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Relativism in the philosophy of science
... En esta sección se han discutido diferentes ejemplos sobre el significad del concepto de capacidades, en secciones posteriores se analizaráéste concepto utilizando como ejemplo el comportamiento de los electrones en la mecánica cuántica y el electromagnetismo. Para Cartwright el concepto de capacidad es utilizado para describir lo que un objeto puede hacer dependiendo de su entorno; pero aún no se ha definid qué es una capacidad, a esta pregunta Cartwright responde que una capacidad es lo que es debido a la ley en la que participa [32], sin embargo esto no representa una respuesta clara, ya que da lugar a un sinfín de otras preguntas, por ejemplo: ¿por qué las capacidades de los objetos se manifiesta dependiendo de la ley en la que esten participando? ¿Cómo saben los objetos bajo que ley están actuando? ...
En este artículo se presenta una breve introducción a la filosofía de la ciencia de Nancy Cartwright, esto a partir de una crítica y análisis físico y filosófico de varias de sus publicaciones, en particular "How the Laws of Physics Lie" [1] y "The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science" [2]. Nancy Cartwright es conocida por lo original y controversial de muchas de sus posturas filosóficas; en especial sus ideas sobre leyes, verdad y modelos han logrado que estos temas sean nuevamente estudiados y analizados por muchos otros filósofos. Para explicar sus ideas, Cartwright hace uso de diferentes conceptos, algunos novedosos y otros no tanto, pero redefinidos con un sentido específico, por ejemplo; máquinas nomológicas, capacidades, leyes ceteris paribus, entre otros. Cartwright considera que ninguna teoría puede ser universal ni fundamental,éstas solo pueden ser probablemente verdaderas y aplicables en un rango determinado bajo ciertas circunstancias y condiciones. Su filosofía se centra en la idea de que el mundo está regido por un conjunto de leyes ceteris paribus, es decir leyes que solo funcionan bajo condiciones específicas y en un determinado dominio, y por lo tanto ninguna ley puede ser considerada como universal. Esto en contraste con el fundamentalismo científico aceptado por algunos científicos que creen en la existencia de una sola ley fundamental, o un conjunto de leyes fundamentales y universales, capaces de explicar y predecir todos los fenómenos físicos que existen en la naturaleza, en donde por fenómeno físico se entiende un hecho o acontecimiento de la naturaleza. Es sabido que los fundamentalistas creen que la historia de la ciencia y el conocimiento científico proporciona una gran variedad de resultados que confirman la existencia de leyes fundamentales. Este es el fundamentalismo que Cartwright combate y sus argumentos principales son aquí discutidos. Así mismo, se expone el uso y significado de términos particularmente controversiales en la filosofía de la ciencia de Cartwright como el concepto de capacidades, el cual ha sido examinado por muchos filósofos contemporáneos. Asimismo, Cartwright sostiene que no todo lo que sucede en el mundo puede ser explicado por leyes, sino solo aquellas cosas para las cuales existen modelos, sus argumentos son expuestos y discutidos, así como su planteamiento de que los modelos son planos para la creación de máquinas nomológicas. Finalmente se considera el concepto de capacidad en la mecánica cuántica lo cual se hace a partir del análisis de la aplicación de la ecuación de Schrödinger.
... Among these are probably the two best known post-war philosophers of science: Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn (of course, there are many more authors who have relevant writings on the topic e.g. [22]). ...
Clark Glymour argued in 2004 that "despite a lack of public fanfare, there is mounting evidence that we are in the midst of ... a revolution - premised on the automation of scientific discovery" [1]. This paper highlights some of the philosophical and sociological dimensions that have been found empirically in work conducted with robot scientists - that is, with autonomous robotic systems for scientific discovery. Robot scientists do not supply definite answers to the discussed questions, but rather provide "proofs of concept" for various ideas. For example, it is not that robot scientists solve the realist/antirealist philosophical debate, but that when working with robot scientists one has to make a philosophical choice - in this case, to assume a realist view of science. There are still few systems for autonomous scientific discovery in existence, and it is too early to generalize and propose new theories. However, being "in the midst of ... a revolution" it is important for the research community to re-examine views pertinent to scientific discovery. This paper highlights how experience with robot scientists could inform discussions in other disciplines, from philosophy of science to computer creativity research.
... Although most philosophers of science seem not to have engaged with the possibility of automating science, the views of certain philosophers would appear to infer that science, as a set of practices would be very difficult to automate. Among these are probably the two best known post-war philosophers of science: Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn (of course, there are many more authors who have relevant writings on the topic, e.g., [22]). ...
Clark Glymour argued in 2004 that "despite a lack of public fanfare, there is mounting evidence that we are in the midst of ... a revolution - premised on the automation of scientific discovery" [1]. This paper highlights some of the philosophical and sociological dimensions that have been found empirically in work conducted with robot scientists - that is, with autonomous robotic systems for scientific discovery. Robot scientists do not supply definite answers to the discussed questions, but rather provide "proofs of concept" for various ideas. For example, it is not that robot scientists solve the realist/antirealist philosophical debate, but that when working with robot scientists one has to make a philosophical choice - in this case, to assume a realist view of science. There are still few systems for autonomous scientific discovery in existence, and it is too early to generalize and propose new theories. However, being "in the midst of ... a revolution" it is important for the research community to re-examine views pertinent to scientific discovery. This paper highlights how experience with robot scientists could inform discussions in other disciplines, from philosophy of science to computer creativity research.
The number and field of researches on the application of Multi-Indicator Comprehensive Evaluation (MICE) are increasing. It is important to reflect on the understanding of the MICE method systematically and the issues implied behind it. This paper compares the core concepts and methodological elements of the three papers that systematically study the MICE method. It is found that the views of the three papers on the core issue are consistent and mutually supportive, but there are differences in the step division and sequence of the evaluation content. In addition, this paper considers the historical status of the MICE and holds that the key to solving the quality of weight lies in the "equivalent conversion" problem in the MICE. Taking the Human Development Index as an example, this paper illustrates the absoluteness of the "equivalent conversion" relationship. In addition, there are multiple processing methods for the MICE from the spatial dimension and multiple evaluation results accordingly, therefore, the results of the MICE need to be used carefully. Finally, based on the systematic summary and reflection of the MICE method, three suggestions are given for the application of the MICE method.
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