31 USC § 3302(b) (1994).
187
Pub L No 97-258, 96 Stat 923 (1982), codified at 31 USC § 1341(a)(1) (1994) (“An of-
ficer or employee of the United States Government may not make or authorize an expen-
diture or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the ex-
penditure or obligation; or involve [the] government in a contract or obligation for the
payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law.”).
188
According to the GAO, “The prohibition against augmentation is a corollary of the
separation-of-powers doctrine. . . . Restated, the objective of the theory against augmenta-
tion of appropriated funds is to prevent a government agency from undercutting the con-
gressional power of the purse by circuitously exceeding the amount Congress has appro-
priated for that activity.” GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 5-62 (GAO
1998] Policing for Profit 85
the Appropriations Clause assures that government income can-
not be spent until a specific congressional appropriation releases
it.
189
By contrast, under 21 USC § 881(e)(2)(B), money seized by a
federal agency is deposited in the Department of Justice’s Asset
Forfeiture Fund, where it is then available to the Department
and other federal agencies for drug law enforcement and, in some
cases, prison funding.
190
This arrangement bypasses the Treas-
ury, leaving the Department of Justice free to determine the con-
tours of its own budget. The Department of Justice, the DEA, and
other federal law enforcement agencies have essentially been
given the freedom to fund themselves in whatever amount their
agents can legally seize. The constitutional questions are whether
this kind of blank check comports with Article I, Section 9, Clause
7 and, more broadly, the constitutional scheme of separate pow-
ers that serve to check and balance each other.
The complication is that Congress issued this blank check,
and in theory it can terminate the privilege at any time. This
generates two alternative possible interpretations: Section 881
might be deemed either an exercise of the congressional appro-
priations power,
191
or an unconstitutional transfer of this power to
the executive branch. Obviously executive agencies must exercise
legislatively delegated power, but there must be limits of degree
or the organizing principle of the constitutional structure, the
separation of powers, could be lawfully destroyed.
192
1982). Statutory counterparts to this doctrine include Pub L No 97-258, 96 Stat 923
(1982), codified at 31 USC § 1342 (1994) (prohibiting employees of the government from
accepting voluntary services for the government except in defined emergencies), and Pub
L No 87-849, 76 Stat 1125 (1962), codified at 18 USC § 209 (1994) (barring supplementa-
tion of government salaries with third-party funds).
189
Supreme Court cases articulating this principle include Cincinnati Soap Co v
United States, 301 US 308, 321 (1937); Bradley v United States, 98 US 104, 112-13 (1878);
Knote v United States, 95 US 149, 154 (1877). According to the GAO, “the effect of 31
U.S.C. § 484 is to ensure that the executive branch remains dependent on the congres-
sional appropriations process . . . . [It] emerges as another element in the statutory pat-
tern by which Congress retains control of the public purse under the separation-of-powers
doctrine.” GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 5-65 (cited in note 188).
190
21 USC § 881(e)(2)(B); 28 USC § 524(c)(1).
191
That is, it could be an exercise of the appropriations power either directly or through
a constitutional delegation to the Department of Justice. For reasons that will become
clear in the balance of this section, the issuance of this kind of blank check can hardly be
considered a direct appropriation because the agency gets to determine the size of its
budget. It is rather a delegation, and because it is a delegation of basic legislative power,
an unconstitutional one. See text accompanying notes 205-23.
192
See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia dissenting) (“[T]he ba-
sic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the Legislature. Our Members of
Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all power to the President and adjourn sine
86 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
In theory, the nondelegation doctrine is designed to discern
this limit. The doctrine recognizes that legislative delegations are
sometimes necessary because administrative agencies are better
able to provide expertise, or the expeditious and flexible re-
sponses that may be required to regulate an area adequately. But
to ensure that the legislative power remains with Congress, and
that lawmaking does not devolve into the promulgation of ad hoc
rules by unelected administrators, the doctrine requires that
agency action be tethered to the legislature’s defined ends.
193
To
accomplish this, a statute delegating congressional power must
provide “intelligible principles” sufficient to channel agency dis-
cretion and provide a basis for a judicial review of that discre-
tion.
194
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court struck down a series of
legislative delegations unaccompanied by such guiding stan-
dards.
195
But although the Supreme Court subsequently invoked
the doctrine, and sometimes construed statutory delegations nar-
rowly in order to comply with its requirements,
196
the Court did
not again find a delegation of legislative power unconstitutional
for almost half of a century.
Scholars came to regard the idea of an unconstitutional legis-
lative delegation as something of an oxymoron, but in the 1980s
and 1990s, the nondelegation doctrine has been showing new
signs of life. In The Benzene Case,
197
an occupational health and
safety standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor was
struck down as exceeding the executive’s lawfully delegated au-
die.”). Article I of the Constitution, which provides that “all legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress,” prohibits the transfer of this power.
193
See also Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute,
448 US 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist concurring) (The nondelegation doctrine is designed to
ensure “that important choices of social policy are made by Congress . . . .”).
194
See id at 685-86, relying in part on J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co v United States, 276 US
394, 409 (1928), and Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388, 430 (1935).
195
See Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238, 289-97 (1936) (striking down a delegation
of legislative authority to price-setting boards elected by coal producers); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 537-42 (1935) (finding the National Industrial
Recovery Act unconstitutional in delegating to the President broad, standardless authority
to establish codes of fair competition); Panama Refining, 293 US at 430-32 (striking down
standardless statute granting the President discretionary power to prohibit interstate
transportation of hot oil).
196
National Cable Television Association, Inc v United States, 415 US 336, 341-44
(1974) (citing Schechter, and narrowing the criteria enacted to govern the Federal Com-
munications Commission (“FCC”) in order to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of the
power to tax); Industrial Union, 448 US at 645-46 (narrowing the discretion of the Secre-
tary of Labor in promulgating Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
standards to avoid unconstitutional delegation).
197
Industrial Union Department, AFL/CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US
607 (1980).
1998] Policing for Profit 87
thority.
198
Two years later in INS v Chadha,
199
the Court over-
turned a delegation of legislative power to one House, finding it
offended both the Presentment Clause and the bicameral struc-
ture of Article I. In 1995, the Eighth Circuit applied the nondele-
gation doctrine to overturn a statute authorizing the Secretary of
the Interior to acquire land in trust for Indian tribes; it found
that the standardless delegation created “an agency fiefdom
whose boundaries were never established by Congress . . . . It is
hard to imagine a program more at odds with separation of pow-
ers principles.”
200
This past April, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia declared the Line Item Veto Act unconstitu-
tional because Congress had ceded nondelegable, basic legislative
functions to the President.
201
A divided Supreme Court reversed
this decision three months later, holding that because the Presi-
dent had yet to exercise the line item veto, the plaintiffs lacked
the injury necessary for standing to sue.
202
The Court’s ultimate
198
Id at 652-62. The plurality opinion construed the Secretary’s delegated authority
narrowly to avoid unconstitutionality, placing the challenged regulation beyond the legis-
lative delegation, while Justice Rehnquist found the statute itself an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. Id at 685-88 (Rehnquist concurring). See also American
Textile Manufacturer’s Institute, Inc v Donovan, 452 US 490, 545-48 (1981) (Rehnquist
dissenting) (dissenting on grounds that the OSHA standard was promulgated pursuant to
an unconstitutional statute that delegated lawmaking power).
199
462 US 919, 944-59 (1983).
200
South Dakota v United States Department of Interior, 69 F3d 878, 885 (8th Cir
1995). Following this decision, the Government changed its position and promulgated a
procedure for judicial review of the Secretary’s decisions; a preamble to the regulation
conceded that the Secretary was precluded from taking the land at issue in the Eighth
Circuit case. The Supreme Court then granted the government’s petition for certiorari, va-
cated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to
remand the case to the Secretary to reconsider his administrative decision. Deptartment of
the Interior v South Dakota, 117 S Ct 286, 286-87 (1996). Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
O’Connor and Thomas, dissented, arguing that to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand be-
cause “the Government, having lost below, wishes to try out a new legal position” was un-
fair. Id at 287.
201
Byrd v Raines, 956 F Supp 25, 33 (D DC 1997) (“[E]ven if Congress may sometimes
delegate authority to impound funds, it may not confer the power permanently to rescind
an appropriation or tax benefit that has become the law of the United States. That power
is possessed by Congress alone, and, according to the Framers’ careful design, may not be
delegated at all.”). The Line Item Veto Act, Pub L No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200 (1996), codi-
fied at 2 USCA §§ 691 et seq (West 1997), allows the President to sign a bill into law and
then “cancel” any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct
spending, and any limited tax benefit. 2 USCA § 691(a). Cancellation would take effect
unless Congress reenacted a canceled item within thirty days of Presidential notification.
2 USCA § 691d.
202
Raines v Byrd, 117 S Ct 2312, 2322 (1997). Seven Justices refused to address the
merits because the President had not yet exercised the veto. (President Clinton did so for
the first time on August 11, 1997.) Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented separately, each
finding the threat of a veto sufficient to restructure the relationship between the
88 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
decision on the merits, briefly delayed but inevitable, will provide
at least some clues to its present thinking on the nondelegation
issue. At this point it appears clear that the pendulum is gaining
momentum in this new direction as Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia,
203
along with numerous constitutional scholars,
204
argue
for a more vigorous application of the nondelegation doctrine.
If some delegations of legislative power are constitutionally
suspect, giving law enforcement agencies the opportunity to set
the size of their own budgets through police seizures must be one
of them. By issuing this blank check, Congress has alienated the
vital legislative function assigned to it by the Appropriations
Clause: specifying the size and nature of the government’s activi-
ties. To see this, one must recognize that an appropriation is not
simply a procedural mechanism by which funds are released, but
a substantive determination by the legislature of the relative
worth of the program it funds. This understanding of the appro-
priations process—as a budgetary mechanism by which Congress
shapes the activities of the federal government—has prevailed
from the Constitution’s inception to the present day.
205
To consti-
branches. Id at 2325-29. Justice Stevens, the only Justice to reveal explicitly his view on
the merits, noted that he would find the law unconstitutional. Id at 2325 (Stevens dissent-
ing).
203
See Industrial Union, 448 US at 685-88 (Rehnquist concurring); Mistretta, 488 US
at 416-27 (Scalia dissenting).
204
See, for example, David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give
it Substance?, 83 Mich L Rev 1223, 1283-90 (1985); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn,
and Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L Rev 1, 63-67
(1982); John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 132-34 (Harvard 1980); Paul Gewirtz, The
Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 L & Contemp
Probs 46, 49-65 (Summer 1976); Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 Colum L Rev 1119, 1127-30 (1977).
