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Mirror neuron system involvement in empathy: A critical look at the evidence


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It has been proposed that the human mirror neuron system (MNS) plays an integral role in mediating empathy. In this review, we critically examine evidence from three bodies of research that have been cited as supporting this notion: (1) behavioral studies that have examined the relationship between imitation and empathy, (2) findings from functional neuroimaging studies that report a positive correlation between MNS activation and self-report on an empathy questionnaire, and (3) observations of impaired imitation and empathy in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). In addition, we briefly review lesion studies of the neural correlates of imitation and empathy. Current evidence suggests that the MNS is broadly involved in empathy, but at this stage there has been limited consideration of its various forms, including motor, emotional, and cognitive empathy. There are also various forms of imitation, encompassing emotional and non-emotional, automatic, and voluntary actions. We propose that the relationship between imitation and empathy may vary depending on the specific type of each of these abilities. Furthermore, these abilities may be mediated by partially distinct neural networks, which involve the MNS to a variable degree.
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Social Neuroscience
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Mirror neuron system involvement in empathy: A critical look at the evidence
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Mirror neuron system involvement in empathy: A
critical look at the evidence
Amee D. Baird a , Ingrid E. Scheffer b c & Sarah J. Wilson a c
a Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
b Department of Medicine, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
c Epilepsy Research Centre, Austin Health, Melbourne, Australia
Available online: 19 Sep 2011
To cite this article: Amee D. Baird, Ingrid E. Scheffer & Sarah J. Wilson (2011): Mirror neuron system involvement in
empathy: A critical look at the evidence, Social Neuroscience, 6:4, 327-335
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SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE, 2011, 6 (4), 327–335
© 2011 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2010.547085
PSNS Mirror neuron system involvement in empathy:
A critical look at the evidence
Mirror Neuron System In Empathy
Amee D. Baird1, Ingrid E. Scheffer2,3, and Sarah J. Wilson1,3
1Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
2Department of Medicine, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
3Epilepsy Research Centre, Austin Health, Melbourne, Australia
It has been proposed that the human mirror neuron system (MNS) plays an integral role in mediating empathy. In
this review, we critically examine evidence from three bodies of research that have been cited as supporting this
notion: (1) behavioral studies that have examined the relationship between imitation and empathy, (2) findings
from functional neuroimaging studies that report a positive correlation between MNS activation and self-report on
an empathy questionnaire, and (3) observations of impaired imitation and empathy in autism spectrum disorders
(ASD). In addition, we briefly review lesion studies of the neural correlates of imitation and empathy. Current
evidence suggests that the MNS is broadly involved in empathy, but at this stage there has been limited consider-
ation of its various forms, including motor, emotional, and cognitive empathy. There are also various forms of
imitation, encompassing emotional and non-emotional, automatic, and voluntary actions. We propose that the
relationship between imitation and empathy may vary depending on the specific type of each of these abilities.
Furthermore, these abilities may be mediated by partially distinct neural networks, which involve the MNS to a
variable degree.
Keywords: Empathy; Mirror neuron system; Imitation; Autism spectrum disorders (ASD).
The initial discovery of the human mirror neuron sys-
tem (MNS), comprising the inferior frontal gyrus and
inferior parietal cortex, has led to a surge of interest in
the neural correlates of social cognition, including
empathy. The broad notion that empathy involves
“putting oneself in another’s shoes,” by simulating
what others do, think, or feel, has been linked to the
properties of mirror neurons (Iacoboni & Mazziotta,
2007). Specifically, it has been proposed that the
“internal simulation” or “mirror matching” of actions
and emotions by the MNS occurs automatically and
unconsciously, and underlies our ability to empathize
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003;
Gallese, 2003; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton,
The adoption of mirror neurons as the neural
underpinning of empathy, or at least an integral part
of the neural network underlying this ability, is partly
based on a presumed link between imitation and
empathy. Surprisingly, there is limited empirical evid-
ence for this link. In this short review, we critically
evaluate studies that have examined the relationship
between imitation and empathy and their neural corre-
lates. We have chosen to focus our review on studies
published since 2008 to ensure that it is topical and
up-to-date. The role of the MNS in motor imitation
and action understanding has recently been questioned
(e.g., Hicock, 2008; Molenbergh, Cunnington, &
Mattingley, 2009), and evidence for its specific
involvement in empathic functioning is even less
Correspondence should be addressed to: Sarah J. Wilson, Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia.
This work was supported by funding from the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (Project grant 566759) and a
Medical Research Grant from the University of Melbourne.
Downloaded by [ ] at 19:21 15 January 2012
compelling (Decety, 2010). It is enticing to assert that
the MNS underpins empathy, and studies in several
different areas support this contention. These include
lesion studies of imitation and empathy, functional
neuroimaging showing a positive correlation between
empathy self-report and MNS activation, and obser-
vations of impaired imitation and empathy in autism
spectrum disorders (ASD). While valuable, these
studies do not as yet provide us with a comprehensive
framework for understanding the role of the MNS in
empathy, and researchers have recently challenged
the extent to which the MNS may be involved
(Decety, 2010).
As this review will show, research to date suggests
that there are various forms of imitation and empathy
that are likely to be underpinned by partially inde-
pendent neural substrates. These forms include emo-
tional and non-emotional, automatic, and voluntary
imitation, as well as motor, cognitive, and emotional
empathy (see summary in Table 1). Recent neuroim-
aging and lesion studies demonstrate that distinct neu-
ral regions underlie these forms, and each form recruit
the MNS to a variable degree (Bien, Roebroeck,
Goebel, & Sack, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-
Peretz, & Perry, 2008). Conceivably, the development
of a comprehensive account of empathy and its neural
underpinnings would need to address the relevance of
the relationships between these various forms and the
role of the MNS in each.
