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The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic Negotiation
Abstract
This study examines how differential power among negotiators (in the form of alternatives available to the individuals if the parties fail to reach a negotiated settlement) influences the parameters (e.g., the aspiration levels and reservation prices), the process, and the outcome of the negotiation. The results suggest that (a) the possession of an alternative increases one′s own outcome as well as joint outcome; (b) the more attractive or valuable the alternative, the greater the benefits regarding own and joint outcome; and (c) the better one′s own alternative relative to the other parties′ alternative, the larger one′s piece of the resource pie (i.e., one′s benefit increases).
... The abilityeven if never acted uponto walk away from a given negotiation or to accept an alternative offer, allows negotiators to influence a negotiated outcome in the direction of their ideal outcome (Galinsky et al., 2017). In line with this notion, for example, negotiators with more attractive BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) set more ambitious aspirations (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994;Pinkley, 1995;Raiffa, 1982), defined as "goals that a party is striving for… or minimal standards that a party aspires to meet or exceed" (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994, p.16). Indeed, research has found that attractive BATNAs lead to more aggressive reservation prices and target prices (Pinkley et al., 1994). ...
... In line with this notion, for example, negotiators with more attractive BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) set more ambitious aspirations (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994;Pinkley, 1995;Raiffa, 1982), defined as "goals that a party is striving for… or minimal standards that a party aspires to meet or exceed" (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994, p.16). Indeed, research has found that attractive BATNAs lead to more aggressive reservation prices and target prices (Pinkley et al., 1994). Also, negotiators with attractive BATNAs are more risk-taking (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and agentic (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007) in working towards their goals, more likely to initiate a negotiation, and more likely to make the first offer (Magee et al., 2007). ...
... Negotiators with attractive BATNAs not only demand more of themselves, they also demand more of their counterparty (De Dreu, 1995). In combination, these influences on negotiators' behavior ensure that negotiating with an attractive alternative usually leads to superior outcomes at the bargaining table (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002;Galinsky et al., 2017;Pinkley et al., 1994). This effect of alternatives is so robust that it even holds for alternatives that are not guaranteed (Pinkley et al., 2019) or indeed are purely imaginary (Schaerer, Schweinsberg, & Swaab, 2018). ...
Having attractive alternatives is often seen as a sine qua non for negotiator success. Given that alternatives are not set in stone and are thus inherently probabilistic in nature, what happens if an alternative is lost? Across seven experiments (N = 2538), we demonstrate that losing an attractive alternative carries advantages compared to never having had this alternative. Specifically, negotiators who lose an attractive alternative set more aggressive aspirations, first offers, and obtain better outcomes. These advantages appear to result from negotiators anchoring their aspirations and first offers on the lost alternative. At the same time, because the attractive alternative is used as a reference point to evaluate the outcome, negotiators who lost an attractive alternative are less satisfied with the better outcome they obtain. The present research highlights the powerful influence lost alternatives have on how negotiators prepare, behave, feel, and perform in a negotiation.
... Negotiators often compare the quality of the outcomes that they might achieve via the focal negotiation to the quality of outcomes that they could achieve via other means (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). The strength of one's alternative to a negotiated agreement can thus be a powerful driver of behavior (Brett et al., 1996;Kim & Fragale, 2005;Malhotra & Gino, 2011;Pinkley et al., 1994). Specifically, stronger (i.e., better) alternatives embolden negotiators to aim higher and behave more assertively (Morris et al., 1999). ...
... Negotiators with a strong alternative have been shown to feel more agentic and act more assertively, two established psychological consequences of having power (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Stronger alternatives can thus lead negotiators to set more ambitious targets and perform better in the negotiation (Kim & Fragale, 2005;Pinkley et al., 1994). Indeed, even simulating a strong alternative in one's mind has been shown to increase one's negotiation outcomes (Schaerer et al., 2018). ...
... Third, the use of concrete alternatives may have functioned as potent anchors that reduced variance in negotiator behavior and performance relative to negotiations in which men and women do not receive well-defined alternatives (and may therefore form very different impressions of the value of their alternative; Pinkley et al., 1994). Future research may examine directly whether men and women provide different evaluations of the quality of ill-defined and well-defined alternatives to a negotiated agreement. ...