205
See, for example, Alexander Hamilton, Explanation (Nov 11, 1795), in Henry Cabot
Lodge, ed, 8 The Works of Alexander Hamilton 122, 128 (Putnam 1885) (“[N]o money can
be expended, but for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have pre-
scribed.”); Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw The Purse Strings?, 83 Am J Intl
L 758, 761 (1989) (“The Framers were familiar with efforts by English kings to rely on ex-
tra-parliamentary sources of revenue for their military expeditions and other activities. . . .
The rise of democratic government is directly related to legislative control over all expen-
ditures.”); Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency’s Appropria-
tion, 43 Op Atty Gen 224, 229 (1980) (stating Congress is required to determine the pur-
poses and amounts of government expenditures); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse,
97 Yale L J 1343, 1352 (1988) (Appropriations constitute “legislative specifications of the
powers, activities, and purposes—what we may call, simply, ‘objects’—for which appropri-
ated funds may be used.”). Stith provides a comprehensive analysis of Congress’ obliga-
tions in exercising its appropriations power. See also 31 USC § 1301(a) (1994) (Appropria-
tions “shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except
as otherwise provided by law.”). For an argument opposing this interpretation of the con-
stitutional role of the appropriations process, see J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power
of the Purse, 1989 Duke L J 1162, 1185-88.
1998] Policing for Profit 89
tutional scholar Kate Stith, one consequence is that the appro-
priations function imposes
an obligation on Congress itself. Congress has not only the
power but also the duty to exercise legislative control over
federal expenditures. . . . In determining whether a grant of
spending authority is a constitutional appropriation . . .
[w]hat matters is whether Congress in fact determines how
much funding for a government activity is “appropriate.”
206
This is precisely what Congress did not do when it enabled
law enforcement agencies to fund themselves with whatever as-
sets they might lawfully seize. As former Attorney General Rich-
ard Thornburgh has noted, “it’s now possible for a drug dealer to
serve time in a forfeiture-financed prison after being arrested by
agents driving a forfeiture-provided automobile while working in
a forfeiture-funded sting operation.”
207
In other words, law en-
forcement activities and resources are now unconstrained by any
legislative determination of an appropriate budgetary level. This
wholly thwarts Section 9’s function as defined by the Supreme
Court, which is “to assure that public funds will be spent accord-
ing to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress as
to the common good and not according to the individual favor of
Government agents.”
208
Our claim here is not that the Appropriations Clause re-
quires Congress to specify a definite budgetary figure for execu-
tive agencies, or to do so yearly. As Stith argues, Congress may
permanently authorize the expenditure of an indefinite sum to be
206
Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1345-46 (cited in note 205). Stith maintains that because Arti-
cle I, Section 8 enumerates Congress’s powers, the Appropriations Clause in Section 9
does not grant power but rather “affirmatively obligates Congress to exercise a power al-
ready in its possession.” Id at 1348. “Congress abdicates, rather than exercises, its power
of the purse if it creates permanent or other open-ended spending authority that effec-
tively escapes periodic legislative review and limitation.” Id at 1345. Stith’s analysis
builds on her conception of the appropriations process as effecting two constitutionally
mandated principles, which she calls the Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropria-
tions Control. The former is the principle that all monies received from whatever source
by any part of the government are public funds. The Principle of Appropriations Control
prohibits expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization. Id at 1345.
207
Kelley Shannon, Seized drug money to be used for prisons, Houston Chron 12 (Sept
28, 1989).
208
OPM v Richmond, 496 US 414, 428 (1990). The Court described this function as Sec-
tion 9’s “fundamental and comprehensive purpose.” Id at 427. In another legislative dele-
gation case, this one involving the Presentment Clauses, the Court observed that “the
purposes underlying the Presentment Clauses . . . [must] guide our resolution [of the
question whether a given procedure is constitutional].” Chadha, 462 US at 946.
90 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
fixed by later events
209
(such as the sum necessary to finance the
national debt,
210
entitlement obligations,
211
or contract obligations
incurred by an agency pursuant to congressional authorization
212
)
so long as it reflects a decision by Congress that the formula will
result in the appropriate degree of funding and, therefore, agency
activity.
213
This could be the case even if Congress has authorized
an agency to collect fees and utilize them for its operating budget,
as when it decides a government service should be provided in
proportion to the market’s demand for it. (Consumer-generated
revenue retained by the Postal Service, Amtrak, the Park Ser-
vice, and the Securities and Exchange Commission are exam-
ples.
214
) There is a constitutional chasm, however, between a con-
209
See Stith, 97 Yale L Rev at 1378-83 (cited in note 205). A permanent appropriation
“does not require repeated action by the Congress to authorize its use.” GAO, Principles of
Federal Appropriations Law at 2-5 (cited in note 188).
210
See Pub L No 97-258, 96 Stat 945 (1982), codified at 31 USC § 3123 (1994).
211
For example, a standing appropriation for Social Security payments was codified at
42 USC §§ 401-23 (1994).
212
The Anti-Deficiency Act establishes an exception for agencies to incur an obligation
in advance of an appropriation if “authorized by law.” 31 USC § 1341(a)(1)(B) (1994). Of
course, a statute authorizing such advance expenditures must also comport with the con-
stitutional requirements of the Appropriations Clause.
213
Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1382-83 (cited in note 205). Stith regards the underlying sub-
stantive legislation establishing the entitlement, or authorizing the government to incur
an obligation, as the “real ‘Appropriations’ for constitutional purposes.” Id at 1382.
When Congress decides the substantive contours of the backdoor spending program,
it decides, to a large extent, the proper funding level of the program. . . . In each of
these instances, the form of the actual legislative permission to draw funds from the
Treasury is largely irrelevant, because the government’s monetary obligation is based
on previous legislative action. . . . [Such backdoor] spending is consistent with the
constitutional norm requiring Congress to control the public fisc as long as Congress
clearly defines the activity being funded, provides a time limitation on the spending
program, implicitly or explicitly decides the total amount of spending authority, and
undertakes periodic legislative review.
Id at 1380, 1382-83.
214
The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires all sums received by the government to be
deposited in the Treasury, 31 USC § 3302(b) (1994), but Congress has legislated excep-
tions to this requirement, allowing certain agencies to establish revolving funds or retain
fees or gifts. A revolving fund is designed for government enterprises designed to be at
least partly self-sustaining, such as the Postal Service, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, a government loan program, or a turnpike authority. The activity of the
agency is at least partly sustained by the income it produces. Apart from such dedicated
revolving funds, Congress has also authorized certain agencies to retain the user fees it
charges, see, for example, Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, Act of Aug 31,
1951, 65 Stat 290, codified at 31 USC § 9701 (1994), and National Cable, 415 US at 340-
41, or retain certain gifts, see, for example, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange
Act of 1961, Pub L No 87-256, 75 Stat 527, codified at 22 USC § 2455(f) (1994) (providing
authority to receive and utilize conditional gifts). See also Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1365-81
(cited in note 205) (detailing exceptions to the dual requirements that all funds collected
be deposited in the Treasury and that all spending be pursuant to a specific appropria-
1998] Policing for Profit 91
gressional appropriation deliberately designed to size an agency
according to market demand and a law effectively allowing a law
enforcement agency to decide for itself what its size and resources
will be. In the latter case, Congress has shed its obligation to set
the purposes and amounts of government expenditures, transfer-
ring this legislative policy decision to self-interested administra-
tors in the executive branch.
215
That the executive branch has
used the asset retention law to supplement its federal law en-
forcement budget by billions of dollars,
216
in an area substantially
immune to congressional oversight except through exercise of the
appropriations power,
217
underscores the importance of returning
this power to Congress.
Measured against the kinds of congressional delegations of
power that have been upheld in the past, the asset retention
scheme is extreme, and outside any constitutional rationale.
None of the reasons that courts have used to justify a delega-
tion
218
applies to a law that allows the Department of Justice to
write its own budget. And even were a delegation of the appro-
tion).
215
For related reasons, the Supreme Court construed the Independent Offices Appro-
priation Act of 1952 to permit the FCC to collect fees based only on the value of its services
to the recipient, not on the public interest that might be served by the collection. National
Cable, 415 US at 341-43. The statute “if read literally, carries an agency far from its cus-
tomary orbit and puts it in search of revenue in the manner of an Appropriations Commit-
tee of the House.” Id at 341 (construing the statute to avoid abridging Art I, § 8, cl 1, vest-
ing Congress with the “power to lay and collect taxes.”). Similarly, one important factor in
upholding the delegation at issue in Skinner v Mid-America Pipeline Co, 490 US 212
(1989), was that Congress limited the aggregate amount of pipeline user fees the agency
could charge, and also specified that the fees be set according to “volume-miles, miles, or
revenue.” Id at 219-20.
216
See note 102.
217
See Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1383-84 (cited in note 205). Stith argues that budgetary
oversight is especially important in areas where the Executive has broad discretion in de-
fining government policy, and points to federal prosecutions as an example. In this area,
“the ‘object’ specifications in appropriations are necessarily broad . . . [and] the Executive
bears primary responsibility for determining how and where to assert a federal presence.
If Congress creates spending authority which is open-ended with respect to amount and
duration . . . it effectively concedes any role in defining and constraining executive—that
is, governmental—action.” Id.
218
Legislative delegations have been found appropriate when necessary to avoid en-
meshing legislators in “the sort of intricate, labor intensive task” better suited to adminis-
trators, Mistretta, 488 US at 379 (upholding delegation of sentencing terms to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission); or because the legislature would necessarily speak in terms too
general to suffice, see, for example, American Power and Light Co v SEC, 329 US 104, 105
(1946); or to provide more expeditious or flexible responses than Congress can manage,
see, for example, Zemel v Rusk, 381 US 1, 17 (1965) (dealing with foreign affairs expedien-
cies), and United States v Grimaud, 220 US 506, 516 (1911) (concerning Agriculture De-
partment regulations); or to utilize the kind of expertise that a specialized agency can de-
velop and provide, see Mistretta, 488 US at 368.
92 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
priations function warranted, here it is unaccompanied by any
“intelligible principles” to guide agency discretion, or any other
means of legislative control over the size and scope of the agency’s
budget: the asset retention law is devoid of any spending ceilings,
time limits, funding formulas, meaningful reporting require-
ments, or congressional review procedures.
219
These comparisons, however, are largely beside the point. An
inquiry focused on whether the delegation is “excessive” or
whether the standards are “inadequate” is misdirected when
Congress has transferred a basic legislative function that cannot
be delegated at all. As the courts have recognized, Congress can-
not delegate its basic legislative powers because doing so would
dismantle the essential constitutional structure of balanced, co-
equal branches.
220
In this case, by ceding to the executive part of
its unquestionably exclusive appropriations power,
221
Congress
has abandoned what Edward Corwin described as “the most im-
portant single curb in the Constitution on Presidential power.”
222
The prospect of a self-financing law enforcement branch, largely
able to set its own agenda and accountable to no one, presents the
kind of dangers one of the framers, George Mason, must have had
in mind when he warned that “[t]he purse & the sword ought
never to get into the same hands (whether legislative or execu-
tive).”
