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Success Factors of Macro-Regional Cooperation: the Example of the Baltic Sea Region. Bruges Political Research Papers No. 12, March 2010
Abstract
As illustrated by the recent adoption of the European Union Baltic Sea Strategy, a new level of governance seems to be emerging in the European integration process, i.e. the macroregional level. The present paper aims at identifying the necessary ingredients for successful macro-regional cooperation. It draws on the example of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), where the combination of intense cooperation and of heterogeneity is particularly interesting to analyze. The author argues that effective macro-regional cooperation requires four factors: a common perception of interests, a common identity, a well-balanced cooperation method, and the involvement of the EU. The respective relevance of each of these factors is tested and some key strengths and weaknesses of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region are identified.
... Not only have the political preconditions for collaboration on marine policy among the littoral states been fundamentally altered, but so have the perspectives on what to protect and how to protect it, from abatement of point sources and natural science perspectives to an emphasis on diffuse pollution sources, sustainability and ecosystem approaches to management. Historically, collaboration between people in the region has been prominent, in particular in the area of trade and commerce, but the region also has a long history of war, power struggles and problems caused by the iron curtain and the East-West divide (Karlsson 2004, Salines 2010. thus, the sea itself has been a physical divide separating the north-western from the south-eastern part. ...
... Macro-regions extend the scope of national policy-making because they establish functional regions which serve as a basis for intergovernmental and transnational cooperation. Macro-regional institutions may constitute a layer of governance between the European Union on the one hand and the member states and partner countries on the other (Salines 2010, Schymik 2011. ...
... First, there seems to be different perspectives among the member states with respect to the overall aim of the strategy. While the Nordic countries and Germany put environmental issues high on the agenda, the Baltic States and Poland emphasize economic cohesion and competitiveness (Rostocks 2010, Salines 2010. Therefore, it has become a real challenge to keep all actors focused on a set of common goals (Reinholde 2010). ...
... Not only have the political preconditions for collaboration on marine policy among the littoral states been fundamentally altered, but so have the perspectives on what to protect and how to protect it, from abatement of point sources and natural science perspectives to an emphasis on diffuse pollution sources, sustainability and ecosystem approaches to management. Historically, collaboration between people in the region has been prominent, in particular in the area of trade and commerce, but the region also has a long history of war, power struggles and problems caused by the iron curtain and the East-West divide (Karlsson 2004, Salines 2010. Thus, the sea itself has been a physical divide separating the north-western from the south-eastern part. ...
... Macro-regions extend the scope of national policy-making because they establish functional regions which serve as a basis for inter-governmental and trans-national cooperation. Macro-regional institutions may constitute a layer of governance between the European Union on the one hand and the member states and partner countries on the other (Salines 2010, Schymik 2011. ...
... First, there seems to be different perspectives among the member states with respect to the overall aim of the strategy. While the Nordic countries and Germany put environmental issues high on the agenda, the Baltic States and Poland emphasize economic cohesion and competitiveness (Rostocks 2010, Salines 2010. Therefore, it has become a real challenge to keep all actors focused on a set of common goals (Reinholde 2010). ...
... Macro-regional strategies are the latest expression of this development. They stipulate strong topdown elements and a prominent role of national governments and the European Commission (Salines, 2010;Nacchia, 2011). In the Alpine space, this structure of opportunities and constraints meets with an active engagement of regional authorities. ...
... First, MRS respond to perceived fragmentation through creating a topdown structure (Salines, 2010;Nacchia, 2011). The European Commission has an influential role as the central coordinator and facilitator. ...
The literature on the relationship between regions and the European Union (EU) has generated three important insights. First, research has found that the EU empowers as well as disempowers regions. Second, studies have demonstrated that regions adapt to the EU opportunity structure. Third, scholars have discovered that regions also change the EU opportunity structure. However, the three dimensions are rarely brought together. To examine the mutual influence and constant interaction between the three, the article applies a strategic-relational approach to regional action within the EU. Using the empirical example of the EU macro-regional strategy for the Alpine region, the article shows how regional motivations, differential opportunities and constraints and strategies of adaptation and transformation interact. The conclusions imply that both opportunity structures and regional strategies together produce the mosaic of rules, resources, relationships and ideas that makes up the EU.
... Macro-regional strategies are the latest expression of this development. They stipulate strong topdown elements and a prominent role of national governments and the European Commission (Salines, 2010;Nacchia, 2011). In the Alpine space, this structure of opportunities and constraints meets with an active engagement of regional authorities. ...