A substantial body of prior research documents a gender gap in negotiation performance. Competing accounts suggest that the gap is due either to women's stereotype-congruent behavior in negotiations or to backlash enacted toward women for stereotype-incongruent behavior. In this article, we use a novel data set of over 2,500 individual negotiators to examine how negotiation performance varies as a function of gender and the strength of one's alternative to a negotiated agreement. We find that the gender gap in negotiation outcomes exists only when female negotiators have a strong outside option. Furthermore, our large data set allows us to examine an understudied performance outcome, rate of impasse. We find that negotiations in which at least one negotiator is a woman with a strong alternative disproportionately end in impasse, a performance outcome that leaves considerable potential value unallocated. In addition, we find that these gender differences in negotiation performance are not due to gender differences in aspirations, reservation values, or first offers. Overall, these findings are consistent with a backlash account, whereby counterparts are less likely to come to an agreement and therefore reach a potentially worse outcome when one party is a female negotiator empowered by a strong alternative. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
... Participants arrived at the laboratory two at a time and were randomly assigned to one of two roles-candidate or recruiter-in a negotiation simulation. The negotiation simulation was modelled after the classic New Recruit exercise (Neale, 1997;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), which involves a candidate and a recruiter negotiating over multiple issues concerning the candidate's employment compensation package. The simulation consisted of five scored issues to be negotiated, with point totals reflecting the preferences and priorities attached to each issue. ...
... Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of two roles in a negotiation simulation based on the New Recruit (Neale, 1997;Pinkley et al., 1994) exercise. The 9 We tested and found no effects of gender (all ps .24-.29). ...
... Recruit exercise (Neale, 1997;Pinkley et al., 1994) with random assignment to dyads and, within dyads, to the role of recruiter or candidate. A lottery-based financial incentive was again used. ...
We examine the previously unstudied effects of silent pauses in bilateral negotiations. Two theoretical perspectives are tested-(a) an internal reflection perspective, whereby silence leads to a deliberative mindset, which, in turn, prompts value creation, and (b) a social perception perspective, whereby silence leads to intimidation and value claiming. Study 1 reveals a direct correlation between naturally occurring silent pauses lasting at least 3 s (extended silence) and value creation behaviors and outcomes. Study 2 shows that instructing one or both parties to use extended silence leads to value creation. Additional studies establish a mechanism for this effect, whereby negotiators who use extended silence show evidence of greater deliberative mindset (Study 3) and a reduction in fixed-pie perceptions (Study 4), both of which are associated with value creation. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the internal reflection perspective, whereby extended silence increases value creation by interrupting default, fixed-pie thinking, and fostering a more deliberative mindset. Findings of Study 3 also suggest a boundary condition whereby when status differences are salient, the use of silence by higher status parties leads to value creation, whereas the use of silence by lower status parties does not. Finally, Study 4 shows that instructing negotiators to use silence is more effective for value creation than instructing them to problem-solve. Challenging the social perception perspective that silence is a form of intimidation, we find no evidence for any associations between extended silence and the proportion of value claimed or subjective value of the counterpart. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
... Although power and dominance can be dispositional traits, they can also be related to situational factors, such as a person's status or role, which can therein serve as relative power (Kray & Thompson 2004;Pinkley et al. 1994). Power is defined as the ability to control resources, one's own and others', without social interference (Galinsky et al. 2003a). ...
... Within employment negotiations, given that power is defined as control over resources and outcomes, the consensus is that recruiters, who are offering the job and associated resources, are generally more powerful than candidates, who are seeking to obtain the job and associated resources (Galinsky et al. 2003b). As a result, recruiters generally tend to negotiate better outcomes for themselves compared to candidates (Pinkley et al. 1994). ...
... In the second, seemingly unrelated phase, participants engaged in a face-to-face, mock negotiation for a start-up package for a managerial position. The paradigm was adapted from Pinkley et al. (1994) and involved negotiating for four items: salary, vacation days, signing bonus, and location. Female participants were randomly assigned to either the recruiter or candidate role and to negotiate either with a male or female counterpart. ...