223
219
The asset retention law is a good illustration of Stith’s warning that “Congress ren-
ders meaningless the Principles of the Public Fisc and of Appropriations Control if it cre-
ates spending authority without amount or time limitations and fails to subject such au-
thority to periodic legislative review.” Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1383 (cited in note 205).
220
See Panama Refining, 293 US at 421 (“Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdi-
cate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus
vested.”); Field v Clark, 143 US 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legisla-
tive power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”); Byrd, 956 F
Supp at 36 (“Before the question of a delegation’s excessiveness ever arises . . . a court
must be convinced that Congress did not attempt to alienate one of its basic functions.”).
221
See Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for
Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 Minn L Rev 1, 32 (1975).
222
Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today 134 (Princeton 14th
ed 1978). See also Federalist 58 (Madison), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 391, 394
(Wesleyan 1961) (characterizing the appropriations power as “the most compleat and ef-
fectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people”); Alan L. Feld, Shutting Down the Government, 69 BU L Rev 971, 989 (1989) (de-
scribing the power of the purse as “the most viable limitation that legislation and the Con-
stitution places on executive discretion”). See also Chadha, 462 US at 957 (Article I’s en-
during checks “protect the people from the improvident exercise of power . . . .”).
223
Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records Of The Federal Convention Of 1787 139-40 (Yale
1937). The Iran-Contra scandal was a recent and egregious illustration of this danger.
There the executive branch usurped the appropriations power by having Oliver North ob-
1998] Policing for Profit 93
B. Policy Objections
Suppose we are wrong, and the Appropriations Clause poses
no constitutional obstacle to law enforcement self-funding. Should
Congress continue to authorize potentially independent law en-
forcement agencies that need not justify their activities to the
taxpayers, their elected representatives, or any budgetary au-
thority? To us it is self-evident that agencies privileged to arrest,
seize property, and use even deadly force pose special risks that
warrant greater safeguards and scrutiny, not less. For this rea-
son, the forfeiture self-funding mechanism poses a double threat:
the risks of abuse that flow from this financial incentive are com-
pounded because no one is watching.
We need not reiterate here the kinds of abuses and policy
problems discussed in Section II. It is useful, however, to docu-
ment the remarkable lack of accountability drug law enforcement
now enjoys. The asset retention law did not create this problem,
or the uncontrolled agencies and rogue officers that are endemic
to drug law enforcement, but it did add a great deal of fuel to the
fire. To illustrate this, we detail some of the activities of the mul-
tijurisdictional drug task forces that have proliferated in the past
decade. They reveal that while the forfeiture and drug prohibition
laws have not solved America’s drug problem, enforcing them has
created a significant police problem.
Most multijurisdictional drug task forces are offspring of the
Byrne program, but once created they may achieve an independ-
ent life of their own. The block grant concept minimizes congres-
sional oversight,
224
and federal participation in the Byrne-funded
tain funds through secret arms sales to Iran that were then channeled directly to the
Nicaraguan Contras. See generally House and Senate Committees Investigating the Iran-
Contra Affair, Iran Contra Investigation Report, HR Rep No 100-433, S Rep No 100-216,
100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987). As the report noted, “[t]he Constitution contemplates that the
Government will conduct its affairs only with funds appropriated by Congress.” Id at 411.
“[U]nder the view of North and Poindexter, a President whose appropriation requests
were rejected by Congress could raise money from private sources . . . [even for] domestic
programs. That is the path to dictatorship.” Id at 390. Of course, the forfeiture case is dis-
tinguishable in that Congress has itself authorized the executive to bypass the appropria-
tions process. How important is this distinction? To answer that question, we would do
well to ask another: if Congress had been told about Oliver North in advance, and had
passed a law institutionalizing a secret, self-financing “off-the-shelf
” White House opera-
tion whose scope and activities would be determined by the entrepreneurial skills of its
agents, would the constitutional order have been any less threatened?
224
See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1996, Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ap-
propriations, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 489-90 (Mar 28, 1995) (statement of Joseph E. Brann,
Director of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services), where Brann testified
about the lack of oversight, and that “block-granting law enforcement money led to waste,
94 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
task forces is uncommon.
225
In theory, a multijurisdictional drug
task force is tied to state budgetary allocations and oversight, as
the law requires states to match the federal grant with 25 per-
cent state funding.
226
But states may satisfy this requirement
with forfeiture money seized by the task force,
227
thereby elimi-
nating any need for the task force to justify its activities to a state
or local authority. Indeed, if the forfeiture intake is high enough,
federal Byrne grant money can also be phased out, and the task
force may become a self-financing, self-perpetuating, and inde-
pendent entity.
228
Between 1988 and 1992, Byrne-grant-funded
multijurisdictional task forces seized over $1 billion in assets.
229
Multijurisdictional drug task forces may elude meaningful
oversight for two additional reasons. First, they are not tied to
any local constituency. The combination of state, local, and in
some cases, federal agencies divides responsibility, encourages
passing the buck, and leaves no particular elected government in
control. It also promotes jurisdictional game playing: if local po-
lice do not like their state’s asset distribution scheme, or if state
law would bar a seizure, federal involvement allows them to nul-
lify the state’s efforts to regulate their activity.
230
Second, drug
task forces are engaged in the enforcement of so-called victimless
crimes, where there is no aggrieved individual to inform the po-
lice what happened. Consequently, task forces must operate sur-
reptitiously at the margins of legitimate activity, utilizing under-
cover police, spies, informants, stings, and entrapment. Such se-
fraud, and abuse, and not a commensurate reduction in crime.”
225
In a nationwide survey of task force commanders, 97 percent reported that local law
enforcement agencies were components of their task forces, but just over 25 percent in-
cluded federal law enforcement agencies. Coldren, et al, Multijurisdictional Drug Task
Force Operations at 9 (cited in note 33).
226
See Pub L No 90-351, 102 Stat 4333 (1988), codified at 42 USC § 3754(a) (1994).
227
42 USC § 3754(e) (1994).
228
See JRSA, Five-Year Review at 9 (cited in note 1).
229
Id at 10. This amount includes only those seizures by task forces receiving federal
Byrne grants. It does not include assets seized by the DEA or other task forces, or seizures
under state forfeiture laws.
230
See, for example, the situation described in United States v Winston-Salem/Forsyth
County Board of Education, 902 F2d 267, 269 (4th Cir 1990), in which local police seized
over $10,000, temporarily turned it over to the DEA for federal adoption, and then re-
ceived most of it back for their own use. Although the state constitution required the funds
to be used for public school maintenance, and prohibited the transfer to the DEA, the
court found that the federal government could adopt a seizure even when the person seiz-
ing the property was prohibited from seizing or transferring it under state law. Id at 271-
72. In other words, the federal route allowed state police to directly profit from their own
lawlessness.
1998] Policing for Profit 95
cret and deceptive activities further complicate any effort to make
task forces accountable, while simultaneously inviting corruption.
How have task forces exercised their freedom? Of course, one
obstacle to answering this question is that the very absence of ac-
countability makes it difficult to monitor what the task forces
do.
231
Their actual operations are inevitably murky. The best,
though flawed, evidence we have comes from the task force com-
manders themselves via a 1993 nationwide survey.
232
Prefaced
with a disclaimer that “little is known about the range of tactics
being employed by task forces, how frequently they are used, or
how often task forces change their tactical approaches to en-
forcement,”
233
the survey nevertheless conveys some rudimentary
knowledge of task force activities. It reports that tactics com-
monly used include buy-busts, reverse stings, street sweeps, un-
dercover operations, and confidential informants.
234
In addition,
slightly over 30 percent of task force commanders said they were
using novel tactics, such as:
enrolling youthful-looking officers to perform undercover
work in high schools, using college students as operatives in
universities . . . and placing undercover officers in jail with
known drug users and dealers . . . ,
[targeting] public events such as sporting matches and con-
certs to identify and arrest drug offenders . . . ,
operating hotel/motel programs where narcotics officers in-
teract regularly with hotel/motel personnel to detect drug ac-
tivity and identify suspects . . . ,
[operating] business fronts, often in high drug activity areas,
to purchase drugs and identify drug dealers. Fronts include a
travel agency, gamerooms, pool halls, a car dealership, bars,
and a chemical company . . . ,
231
Three scholars who attempted to study the Byrne program found that its adminis-
trative complexity “makes it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to assess the program’s im-
pact on violent crime, drug trafficking or other specific crime prevention goals on a na-
tional scale.” Editorial, Should Washington Fight Crime?, Inv Bus Daily A2 (Dec 13,
1995), quoting report by John J. DiIulio, Steven K. Smith, and Aaron J. Saiger.
232
The survey obtained information from 528 task force commanders across the coun-
try. Coldren, et al, Multijurisdictional Drug Task Force Operations at i (cited in note 33).
233
Id at 16. The report also states, “The impact of MDTFs on the availability of drugs,
drug trafficking, drug abuse or other indicators has been difficult to determine, but is gen-
erally presumed to be positive by those involved in task force operations.” Id at 2.
234
Id at 17.
96 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
[establishing] drug hotlines with toll free, 24 hour numbers
so citizens can call in anonymous tips on drug dealers and
drug activity. . . . Some pay rewards for useable information.
. . .
The few task force commanders who reported intercepting
suspects’ garbage indicated they thought these efforts were
quite successful in producing evidence leading to search war-
rants. . . . [Less frequently reported tactics included] trading
food stamps for drugs enabling MDTFs to prosecute through
the federal system.
235
With little oversight and a lot of money, task forces might be
expected to develop just such aggressively unconventional tech-
niques to prosecute the Drug War. Yet despite these efforts, and
the attendant prodigious seizures of assets and drugs (primarily
cannabis
236
), a five-year review of task forces concluded that “[i]t
is not clear . . . whether task forces have been an effective deter-
rent to either the street- or mid-level dealers.”
237
Not surprisingly, the commanders’ survey did not reveal any
management or corruption problems. But it is increasingly ap-
parent that task forces are plagued by these problems. One ex-
ample came to light in 1996, when almost $66,000 was discovered
hidden in the former headquarters of the Western Area Narcotics
Task Force (“WANT”) in Paducah, Kentucky.
238
An inquiry fol-
lowed to determine where the money came from and what to do
with it.
239
Investigators learned that the task force had seized
235
Id at 18-19.
236
The total kilograms of cannabis (marijuana and hashish) removed from circulation
exceeded the kilograms of cocaine removed by a ratio of twenty-six to one. JRSA, Five-
Year Review at 8 (cited in note 1).
237
Id at 10.
238
This investigation has been closely reported by Bill Bartleman, David Fraser, and
Robin Divine in The Paducah Sun since January 1996.