... First, MRS respond to perceived fragmentation through creating a topdown structure (Salines, 2010;Nacchia, 2011). The European Commission has an influential role as the central coordinator and facilitator. ...
Exploring the role of territorial actors in cross-border regions. Territory, Politics, Governance. This paper introduces a strategic-relational approach to the analysis of subnational meta-governance in cross-border regions. The proposed approach aims to overcome two weaknesses in the literature on cross-border cooperation. Studies on cross-border regions leave little room for the strategic role of subnational authorities. Moreover, they typically examine strategy or structure in isolation. The strategic-relational heuristic allows for the investigation of the conscious mobilization, forming and shaping of cross-border spaces by subnational actors. It also relates the strategies employed at various levels to the differential opportunities and constraints the context poses. Using the macro-regional strategy for the Alpine space as an example, the paper demonstrates that subnational authorities are not just empowered by cross-border cooperation, but actively shape it as an opportunity structure. The creation, geographical dimension, thematic priorities, governance mechanism and related spatial aspects of territory, place, scale and network appear as key objects of meta-governance. Specifically, the paper argues for a consideration of the mutual interaction between strategy and structure in multi-level cross-border contexts.
... Comprising Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 3 Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, it is primarily conceived as an EU internal strategy. 'Partner' countries of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea, such as Iceland and Norway, but also the Russian Federation, have remained loosely 'associated' via the frame of the Economic Area Agreement (EEA) and the Northern Dimension (ND) (Bengtsson, 2009;Makarychev & Sergunin, 2017;Salines, 2010). The EU's inward-looking focus of the EUSBSRfurthered by the bilateral sanction regime between the EU and Russia as a consequence of the Ukraine crisisstands in stark contrast to the three other EU macro-regional strategies that have hitherto been adopted by the European Council. ...
In the past, Baltic Sea cooperation has been characterized by a plethora of actors, embracing a wide range of policy objectives, such as the establishment of a good environmental status for the regional sea. In 2009, the European Council endorsed the European Union’s (EU) Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) as a new tool in the repertoire of Cohesion Policy and European Territorial Cooperation (ETC). The EUSBSR seeks to foster cross-sectoral coordination and functional cooperation in policy areas of ‘macro-region-level’ relevance, such as transport infrastructure, economic development and environmental protection – thus projecting a ‘soft space’ of transnational Baltic Sea cooperation. Although firmly placed under the so-called ‘Three No’s’, that is, the requirement of no additional EU funding, institutions and legislation, a lean governance architecture at the macro-regional level has emerged over time and the strategy mobilizes actors from all tenets of the EU’s multilevel governance system, including the EU itself, its member and adjacent partner states, as well as subnational authorities and civil society. Drawing on the lens of experimentalist governance, this paper analyzes the underlying mechanisms that allow it to be gauged to what extent the Baltic Sea ‘soft space’ has solidified over the past decade. It also shows that the EUSBSR effectively rebalances EU transnational and intergovernmental regional cooperation in the Baltic macro-region.
... The strategy for the Baltic Sea States, even though a new phenomenon, has received a considerable attention from the analysts. Scientific works, EU institutional documents and political discourse address different aspects: the strategy as a new instrument for EU policy and its implementation (Berjkan, Olsen, Tempel, 2009;Samecki, 2009;Mirwaldt, McMaster, Bechtter, 2010;Teska, 2011), the strategy as an instrument for resolving problems of the Baltic Sea Region (Bengtsson, 2009;Antola, 2009;Salines, M.,2010;Stocchiero, 2011;Commission …, 2011;Vanags, 2008), or the effect of the strategy on specific areas of regional cooperation (Borg, 2009;Wisniewski, 2008). Irrespective of some of the negative aspects of the strategy for the Baltic Sea Region , such as: ...
... Project with Russia in water, wastewater, solid waste and energy efficiency are implemented in the framework of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. 27 The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership has also contributed to activities in Belarus under Flagship Project 1.5. "Assessment of regional nutrient pollution load and identification of priority projects to reduce nutrient inputs from Belarus to the Baltic Sea". ...
This paper was drafted at the request of Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy, Unit D1, Competence Centre for macro-regions and European territorial cooperation. The paper forms part of the European Commission’s response to the European Council’s request (April 2011) to “clarify the concept of macro-regional strategies, to evaluate their value added and submit the outcomes to the Council and the European Parliament by June 2013“.
