Resource extraction by cartels facing constraints on cooperation

ArticleinResource and Energy Economics 30(3):409-427 · August 2008with7 Reads
Impact Factor: 1.24 · DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2007.12.002 · Source: RePEc


    This paper considers a non-renewable resource cartel facing constraints on cooperation. Although different kinds of constraints are conceivable and some of them are also investigated, the analysis focuses on the case in which cooperation is restricted to sufficiently high quotas. This approach of imposing constraints on cartelization complements papers that assume exogenously when a monopoly ends (in particular Benchekroun, H., Gaudet, G., Van Long, N., 2006. Temporary natural resource cartels. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 663-674) in two aspects: an endogenous determination when the cartel breaks up and the consequence that it is impossible to shift resource sales between the two regimes.