WANT was established in 1988 with Byrne-grant funding. Although twenty law en-
forcement agencies were nominally members, it was staffed and run by members of the
Paducah Police Department, and given a separate office in the police building’s basement.
The event triggering media attention was the removal of WANT from these separate
headquarters to an office within the Paducah Police Department, in response to criticisms
that WANT had been hindering investigations by other law enforcement agencies. See As-
sociated Press, State Finds Room for Improvement in Drug Team, Louisville Courier J B1
(Sept 5, 1993); Robin Divine, Paducah overhauls drug investigation unit, Paducah Sun 1A
(Feb 14, 1996); David Fraser, Police asked to investigate loss of evidence, Paducah Sun 1A
(June 22, 1996).
239
Authorities believe that the money is either evidence or property seized from drug
dealers from hundreds of separate drug-related incidents. Editorial, Cash discovery raises
questions, Paducah Sun 4A (Feb 27, 1996).
1998] Policing for Profit 97
large amounts of money and then dispensed it freely, uncon-
strained by audits, reporting requirements, or the task force’s
mission.
240
This problem is endemic to forfeiture beneficiaries,
from the Department of Justice on down.
241
The investigation shed light on the routine operations of
WANT, and probably many others as well. Both seizures and ex-
penditures were largely lawless. Like other task forces,
242
WANT
made asset seizures a priority, mandating expected forfeiture
growth rates.
243
But WANT met its quotas with much more zeal
than care. The police chief estimated that 60 percent of the
money found in WANT headquarters will be returned to the own-
ers because it was not properly seized.
244
Often the seizures had
no nexus to any drug transaction. Arrests were delayed for weeks
and even months, at which point the police took whatever they
found on or near the defendant at the time, despite the lack of
connection between the seized property and the now-distant drug
transaction.
245
Some seizures were as small as eight cents.
246
An-
240
The Paducah Sun editorialized:
The discovery of the money and the management breakdown it suggests are disturb-
ing . . . . The developments provide further confirmation that WANT operated with
far too much independence and far too little accountability. . . . [T]he strictest ac-
counting and supervisory backup are demanded; instead they were conspicuously
lacking. The result, as we see, is a scramble by top city officials to explain how
$50,000 can suddenly show up in a municipal space.
Id.
241
See, for example, Directive 87-1, Memorandum from Associate Attorney General
Stephen S. Trott to all U.S. Attorneys, Seized Cash (Mar 13, 1987), in DOJ Asset Forfei-
ture Manual at B-477 (cited in note 62) (“The security, budgetary, and accounting prob-
lems caused by retention of large amounts of cash is causing great concern within the De-
partment and the Congress.”); Federal Government Financial Management, Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 54 (Dec 14,
1995) (statement of Charles Bowsher, Comptroller General) (“[A]udits found that Customs
did not . . . have adequate accountability over tons of illegal drugs and millions of dollars
of cash and property seized or used in its enforcement efforts . . . .”).
242
See generally Coldren, et al, Multijurisdicitonal Drug Task Force Operations (cited
in note 33). Seventy-eight percent of task force commanders rate seizing assets as a high
priority. Id at 7 (“The most significant change [in task forces occurring since their incep-
tion] is in the number of task forces that now place a high priority on asset seizures and
promoting awareness within the community compared to when the task forces began.”).
The most common change reported in the operation of task forces was seizing assets;
ninety-nine percent of those who changed their emphases said they had increased empha-
sis on asset seizure. Id at exh 4.
243
For example, WANT’s 1995 application for federal grant money declared an objec-
tive of a 20 percent rise in asset seizures. David Fraser, WANT applications place burden
on Gorden, officer, Paducah Sun 1A, 18A (Mar 22, 1996).
244
David Fraser, Some cash seizures wrong, Paducah Sun 1A, 12A (Mar 14, 1996).
245
David Fraser and Bruce Gardner, WANT records emphasize deals of smaller scale,
Paducah Sun 1A, 12A (Mar 16, 1996).
246
David Fraser, More WANT money found, Paducah Sun 1A, 13A (Mar 13, 1996).
98 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
other seizure of ninety-three cents showed “once again that the
officers were taking whatever the suspects were carrying, even
though by no stretch could pocket change . . . be construed to be
drug money.”
247
The subsequent handling of seized assets was equally law-
less. WANT refused to deposit money into a special account
through the city’s Finance Department. It maintained no system
to record seizures, identify particular seized assets with their
owner, or indicate what assets had been forfeited.
248
Kentucky’s
asset distribution formula was disregarded,
249
and the task force
retained cash in vaults, boxes, bags, lockers, and envelopes. One
can only speculate on how the money was used, but earlier re-
ports had criticized WANT for improperly diverting its grant
money to investigate non-drug activity and cover cost overruns,
250
and diverting personnel and equipment to monitor elected offi-
cials and private citizens for what appeared to be vindictive rea-
sons.
251
The discovery of hidden cash provoked a major media
scandal in Kentucky. But despite the predictions of some task
force members that WANT’s history would mark it for termina-
tion, WANT survived, changed its name, and prospered with in-
creased funding.
252
The new forfeiture laws have promoted these police abuses
and, by abandoning budgetary oversight, helped insulate them
from public scrutiny. Drug law enforcement does not need these
additional problems. It is already plagued by a higher degree of
lawlessness and corruption than any other area of law enforce-
247
Editorial, Police Woes: Lost evidence reflection on WANT, Paducah Sun 4A (June 21,
1996).
248
A 1993 study conducted by the state’s criminal justice agency, the Justice Cabinet,
cited WANT for failing to establish adequate procedures for handling cash and storing
evidence (as well as for misuse of equipment and resources, inadequate leadership, and
lack of accountability). WANT Grant Program Monitoring—Final Report (Sept 2, 1993).
249
Ky Rev Ann Stat § 218A.435 (Michie 1995).
250
See Bill Bartleman, Hoover: Plan about WANT not followed, Paducah Sun 1A, 8A
(Mar 5, 1996). Byrne grant money may be spent for carefully delineated items. It may not
be used to pay for budgeted items or cost overruns. See GAO, War on Drugs, Federal As-
sistance to State and Local Drug Enforcement at 20-21 (cited in note 33).
251
See Bartleman, Paducah Sun at 1A.
252
Its 1996 federal grant was increased by almost $100,000 over the previous year, to
$312,368, with local agencies contributing almost $150,000. David Fraser, Drug team gets
new grant, and new name, Paducah Sun 2A (July 3, 1996). Under new direction and with
an increased staff and budget, the rechristened Jackson Purchase Area Drug Task Force
is ready to resume fighting the war on drugs. Paducah’s mayor remarked, “[T]hey gave us
all we asked for . . . . I don’t know exactly what caused it to happen that way. . . . I think
we will see new horizons open for the task force, larger scale operations.” Id.
1998] Policing for Profit 99
ment.
253
Its reliance on informants and undercover work puts offi-
cers in intimate contact with criminals, money, and drugs, while
simultaneously shielding their activities from public view. For
dishonest officers, these circumstances are tantamount to a li-
cense to steal, deal drugs, plant evidence, or perjure themselves
with impunity.
254
Defendants are unlikely to benefit from com-
plaining about police theft of their drugs or money, and otherwise
honest officers who learn of police illegality confront intense insti-
tutional pressures not to report fellow officers.
255
It may be that
such problems are intractable, but there is no reason for state
and federal governments to exacerbate them by relinquishing
whatever controls and budgetary oversights they possess.
253
See, for example, Mollen Commission Report at 15 (cited in note 163) (“Most serious
police corruption today arises from the drug trade. . . . [The] wide spectrum of drug-related
corruption [ranges] from opportunistic thefts from street dealers, to carefully planned
group assaults on drug locations, and long term partnerships with narcotics traffickers.”).
254
A former federal prosecutor says that in drug arrests “you almost always find cash.
The problem has always been: How do you watch this process? . . . It’s a textbook scenario
for corruption.” Gerard O’Neill, Mitchell Zuckoff, and Dick Lehr, Corruption probe shakes
up Boston police detective unit; The case of the disappearing money, Boston Globe Metro 1
(Feb 10, 1996). The comment pertained to a Boston police scandal, but similar corruption
in drug law enforcement has been uncovered in numerous other cities. In New York, the
Mollen Commission revealed widespread corruption in the 30th Precinct with more than
thirty officers stealing drug money, and some selling the drugs they seized. Mollen Com-
mission Report at 22-35 (cited in note 163). It also found pervasive police perjury designed
to cover up illegal arrests and searches in drug cases. Id at 36-43. In Philadelphia, five of-
ficers in the 39th precinct were indicted and dozens of convictions overturned due to ram-
pant criminal activity that included beating suspects, planting drugs, stealing drugs and
money, selling drugs, falsifying official arrest reports to sanitize illegal arrests, and pro-
viding perjured testimony. According to The Philadelphia Inquirer, the officers worked
“with virtual impunity . . . driven by the opportunity to steal money and drugs from street
dealers and earn overtime pay for court appearances. . . . Because those officers admitted
framing countless drug suspects, 42 people arrested since 1988 have had their cases dis-
missed. Hundreds of other convictions are being reviewed.” Mark Bowden and Mark
Fazlollah, Police Corruption Inquiry Widens: Up to 9 Officers in Elite Unit Implicated, Phil
Inq A1 (Aug 13, 1995). See also David Rudovsky, Why It Was Hands Off On the Police,
Phil Inq A7 (Aug 8, 1995) (regarding the 39th District, “it now appears that well over a
thousand persons were either arrested without cause, subjected to illegal searches and sei-
zures, had money stolen and/or were physically abused by the police”); Joseph D.
McNamara, Law Enforcement: Has the Drug War Created An Officer Liars’ Club?, LA
Times M1 (Feb 11, 1996) (“The message that politicians seem to be sending to the nation’s
police chiefs is that we understand police perjury is a part of the drug war.”).
255
Since failure to report their colleagues would make these officers complicit anyway,
it is often easier to join in the illegalities. An unwilling officer may even be coerced into
joining the others by threats that he will be implicated whether or not he engages in cor-
ruption. See Mollen Commission Report at 20 (cited in note 163) (“[C]orrupt officers were
typically protected by the silence of their fellow officers, and often the willful blindness of
supervisors.”).
100 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
IV. REMEDIES AND PROSPECTS
The logic of Supreme Court decisions leads to the conclusion
that self-financing, potentially independent law enforcement
agencies are constitutionally objectionable, on both due process
and separation of powers grounds. But in each case the Supreme
Court would have to take a step into territory that it has left rela-
tively unexplored. Whether the present Supreme Court would do
so is speculation at this point. Although most forfeiture law re-
form challenges have failed, the Court has recognized that forfei-
ture “can be devastating when used unjustly”
256
and that “it
makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when
the State stands to benefit.”