In every major occupational group and at every level of educational attainment, U.S. women earn less than men (Carnevale et al. 2018). Besides a component explained by objective factors (e.g., hours worked, occupation, experience), the gender wage gap includes a large component unexplained by objective factors. This latter component may be attributed, at least in part, to factors such as gender stereotyping and discrimination. In one study, we focus specifically on negotiation partners’ gender stereotypes by investigating mock face-to-face negotiations around salary and benefits mimicking real world job settings. We specifically investigated whether U.S. women’s (n = 83) negotiation performance was predicted by their negotiation counterparts’ implicit and explicit gender stereotypes and whether these effects depended on the gender of the negotiation counterpart and their randomly assigned power role in the negotiation (recruiter vs. candidate). Overall, our findings suggest that regardless of women’s power role in negotiations, women’s lower performance is predicted by their male counterparts’ higher implicit stereotypes. For female recruiters, this effect is further qualified by their male counterparts’ explicit stereotypes. Our discussion explores how temporary power roles contribute to the expression of implicit and explicit gender stereotypes in negotiations. We also discuss practice implications for reducing negative effects of stereotypes on women’s negotiation performance.
... In particular, a lively discussion has formed on the effect of alternatives in terms of the integrativeness of an agreement [89]. Sondak and Bazerman [74] and later Pinkley et al. [62] concluded that an asymmetric power structure leads to a better joint outcome. Both studies involved a job contract negotiation and were conducted with graduate students but their manipulation was slightly different in that three conditions (high, low or no BATNA) were included in the study of Pinkley et al. [62] contrasted with two BATNA conditions in the study of Sondak and Bazerman [74]. ...
... Sondak and Bazerman [74] and later Pinkley et al. [62] concluded that an asymmetric power structure leads to a better joint outcome. Both studies involved a job contract negotiation and were conducted with graduate students but their manipulation was slightly different in that three conditions (high, low or no BATNA) were included in the study of Pinkley et al. [62] contrasted with two BATNA conditions in the study of Sondak and Bazerman [74]. The opposing camp argues that a symmetric power structure leads to a better joint outcome because the frequency of exchange is increased which generates more positive emotions [45,49]. ...
... This manipulation was chosen to give one party substantial leverage stemming from an alternative but still leaving scope to gain a superior result with the opposing party. Additionally, the design ensured easy comprehensibility of the alternative by handing the exact features of the alternative to the participants and not manipulating the likelihood of receiving the alternative [62]. ...
This study aims to deepen the understanding of the drivers of bargaining power in negotiations and in particular the role of best alternatives (BATNA) and time pressure. Previous experimental negotiation research mainly focused on the power of BATNA and the influence of the context on the negotiation outcome, raising the question as to whether BATNA is indeed the only relevant power lever in negotiations. Especially game theorists have shown that time-related costs have a decisive influence on negotiation outcomes. The study proposes a framework to actually measure and compare the relevance and force of different power levers in a simulated distributive buyer-seller negotiation. The results suggest that time pressure can be as influential as an alternative; however, students and professionals seem to react differently to power manipulations. Whereas the student sample was significantly influenced by time pressure but not by alternatives, the opposite could be observed in the professional group. The findings question the common belief that alternatives are the key driver of power in negotiations.
... Participants arrived at the laboratory two at a time and were randomly assigned to one of two roles-candidate or recruiter-in a negotiation simulation. The negotiation simulation was modelled after the classic New Recruit exercise (Neale, 1997;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), which involves a candidate and a recruiter negotiating over multiple issues concerning the candidate's employment compensation package. The simulation consisted of five scored issues to be negotiated, with point totals reflecting the preferences and priorities attached to each issue. ...
... Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of two roles in a negotiation simulation based on the New Recruit (Neale, 1997;Pinkley et al., 1994) exercise. The 9 We tested and found no effects of gender (all ps .24-.29). ...
... Recruit exercise (Neale, 1997;Pinkley et al., 1994) with random assignment to dyads and, within dyads, to the role of recruiter or candidate. A lottery-based financial incentive was again used. ...