Theodor Lipps is regarded as the father of the concept
of einfühlung or empathy (translated from the German
by Tichener in 1909). Although Robert Vischer first
used the term in 1873 to describe the projection of
human feeling onto the natural world, Lipps (1903)
expanded this theory to explain how we understand
the mental states of others. He considered it to be an
unconscious process based on a “natural instinct” and
“inner imitation” (Montag, Gallinat, & Heinz, 2008).
Since then, empathy has been defined in many ways,
and definitional debates have predominated, including
whether empathy is a cognitive or an emotional
process (Preston & de Waal, 2002). For example,
some authors adopt a broad definition of empathy that
encompasses emotional contagion or sympathy,
while others prefer a narrower definition that distin-
guishes empathy from these related phenomena
(de Vignemont & Singer, 2006).
Different forms of empathy have been proposed.
Blair (2005) distinguished cognitive, motor, and emo-
tional empathy, and considered each to have a distinct
neural correlate. Others acknowledge various forms,
such as cognitive and emotional empathy, but argue
that in most instances these components co-occur and
cannot be disentangled (Baron-Cohen & Wheel-
wright, 2004). In addressing this issue, Preston and de
Waal (2002, p. 3) suggested that “the different views
of empathy can be cohered into a unified whole if a
broad view of the perception action model is taken.”
They conceived empathy as part of a group of related
processes, including imitation, which depend on a
“perception action mechanism.” These mechanisms
are thought to be underpinned by the same neural net-
work that mediates the perception and production of a
given behavior. This assumption is evident in recent
functional neuroimaging studies that have used imita-
tion paradigms as a proxy for an “empathy” condition
(see below). Thus, while differences in defining
empathy between studies make it difficult to compare
A schematic overview of the different forms of imitation and empathy and their main neural correlates identified by
research to date
Function Main neural correlates Type of research studies
Emotional Automatic Unknown No studies to date
Voluntary Right inferior frontal gyrus, “limbic” systemafMRI
Non-emotional Automatic Frontal regions: left frontal operculumbLesion, fMRI, TMS
Voluntary Frontal regions: premotor cortex, inferiorfrontal gyrus
Parietal regions: superior and inferiorparietal lobules
Lesion, fMRI, TMS
Motor “Sensorimotor” MNS TMS
Emotional Inferior frontal gyrus Lesion, fMRI
Cognitive Ventromedial prefrontal cortex Lesion, fMRI
fMRI: functional magnetic resonance imaging; TMS: transcranial magnetic stimulation; MNS: mirror neuron system.
aSee Iacoboni (2009). bSee Bien et al. (2009).
Downloaded by [ ] at 19:21 15 January 2012
findings, they nonetheless allow examination of MNS
involvement in various forms of empathy and imita-
tion. In this review, we will define the type of empa-
thy (corresponding with the measure used) that each
study investigated, where possible. When it is not
specified, the reader can assume that we are referring
to emotional empathy.
Measures of individual differences
in empathy
Numerous measures of empathy have been previously
reviewed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004).
Here, we briefly review only two self-report question-
naires that are relevant to the discussion of this review.
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis,
1983) is the most commonly used questionnaire in
empathy research. This measure comprises four scales
of seven items each: (1) perspective taking (PT),
assessing cognitive empathy or the ability to under-
stand another’s point of view; (2) fantasy scale (FS),
measuring the ability to imagine oneself in the place of
fictional characters in books or movies; (3) empathic
concern (EC), assessing emotional empathy or
expressed concern for others; and (4) personal distress
(PD), measuring the emotional response induced by
observing strong emotions in others. This scale has
good internal consistency, with alpha coefficients
ranging from .68 to .79 (Davis, 1983). Although it has
been criticized as measuring processes broader than
empathy, such as self-control and imagination, it is
generally considered the most comprehensive measure
available (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).
The Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy
(QMEE) (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) contains seven
subscales assessing the tendency to react to another’s
experience. Its split-half reliability is high (.84), sug-
gesting that it measures a single construct. The
authors propose this is emotional arousal to the envir-
onment in general, rather than the emotions of others
specifically. Thus, while the scale has been used to
assess affective empathy, it may be measuring a
different but related construct (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2004).
Despite the long-held association between imitation and
empathy, there are few empirical studies of individual
differences in this relationship. Only two studies have
examined both abilities in healthy individuals. Chartrand
and Bargh (1999) investigated unconscious motor
mimicry, or what they termed the “chameleon effect,”
in participants during social interactions. They
described the mechanism underlying this effect as a
“perception-behavior link,” or the tendency to auto-
matically engage in behavior that one has perceived in
another. Chartrand and Bargh considered this a pas-
sive, cognitive process that is not associated with an
affective or emotional state. Correspondingly, they
predicted that individual differences in emotional
empathy would not modulate the chameleon effect. In
support of their prediction, they found a higher fre-
quency of motor imitation (foot shaking, face rubbing,
smiling) in individuals with higher cognitive empathy
scores (PT scale of the IRI) (Davis, 1983), but no
association between motor mimicry and emotional
empathy scores (EC scale of the IRI).
Sonnby-Borgström (2002) subsequently reported
findings that appear inconsistent with the work of
Chartrand and Bargh (1999). She used electromyogra-
phy (EMG) to measure the motor mimicry of emo-
tional facial expressions, such as happy and angry.
Individuals with high emotional empathy (as meas-
ured by the QMEE) showed a higher degree of facial
expression mimicry than those with low emotional
empathy. This led Sonnby-Borgström (2002) to con-
clude that “automatic mimicry is an early automatic
element of emotional empathy” (p. 439).