257
Some of the Justices are committed
to strengthening property rights,
258
or restricting legislative dele-
gations to the executive
259
—legal values entirely at odds with the
present forfeiture laws. Critics of the present system also may be
heartened by the increasingly vocal concern expressed by observ-
ers across the political spectrum—from the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (“ACLU”)
260
to Justice Thomas,
261
and including the
256
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 634 (1989).
257
United States v James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 US 43, 56 (1993), citing
Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957, 979 n 9 (1991) (Scalia dissenting). In James Daniel
Good, the Supreme Court required notice and a hearing before seizure of allegedly forfeit-
able real estate under 21 USC § 881(a)(7). 510 US at 62.
258
See, for example, James Daniel Good, 510 US at 61 (Justice Kennedy writing for the
Court, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) (“Individual freedom
finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in this and many other forfeiture
cases are the security and privacy of the home and those who take shelter within it.”).
259
See Section III.A.
260
See Jan 10, 1994 Letter to President Clinton from a coalition led by the ACLU seek-
ing a national commission to review the policies and practices of all federal law enforce-
ment agencies, and criticizing, inter alia, the “inappropriate and disproportionate use of
forfeiture proceedings to obtain financing for law enforcement equipment and activities.”
ACLU, News Release 4 (Jan 10, 1994). Other signers included the National Rifle Associa-
tion, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the Second Amendment Founda-
tion, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Id at 2. For a report on
this coalition, see Michael Hedges, Diverse Coalition Seeks Oversight of Federal Law Offi-
cers, Wash Times A3 (Jan 11, 1994).
261
Justice Thomas cautions that forfeiture “[i]mproperly used . . . could become more
like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose
property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with
criminals, than a component of a system of justice.”
Bennis, 116 S Ct at 1003 (1996) (Tho-
mas concurring). Although Justice Thomas consistently votes to uphold the government in
forfeiture cases, he has expressed concern with the breadth of modern forfeiture law, sug-
gesting that it may be time to “reevaluate our generally deferential approach to legislative
judgments in this area of civil forfeiture.” James Daniel Good, 510 US at 82 (Thomas con-
curring). Justice Thomas argues that property rights, and particularly rights to real prop-
erty, are threatened by the government’s aggressive use of broad forfeiture statutes like
21 USC § 881(a)(7), which he believes significantly differs in degree and in kind from its
1998] Policing for Profit 101
former Associate Director of the Department of Justice’s Asset
Forfeiture Office
262
—that forfeiture laws prompt some police and
prosecutors to target assets rather than crime.
If the Supreme Court is unresponsive to constitutional claims
regarding asset retention, there are other, less direct litigation
strategies to limit the abusive application of Section 881. An im-
portant 1993 Supreme Court decision, Austin v United States,
263
has the potential to do so, although whether this potential will be
realized is not yet clear. In Austin, the Court held unanimously
that civil forfeitures are subject to the Eighth Amendment’s pro-
hibition on excessive fines.
264
This is an important limitation be-
cause on its face, Section 881 would seem to allow forfeiture of
any property, no matter how valuable, if it could be linked to even
a minor drug violation.
265
Civil forfeiture formerly was thought
not to implicate the excessive fines provision because it was la-
beled civil. In Austin, however, the Court found that forfeiture
constitutes punishment regardless of whether it is considered
civil or criminal, and therefore is subject to the Eighth Amend-
ment.
266
Presumably the Austin holding will now provide recourse
historical antecedents. He questions whether the fiction of guilty property can justify the
“immense scope” of this statute. Id at 81-82.
262
The former Associate Director, David Smith, writes that
a less obvious reason for the large number of conveyances seized by law enforcement
agencies is the fact that forfeited conveyances are often placed into government ser-
vice. Forfeiture of conveyances is a cheap way to provide the cars, vessels and planes
that law enforcement agencies need. However, there is evidence that law enforcement
priorities are being distorted by this system. There is also the danger that agents
may pursue forfeitures overzealously in these circumstances.
Smith, Forfeiture Release 16 ¶ 3.03 at 3-12 (cited in note 44), citing as one example,
United States v One 1976 Buick Skylark, 453 F Supp 639, 643 (D Colo 1978). As Smith
also notes, drug seizures have a more significant impact on a trafficker’s cost of doing
business than asset forfeitures. “[L]arge quantities of drugs have a much greater cost to
the owner than anything likely to be seized for forfeiture, although their value to the gov-
ernment is zero. Accordingly, it would be counterproductive for DEA and other federal
agencies to devote more resources to asset forfeitures at the expense of drug seizures.”
Smith, Forfeiture ¶ 1.02 at 1-25. See also United States v That Certain Real Property Lo-
cated at 632-636 Ninth Avenue, Calera, Alabama, 798 F Supp 1540, 1551 (N D Ala 1992)
(“More and more courts are voicing frustration at what appears to be overreaching by the
United States in the drug war, particularly in forfeiture cases where law enforcement
agencies have a ‘built-in’ conflict of interest because they share in the product of the sei-
zure.”).
263
509 US 602 (1993).
264
Id at 621-22.
265
Controlled substances, raw materials, instrumentalities, containers, and convey-
ances tied to a drug violation may be forfeited pursuant to 21 USC § 881(a), except that
real estate may be forfeited only if it facilitated the commission of a drug crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year. 21 USC § 881(a)(7).
266
The Court refused to define forfeiture as purely remedial and nonpunitive because
102 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
for a family whose home was seized because a teenage son had
sold “nickel bags” in his bedroom. The Supreme Court, however,
did not announce a test of excessiveness, leaving that task to
lower courts. Which test ultimately prevails will determine
whether the Eighth Amendment provides a meaningful con-
straint.
267
there is no necessary correlation between the seized property and costs borne by the gov-
ernment or by society. Austin, 509 US at 621, citing United States v Ward, 448 US 242,
254 (1980). See also United States v Certain Real Property and Premises Known As 38
Whalers Cove, 954 F2d 29, 37 (2d Cir 1992) (To be solely remedial, a forfeiture cannot be
disproportionately large, “placing full responsibility for the ‘war on drugs’ on the shoulders
of every individual claimant.”). Even before Austin, many lower court judges had ques-
tioned the constitutionality of grossly disproportional forfeitures under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. See, for
example, Pratt and Petersen, 65 St John’s L Rev at 669 (cited in note 27) (arguing that,
“When an expensive automobile is forfeited on the strength of less than twenty-five grams
of marijuana, one must swallow hard to maintain that the ‘punishment’ is proportionate to
the ‘crime’ . . . .”) (citations omitted), citing similar concerns in United States v Property at
4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F2d 1258, 1270 (2d Cir 1989).
267
The Supreme Court will revisit the issue in 1998, having agreed to hear an appeal
from a Ninth Circuit decision holding that forfeiture of $357,114 in cash at Los Angeles
International Airport from a man trying to smuggle it to Syria, in violation of a law pro-
hibiting the undeclared export of more that $10,000, was an excessive fine under the
Eighth Amendment. United States v Bajakajian, 117 S Ct 1841 (1997). Although Justice
Scalia proposed an “instrumentality test” that would measure excessiveness solely by ex-
amining the property’s nexus to the offense without reference to its value, Austin, 509 US
at 627-28 (Scalia concurring), the majority explicitly left the question open, id at 622. Sev-
eral lower courts have insisted that a comparison between the gravity of the offense and
the value of the property (a “proportionality test”) must figure in the Eighth Amendment
determination as well. One test, enunciated by a federal district court, would apply the fol-
lowing three-factor test to determine whether the Excessive Fines Clause is violated: “(i)
the inherent gravity of the offense compared with the harshness of the penalty; (ii)
whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the crime; and (iii)
whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of
time and/or spatial use.” United States v Real Property Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive,
Malibu, California, 845 F Supp 725, 732 (C D Cal 1994). It notes that the test considers
both the culpability of the claimant and the property’s relationship to the offense, id at 733
n 4, and concludes:
[T]he multi-factor test enunciated here . . . will have the added benefit of checking the
government’s potential for abusive use of the civil forfeiture statutes. The constitu-
tional protection of the Excessive Fines Clause is especially important in the forfei-
ture context “where the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the proceeding. . . .” Failure to strictly enforce the Excessive Fines Clause inevitably
gives the government an incentive to investigate criminal activity in situations in-
volving valuable property, regardless of its seriousness, but to ignore more serious
criminal activity that does not provide financial gain for the government.
Id at 735 (citations omitted). For alternative circuit court tests, see United States v Mil-
brand, 58 F3d 841, 844-48 (2d Cir 1995); United States v Rural Route #1, Box 224, 14 F3d
864, 874-76 (3d Cir 1994); United States v Chandler, 36 F3d 358, 362-65 (4th Cir 1994);
United States v 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F3d 327, 328-31 (8th Cir 1994); United States v
6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F3rd 974, 982-86 (9th Cir 1995).
1998] Policing for Profit 103
Other more speculative litigation strategies are beyond the
scope of this Article. We merely note that as forfeiture law and
constitutional doctrine continue to develop, some possible chal-
lenges may be grounded in the ethical constraints that govern
prosecutors,
268
doctrinal limitations on “outrageous governmental
conduct,”
269
and the Supreme Court’s emerging doctrines designed
268
Like all attorneys, prosecutors must not labor under actual or potential conflicts of
interest. This restriction may be found not only in constitutional due process require-
ments, but in professional responsibility requirements. See ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility EC 5-1 at 1:323-24 (ABA 1995) (stating that lawyer’s judgment
should be free of “compromising influences and loyalties”), EC 5-2 at 1:324 (stating that
lawyer should refuse client if reasonable probability that personal interests will affect ad-
versely the services to be rendered); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7
comment 3 at 1:116 (ABA 1995) (“The lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to
have adverse effect on representation of a client”), Rule 1.11 comment 1 at 1:129 (govern-
ment lawyers subject to Rule 1.7 prohibition of conflicts). These or similar restrictions
have been codified by the states to govern their attorneys, and additional state laws may
mandate courts to disqualify prosecutors laboring under a conflict of interest, see, for ex-
ample, People v Eubanks, 14 Cal 4th 580, 59 Cal Rptr 2d 200, 206-09 (1996) (interpreting
Cal Penal Code § 1424 to require disqualification where conflict renders it unlikely defen-
dant will receive fair treatment), or to dismiss indictments obtained by biased prosecutors,
see, for example, People v Superior Court (Greer), 19 Cal 3d 255, 561 P2d 1164, 1165 n 5
(1977).