We examine the previously unstudied effects of silent pauses in bilateral negotiations. Two theoretical perspectives are tested—(1) an internal reflection perspective, whereby silence leads to a deliberative mindset, which in turn prompts value creation, and (2) a social perception perspective, whereby silence leads to intimidation and value claiming. Study 1 reveals a direct correlation between naturally-occurring silent pauses lasting at least 3 seconds (extended silence) and value creation behaviors and outcomes. Study 2 shows that instructing one or both parties to use extended silence leads to value creation. Additional studies establish a mechanism for this effect, whereby negotiators who use extended silence show evidence of greater deliberative mindset (Study 3) and a reduction in fixed-pie perceptions (Study 4), both of which are associated with value creation. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the internal reflection perspective, whereby extended silence increases value creation by interrupting default, fixed-pie thinking and fostering a more deliberative mindset. Findings of Study 3 also suggest a boundary condition whereby when status differences are salient, the use of silence by higher-status parties leads to value creation, whereas the use of silence by lower-status parties does not. Finally, Study 4 shows that instructing negotiators to use silence is more effective for value creation than instructing them to problem-solve. Challenging the social perception perspective that silence is a form of intimidation, we find no evidence for any associations between extended silence and the proportion of value claimed or subjective value of the counterpart.
... In the present study, we randomly assigned dyads of unacquainted participants to complete either a brief validated audio-visual ERA training (the Training of Emotion Recognition Ability or TERA; Schlegel et al., 2017b) or an identically structured control training about cloud types (e.g., cumulus, cirrus, etc.), and asked them afterwards to engage in a widely used negotiation task about a fictitious work contract (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). ...
... Second, in standard negotiation tasks the topics, options, and economic gains (points) are predefined which makes the interactions relatively structured and comparable between dyads. Third, such tasks allow studying a variety of outcomes that we examined in the present study: Economic outcomes include joint gains reflecting how well the dyad members succeeded in arriving at a mutually beneficial deal, as well as individual gains reflecting the share of the pie one negotiator obtained for him-or herself (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994). Relational outcomes include ratings of trust, rapport, cooperation etc. made by the negotiators (e.g., Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008). ...
... Participants completed the "New Recruit" exercise (Pinkley et al., 1994) in which dyad members are randomly assigned either the role of a "recruiter" or an "employee" and are asked to discuss the terms of an employment contract on eight topics such as salary, vacation days, and starting date of the contract. For each topic, there were five predefined options for agreement. ...
Being accurate in recognizing others’ emotions from nonverbal cues has been shown to correlate with a variety of positive social outcomes. Several training programs to enhance emotion recognition ability have been developed; however, no study to date has examined whether such programs affect behaviors and outcomes in face-to-face social interactions. In the present study, dyads of same-gender students were randomly assigned to complete either a self-administered brief emotion recognition training or a control training about cloud types. All dyads then engaged in an employee-recruiter negotiation. Results showed that dyads trained in emotion recognition reached more egalitarian economic outcomes, rated themselves and their partners as less competitive after the negotiation, and received higher ratings of positive affect from independent observers. These findings open up the potential for various applications in the context of work, education, and close relationships.
... The negotiation literature has consistently established that high valued BATNAs provide advantage to negotiators (Pinkley Neale, & Bennett, 1994;Lewicki et al., 2015). As examples, Buelens and Van Poucke (2004) found that BATNA value profoundly shapes the initial bid of opponents, and Magee et al. (2007) demonstrated that negotiators are more likely to make the first offer when they possess a high valued BATNA. ...
... As examples, Buelens and Van Poucke (2004) found that BATNA value profoundly shapes the initial bid of opponents, and Magee et al. (2007) demonstrated that negotiators are more likely to make the first offer when they possess a high valued BATNA. In addition, negotiators with high valued BATNAs choose higher reservation points and claim larger portions of the resource pie than negotiators with BATNAs of lower value or those told nothing regarding an alternative (typically used as a control group in studies; e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994). ...
... Our primary questions concern whether, how, and why variations in the likelihood of a BATNA will affect negotiator perceptions and outcomes. Past research suggests that having a high valued (and certain) BATNA is more advantageous than having a low valued BATNA or no BATNA at all, due to the perceived power that is associated with BATNA values (Pinkley et al., 1994). In contrast, a recent study suggests that having a low valued BATNA may be worse than having no BATNA at all, because low valued alternatives lead negotiators to consider anchors lower than those envisioned by negotiators lacking BATNA information (Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). ...