The findings of these studies suggest that the rela-
tionship between imitation and empathy may vary
depending on the particular form of each of these abil-
ities. Specifically, facial imitation was associated
with emotional empathy (Sonnby-Borgström, 2002),
while motor imitation was related to cognitive but not
emotional empathy (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). It is
noteworthy, however, that Chartrand and Bargh’s def-
inition of motor imitation included smiling, a form of
facial imitation. The inconsistent results in relation to
facial imitation may be due to the use of different
stimuli (i.e., static photographs versus actors), or the
different measures of emotional empathy used in each
study. Further research is therefore required to clarify
the relationship between these different forms of
imitation and empathy, using a range of stimuli.
Neural correlates of imitation
and empathy
Neuroimaging studies of empathy
Numerous neuroimaging studies have investigated
empathy with a variety of stimuli and paradigms, the
majority using observation of pain in others as a
Downloaded by [ ] at 19:21 15 January 2012
model (Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006). In gen-
eral, these studies have shown shared neural activa-
tion for observing and experiencing pain that includes
the bilateral anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate,
and sensorimotor cortices. Although these findings
appear to support the notion that empathy for pain
involves an automatically activated “sensorimotor
resonance” between self and other, Decety and col-
leagues (Decety, 2010; Yamada & Decety, 2009)
have recently argued that the involvement of these
brain regions may simply reflect a general aversive
response and activation of the threat detection and
defensive preparation system. Furthermore, studies of
disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) and taste (Jabbi, Swart, &
Keysers, 2007) demonstrate the integral role of the
insula in empathy, and thus highlight the importance
of regions outside the MNS in empathy for pain and
other specific emotions.
MNS involvement in empathy has been suggested
by four functional neuroimaging studies reporting a
positive correlation between MNS activation and
empathy scores derived from the IRI (Gazzola, Aziz-
Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006; Jabbi et al., 2007; Kaplan &
Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta, &
Dapretto, 2007). These studies are summarized in
Table 2 and show differing associations between spe-
cific IRI scales (and their corresponding forms of
empathy) and localized regions of MNS activation.
Three of the four studies found that MNS activation
correlated with emotional empathy (EC or PD scales)
(Jabbi et al., 2007; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer
et al., 2007). These studies varied according to pas-
sive observation versus active imitation of the in-
scanner task, and included both auditory and visual
paradigms. The direction of the correlation was nega-
tive in one study (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006) and pos-
itive in two (Jabbi et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2007). In
contrast, Gazzola et al. (2006) found a positive corre-
lation between cognitive empathy (PT scale) and the
MNS, specifically left parietal lobule activation.
Taken together, these studies are generally consid-
ered to support MNS involvement in emotional empa-
thy, most commonly seen as increased activation of
the inferior frontal gyrus either unilaterally or bilater-
ally. It is noteworthy, however, that all the studies
used out-of-scanner correlations, the significant pit-
falls of which have been outlined by Yarkoni (2009),
as well as by Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and Pashler
(2009). Methodological differences between these
studies also question the strength of the conclusions.
Although all the studies used the same out-of-scanner
measure of empathy, the in-scanner paradigms, type
of stimuli, and age of the participants varied widely
(Table 2).
Moreover, prefrontal brain regions, such as the infe-
rior frontal gyrus, may be activated for reasons other
than an individual’s empathic abilities. As noted by
Cabeza and Nyberg (2000), this brain region is consist-
ently activated during a wide range of tasks, and its
engagement may reflect attention or linguistic proc-
esses rather than empathic functioning per se. Mirror
neurons account for only a minority of the cell popula-
tion in this area in the monkey, yet, despite this, Decety
(2010) has noted a bias in human neuroimaging
research to attribute a hemodynamic response in the
inferior frontal gyrus to MNS activity. Nevertheless, a
recent lesion study (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2008) sup-
ports the preliminary neuroimaging findings of Table 2.
This study demonstrated dissociable neuroanatomical
substrates for cognitive and emotional empathy, with
emotional empathy deficits occurring after damage to
the inferior frontal gyrus, while impaired cognitive
empathy was manifested after ventromedial prefrontal
cortical damage (see section below). This finding again
highlights the need for a more comprehensive frame-
work that identifies the roles of specific brain regions in
the various forms of empathy.
Other functional neuroimaging studies have used
imitation paradigms as a proxy for empathy (e.g., Carr
et al., 2003); however, this approach is problematic.
Currently, there is limited empirical evidence of an
association between imitation and empathy. Given
that the MNS has been found to play a role in imita-
tion, these studies inevitably conclude that the MNS is
involved in empathy. As noted by Decety and Michal-
ska (2010, p. 896), “there is a problem with equating
empathy with motor resonance because the latter does
not convey insight into another’s internal state and
does not account for any other-oriented motivational
state that characterises sympathy.”
A distinction has also been typically made between
voluntary (conscious) and automatic (unconscious)
imitation, with the latter assumed to underlie
empathic functioning (Leslie et al., 2003). Voluntary
imitation typically requires the experimenter to ask
the participant to copy an action or expression. Per-
formance on such tasks may be influenced by nonspe-
cific factors such as executive function (Bird,
Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007). Automatic imitation
requires a participant to observe an action or expres-
sion, either passively or accompanied by a simple
movement, while the experimenter measures involun-
tary movements or the performance speed of the
simple movement. In this way, automatic imitation is
considered a purer measure of imitative ability.