... The governance of multi-level systems works best if horizontal interplay leads to synergies. This is relevant for macro-regions because macro-regional strategies create a new layer of governance between the European Union and the 'national' level of member states and partner countries (Salines 2010;Schymik 2011). Macro-regions transcend the nation-state because they constitute new functional regions which provide new opportunities for the transnational cooperation of subnational actors. ...
With the adoption of the EU Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region in 2009 and the Danube Region in 2011, the European Union (EU) set out to forge a new ‘macro regional’ approach focussing on functional and territorial cooperation in areas such as transport and environmental policy. Drawing on the multi-level governance approach, this paper argues that the EU’s macro-regional strategies affect (1) horizontal interplay between the EU and macro-regional institutions; (2) vertical interplay within macro-regions, in particular the involvement of subnational authorities and civil society; and (3) the relationship between EU member states and non-member states. The macro-regional policy process provides the European Commission with a central role in various phases of policy making and implementation of macro-regional strategies. The paper discusses whether ‘macro-regionalisation’ leads to a new form of EU governance and demonstrates that macro-regional strategies change existing institutions because they co-opt non-EU institutions into EU policy-making; affect the implementation of existing legislation which can be stimulated by macro-regionalisation; and transform existing funding schemes since they require an alignment of project funding through Structural Funds.
During the last years, scholars have broken up dichotomies that have shaped our understanding of cross-border cooperation. In geography, the confrontation between a territorial and a relational reading of space has given way to approaches that stress their dialogue. In political science, a struggle between a focus on government and governance has shifted towards a recognition of their coexistence. In this sense, cross-border networks no longer appear as antipodes to territorial borders, scalar relationships, sectoral differentiation and political hierarchies. Rather, they constitute and condition each other. While both geography and political science stress how connections mingle with patterns of exclusion and subordination, scholars rarely bring spatial and institutional accounts together. This paper aims at bridging the gap between spatial and institutional approaches of cross-border cooperation. With regard to theory, it embeds similarities in their ontological focus on structures and strategies in a strategic-relational approach. Empirically, the paper examines the EU macro-regional strategy for the Alpine space. The conclusions imply that the macro-regional strategy embodies a dynamic balance of spatial and institutional boundlessness and boundaries.
This paper has been mentioned by The Think Tank Review (issue 50/2017 - page 33) compiled by the EU Council Library: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uploadedFiles/Blogs/Library-Blog/Posts/TTR%20-%202017%20-%2050.pdf . It investigates to what extent and why the key action 1 of the Erasmus+ programme, namely learning mobility of individuals, can be considered a soft power’s instrument on European Neighbourhood countries. The core assumption is that due to people-to-people contact, Erasmus participants are most likely to become EU informal ambassadors, in the sense that they become carriers of EU soft power leading to changes in cultural and social perceptions. However, what will the place of Erasmus+ be in the ongoing debate on international cultural relations’ strategy? Erasmus+ can play a major role in this new strategy considering the huge growth of mobility flows between EU and ENP countries, since the new programme was launched. Moreover, EU institutions are looking for new strategic tools of public diplomacy. Have they realised that the external dimension of Erasmus+ lends itself to being one of these? Therefore, the topic of this work is of high interest because it is closely related to the debate about both the means and the ends of the EU external policy. For the sake of this research, three case studies, from different geographical regions neighbouring the EU, have been chosen: Tunisia, Ukraine and Georgia. A comparison among these three countries will reveal under which conditions Erasmus+ can be considered a soft power’s instrument. Hence, the identification of conditions applicable to all EU partner countries in order to evaluate whether the EU can spread its soft power through Erasmus+, represent the paper’s added value which opens new avenues for further research on the topic.
The term ‘region’ is normally used to denote a subnational authority located between the national centre and the local periphery, but it is also (with increasing frequency) used to denote a space of varying size with economic, social and cultural significance. Institutional regions have precise boundaries, defined powers and belong to nation states. Spatial regions, in contrast, have fuzzy borders, informal or derivative powers and may span across nation states. ‘Regionalization’ — the process through which regions develop or acquire new prominence — is therefore a polysemic word. Regionalization can denote the process of creating free trade areas, common markets and monetary unions among sovereign states (so it is synonymous with regional integration); it can indicate the process of political or administrative devolution to institutional tiers located below the national centre (as in regional decentralization); and it can indicate the creation of intermediate entities among sovereign states and subnational governments in order to jointly carry out certain activities (also denoted as sub- or macro-regionalization, see Gänzle and Kern, chapter 1 in this volume). Finally, it can indicate more bottom-up processes that do not generate any new institutional structures but are nevertheless characterized by intensified economic, social and cultural exchanges between the people living in contiguous or distant places (Fioramonti, 2012a, 2012b). This broader phenomenon is loosely indicated as ‘cross-border cooperation’ (CBC), regardless of whether such cooperation gives rise to mere agreements, working communities or novel institutional tiers. In all cases, the aim is to reap material and symbolic benefits.