We examine the notion of a Phantom BATNA – a negotiation alternative that may or may not materialize – and its impact on a current negotiation. Across three studies, we investigate the impact of such alternatives on negotiation, and compare them to when negotiators have a certain BATNA, when they have no BATNA, or when they are provided no information whatsoever regarding a BATNA. We demonstrate that perceptions of power mediate the effects of BATNA likelihood on the performance-related outcomes (final settlements or counter-offers) of negotiators. We establish these effects when the alternative has a known or an unknown likelihood of occurring. Additionally, BATNA likelihood influences the extent to which negotiators mention the possibility of an alternative to their counterpart during the negotiation. Based on our investigation, we offer BATNA likelihood as an important dimension of BATNA influence that can enhance theoretical and practical understanding, and stimulate future research.
... The negotiation literature has consistently established that high valued BATNAs provide advantage to negotiators (Pinkley Neale, & Bennett, 1994;Lewicki et al., 2015). As examples, Buelens and Van Poucke (2004) found that BATNA value profoundly shapes the initial bid of opponents, and Magee et al. (2007) demonstrated that negotia- tors are more likely to make the first offer when they possess a high valued BATNA. ...
... As examples, Buelens and Van Poucke (2004) found that BATNA value profoundly shapes the initial bid of opponents, and Magee et al. (2007) demonstrated that negotia- tors are more likely to make the first offer when they possess a high valued BATNA. In addition, negotiators with high valued BATNAs choose higher reservation points and claim larger portions of the re- source pie than negotiators with BATNAs of lower value or those told nothing regarding an alternative (typically used as a control group in studies; e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994). ...
... Our primary questions concern whether, how, and why variations in the likelihood of a BATNA will affect negotiator perceptions and out- comes. Past research suggests that having a high valued (and certain) BATNA is more advantageous than having a low valued BATNA or no BATNA at all, due to the perceived power that is associated with BATNA values (Pinkley et al., 1994). In contrast, a recent study suggests that having a low valued BATNA may be worse than having no BATNA at all, because low valued alternatives lead negotiators to consider anchors lower than those envisioned by negotiators lacking BATNA information (Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). ...
... A broader scope of strategic chances becomes particularly relevant for negotiation performance where one party is disadvantaged. A power imbalance between negotiators is one of these scenarios, as it affects the negotiation process and performance measures differently (Mannix 1993;Mannix and Neale 1993;Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;Mannix, Neale, and Northcraft 1995;. Several researchers have agreed that a higher power position positively affects a negotiation's individual outcomes (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;Giebels, De Dreu, and van de Vliert 2000;Wolfe and McGinn 2005). ...
... A power imbalance between negotiators is one of these scenarios, as it affects the negotiation process and performance measures differently (Mannix 1993;Mannix and Neale 1993;Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;Mannix, Neale, and Northcraft 1995;. Several researchers have agreed that a higher power position positively affects a negotiation's individual outcomes (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;Giebels, De Dreu, and van de Vliert 2000;Wolfe and McGinn 2005). Situational power enables negotiators to influence a negotiation process favorably, mainly due to the control of resources and the ability to influence the reward structure (Greenhalgh, Neslin, and Gilkey 1985). ...
... Bargaining power is defined as an advantageous position during negotiation that allows claiming the larger amount of the overall value due to resource control and enables assertiveness regarding one's own interests (Magee, Galinsky, Fragale, and Gruenfeld 2007;Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2010;Fragale, Overbeck, and Neale 2011;Belkin, Kurtzberg, and Naquin 2013). Many researchers agree that a higher power position affects the individual outcome of a negotiation positively (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;Giebels, De Dreu, and van de Vliert 2000;Wolfe and McGinn 2005). It is also suggested that the absence or loss of bargaining power does not necessarily entail a decrease of demands regarding negotiation issues (Wolfe and McGinn 2005). ...
Researchers have shown that structuring issues and organizing an agenda before a negotiation lead to improved negotiation performance. By using issue analysis, negotiators become aware of their own and their opponents’ preferences on negotiation issues and are able to use this knowledge to optimize their degree of success. Following research on asymmetrical preferences in negotiations, we introduce a new approach for issue analysis that considers the identification of one-sided preferences, specifically a 0-preference for issues from one party. We conducted an experimental study to test if this type of preference for an issue (chance issue) yields strategic potential for a negotiator. We also examined whether the identification of these chance issues could be particularly relevant for a low-power party in negotiations with a power imbalance, to overcome the lower scope of action due to the weaker negotiating position. The results indicate initial verification that no preference at all for one issue could lead to higher individual performance and noneconomic outcomes. Joint performance was positively affected by 0-preference, even in unbalanced power situations.