Despite this, to date there have been no functional
neuroimaging studies investigating empathy that use
an automatic imitation task. This is a significant gap
Downloaded by [ ] at 19:21 15 January 2012
Summary of neuroimaging studies showing a positive correlation between self-reported empathy and MNS activation
Author (year) Participants (mean age) Imaging task and stimuli Empathy measure Main findings
Kaplan et al. (2006) 26 adults (26 years) Observation of film clips of drinking cups
in different contexts (cleaning, drinking,
and no context) and with different hand
grips (precision or whole hand)
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI)* (Davis, 1983)
Positive correlation between right inferior frontal gyrus
activation and empathic concern scale (average across
all film clips), and fantasy scale scores (during
incongruent and context alone clips)
Negative correlation with personal distress scale scores
(during congruent actions and action in context clips)
Gazzola et al. (2006) 16 adults (31 years) Listening to or performing mouth or hand
action sounds (e.g., kissing, ripping paper)
IRI Positive correlation between left premotor cortex and inferior
parietal lobule activation (during hand and environmental
sounds) and perspective-taking scale scores
(Note that participants were categorized into high and low
empathy groups)
Jabbi et al. (2007) 18 adults (24 years) Observation of film clips of actors drinking
liquids and displaying pleased, disgusted,
and neutral facial expressions, and actual
ingestion of pleasant, disgusting, and
neutral tasting liquids
IRI Positive correlation between bilateral anterior insula and frontal
operculum activation and total IRI score (particularly evident
for the personal distress and fantasy scale scores)
No correlation between IRI scores and brain activation during
Pfeifer et al. (2008) 16 children (10 years) Imitation and observation of five facial
expressions (happy, fearful, sad, angry,
IRI and Interpersonal
Competence Scale (parental
Positive correlation between inferior frontal gyrus activation (in
addition to right insula, left amygdala, and left fusiform gyrus)
and IRI scale scores (except perspective-taking scale) during
observation and imitation of facial expressions
*See section on measures of empathy for a description of this questionnaire.
Downloaded by [ ] at 19:21 15 January 2012
in our current knowledge. Future neuroimaging and
lesion studies will need to distinguish between auto-
matic and voluntary imitation involving different
body parts (i.e., face, hand, body) and determine how
they relate to the various types of empathy and their
neural correlates.
Lesion-based research
While recent neuroimaging research has focused
on the neural networks associated with imitation and
empathy, only lesion or transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) studies can identify brain regions that
are necessary for these functions. The majority of
neuropsychological studies examining the neural
basis of imitation and empathy have involved patients
with frontal lobe lesions, who typically show
enhanced imitation or impaired empathy (e.g., Brass,
Derrfuss, Mathes-von Cramon, & von Cramon, 2003;
Eslinger, 1998; Luria, 1980; Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2008). Damage to the left parietal region has also
been shown to alter imitation performance (Halsband
et al., 2001), while there appear to be no studies
reporting impaired emotional processing in these
patients. In general, lesion studies suggest a “core cir-
cuitry of imitation” underpinned by the MNS; how-
ever, human lesion research has yet to identify more
specific areas within frontal and parietal regions.
Notably, a recent meta-analysis of 20 functional MRI
studies that examined the role of frontal and parietal
brain regions in imitation suggested that areas extend-
ing beyond the classic MNS are also crucial for imita-
tion (Molenbergh et al., 2009).
Two recent TMS studies using self-report question-
naires have demonstrated an association between “sen-
sory” or “motor” empathy for pain and MNS function
(Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Fecteau,
Pascual-Leone, & Theoret, 2008). Both studies meas-
ured motor cortex excitability as a marker of “sensorim-
otor” MNS function. Although the motor cortex is not
typically considered part of the human MNS (Iacoboni
& Mazziotta, 2007), mirror neurons have been found in
the monkey primary motor cortex (Tkach, Reimer, &
Hatsopoulos, 2007). The findings of these two TMS
studies provide support for the motor system being
involved specifically in awareness of pain.
From observations of impaired imitation and
empathic abilities in individuals with ASD, it has
been hypothesized that the MNS plays a critical role
in these deficits (Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, &
Perrett, 2001). Recent studies, however, have chal-
lenged the presence of either a global imitation or an
empathic deficit in ASD.
Imitation in ASD
The first observation of an imitative deficit in autism
was made over 50 years ago (Ritvo & Provence,
1953). Since then, there have been numerous studies
of imitation in the ASD population, the majority
focusing on motor imitation (meaningful/meaningless
gestures or actions). In general, these studies show
impaired imitative abilities in ASD compared with
controls (Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004).
More recently, three studies have demonstrated
atypical activation of MNS regions during perform-
ance of various motor imitation tasks in ASD groups
compared with controls (Dapretto et al., 2006; Nishi-
tani, Avikainen, & Hari, 2004; Williams et al., 2006).
These findings have been cited as support for MNS
dysfunction in ASD. The issue here, however, is that
performance of the imitation task by the ASD group
was intact (Dapretto et al., 2006; Nishitani et al.,
2004; Williams et al., 2006). This suggests that atypi-
cal MNS activation does not necessarily reflect MNS
dysfunction per se, as imitation was not impaired.
Rather, individuals with ASD may simply recruit
alternative brain regions or use the MNS differently to
perform such tasks. All three studies measured volun-
tary imitation, which may be dissociated from auto-
matic imitative abilities in ASD (McIntosh,
Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & Wilbarger, 2006;
Tardif, Laine, Rodriguez, & Gepner, 2007). Only a
few studies have examined automatic imitation in the
ASD population, with inconsistent results. Bird et al.
(2007) found intact automatic imitation of robotic and
human hand actions in adults with ASD. Moreover,
Tardif et al. (2007) found enhanced automatic imita-
tion of facial and vocal stimuli in children with ASD
compared with controls.
In general, the differing imitation results in ASD
probably reflect methodological variations, such as
stimulus type (motor or facial/emotional), the age of
participants, and the method of measuring automatic
imitation (behavioral observations or physiological
measures such as EMG). Equally plausible, however,
is the suggestion that imitation may not be a unitary
construct, but may depend on more than one neural
network. Hamilton, Brindley, and Frith (2007), using
“mirror neuron” tasks previously employed in
neuroimaging studies, reported intact hand action
Downloaded by [ ] at 19:21 15 January 2012
imitation in children with ASD. They suggested that
different imitation behaviors may be supported by dif-
ferent neural systems. They also reported impaired
“theory of mind” (cognitive empathy) in this sample.