The failure of the Vilnius summit in late 2013 and the recent events in Ukraine have revealed the consequences of neglecting the historical trajectories of partner countries in negotiations between the European Union and its Eastern partners. The events demonstrate that collective experiences nourished by different historical references provide actors with the capability to invoke other temporalities. It appears that without shared references and collective interests, asymmetries between actors are bound to increase. The examination of the enlargement process and the European Neighbourhood Policy exposes the limits of the European Commission’s strategy that allegedly counts on the socialisation of elites to counteract conflict. When the ideas that founded the EU and the transfer of competences become irrelevant, results are no more than empty declarations. Based on the analysis of the two sequences of external EU policy, the article comes to the conclusion that temporalities are a major issue in negotiations and that “Europeanization” is not the model for every possible negotiation.
Collaborative networks have been considered as a key policy tool in the last decades in the field of science and technology. Therefore S&T policymakers and officials needed to know the measures affecting the success and failure of these networks. Four inter-Islamic S&T networks -established under the umbrella of S&T standing committee (COMSTECH) of Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) - were the cases of this study. Conducting a qualitative inquiry and using multiple-case study method, we collected related data adequately from in-depth interviews with key informants, observation, and archived documents. In this research, 24 success factors of regional/ international S&T collaborative networks were identified and categorized through developing a conceptual model. These factors divided to two main endogenous and exogenous groups. The results reveals that besides the general success factors of networks, there are some specific factors playing important role in each network that need to be addressed.
Mit der Entwicklung des Konzeptes der makroregionalen Strategien (MRS) hat in den vergangenen vier Jahren die Diskussionen um neue Formen der transnationalen Zusammenarbeit in der EU eine neue Dynamik angenommen. Vor dem Hintergrund voranschreitender Globalisierung und Europäisierung gewinnen funktionale Verflechtungen als Grundlage für Kooperationen an Bedeutung. MRS sind ein Anpassungsprozess und haben Einfluss auf die räumliche Entwicklung und Netzwerkbildung. Sie tragen zum Ziel der territorialen Kohäsion bei und verbinden die Regionalpolitik als projektorientierten Ansatz mit den sektoralen Planungen und geben diesen durch einen strategischen Ansatz ein Dach. Nach der Entwicklung der Ostseestrategie entstanden schnell ähnliche Initiativen, sodass mit der EU-Strategie für den Donauraum (EUDRS) im Juni 2011 die zweite MRS verabschiedet wurde. Angesichts des großen Interesses an strategischen, auf makroregionale Herausforderungen zugeschnittenen Formen der Zusammenarbeit liegt der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit auf der Einschätzung der Perspektiven für makroregionale Kooperationen in der EU. Das Erkenntnisinteresse der Arbeit besteht darin das Konzept der MRS besser zu verstehen und am Beispiel der EUDRS die Entwicklung, die Koordinierung sowie die potentiellen Mehrwerte und Herausforderungen aus Perspektive der Akteure nachzuvollziehen. Weiterhin besteht das Erkenntnisinteresse darin die Hintergründe für die makroregionale Kooperation zu verstehen und die Perspektiven für eine Zukunft in der EU zu analysieren. MRS entstehen in funktionalen Verflechtungsräumen und werden in Verbindung mit einer Regionalisierung der EU durch das Entstehen einer neuen Handlungsebene diskutiert. Die Entstehung von weichen, netzwerkartigen Kooperationsansätzen in Ergänzung zur formalen politischen Steuerung wird durch das Konzept der soft spaces aufgegriffen. Soft spaces beschreiben informelle, flexible Raumzuschnitte, die durch Kooperation über verschiedene Ebenen, Sektoren und Akteursgruppen entstehen. In dieser Arbeit wird die Übertragbarkeit des Konzeptes der soft spaces zur Erklärung der Vorgänge auf makroregionaler Ebene untersucht. Die Arbeit stellt heraus, dass die EUDRS das Ergebnis eines politischen Prozesses ist, der funktionale Herausforderungen in den Fokus setzt. Weiterhin kommt die Arbeit zu dem Schluss, dass Makroregionen keine eigene Handlungsebene darstellen, da keine Entscheidungskompetenz auf diese Ebene verlagert wird. Gleichwohl werden neue, weiche Kooperationsformen im transnationalen Zusammenhang weiter an Bedeutung gewinnen. Auf Grundlage der Analyse