Federal prosecutors are governed by both state and federal rules of professional re-
sponsibility. The Model Code has been specifically applied to U.S. Attorneys by Justice
Department regulation. 28 CFR § 45.735-1(b) (1986). Additionally, U.S. Attorneys are
lawyers and as such are generally subject to the ethical rules of the state in which they
practice, as many local federal court rules make clear. See, for example, U.S. District
Court for Massachusetts Local Rule 83.6(4)(B); United States v Klubock, 832 F2d 649, 655
(1st Cir 1987). Moreover, conflicts may be criminally prosecuted under 18 USC § 208(a)
(1994) (prohibiting federal prosecutors from representing the government in any judicial
proceeding in which they, their families, or their business associates have a financial in-
terest, and punishing violations by a fine and up to five years imprisonment).
In Young v United States, 481 US 787, 809 (1987), the Supreme Court reversed crimi-
nal contempt convictions because counsel for the beneficiary of the contempt order had
been appointed to prosecute the contempt. The Court found that regardless of whether
there was actual prosecutorial impropriety, the conflict created “the potential for private
interest to influence the discharge of public duty,” id at 805, and was so fundamental an
error as to obviate any inquiry into prejudice. Id at 809-10. The court distinguished the po-
tential conflict in Marshall v Jerrico as too remote and therefore speculative. Id at 807.
For other cases prohibiting prosecutorial conflicts, see Ganger v Peyton, 379 F2d 709, 715
(4th Cir 1967); New Jersey v Imperiale, 773 F Supp 747, 751-56 (D NJ 1991); People v
Zimmer, 51 NY2d 390, 434 NYS2d 206 (1980). For proposals to further regulate prosecu-
torial discretion, see ABA, Projection Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Function §§ 3-3.9(d), 3-1.3(a), (f) at 30-35 (ABA 1971); ALI, A Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure for Criminal Justice § 350.3(2)-(3) (ALI 1975); Kenneth Bresler, “I
Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 Georgetown J
Legal Ethics 537, 542 (1996) (Prosecutors “should not create individual incentives to seek
convictions; they should seek justice.”); Norman Abrahms, Internal Policy: Guiding
the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L Rev 1 (1971).
269
Supreme Court dicta allowed that outrageous government misconduct may consti-
tute a due process defense in United States v Russell, 411 US 423, 432 (1973), and Hamp-
104 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
to protect states’ rights against national power. Given the Su-
ton v United States, 425 US 484, 490 (1976). But the doctrine has been only rarely in-
voked, and then primarily in entrapment situations where the government’s conduct was
deemed intolerable. (Unlike the entrapment defense, however, here the focus is purely on
the government’s conduct, and the defense is available even to a culpable defendant.) See,
for example, United States v Twigg, 588 F2d 373 (3d Cir 1978); United States v Batres-
Santolino, 521 F Supp 744, 750-53 (N D Cal 1981). In a particularly relevant opinion, the
Ninth Circuit found that a crime choreographed by an informant crossed this line because
the informant was paid based on the conviction rate, the amount of drugs involved and the
value of assets seized, but it withdrew the opinion after further argument successfully
challenged the existence of these financial incentives. United States v Solorio (9th Cir Aug
2, 1994) (on file with U Chi L Rev), withdrawn and superceded by 52 F3d 827 (9th Cir
1995). The court’s initial reasoning, however, should apply to future cases that do present
the kind of rewards assumed in its first opinion:
[Such financial incentives create too great a risk evidence will be fabricated, and] it is
extremely likely that innocent people will be prosecuted and convicted, and that in-
formants will induce defendants to sell greater quantities of drugs than they are pre-
disposed to sell.
. . .
The danger is further exacerbated where the party with the financial incentive is the
person orchestrating the crime. . . . Complete control over the “crime” makes “sting
operations” an efficient law enforcement technique. However, this same feature cre-
ates enormous potential for abuse. When, as here, “sting operations” are combined
with contingency fees designed to maximize the conviction rate and the amount of
drugs, it is likely that this potential will become actual. At a minimum, the Due Proc-
ess Clause protects against the conviction of individuals on the basis of evidence that
has such a high risk of being false
.
Solorio (withdrawn opinion) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
In some cases, the reverse stings favored by asset-hungry police agencies may violate
the outrageous conduct doctrine. A federal district court so found in United States v San-
tana, 808 F Supp 77, 79, 82 n 3 (D Mass 1992), where the government delivered 13.3
grams of 92 percent pure heroin to a suspect to gain his confidence, lost track of the drugs,
and thereby sent 2,500 street doses into commerce. The court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court’s dismissal, however, persuaded that the tactic was necessary and that the de-
fendant had suffered no prejudice. United States v Santana, 6 F3d 1, 8 (lst Cir 1993). Nev-
ertheless, the opinion did reaffirm that sufficiently outrageous governmental conduct does
mandate dismissal on due process grounds, and may warrant dismissal under the court’s
supervisory powers for the sole purpose of deterring government misconduct even in the
absence of constitutional harm to a defendant. Id at 9, 11-12, citing United States v Hast-
ing, 461 US 499, 505 (1983). In the First Circuit and most others, the “outrageous miscon-
duct doctrine, no matter how cramped its confines, is not entirely mummified,” Santana, 6
F3d at 12, although it has been rejected by two circuits. See United States v Tucker, 28
F3d 1420, 1423 (6th Cir 1994); United States v Boyd, 55 F3d 239, 241 (7th Cir 1995).
While the outrageous conduct doctrine has been asserted as a defense to government
entrapment efforts, the defense is much broader, at least in theory. The due process pro-
hibition applies to prevent conviction brought about by any “methods that offend ‘a sense
of justice.’” Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 173 (1952). There, pumping the stomach of a
defendant to obtain swallowed capsules was found to violate the Due Process Clause. Id at
174. Rochin and subsequent cases have been identified as a separate line of authority pro-
hibiting physical abuse of the defendant as “outrageous conduct” in violation of due proc-
ess. See United States v Kelly, 707 F2d 1460, 1476 n 13 (DC Cir 1983); United States v Bo-
gart, 783 F2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir 1986).
1998] Policing for Profit 105
preme Court’s rapidly increasing interest in the latter issue,
there may come a time when the adoptive forfeiture law—which
permits local police departments to combine with the federal gov-
ernment in order to circumvent their own state forfeiture laws—
is ripe for effective challenge on federalism grounds.
270
Legislative reform efforts should also be pressed, especially
because it appears highly likely that the 105th Congress will en-
act some measure of forfeiture reform in the coming year.
271
Within Congress, Representatives as diverse as Hyde, Conyers,
and Frank united in support of one bill that would institute some
badly needed due process protections for persons whose property
is seized. Based on proposals Congressman Hyde has been intro-
ducing since 1993, this bill would make the forfeiture laws fairer
by strengthening the innocent owner defense, shifting the burden
of proof, and removing procedural obstacles to contesting forfei-
ture in court.
272
Outside Congress, a broad-based coalition sup-
270
This is not a prediction, but speculation on the Supreme Court’s ultimate destina-
tion in developing new federalism doctrines. The Court has recently effected a sea change
in the scope of federal power. See Printz v United States, 117 S Ct 2365, 2384 (1997)
(striking down a portion of the Brady Bill on grounds that it conscripted state officials to
execute federal law); Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 116 S Ct 1114, 1125-28 (1996)
(holding that the previously established congressional power to abrogate state immunity
is limited to implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment and may not be invoked to
implement its commerce power under Art I, § 8); United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567-
68 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act as beyond Congress’s Commerce
Clause power); New York v United States, 505 US 144, 174-77 (1992) (overturning a law
that required the states either to enact radioactive waste legislation or take title to the
waste). However, nothing in those cases would bar the kind of federal inducements that
exist in the adoption law; unlike the Brady Bill, adoption does not require the states to
provide services or spend money, but rather transfers money to those local agencies who
wish to receive it. But such a scheme does profoundly alter the balance of federal and state
powers, and it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court might ultimately prove re-
sponsive to an argument that the federal government cannot constitutionally alienate lo-
cal agencies from their state government in this way. For one opinion raising federalism
concerns about federal adoptions, see Scarabin v Drug Enforcement Administration, 966
F2d 989, 994-95 (5th Cir 1992).
271
On June 20, 1997, the House Judiciary Committee passed Congressman Hyde’s pro-
posed Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, HR 1965, by a vote of twenty-six to one.
272
See the proposed Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, HR 1965, 105th Cong, 1st Sess
(1997), and the Report of the House Judiciary Committee, HR Rep No 105-358 Part I (Oct
30, 1997). As passed by the House Judiciary Committee, this Act would institute numer-
ous procedural changes generally providing more protection to property owners, including
a requirement that the government shoulder a burden of proving its case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the provision of a court-appointed attorney for indigent claimants in
some cases, the elimination of the bond required to challenge a seizure, compensation to
the owner if the government negligently damages the seized property, an extension of the
deadline for challenging a forfeiture to thirty days, requirement of notice to all identified
interested parties within sixty days, and clarification of the federal “innocent owner” de-
fense to include unknowing or unconsenting owners.
106 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
ports these procedural changes, including the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Bar Association,
the ACLU, the Cato Institute, and even, to some extent, the Jus-
tice Department; but the Hyde Bill has lost the support of many
forfeiture critics because its most recent incarnation added provi-
sions that would greatly expand the reach of the forfeiture law.
273
Moreover, pending forfeiture reform bills do not include any
measures to rectify equitable sharing and other asset distribution
provisions, or the conflict of interest and accountability problems
that result, largely because of the continued, vigorous opposition
of law enforcement.
274
Congressman Hyde has omitted asset allo-
cation reform from his bill despite its importance because, he
says, “the financial considerations involved in the present federal
adoption system mean unyielding opposition from law enforce-
ment officials at all levels to any change in the law . . . .”
275
Repre-
273
The ABA in 1996 urged Congress to rewrite forfeiture laws to make them more just
and equitable, and “‘restore public confidence that the civil forfeiture laws can and will be
fairly deployed to fight crime, and not merely to further fiscal interests.’” Rhonda McMil-
lian, Fairness in Civil Forfeiture, ABA J 102 (Nov 1996), quoting Terrance G. Reed, chair
of the RICO, Forfeiture and Civil Remedies Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice Sec-
tion, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in July 1996 concerning the ABA’s
Statement of Principles on the revision of the Federal Asset Forfeiture Laws. Representa-
tives of all of the other organizations named above testified or provided submissions to the
House Judiciary Committee supporting some or all of the proposed reforms on June 11,
1997. See Report of the House Judiciary Committee, HR Rep No 105-358 at 36 (cited in
note 272). However, the Justice Department’s support of the Hyde Bill may hinge on other
provisions that expand the reach of the forfeiture law, including Section 21 (forfeiture of
proceeds traceable to facilitating property in drug crimes), Section 22 (forfeiture of pro-
ceeds of certain foreign crimes), Section 32 (forfeiture of additional money laundering of-
fenses), Section 37 (forfeiture of instrumentalities of terrorism and telemarketing fraud),
Section 38 (forfeiture of criminal proceeds transported in interstate commerce), and Sec-
tion 40 (forfeiture of counterfeit paraphernalia). This in turn has driven away supporters
of earlier versions of the Hyde Bill, including the ACLU. See ACLU Press Release, ACLU
Says Changes in Civil Asset Forfeiture Bill Make Continued Support Impossible (July 22,
1997).