Accordingly, various types of empathy may be associ-
ated with different forms of imitation, and the integ-
rity of these different forms and their relationships to
cognitive and emotional empathy requires systematic
investigation in both healthy and ASD populations.
Empathy in ASD
Impaired empathy is considered a hallmark feature of
ASD (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Blair,
2008; Gillberg, 1992). Despite this, there is a paucity
of research on the nature of empathic functioning in
ASD, particularly in relation to specific forms of
empathy. Extant research has primarily focused on
one form of empathy, namely cognitive empathy, the
majority of studies showing theory of mind deficits.
This focus has led to the conclusion that empathy is
impaired in ASD. Recent studies, however, have
begun to adopt a broader framework, challenging the
notion that empathy is a unitary concept by examining
different forms of empathy in this population.
Three studies have assessed emotional empathy in
the ASD population to date. In a case study of two
individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS), Shamay-
Tsory, Tomer, Yaniv, and Aharon-Peretz (2002),
using the IRI and QMEE, found that both cognitive
and emotional empathy were impaired. Two group
studies, however, refute this finding. Rogers, Dzi-
obek, Hassenstab, Wolf, and Convit (2007) used the
IRI to assess empathy in a sample of individuals with
AS and found that while cognitive empathy was
impaired, scores on the emotional empathy scale were
similar to controls. This finding was replicated by
Dziobek et al. (2008). These findings question
whether all forms of empathy are impaired in ASD
and raise the possibility that cognitive and emotional
forms of empathy may be dissociated in this popula-
tion. This notion is supported by the findings of the
lesion study by Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2008) described
above. It poses a challenge for the MNS dysfunction
hypothesis of ASD, which assumes that empathy is a
unitary phenomenon underpinned by the MNS.
In this paper, we have critically examined the current
evidence for MNS involvement in empathy. The
assumption of an intimate relationship between imitation
and empathy has contributed to the notion of the MNS
as the neural correlate of empathy. There is, however,
limited empirical evidence for such an association.
Further research is required to clarify the exact nature
of this relationship in both healthy and neurologically
impaired populations. In our review of functional neu-
roimaging studies showing positive correlations
between MNS activation and empathy scale scores,
we found that the results are mixed, despite use of the
same behavioral measure of empathic functioning
(the IRI). While MNS dysfunction has been demon-
strated in ASD, undoubtedly complex links exist
between the nature of the imitative or empathic deficit
and the network involved. To summarize, we propose
that a more comprehensive framework that promotes
systematic investigation of the various forms of
empathy is needed to guide future research. Develop-
ment of this framework offers the opportunity to
extend our understanding of the neural bases of this
complex and fundamental human ability.
Manuscript received 17 February 2010
Manuscript accepted 25 November 2010
First published online 10 January 2011
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... Research highlights that individuals who showed high motor and facial mimicry more frequently had higher empathy scores (Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003). Moreover, neuroimaging studies show positive correlations between the activation of the MNS and empathy scores from the IRI (Baird et al., 2011). These studies included both auditory and visual paradigms, suggesting that empathy could possibly play a part in both functions of the MNS. ...
... These studies included both auditory and visual paradigms, suggesting that empathy could possibly play a part in both functions of the MNS. However, Baird et al. (2011) speculated that the brain regions associated with empathy could be related to partially different brain networks, depending on the specific form of empathy investigated (e.g., motor, emotional, and cognitive empathy), and hence, more studies that focus more specifically on specific forms of empathy are needed. They also explain that mirror neurons account for only a minority of cells in the brain regions associated with the MNS but that activation in the corresponding areas in humans has been heavily attributed to mirror neurons, prompting further clarification and study (Baird et al., 2011). ...
... However, Baird et al. (2011) speculated that the brain regions associated with empathy could be related to partially different brain networks, depending on the specific form of empathy investigated (e.g., motor, emotional, and cognitive empathy), and hence, more studies that focus more specifically on specific forms of empathy are needed. They also explain that mirror neurons account for only a minority of cells in the brain regions associated with the MNS but that activation in the corresponding areas in humans has been heavily attributed to mirror neurons, prompting further clarification and study (Baird et al., 2011). Possible involvement of the MNS was also reported by Schnell et al. (2011), who found that cognitive empathy involves references to an individual's own affective state. ...
... Anger appeared to be the most extensively studied basic emotion, with almost a third of selected studies reporting anger-specific contrasts. While the analysis naturally highlighted localized activation in the EVA, it also suggests activity in STC areas beyond those highlighted in the affect-general analysis, as well as in the inferior frontal gyrus, a region often attributed to emotional prosody integration and categorization (Grandjean, 2021;Witteman et al., 2012) and emotional contagion as part of the mirror neuron system (Baird et al., 2011;Prochazkova & Kret, 2018). This activity suggests that emotion processing may extend beyond the EVA in a more partitioned manner dependent on different aspects of emotions. ...