der EUDRS wird MRS das Potenzial zugesprochen die bestehenden Netzwerke in funktionalen Verflechtungsräumen zu verbinden, da sie in ihrer Governancestruktur die Möglichkeit für eine effiziente Kooperation zwischen territorial und funktional orientierten Akteuren bietet. Das Konzept der soft spaces lässt sich zur Beschreibung der Vorgänge auf makroregionaler Ebene anwenden. Dabei werden die Schwerpunktbereiche als die Möglichkeitsräume für soft spaces unter dem Dach der Metagovernanceebene der Strategie identifiziert. Ob MRS eine Perspektive für die zukünftige territoriale Zusammenarbeit sind, hängt nach den Erkenntnissen aus der Analyse der EUDRS von dem politischen commitment der Nationalstaaten und Schlüsselakteure, dem Erkennen und Nutzen des Potenzials der Steering Groups als politstrategisches Netzwerk zur Vorbereitung transnationaler Aktivitäten, sowie von einer geeigneten Kommunikation des Mehrwertes der Strategie ab.
With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 — the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) — the European Union has started to charter new territory in transnational cooperation and cohesion policy. Subsequently, other ‘macro-regions’ have begun to self-identify — such as the Danube (2011), the Adriatic-Ionian basin (2014), the Alpine (2015) and the North Sea regions1 (see European Parliament, 2015) — and are in the process of developing similar strategies of their own, often drawing on ‘the inspiration from the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region’ (North Sea Commission, 2011, p. 2). These developments suggest that some parts of Europe, if not the entire EU, could come to be covered by some kind of macro-regional strategy. Indeed, in 2013, the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council proposed a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council, 2013, p. 9) and an ever-increasing area has been described as having succumbed to a kind of ‘macro-regional fever’ (Dühr, 2011, p. 3). Such observations and the concrete developments that underpin them warrant a critical assessment of this ‘“nouvelle vogue” of transnational cooperation’ (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012), which has also been depicted as a new ‘tool of European integration’ (Dubois et al., 2009, p. 9; see also Bellini and Hilpert, 2013).2
This article examines the role of the organization of parliamentary work on the empowerment of the European Parliament. Relying on the insights of the governing theory, we argue that the procedural reforms in the EP are the result of MEPs efforts to strengthen the role of the institution in the European decision-making process, through an improvement of its legislative efficiency. In order to test this hypothesis, we analyze the impact of the rationalization of EP's work on three key aspects: the powers of the hierarchical bodies in the EP and the political groups, deliberation in plenary and the behaviour of MEPs. We show that the argument of "efficiency" has become a goal in itself at the expense of the freedom of MEPs.
This paper examines the extent to which the European Institute for Innovation and Technology (EIT) represents an institutional innovation in the EU landscape. This flagship initiative of the Barroso I Commission was established in March 2008 and aims at unlocking Europe‘s innovation potential by pooling together the best European students, researchers and businesses in integrated partnerships, called 'Knowledge Innovation Communities' (KICs), which should be operational by mid-2010. Using a comparative approach with a sample of leading technological universities, both EIT's nature and added value are questioned. Empirical findings lead to the conclusion that the institute can be considered as an institutional novelty, mainly because of its atypical virtual two-level structure, its independence and long-term focus and the integration of education, but that its added value - and thus its innovativeness - may be limited.
This policy brief examines the implementation to date of the Lisbon Treaty's provisions for EU external policy, in particular the High Representative/Commission Vice President and the External Action Service. Numerous challenges inherent to the structure of the system are becoming apparent already, involving as they are complex trade-offs both between EU institutions and among the Member States. The EU's ability to act as a coherent external actor will be tested only after the new 'system' takes a clearer shape. This may take time and require adjustments along the way - while the rapid evolution of the international system and dramatic power shifts at the global level require both immediate action and strategic vision.
Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont outline a concrete proposal to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Their proposal comprises three dimensions: real but realistic criteria; a permanent capability generation conference; and promotion of pooling and sharing. On such a basis, Permanent Structured Cooperation offers real added value to the EU and Member States alike.
This article deals with attempts to create a transnational political community in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) in order to deal with a variety of economic, environmental, security and social issues. Characterized by considerable institutional heterogeneity, regionalist initiatives in the BSR could presage the emergence of new 'networked' governance structures. However, despite its apparent 'bottom-up' character, Baltic Sea regionalism is clearly dominated by the specific interests and agendas of BSR states and the European Union. The governance question is therefore perhaps best addressed in terms of establishing (in the long-term) geopolitical and institutional conditions for more forceful cooperation within the region.
In European politics, the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ came to the fore in the 1980s and early 1990s, in response to innovative policy and institutional developments in European integration. Different subnational actors saw in these developments the potential for creating an alternative supranational framework for meeting their territorial and other policy goals. Scholars of the European Union were also inspired to develop new theories and concepts for explaining decision making within a multi-level European polity. In recent years, however, as the limitations for regional mobilization within the EU have become more apparent, the notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ has fallen out of favour. One unfortunate consequence of this has been that the regional dimension of European politics has become increasingly neglected. This Introduction makes the case for the need to revisit the regional dimension to European politics. After summarizing the rise and fall of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ idea, the numerous ways in which the EU remains highly important for regions, and in which regional politics plays a significant role in shaping the nature and direction of European integration, are outlined. The Introduction concludes by summarizing how the contributions to this Special Issue take up the challenge of re-examining this regional dimension within an ever-changing and ever-expanding Europe.
Sovereignty is not a neutral concept. It is rather used as a tool in a variety of contexts
by political agents to establish and maintain their rule. In particular situations of competition
and interdependence are relevant because they potentially threaten state survival. In these two
types of situation, five uses of sovereignty are distinguished. First, in situations of internal
competition states use sovereignty for competitive advantage. Second, in cases of external
competition states use sovereignty to temporarily subordinate the interests of citizens to those
of the state. Third, in situations of interdependence some states use sovereignty to reduce it.
However, in a globalizing world this becomes less feasible. Fourth, sovereignty is used to
conquer interdependence. Yet this is only effective when a world-state is created. Fifth, states
use sovereignty to manage interdependence.
The Chamber of Representatives of the Belgian Parliament asked the permanent professors of the College of Europe to write brief papers for a conference organized in honour of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The objective of these papers was to highlight the main challenges facing the European Union in four different issue areas (Lisbon Strategy, enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and institutional reform) and to generate a debate among Belgian academics, politicians and members of civil society. The papers produced used to promote this discussion are reprinted here.
Member States have been trying to shield their welfare systems from European integration. Yet, as the recent European Court of Justice’s ruling on the Watts case has shown, Member States’ healthcare systems have to comply with the fundamental principles of the European Single Market. The obstacles to undergo non-emergency medical treatment in other Member States have been significantly reduced for European citizens. This paper analyzes how Member States’ healthcare systems have been affected by the development of European cross-border patient mobility using the concept of Europeanization. Drawing on Historical Institutionalism, it is argued that a process of institutional adaptation will occur in which the pace and the scale of the transposition of European legislation to domestic legislation depend on its fit with existing domestic institutions. Depending on their institutional set-ups, Germany’s social insurance system will show a lower degree of institutional misfit than Denmark’s national health system. Therefore Germany will try to upload different policy preferences to the European level than Denmark in order to lower the costs of their institutional adaptation to European obligations. It turns out that national health systems show a higher institutional misfit than social insurance systems: the costs of institutional adaptation are much higher for Denmark than for Germany. Hence, Denmark has been slower in transposing European legislation into national law than Germany. Conversely, Germany tries to upload different policy preferences to the European level than Denmark in order to lower the costs of their institutional adaptation to European obligations. The political preferences and interests that the Member States are trying to upload differ as much as their adaptive pressures. A restrictive interpretation of the Court’s jurisprudence is of much more importance to Denmark than to Germany, as Germany just tries to avoid further adaptive pressures.
Over a period of twenty-five years, we have witnessed the waxing and waning of the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. These concluding remarks begin by examining the factors that fuelled interest in, and enthusiasm for, this notion during the 1980s and early 1990s. It is argued that whilst the EU has not turned into a Europe of the Regions, spatial restructuring continues apace, as part of attempts to deepen and widen the European polity. Territorial politics will continue to be a salient feature of European politics for the next quarter of a century.