274
Congressman John Conyers did include asset distribution reform in the unsuccess-
ful bill he introduced in 1993, The Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, HR 3347, 103d Cong, 1st
Sess (1993). The Asset Forfeiture Justice Act would have redirected 50 percent of the pro-
ceeds in the asset forfeiture program to community-based crime control efforts, drug edu-
cation, and treatment programs, id at § 15, and would have assured that forfeitures trans-
ferred to state or local agencies were disposed of according to the state’s law, id at §§ 14,
17. But these proposals were cast aside, and Congressman Hyde did not include them in
his reform bill because he believed such a bill would have no chance of getting through
Congress. See text accompanying notes 275 and 283.
275
Henry Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights 68 (Cato Institute 1995). The Hyde
Bill’s failure to address asset distribution more directly prompted the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers to submit a written statement to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, urging that it not “ignore the conflicts of interest and policy problems which arise
when law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies reap financial bounty from the forfei-
ture decisions they make. Decisions regarding whose property to seize, and how to deal
1998] Policing for Profit 107
sentative Hyde’s reluctance reflects his congressional experience.
On the few occasions when Congress considered laws that would
reduce the Drug War income stream, law enforcement wielded its
abundant political power to soundly dispose of the threat.
The first such case occurred in 1988, after Congress passed a
law requiring that Justice Department transfers of forfeited as-
sets to a state be allocated according to the state’s forfeiture law
asset distribution formula. This amendment was designed to pre-
vent local agencies from conspiring with the Justice Department
to circumvent state forfeiture laws, which often earmark at least
some of the assets for purposes other than law enforcement. By
1988, many police officials had learned that they could retain a
larger percentage (at that time, 85 percent) of the assets by “fed-
eralizing” their seizures through Justice Department adoption
and bypassing their own state’s law.
276
Congress responded by
eliminating this option to escape state requirements,
277
but its re-
form was short-lived. Under law enforcement pressure, Congress
repealed the amendment before it could take effect. In its place,
Congress substituted language requiring the Attorney General to
“encourage further cooperation between the recipient State or lo-
cal agency and Federal law enforcement agencies,”
278
even though
it is precisely this cooperation that results in nullifying the state
forfeiture distribution laws. A second, subsequent attempt also
“went nowhere,” according to its sponsor, “because law enforce-
ment rallied and convinced everybody they needed those cuts of
the pie.”
279
Law enforcement rallied again in 1994 and 1995, when Con-
gress considered a Clinton Administration proposal to eliminate
with citizens whose property has been seized is too often dictated by the profit the agen-
cies stand to realize from the seizures.” Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, Hearings on HR
1916 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 310 (July 22,
1996) (prepared statement of E.E. Edwards, III, David B. Smith, and Richard J. Trober-
man, Co-Chairs of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Asset Forfeiture
Abuse Task Force).
276
See note 64 and accompanying text.
277
This 1988 amendment included a provision stating, “The Attorney General shall as-
sure that any [forfeited assets] transferred to a State or local law enforcement agency . . .
is not so transferred to circumvent any requirement of State law that prohibits forfeiture
or limits use or disposition of property forfeited to State or local agencies.” Asset Forfei-
ture Amendments of 1988, Pub L 100-690, § 6077(a), 102 Stat 4325, codified at 21 USC
§ 881(e)(3) (1988).
278
See 1989 amendment to 21 USC § 881(e)(3)(B), Pub L No 101-189, § 1215(a), 103
Stat 1569, codified at 21 USC § 881(e)(3)(B) (1994).
279
The sponsor was Congressman Bill Hughes, the original author of the federal adop-
tion provision who had come to regret its impact. See Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights
at 68 (cited in note 275), quoting Hughes.
108 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
Byrne grants from the 1995 budget and substitute the funding of
one hundred thousand additional police positions. Law enforce-
ment agencies greatly preferred the Byrne Program, and
launched a well-organized campaign to prevent the Byrne grant
cut.
280
Byrne grant money can be used to make more money
through asset forfeiture, which makes law enforcement resistant
to proposals that would kill the golden goose by diverting Drug
War money to other law enforcement uses. Additionally, as the
New Jersey Attorney General testified, many existing Byrne-
funded drug enforcement jobs were at stake.
281
In the end, the law
enforcement lobby succeeded in obtaining full funding of both the
Clinton police jobs bill and the Byrne Program. It even persuaded
Congress to amend the program to allow continued funding of in-
dividual task forces beyond the forty-eight month limit Congress
had earlier imposed to assure the grants would serve as seed
money only.
This year the Justice Department has again circled the wag-
ons around its Asset Forfeiture Fund, this time lobbying against
a congressional proposal to appoint counsel for indigent claimants
with money from the Fund.
282
Congressman Hyde has concluded that at this point no legis-
lation can prevail “that will take hundreds of millions—indeed,
billions—of dollars away from the Justice Department and state
and local agencies—away from the war on drugs.”
283
Neverthe-
280
Police witnesses testified to dire consequences if the Byrne program were not re-
funded, including “anarchy” in the cities, police inability to enforce of drug laws, and the
general deterioration in the quality of American life. See Federal Assistance to State and
Local Law Enforcement: The Proposed Elimination of the Byrne Block Grant, Hearing be-
fore the Committe on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, 103d Cong,
2d Sess app 1-3 (Mar 2, 1994).
281
Department of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies: FY
1995 Appropriations, Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, 103d Cong,
2d Sess (May 3, 1994) (statement of NJ Attorney General Deborah Poritz) (stating 404 po-
lice officials would lose their jobs if grants were eliminated). An additional factor, distress-
ing to rural and suburban police forces, was fear that unlike Byrne grants, the funding for
new police officers would be allocated based on population density. This turned out not to
be the case. These new police positions were distributed “to a wide range of communities,
including those in which violence was not a serious problem, leaving insufficient resources
for the communities that were in greatest need.” Philip Heymann and Jody Heymann, The
Fate of Public Debate in the United States, 33 Harv J Leg 511, 518 (1996).
282
According to Richard Troberman, a member of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers involved in discussions with the Justice Department and Congress over
forfeiture reform, negotiations between reformers and the Justice Department foundered
over this issue, the one procedural reform that would have directly affected the forfeiture
income stream. Interview with Richard Troberman by authors, conducted April 1, 1997.
283
Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights at 66-67 (cited in note 275) (advising that for-
feiture proceeds be deposited in the General Fund, and explaining why he has not pro-
1998] Policing for Profit 109
less, unless Congress wants to abandon any hope of regaining
control over the Drug War bureaucracy it has created, it had bet-
ter try to do so sooner rather than later.
The most obvious federal reform, and one that would cure
both the conflict of interest and accountability hazards of the pre-
sent system, would require forfeited assets to be deposited into
the Treasury’s General Fund. This one measure would restore
congressional budgetary oversight and remove the incentive for
police departments to distort their agendas for budgetary rea-
sons. An alternative solution, identical in effect, would require
that a law enforcement agency debit the value of any forfeited as-
sets it retains from the budget it receives through congressional
appropriation.
If Congress cannot or will not enact these fundamental re-
forms, there are lesser but still powerful steps it might take to
ameliorate the particularly destructive impact of the adoption
procedure. Adoption serves to provide police with a means of ma-
nipulative forum shopping without furthering any other, more le-
gitimate purpose. Although we have seen how powerful the oppo-
sition can be, Congress should revisit this adoption law and ei-
ther (1) repeal it, or (2) amend it to require that money given
back to the states after an adoptive forfeiture be allocated accord-
ing to state forfeiture law.
284
A third alternative would prohibit
the Department of Justice from adopting a state forfeiture until a
state court considers whether circumstances exist that justify
bypassing the state forfeiture law.
Many state forfeiture laws also promote self-aggrandizing po-
lice practices and should be reformed. Few states replicate fed-
eral law in channeling virtually all forfeited assets to law en-
forcement.
285
But those that do, and those that provide law en-
posed such a measure).
284
The unsuccessful Conyers Bill, HR 3347, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (1993), included this
option, and state officials have urged this reform. See, for example, Mississippi Attorney
General Mike Moore and Jim Hood, The Challenge to States Posed by Federal Adoptive
Drug Forfeitures 1, 3 (June/July 1992). We have seen that two previous attempts failed.
See notes 277-79 and accompanying text. While failing to include it in his reform bill,
Congressman Hyde suggests that procedural changes making federal forfeiture more diffi-
cult would encourage local and state police to use their own forfeiture laws. Hyde, Forfeit-
ing Our Property Rights at 66-68 (cited in note 275).
285
All states except Iowa and Vermont have forfeiture laws. Some allow forfeiture of
assets only after a criminal conviction. See, for example, Missouri’s Criminal Activity For-
feiture Act, Mo Ann Stat § 513.600-645 (Vernon Supp 1997). Some allow forfeiture of very
limited kinds of assets or under very limited circumstances. See, for example, Cal Health
& Safety Code § 11469 (West 1997) (mandating specific guidelines for police and prosecu-
tors in order to ensure that law enforcement is the principal objective of forfeiture). Some
110 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
forcement with a direct and substantial share of the assets they
seize, promote the abuses we have discussed. One leading reform
organization, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, has produced a model forfeiture act for states to
consider. Its 1994 Uniform Controlled Substances Act mandates
that forfeiture proceeds be deposited in the state treasury’s gen-
eral operating fund and subject to ordinary appropriation re-
quirements because “earmarking funds [for law enforcement]
risks skewing enforcement and prosecutorial priorities . . . .”
286
During three years of debate leading to this provision, commis-
sioners noted the “abuses . . . arising because millions and mil-
lions of dollars are going to people who may or may not be re-
sponsible and certainly are not accountable,”
287
as well as the
danger in “revolving funds where [expenditures do not] receive
the review of the elected representatives of the people.”
288
When
require forfeited assets to be deposited in the general treasury. See, for example, NC Gen
Stat § 90-112; NC Const Art IX, § 7; NM Stat Ann §§ 30-31-35, 22-8-32. Others specify a
particular division among branches of law enforcement and some non-law enforcement en-
tities. See, for example, 1997 NY Laws § 1349 (40 percent to substance abuse service
fund); Minn Stat Ann § 609.5315 (1995) (70 percent to police, 20 percent to prosecutor, 10
percent to general fund); Mass Ann Law, ch 94C, § 47(d) (Michie/Law Coop 1995) (50 per-
cent to prosecutor and 50 percent to police, but only since 1984). For a complete list of
state statutes and their asset distribution provisions, see note 66.