Recent advances in neuroimaging research on vocal emotion perception have revealed voice-sensitive areas specialized in processing affect. Experimental data on this subject is varied, investigating a wide range of emotions through different vocal signals and task demands. The present meta-analysis was designed to disentangle this diversity of results by summarizing neuroimaging data in the vocal emotion perception literature. Data from 44 experiments contrasting emotional and neutral voices was analyzed to assess brain areas involved in vocal affect perception in general, as well as depending on the type of voice signal (speech prosody or vocalizations), the task demands (implicit or explicit attention to emotions), and the specific emotion perceived. Results reassessed a consistent bilateral network of Emotional Voices Areas consisting of the superior temporal cortex and primary auditory regions. Specific activations and lateralization of these regions, as well as additional areas (insula, middle temporal gyrus) were further modulated by signal type and task demands. Exploring the sparser data on single emotions also suggested the recruitment of other regions (insula, inferior frontal gyrus, frontal operculum) for specific aspects of each emotion. These novel meta-analytic results suggest that while the bulk of vocal affect processing is localized in the STC, the complexity and variety of such vocal signals entails functional specificities in complex and varied cortical (and potentially subcortical) response pathways.
... This focus makes sense given the role of the ACC in the affective sensation of pain -as part of the medial pain system alongside the anterior insula (Shackman et al., 2011;Xiao and Zhang, 2018;Zhao et al., 2018). Based on this connectivityand sensitivity to both personal and vicarious pain stimuli (Singer et al., 2004) -researchers have suggested that, across species, the ACC may integrate pain and social stimuli through "emotional mirror neurons" (Preston and de Waal, 2002;Baird et al., 2011). The notion of emotional mirror neurons has been supported in rats showing subpopulations of ACC neurons that respond both to witnessing and experiencing pain, suggesting that one function of the ACC is to signal the affect of pain and fear to both the self and others (Carrillo et al., 2019). ...
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In 2014, we participated in a special issue of Frontiers examining the neural processing of appetitive and aversive events. Specifically, we reviewed brain areas that contribute to the encoding of prediction errors and value versus salience, attention and motivation. Further, we described how we disambiguated these cognitive processes and their neural substrates by using paradigms that incorporate both appetitive and aversive stimuli. We described a circuit in which the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) signals expected value and the basolateral amygdala (BLA) encodes the salience and valence of both appetitive and aversive events. This information is integrated by the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and dopaminergic (DA) signaling in order to generate prediction and prediction error signals, which guide decision-making and learning via the dorsal striatum (DS). Lastly, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is monitoring actions and outcomes, and signals the need to engage attentional control in order to optimize behavioral output. Here, we expand upon this framework, and review our recent work in which within-task manipulations of both appetitive and aversive stimuli allow us to uncover the neural processes that contribute to the detection of outcomes delivered to a conspecific and behaviors in social contexts. Specifically, we discuss the involvement of single-unit firing in the ACC and DA signals in the NAc during the processing of appetitive and aversive events in both social and non-social contexts.
... However, this term is perhaps confusing, since mimicry and emotional contagion are preceding components of the emerging empathy construct and, as such, should be regarded as precursors of empathy (Klimecki & Singer, 2013). Ultimately, mimicking induced emotional contagion can facilitate the processing of affective forms of empathy (Hermans et al., 2006;Hoffman, 2000;de Wied et al., 2006;Sonnby-Borgström, 2002;Scheffer et al., 2011). In emotional contagion, the self-other distinction is not present, while in the evolving process toward empathic behavior the cognitive notion arises that the emotion one is resonating with is the emotion of the other (Singer and Klimecki, 2014;Bird and Viding, 2014). ...
Psychopathy is a neurodevelopmental disorder that has a highly deleterious effect upon both individuals and society at large. Psychopaths grossly neglect and disrespect the interests of others. Their antisocial behavior is thought to originate from a lack of empathy. However, empathy is multidimensional in nature, as evidenced by the considerable heterogeneity in extant theorizing on the subject. Here, we present the "Zipper model of empathy" that reconsiders how both its affective and cognitive components converge in mature empathic behavior. Furthermore, the Zipper model of empathy is expedient for explaining the empathy deficits in psychopathy, insofar as it brings together current theories on the dysfunctional affective components of empathy, violence inhibition, and automatic versus goal-directed attention. According to the literature, the neurobiological underpinnings of these theories are amygdala-centered; however, this article traces this specifically to the basolateral and central amygdala subregions. When viewed together, the cognitive and affective components of empathy are zipped together in a natural fashion in healthy empathic behavior, whereas psychopaths leave the zipper substantially unzipped in pursuit of their purely self-centered goals.
... Cognitive empathy relies on self-other awareness and is described as involving understanding another person's emotions and responses (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), perspectivetaking, and theory of mind or mentalizing, which involves imagining experiencing the world from another person's perspective. These components are considered interrelated, and an interplay among them is needed to result in the subjective experience of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004;Baird et al., 2011;Decety & Jackson, 2004;Hall & Schwartz, 2019). Presence of both components will motivate whether a person responds compassionately to another's distress, which can be objectively observed and is easier to assess. ...
... Empatia emoțională Mirror neurons system (MNS) [128,129] Mirror neurons system (MNS) [130], afirmație amendată ulterior [131,132] Amygdala billateral [133] Amygdala [134] Hypotalamus [135] Hypotalamus [136,137] ventromediale PFC [138] mPFC [139] ventromediale PFC [140] left mPFC [141] Left mPFC [142] right PFC [143] Righ PFC [144] medial PFC [145] dorsal medial PFC (dmPFC) [146] inferior frontal cortex (iFC) [147] orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) [148] medial orbital-prefrontal cortex (mOPC) [149,150] inferior frontal gyrus IFG [151] right IFG [152] inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) [153] left anterior mid cingulate cortex (lamCC) [154] dorsal anterior mid cingulate cortex (damCC) [155] anterior mid cingulate cortex (amCC) [156,157,158] mid cingulate cortex (MCC) [159] anterior cingulate cortex ACC [160] anterior cingulate cortex (aCC) [161,162,163] left anterior cingulate cortex (leftACC) [164] Ventral/subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (v/sg aCC) [165,166], prezentă și experierea beneficiului de pe urma comportamentului prosocial, al întrajutorării [167] pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) [168] posterior cingulate cortex (pCC) [169,170] anterior cingulate gyrus (aCG) [171] TPJ right TPJ [172,173] anterior insular cortex (aIC) [174,175,176] left anterior insular cortex (laIC) [177] bilateral insular cortex (bIC) [178,179] bilateral anterior insular cortex (bIC) [180,181] right anterior insular cortex (raIC) [182] medial insular cortex [183,184] Precuneus [185] right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) [186] supplementary motor area (sMA) [187,188] retrosplenial cortex [189] right angular gyrus (rAG) [190] (se intensifică în loving/kindness meditation -LKM) posterior parahippocampal gyri (pPG) [191] (se intensifică în LKM) ventral striatumul (VS) [192,193,194] pallidum, putamen, ventral tegmental area [195,196] ...