This paper examines the potential for the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) to create and maintain a brand. Providing an initial and overall look at the issue, it poses the question: Can a region with ten countries really successfully engage in brand-building? This question is tackled by building upon the literature on branding and place branding, but also by drawing upon research on the region conducted in social science disciplines such as economic geography, history and cultural history. Empirical sources included interviews and observing conferences and presentations. This study argues that the BSR faces a number of challenges, as suggested by place-branding theory, the most notable being a lack of one single decision-making authority and a lack of unity of purpose among its potential stakeholders. Two possible and somewhat similar strategies that take these challenges into account are presented. It might be possible to compensate for the lack of decision-making authority, but it would take a strong unity of purpose in terms of a unifying core idea or brand story. The kind of unifying element that is needed might be that the region possesses a common identity to some degree or have strong joint interests. A swift review of whether this is the case indicates that a region is indeed being formed, but as yet, it is too early to speak of a coherent region with a common identity, at least in the traditional sense.Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (2007) 3, 120–130. doi:10.1057/palgrave.pb.6000057
What sets the agenda around the Baltic Rim and what are its consequences in terms of political space? Various views have been figured in this debate, ranging from a “clash of civilizations” to predictions that the Baltic area will form one of the “hottest” growth regions in Europe. A variety of new spatial constructions have emerged and numerous regional acronyms and organizations have proliferated. Rich, and rather pluralist, constellations have surfaced. Although there is little to support assumptions of clearly delineated conflicts, a considerable variety of views point to a slow, but steady, pattern of integration and regionalization.
The principal-agent (PA) approach has recently become the dominant approach to the study of delegation in both comparative and international politics. Despite these purported benefits, a growing number of critics have taken exception to both the theoretical assumptions and the empirical claims of PA analysis. Such critiques, it is argued, fall into three groups. The first are the red herrings, the critiques that arise from a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of what PA approaches and their practitioners actually argue. The second and more interesting set of critiques raise the distinction between agents and trustees, questioning applicability of PA analysis to the latter - although it is argued that this distinction needlessly dichotomizes a continuum of agent discretion and a range of motivations for delegation, and strictly defined is of little relevance to the universe of empirical cases that scholars might seek to explain. The third and final group of critiques argue that PA approaches systematically fail to predict correctly either (a) the reasons and the conditions under which political principals delegate powers to agents, or (b) the conditions under which agents enjoy autonomy and influence in domestic and international politics.
Incluye índice Incluye bibliografía Se ofrece un análisis de las principales discusiones conceptuales y téoricas generadas por el estudio de la Unión Europea.
The adoption process of the emission trading scheme (ETS) directive in the co-decision procedure merged the dynamics of problem solution and political gaming, which Kingdon calls policy and political streams. An application of Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework shows that an “economy-first” and an “environment-first” coalition competed for influence on the ETS. Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) as part of one advocacy coalition were subject to the constraints of lobbying in a multi-level governance system. Their ability to influence the ETS depended on relatively stable parameters and external events. As ENGOs are outsiders to the bodies with formal authority in the European Union (EU), they needed powerful coalition members such as DG Environment and the European Parliament (EP) as well as strong external facilitating factors. ENGOs fared better in the policy stream than in the political stream. They aimed for a strong initial Commission proposal to set a path-dependent process in motion and at counterbalancing the Council with the EP. They can contribute to policyoriented learning and instrumentalise perturbations, but they are not able to create a negotiation stalemate.
This paper examines the process of military capability reform undertaken in the European Union (EU)
since the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy in 1999. It is argued that although
the improvement of military capabilities has been the principal rationale underpinning the development
of a security and defence policy within the EU, the continued preference on the part of member states
for non-binding, “new” or “soft” governance mechanisms in this policy field is a key factor accounting
for the lack of progress achieved in capability reform thus far.
The paper applies a policy learning perspective on policy change in the European Union. Based on the idea that complex empirical phenomena require complex analytical tools, the paper argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a suitable approach to the analysis of policy learning when rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are incorporated into the approach so as to address some analytical weak points of the ACF. The paper then asks if any conditions can be identified under which one of the two institutionalisms hold more explanatory power than the other institutionalism. By applying the revised ACF to the analysis of an empirical case of policy learning, consisting of the energy-companies Shell, BP and Exxon Mobile, it is shown that the incorporation of the institutionalisms in the ACF produces some valuable insights and that the time-span included in the empirical analysis constitutes an important factor as to the explanatory power of each of the institutionalisms.