286
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Controlled
Substances Act with Prefatory Note and Comments 4-5 (1994). Section 522(h) of the Uni-
form Controlled Substances Act states in pertinent part, “Money remaining after the satis-
faction of the requirements of subsections (e) through (g) must be deposited in the [general
fund] of the state.” (brackets in original). The model law brackets the words “general fund”
in recognition of the fact that some state constitutional provisions require that collections
be shared with specified funds, such as an education fund. Subsections (e) through (g) give
general directions for sale and/or disposal of property, and allow the transfer of a forfei-
ture action to a federal agency or agency of another state when that agency has contrib-
uted to the forfeiture.
287
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in
Committee of the Whole, Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Art V, Civil Forfeiture 114
(Aug 2-9, 1991) (“1991 Proceedings”) (statement of Commissioner Harold E. Read, Jr.).
288
Id (statement of Commissioner Bryce A. Baggett). At a later meeting, Baggett told
the other participants that “this is the most important decision you’ll make. The money is
corrupting . . . . Prosecutorial decisions are made on the basis of how much we can grab.”
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings in Committee
of the Whole, Uniform Controlled Substances Act Amendments, Art V, Civil Forfeiture
131-32 (July 30 to Aug 6, 1993) (“1993 Proceedings”). Other commissioners were equally
concerned with the asset allocation issue. See 1991 Proceedings at 117 (cited in note 287)
(statement of Commissioner John H. Langbein) (“It is deeply important that we recognize
the venal conflict of interest that exists when law enforcement officers can basically line
their pockets, not so much personally, but in terms of their appropriations, their perks,
those Cadillacs . . . . When they are able to control their own appropriations by making in-
dividual arrests and so forth of citizens, you are in the worst kind of conflict of interest.”);
1993 Proceedings at 115 (statement of Commissioner Michael Cramer) (“I think this is
carrying privatization of public works a little too far. It creates an overzealous attitude
1998] Policing for Profit 111
prosecutors on the Commission were unable to block inclusion of
this provision, they resigned and formed a separate organization
to draft their own model forfeiture statute.
289
No state law reform can be effective, however, so long as fed-
eral adoption continues to provide an escape route from state re-
quirements. In proposing that state forfeitures be directed into
the general fund, the Conference of Commissioners noted that
without concurrent federal law reform “all forfeitures will go un-
der federal law.”
290
Can these reforms be achieved? In proposing the above re-
forms, we do not underestimate the enormous obstacles to re-
structuring the asset distribution scheme, however obvious its
destructive impact. Success will come, if at all, when the critics of
self-financed police forces are able to focus public attention on the
abuses and dangers that have thus far escaped sustained scru-
tiny.
C
ONCLUSION
When Congress fundamentally restructured the forfeiture
laws by allowing agencies to keep most of the assets they seize, it
did so without considering the very substantial costs of these
amendments to both the public welfare and the justice system.
Now, more than a decade later, Congress can draw on an exten-
sive and disturbing history to reassess the wisdom of these laws.
This history is neither subtle nor ambiguous. Together with the
narrow drug enforcement focus of the revised federal law en-
forcement aid program, the asset retention law has wrought a
dramatic shift in police motivation, towards practices that seri-
ously undermine rational law enforcement efforts. As we have
seen, many police agencies choose the law enforcement strategies
that will take maximum advantage of federal forfeiture laws, cir-
which is incompatible with everything in the history of our law, or at least the way I per-
ceive it should be.”).
289
1993 Proceedings at 130-31 (statement of Commissioner Bryce A. Baggett) (cited in
note 288). The prosecutors joined the President’s Commission on Model State Drug Laws
and published their recommendations for reform as the Commission Forfeiture Reform
Act (“CFRA”). The CFRA “continues to allocate forfeiture revenues to law enforcement ac-
tivities, with the exception of an optional diversion of ten percent of revenues to drug
treatment programs . . . . [It] relies upon prosecutorial codes of ethics and conduct to pre-
vent abusive forfeiture practices.” Raymond P. Pepe, Alternative Proposals for the Reform
of State Legislation Dealing with Forfeitures for Drug Offenses, 21 Wm Mitchell L Rev 197,
213-14 (1995) (citations omitted).
290
1991 Proceedings at 118 (statement of Commissioner Donald E. Mielke) (cited in
note 287).
112 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:35
cumvent their own state forfeiture laws, and maximize property
seizures—reducing fairness and crime control issues to an after-
thought. Even the alleged mission of the Drug War may become
secondary; failed policies are immune to reform because they sus-
tain and profit the law enforcement agencies enlisted in this war.
Police abuses and warped law enforcement policy are only
half of this disturbing story. We have also argued that police self-
financing raises serious accountability concerns, and threatens to
establish a sector of permanent, independent, and self-
aggrandizing police forces. This might sound promising to Colonel
North or General Pinochet, but it should not be mistaken for a le-
gitimate organ in a democracy.
The institutional mechanisms we have explored are but one
part of an anti-drug mobilization that continues to have profound
effects on the liberties and well-being of our people. We sink more
deeply into this war year by year, failing to adequately examine
or comprehend the choices we are making.
291
Today commentators
urge that we close the “revolving prison doors,” apparently un-
aware that we already incarcerate far more people for longer time
than almost every other industrialized country.
292
Our politicians
speak casually of enlisting the military, the National Guard, and
the CIA to keep drugs away from the Americans who seek
them,
293
and for his part Mayor Rudolph Guiliani stations New
291
Many judges have noted how constitutional guarantees may be no match for the
frenetic imperatives of the Drug War. See Torruella, 14 Yale J Reg at 256-57 (cited in note
60) (concluding that “citizens have been willing to give up their collective civil rights in the
name of, and in exchange for, an illusory achievement of ‘law and order’ . . . when it comes
to those accused of drug violations”); Patricia M. Wald (Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals), A Report From the Front in the War on Drugs, 7 Ga St U L Rev 1, 4
(1990) (“Without vigilance, a fair, individualized system of criminal and civil justice could
be an early [drug] war casualty.”).
292
See text accompanying notes 172-74 (detailing the growing prison population of
nonviolent drug offenders). Speaker Newt Gingrich has gone so far as to craft the Drug
Importer Death Penalty Act of 1997, HR 41, 105th Cong, 1st Sess § 2 (Jan 7, 1997), in the
105th Congress, which would execute recidivist importers of any illicit drug where the
quantities totaled one hundred times the usual dosage amounts on at least two occasions.
293
For example, William Bennett has proposed putting the military in charge of the
drug interception activities of the DEA, the FBI, and other agencies. Dreyfus, Rolling
Stone at 45 (cited in note 167). Representative Bill McCollum, Chair of the Crime Sub-
committee of the House Judiciary Committee, recently demanded “a massive deployment
of Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Customs ships, planes, radar, night vision surveil-
lance equipment and the personnel to man them for an around-the-clock operation de-
signed to totally disrupt the drug trafficking through the eastern Caribbean.” Congress-
man Bill McCollum, A New Crisis in Drug Use, 142 Cong Rec H 11361-63 (Sept 26, 1996).
In the 1996 presidential campaign, candidate Robert Dole advocated using “our military
power, particularly our technological capabilities, to fight this [anti-drug] battle, to involve
our intelligence agencies, including the CIA, in this effort.” Editorial, Still on Drugs, The
1998] Policing for Profit 113
York City drug police in the Dominican Republic.
294
We routinely
deploy numerous federal agencies, and massive numbers of fed-
eral and state agents, in military-style raids against low-level
drug dealers.
295
All of these changes, mostly unimaginable a gen-
Progressive 9 (Oct 1996). See also Aaron Zitner, Dole Vows Guard Role in Drug War, Bos-
ton Globe A3 (Sept 2, 1996); Shenk, The Nation at 11 (cited in note 4). On the Democratic
side, the continuing militarization of drug law enforcement is symbolized by President
Clinton’s appointment of a retired Gulf War general, Barry McCaffrey, as “Drug Czar,”
heading the Office of National Drug Control Policy. McCaffrey in turn has increased the
staff positions several-fold and filled many of them with active-duty military officers.
Dreyfuss, Rolling Stone at 42 (cited in note 167).
The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC § 1385 (1994), prohibits direct military participation
in purely domestic law enforcement operations, but has been amended to allow the mili-
tary to gather information, give advice, lend equipment, and deploy personnel at the re-
quest of local law enforcement officials with jurisdiction over drug or immigration of-
fenses. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-86, 95 Stat 1115
(1981), codified at 10 USC §§ 371-85 (1994). The proposal to further militarize the drug
war threatens additional and unjustifiable abuses to life and liberty, as was recently illus-
trated by the shooting death of teenager Esequiel Hernandez, Jr. by marines on a drug
surveillance mission in Redford, Texas. See Sam Verhovek, After Marine on Patrol Kills a
Teen-Ager, a Texas Border Village Wonders Why, NY Times A16 (June 29, 1997) (“[C]ritics
. . . say the death of Mr. Hernandez, who had no criminal record and is not described by
anyone as any kind of suspect in the drug trade, is a chilling example of the misunder-
standings and the tragedies that they say will inevitably occur with the militarization of
the border or any other patch of American soil.”).
294
Murray Weiss, Rudy to seal deal for NYPD’s Dominican drug outpost, NY Post 2
(Nov 18, 1996) (reporting that “drug-fighting NYPD cops [will] make the streets safer for
Dominicans who live in the Dominican Republic and for those nationals who live in New
York City . . .”).
295
See Sherry A. Dorsey, 17 Arrested on drug charges in N.H., Boston Globe 23 (June
22, 1995) (reporting on Operation Streetsweeper in New Hampshire, a June 1995 multi-
jurisdictional task force operation deploying 150 officers to arrest seventeen low-level drug
sellers and addicts and seize one gun). Alexander Cockburn notes that when the War on
Drugs began in the late 1960s, there were only two federal agencies enforcing the drug
114 The University of Chicago Law Review
eration ago, are largely the products of twenty-five years of trying
(and failing) to “win” the War on Drugs. The first step towards
recovery, which cannot come too soon, is to look at what we have
done to ourselves, and what kind of institutions we have built, on
the way to a “drug-free” society.
laws. He lists fifty-four today (including the DEA, NSA, IRS, DIA, ATF, State Depart-
ment, Customs, Coast Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) with a federal budget
of $13 billion, with more than $800 million going to the DEA alone. Alexander Cockburn,
Beat the devil, The Nation 560, 561 (Nov 15, 1993). The anti-drug operations executed by
these agencies include coastline interdiction by such agencies as the DEA’s National Nar-
cotics Border Interdiction System, the Coast Guard, and the Navy, including the firing on
drug smuggling ships in international waters; NASA satellite surveillance; Treasury De-
partment tracing of money laundering operations; CIA intelligence gathering about for-
eign drug sources; and State Department pressure on foreign governments to eradicate
crops. Wisotsky, 38 Hastings L J at 892-93 (cited in note 161).