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The incidence of the fatigue caused by medical care brings to attention the emotional reactions to suffering and their possible effects on caregivers. In this study, we shall discuss empathy and compassion. Linguistic analyses and psychological evaluations fail to differentiate between empathy and compassion. We shall therefore make an inventory of the contribution of neuroscientific studies that we consider important. We shall present some research and clinical studies that support the discrimination between compassion and empathy, at the psycho-behavioral level, in terms of vagal and cerebral patterns and in terms of the effects that these emotional states have at the psycho-emotional level. Unlike the interventions aimed at empathic training, cultivating compassion among caregivers produces beneficial effects, decreasing fatigue and increasing resilience. We believe that the differences found between compassion and empathy support the replacement of the phrase “compassion fatigue”, widely used today, with “empathic distress”. We consider the prophylactic and therapeutic capitalization of compassion in health care, by developing training programs to cultivate compassion for specialized staff for patients, to avoid fatigue (empathic distress) and to improve the emotional, humanistic dimension of the doctor-patient relationship, both urgent and necessary.
... This research ignited the heated theoretical debate [37]- [39] in psychology, and the name "mirror neuron " [40] came into view. In understanding the feelings of others through mirror neurons, the observer directly experiences similar feelings [41] because mirror neurons in mind mechanisms [40] make the observer produce the same emotion. When people experience a specific emotion or see others show similar emotions, the mirror neurons in their insula will be activated. ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Currently, the emotional research of dialogue systems is a hot topic. However, several works mainly focused on acquiring state-of-the-art performance in a dialogue system and paid less attention to the inner emotions' response, and lacked interpretability of emotional response mechanism within a dialogue system. Hence, this work proposed an empathic protocol to address this issue via introducing an innovative element (Mirror neuron) from connectionism and neuroscience to gradually design an AMNN (Artificial mirror neuron network) in the dialogue system for clear interpretability firstly. Subsequently, this paper described an empathic protocol to produce and analyze responses between a user and an agent via the self-defined neural network that served as the Central Nervous System of a dialogue agent. By employing this protocol in a traffic-service application, users felt that their emotions were resonated with and understood and communicated with the dialogue agent proactively.
... Adicionalmente, los mecanismos neuronales de la acción de empatizar asociado a la imitación ligada al sistema de neuronas espejo (MNS en sus siglas en inglés), 60 se han ubicado en el giro Tabla 1. Instrumentos de evaluación en empatía frontal inferior, la corteza parietal inferior, amígdala, corteza frontal inferior y corteza temporal superior (Figura2). [61][62][63] No obstante, por su resolución temporal (milisegundos), el electroencefalograma (EEG) es la técnica utilizada con mayor frecuencia para evaluar el funcionamiento eléctrico cerebral 64 y su análisis se realiza en los componentes de los potenciales relacionados con eventos (PRE). Gracias a esta técnica, la revisión de la supresión de ondas alfa ha resultado útil en la evaluación de la toma de perspectiva. ...
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La empatía ha consolidado una importante trayectoria investigativa desde el siglo pasado en las neurociencias cognitivas. Desde su definición como concepto, la construcción de instrumentos de evaluación para diferentes grupos de edad y la búsqueda de dominios y vertientes que aborden este componente no ha cesado. Esta revisión se dirige a recopilar los hallazgos representativos en la historia de la conceptualización del término y el desarrollo de la medición en empatía en las poblaciones, haciendo especial énfasis en los trabajos realizados con población infantil con herramientas de autoinforme y medidas psicofisiológicas. La revisión arrojó que existe un horizonte investigativo prometedor de la mano de técnicas psicofisiológicas como el EEG para la evaluación del constructo. Se discute la necesidad de profundizar en la búsqueda de patrones en la ontogenia de la empatía en la niñez, así como en el diseño de nuevas formas de medición a través de autoinforme para la práctica investigativa en países de habla hispana que involucre las dinámicas sociales y demográficas de estas poblaciones. Palabras clave: cognition, empathy, neuropsychology
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Objective: To study empathy score, stress and socio-demographic factors related to empathy among medical students Methods: Descriptive cross - sectional study was conducted among 255 first to sixth year medical students at the Faculty of Medicine, Vajira Hospital. The instruments were composed of socio-demographic factors questionnaires, Perceived Stress Scale-10 (PSS-10) and Jefferson Scale of Physician Empathy-Student Version (JSPE-S) in Thai language. Statistical analysis included descriptive analysis, unpaired t-test, Mann-Whitney test, ANOVA, Kruskal- Wallis test, Pearson’s correlation, Spearman’s rank correlation, Point-biserial correlation, Eta correlation and multiple linear regression. Results: The participants were 255 medical students, male 51.4% and female 48.6%. The mean empathy scores measured by JSPE-S Thai version was 107.80 (S.D.=12.4). The mean of PSS-10 Thai version score was 15.1 (S.D.=5.9). There were no statistically significant differences in empathy scores between subgroup of socio-demographic factors and level of stress. The results indicated that factors that had significant positive correlation with empathy scores were current department study (r = 0.149), students’ socioeconomic status (r = 0.132), effective medical role models (r = 0.005), personal counselors (r = 0.0.005) and stress (r = 0.141). In the regression model, higher socioeconomic status (β = 0.645, p = 0.037), students’ mental problems (β = -0.281, p = 0.027) as well as stressors (β = 0.186, p = 0.038) had an effect on empathy score. Conclusion: Medical education should emphasize the importance of medical role model, teach how to live a sufficiency economy, and prevent mental health problem in order to enhance the level of empathy in medical students Keywords: Empathy, stress, medical student