The Many Challenges of the BSR
- Kari Liuhto
Liuhto, Kari, "The Many Challenges of the BSR", Baltic Rim Economies, 17.6.08, P.36
The Rise of the competitiveness Discourse-A Neo-Gramscian Analysis No 9
- Davida Bradanini
Davida Bradanini, The Rise of the competitiveness Discourse-A Neo-Gramscian Analysis
No 9/ 2009
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- European Parliament
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the Northern Dimension", 2006/2171(INI), November 2006.
An EU-Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Making a Success of the
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Beazley, Christopher, "An EU-Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Making a Success of the
2004 Enlargement", Baltic Rim Economies, 21.12.07, P.14
Baltic Sea Economic Space-Vision or Illusion?
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Sutela, Pekka, "Baltic Sea Economic Space-Vision or Illusion?", Baltic Sea Agenda, No.1,
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Key Lessons in Fostering Transnational Cooperation in Support for Innovation in Europe
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Innovation in Europe", Inno-Learning Platform Annual Report 2007-2008, PRO
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The Baltic Sea Region: Forms and Functions of Regional Cooperation
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Williams, Leena-Kaarina "The Baltic Sea Region: Forms and Functions of Regional
Cooperation", Humboldt University, Berlin, 2002.
Baltic Sea Cooperation Towards 2020-Serious Challenges but Bright Opportunities
- Alexander Stubb
Stubb, Alexander, "Baltic Sea Cooperation Towards 2020-Serious Challenges but Bright
Opportunities", Baltic Rim Economies, 27.2.09, p.9
Third Wave of Cooperation Needed in the Baltic Sea Region
- Esko Antola
Antola, Esko, "Third Wave of Cooperation Needed in the Baltic Sea Region", Baltic Rim
Economies, 22.6.06, p.8
A Baltic Sea Strategy-Acting Regionally, Thinking Globally
- Ojars Kalnins
Kalnins, Ojars, "A Baltic Sea Strategy-Acting Regionally, Thinking Globally", Baltic Rim
Economies, 31.10.07, p.14
Europe's Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
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European Parliament, "Europe's Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region", "Baltic Europe"
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Visions for the Future BSR Cooperation-an EU Avant-garde in Promoting the Fifth Freedom of the Internal Market?
- Hans Brask
Brask, Hans, "Visions for the Future BSR Cooperation-an EU Avant-garde in Promoting the
Fifth Freedom of the Internal Market?", Baltic Rim Economies, 17.6.08, p.34
Le Partenariat Public-Privé à l'Epreuve du « Juste Retour» No 10
- Martin Caudron
- Galileo
Martin Caudron, Galileo: Le Partenariat Public-Privé à l'Epreuve du « Juste Retour»
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Cluster Alliances: An Analysis of the ScanBalt Alliance from the Knowledge-based Perspective
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Kutsenko, Dimitri, "Cluster Alliances: An Analysis of the ScanBalt Alliance from the
Knowledge-based Perspective", Masterthesis, Free University Berlin, October 2007.
Internal Summary Report WP4, Draft Version
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BSR INNONET, "Internal Summary Report WP4, Draft Version", March 2008.
Innovation in the Nordic-Baltic Sea Region, A Case for Regional Cooperation
- Schwaag Serger
- Emily Sylvia
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Potential to Network Innovative Clusters in the Baltic Metropoles Regions: Present States and Perspectives
- Jörg Sydow
Sydow, Jörg, "Potential to Network Innovative Clusters in the Baltic Metropoles Regions:
Present States and Perspectives", Free University Berlin, 2007.
The Baltic Rim Model
- Marcus Svedberg
Svedberg, Marcus, "The Baltic Rim Model", Baltic Rim Economies, 28.2.06, p.8
Mapping of National Cluster Policies and Programmes in the Baltic Sea Region: Summary and Analysis of National Consultations
- Bsr Innonet
BSR INNONET, "Mapping of National Cluster Policies and Programmes in the Baltic Sea
Region: Summary and Analysis of National Consultations", June 2007.
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Conference at the College of Europe, 'A Swedish Vision for Europe
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• Cecilia Malmström, Conference at the College of Europe, 'A Swedish Vision for
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