... To test these hypotheses, we used a hiring scenario and included a measure of perceived negotiation room. This hiring scenario was modeled on the commonly used New Recruit case (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), in which a new employee has to negotiate their starting package with their employer. To manipulate the choice mindset, we used a choice priming manipulation that has been used frequently in past research, in which participants are asked to recall either their choices or their nochoice actions from their past everyday lives (see Savani & King, 2015, Studies 2 and 3;Savani & Rattan, 2012, Study 1;Savani, Stephens, & Markus, 2017, Studies 1 and 3). ...
... Perceptions of one's choices outside the negotiation are conceptually similar to people's perceptions of their alternatives to the present negotiation (or BATNA). Given past research showing that negotiators with better BATNAs perform better (Kim & Fragale, 2005;Pinkley et al., 1994), we predicted that perceiving that one has many choices outside the negotiation will also be associated with greater perceived negotiation room and willingness to persist. Conversely, perceiving that one's counterpart has many alternatives outside the negotiation is likely to be negatively associated with perceived negotiation room and willingness to persist. ...
... Second, most research concerning choices in negotiation focuses on the objective options that negotiators have within the negotiation (i.e., which negotiation issues one chooses to negotiate, Naquin, 2003) as well as outside the negotiation (i.e., Best Alternative to Negotiation Agreement or BATNA, Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011;Pinkley et al., 1994). Drawing on research on the choice mindset, which argues that people's construals of choice are as important as the actual availability of choices (Savani et al., 2010), the present research shows that perceptions of choice can influence negotiators' cognitions and behaviors while keeping the objective availability of options constant. ...
... Participants arrived at the laboratory two at a time and were randomly assigned to one of two roles-candidate or recruiter-in a negotiation simulation. The negotiation simulation was modelled after the classic New Recruit exercise (Neale, 1997;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), which involves a candidate and a recruiter negotiating over multiple issues concerning the candidate's employment compensation package. The simulation consisted of five scored issues to be negotiated, with point totals reflecting the preferences and priorities attached to each issue. ...
... Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were randomly assigned to one of two roles in a negotiation simulation based on the New Recruit (Neale, 1997;Pinkley et al., 1994) exercise. The 9 We tested and found no effects of gender (all ps .24-.29). ...
... Recruit exercise (Neale, 1997;Pinkley et al., 1994) with random assignment to dyads and, within dyads, to the role of recruiter or candidate. A lottery-based financial incentive was again used. ...
... Indeed, research shows that rather than being careless or selfish, powerholders often see their power as responsibility towards others and as an inner obligation to take care of things that need to happen (e.g., ensuring that important goals are met; Sassenberg et al., 2012;Sassenberg et al., 2014). Differently put, powerful people internalize the goals that are set with their powerless counterparts, and thus treat others more considerately than selfishly (Chen et al., 2001;De Wit et al., 2017;Gordon and Chen, 2013;Pinkley et al., 1994). Moreover, research on people's social attention in organizations (Overbeck and Park, 2006) shows that powerful people are more attentive to powerless people's goals and they are more capable of individuating their powerless targets. ...
... However, when negotiation touches on more important (to them) matters, such as task-related issues, concern for the opponent decreases. Overall, findings supported the collaborative approach of power (Chen et al., 2001;Pinkley et al., 1994;Overbeck andPark, 2001, 2006;Overbeck et al., 2006) and showed that powerholders are more attentive to the interests and goals of their low power opponents as soon as their power position is safe and secure. In contrast, low power negotiators care less about the interests of their high power opponents and tend to compete more, unless the disagreements at hand are less crucial to them (e.g., power-related disagreements). ...
... Our study has important theoretical and practical implications. As far as the theoretical implications are concerned, this study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature (Mannix and Neale, 1993;McAlister et al., 1986;Pinkley et al., 1994). More specifically, our research provides support for the collaborative approach of power and, contrary to the competitive approach, it points out the increased value that powerholders place on their own and their powerless opponents' interests (see Overbeck and Park, 2006). ...
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, the authors state oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. This study further investigates the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e. topics that touch on one’s power position versus topics that are related to the tasks one needs to perform) in this relationship. Finally, the authors state a moderated mediation hypothesis where they expected that the negotiation topic would moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies.
Design/methodology/approach
A vignette study ( N = 279) and a negotiation game ( N = 138) were conducted where the power within dyads was manipulated.