To facilitate a multidimensional approach to empathy the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) includes 4 subscales: Perspective-Taking (PT) Fantasy (FS) Empathic Concern (EC) and Personal Distress (PD). The aim of the present study was to establish the convergent and discriminant validity of these 4 subscales. Hypothesized relationships among the IRI subscales between the subscales and measures of other psychological constructs (social functioning self-esteem emotionality and sensitivity to others) and between the subscales and extant empathy measures were examined. Study subjects included 677 male and 667 female students enrolled in undergraduate psychology classes at the University of Texas. The IRI scales not only exhibited the predicted relationships among themselves but also were related in the expected manner to other measures. Higher PT scores were consistently associated with better social functioning and higher self-esteem; in contrast Fantasy scores were unrelated to these 2 characteristics. High EC scores were positively associated with shyness and anxiety but negatively linked to egotism. The most substantial relationships in the study involved the PD scale. PD scores were strongly linked with low self-esteem and poor interpersonal functioning as well as a constellation of vulnerability uncertainty and fearfulness. These findings support a multidimensional approach to empathy by providing evidence that the 4 qualities tapped by the IRI are indeed separate constructs each related in specific ways to other psychological measures.
The chameleon effect refers to nonconscious mimicry of the postures, mannerisms, facial expressions, and other behaviors of one's interaction partners, such that one's behavior passively rind unintentionally changes to match that of others in one's current social environment. The authors suggest that the mechanism involved is the perception-behavior link, the recently documented finding (e.g., J. A. Bargh, M. Chen, & L. Burrows, 1996) that the mere perception of another' s behavior automatically increases the likelihood of engaging in that behavior oneself Experiment 1 showed that the motor behavior of participants unintentionally matched that of strangers with whom they worked on a task. Experiment 2 had confederates mimic the posture and movements of participants and showed that mimicry facilitates the smoothness of interactions and increases liking between interaction partners. Experiment 3 showed that dispositionally empathic individuals exhibit the chameleon effect to a greater extent than do other people.
Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and Pashler (2009), (this issue) argue that correlations in many cognitive neuroscience studies are grossly inflated due to a widespread tendency to use nonindependent analyses. In this article, I argue that Vul et al.'s primary conclusion is correct, but for different reasons than they suggest. I demonstrate that the primary cause of grossly inflated correlations in whole-brain fMRI analyses is not nonindependence, but the pernicious combination of small sample sizes and stringent alpha-correction levels. Far from defusing Vul et al.'s conclusions, the simulations presented suggest that the level of inflation may be even worse than Vul et al.'s empirical analysis would suggest. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.
The article "Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition" (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009, this issue) makes a broad case that current practice in neuroimaging methodology is deficient. Vul et al. go so far as to demand that authors retract or restate results, which we find wrongly casts suspicion on the confirmatory inference methods that form the foundation of neuroimaging statistics. We contend the authors' argument is overstated and that their work can be distilled down to two points already familiar to the neuroimaging community: that the multiple testing problem must be accounted for, and that reporting of methods and results should be improved. We also illuminate their concerns with standard statistical concepts such as the distinction between estimation and inference and between confirmatory and post hoc inferences, which makes their findings less puzzling. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studiesofemotion, personality, and social cognition have drawn much attention in recent years, with high-profile studies frequently reporting extremely high (e.g., >.8) correlations between brain activation and personality measures. We show that these correlations are higher than should be expected given the (evidently limited) reliability of both fMRI and personality measures. The high correlations are all the more puzzling because method sections rarely contain much detail about how the correlations were obtained. We surveyed authors of 55 articles that reported findings of this kind to determine a few details on how these correlations were computed. More than half acknowledged using a strategy that computes separate correlations for individual voxels and reports means of only those voxels exceeding chosen thresholds. We show how this nonindependent analysis inflates correlations while yielding reassuring-looking scattergrams. This analysis technique was used to obtain the vast majority of the implausibly high correlations in our survey sample. In addition, we argue that, in some cases, other analysis problems likely created entirely spurious correlations. We outline how the data from these studies could be reanalyzed with unbiased methods to provide accurate estimates of the correlations in question and urge authors to perform such reanalyses. The underlying problems described here appear to be common in fMRI research of many kinds-not just in studies of emotion, personality, and social cognition. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.
A major contribution to the neuropsychology of man. The first half is a review of theory and data, and the second half describes methods, chiefly developed by the author, for studying changes in behavior after brain damage in man. Translated from the Russian. Harvard Book List (edited) 1971 #152 (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This paper selectively reviews the neurophysiological evidence for shared neural circuits (supposedly implemented by mirror neurons) as the mechanism underlying empathy. I will argue that while the mirror neuron system plays a role in motor resonance, it is not possible to conclude that this system is critically involved in emotion recognition, and there is little evidence for its role in empathy and sympathy. In addition, there is modest support from neurological observations that lesion of the regions involved in the mirror neuron system leads to dysfunction in empathy, whereas damage of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is associated with such impairment. To significantly advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying empathy, research needs finer conceptualization, better designed paradigms, and integration with knowledge from lesion studies.