Findings
Study 1 showed that powerholders prefer collaborative strategies, whereas powerless negotiators prefer competitive strategies. Perceived threat of the negotiation mediated this effect. Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 showed that the negotiation topic moderates the effect of power on negotiation strategies providing further support for the collaborative approach of power. Finally, Study 1 provided partial support for the moderated mediation hypothesis.
Research limitations/implications
Both Studies 1 and 2 are experimental studies. A field study should try to replicate these results in the future.
Practical implications
This study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature. The results might be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to show the moderating role of negotiation topic in the relationship between power and negotiation.
... Indeed, research shows that rather than being careless or selfish, powerholders often see their power as responsibility towards others and as an inner obligation to take care of things that need to happen (e.g., ensuring that important goals are met; Sassenberg et al., 2012;Sassenberg et al., 2014). Differently put, powerful people internalize the goals that are set with their powerless counterparts, and thus treat others more considerately than selfishly (Chen et al., 2001;De Wit et al., 2017;Gordon and Chen, 2013;Pinkley et al., 1994). Moreover, research on people's social attention in organizations (Overbeck and Park, 2006) shows that powerful people are more attentive to powerless people's goals and they are more capable of individuating their powerless targets. ...
... However, when negotiation touches on more important (to them) matters, such as task-related issues, concern for the opponent decreases. Overall, findings supported the collaborative approach of power (Chen et al., 2001;Pinkley et al., 1994;Overbeck andPark, 2001, 2006;Overbeck et al., 2006) and showed that powerholders are more attentive to the interests and goals of their low power opponents as soon as their power position is safe and secure. In contrast, low power negotiators care less about the interests of their high power opponents and tend to compete more, unless the disagreements at hand are less crucial to them (e.g., power-related disagreements). ...
... Our study has important theoretical and practical implications. As far as the theoretical implications are concerned, this study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature (Mannix and Neale, 1993;McAlister et al., 1986;Pinkley et al., 1994). More specifically, our research provides support for the collaborative approach of power and, contrary to the competitive approach, it points out the increased value that powerholders place on their own and their powerless opponents' interests (see Overbeck and Park, 2006). ...
Purpose: We examined two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, we stated oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. We further investigated the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation, and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e, topics that touch on one’s power position versus topics that are related to the tasks one needs to perform) in this relationship. Finally, we stated a moderated mediation hypothesis where we expected that the negotiation topic would moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies.
Methodology: We conducted a vignette study (N = 279) and a negotiation game (N = 138) where we manipulated power within dyads.
Results: Study 1 showed that powerholders prefer collaborative strategies, whereas powerless negotiators prefer competitive strategies. Perceived threat of the negotiation mediated this effect. Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 showed that the negotiation topic moderates the effect of power on negotiation strategies providing further support for the collaborative approach of power. Finally, Study 1 provided partial support for the moderated mediation hypothesis.
Limitations: Both Studies 1 and 2 are experimental studies. A field study should try to replicate these results in the future.
Implications: Our study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature. The results might be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions.
... Each dyad member completed the training individually. After the respective training, each dyad member was assigned the role of an employee or the role of a recruiter, and the dyad engaged in a widely used negotiation task about a fictitious work contract (Pinkley et al., 1994). ...
... Second, in standard negotiation tasks the topics, options, and economic gains (points) are predefined which makes the interactions relatively structured and comparable between dyads. Third, such tasks allow studying a variety of outcomes that we examined in the present study: Economic outcomes include joint gains reflecting how well the dyad members succeeded in arriving at a mutually beneficial deal, as well as individual gains reflecting the share of the pie one negotiator obtained for him-or herself (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994). Relational outcomes include ratings of trust, rapport, cooperation etc. made by the negotiators (e.g., Curhan et al., 2008). ...
... Participants completed the "New Recruit" exercise (Pinkley et al., 1994) in which dyad members are randomly assigned either the role of a "recruiter" or an "employee" and are asked to discuss the terms of an employment contract on eight topics such as salary, vacation days, and starting date of the contract. For each topic, there were five predefined options for agreement. ...
Emotion recognition ability (ERA) predicts more successful interpersonal interactions. However, it remains unknown whether ERA training can affect behaviors and improve social outcomes in such interactions. Here, 83 dyads of same-gender students completed either a self-administered 45 min ERA training based on audio-visual clips of 14 different emotions, or a control training about cloud types. All dyads then engaged in a face-to-face employee-recruiter negotiation about a job contract. Dyads trained in ERA reached more egalitarian economic outcomes, rated themselves and their partners as less competitive after the negotiation, and received more positive affect ratings as well as lower ratings on forcing from independent observers. Applications of the training in the context of work, education, and therapy are discussed.
... Information about the other party's preferences has been a central element of the bargaining literature. In particular, sensitive information about the seller's reservation price (which can be in the form of seller's cost or the true value of the product), can significantly predict the negotiation outcome (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;White and Neale 1991). Negotiation scholars have consistently demonstrated that when negotiators have limited information about their opponent's reservation price, they are always worse off (Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere 2002;Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983;Perry 1986;Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;White and Neale 1994). ...
... In particular, sensitive information about the seller's reservation price (which can be in the form of seller's cost or the true value of the product), can significantly predict the negotiation outcome (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;White and Neale 1991). Negotiation scholars have consistently demonstrated that when negotiators have limited information about their opponent's reservation price, they are always worse off (Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere 2002;Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983;Perry 1986;Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994;White and Neale 1994). However, when buyers have the opportunity to discover seller's reservation price, or when the search cost associated with finding this information is low, customers can significantly improve their negotiation outcome (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983;Scott Morton, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer 2011;Van Poucke and Buelens 2002). ...
Negotiations today are less likely to be characterized by information asymmetry—the notion that buyers are less informed than sellers—due to the amount of information available to buyers. A number of industries have reacted to this change by shifting their attention to earning profits in aftermarkets: products and services that augment the main purchase (e.g., add-ons, insurance, financing, service and maintenance). In these aftermarkets, firms often retain an information advantage, even if information asymmetries are eliminated from the main purchase. This has given rise to an interesting setting untapped by prior research: information “symmetry” in the front end (main purchase) and information “asymmetry” in the back end (aftermarket). The authors argue that symmetry in the front end provides an opportunity to build trust, as the knowledgeable customer can verify the information disclosed by the seller. In an observational study in the automotive industry, the authors find that customers to whom the salesperson revealed the cost of a car at the beginning of the negotiation spent significantly more in the back end than others. As corroborated in subsequent studies, this effect holds only when cost is disclosed at the beginning of the negotiation and when customers can verify the cost information.
... Similarly, powerful individuals feel less distress and compassion in response to others' suffering [27], which reduces the likelihood of making concessions. These effects of power appear to be relatively consistent across different sources of power, such as alternatives [6], status [12], social capital [14], coercion [18], and others. ...
... A closer inspection of studies reveals that equal-power dyads create more value than unequal-power dyads, but only when both negotiators have a lot of power [29,30*,31,33]. However, when both negotiators have little or no power, equal-power dyads actually create less value than unequal-power dyads [6,37]. This suggests that the effects of power on value creation depend on both the level of power and its distribution [30*]. ...
This review synthesizes the impact of power on individual and joint negotiation performance. Although power generally has positive effects on negotiators’ individual performance (value claiming), recent work suggests that more power is not always beneficial. Taking a dyadic perspective, we also find mixed evidence for how power affects joint performance (value creation); some studies show that equal-power dyads create more value than unequal-power dyads, but others find the opposite. We identify the source of power, power distribution, and competitiveness as critical moderators of this relationship. Finally, we suggest that future research should move beyond studying alternatives in dyadic deal-making, identify strategies to overcome a lack of power, increase empirical realism, and take a more dynamic view of power in negotiations.
... The key structural constraint on reaching a negotiated agreement is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement or BATNA (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Attractive alternatives make an impasse appealing (Raiffa, 1982) by prompting the negotiators to leave the current negotiation (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). They increase the likelihood of a negative bargaining zone where an impasse is the logical outcome. ...
... Conversely, an impasse is less frequent when negotiators' alternatives are weak (Babcock & Pogarsky, 1999). In sum, the alternatives available create an impasse (Pinkley et al., 1994;Raiffa, 1982)-a wanted impasse if both have strong alternatives; a forced impasse if only one party has. ...
Although impasses are frequently experienced by negotiators, are featured in newspaper articles, and are reflected in online searches and can be costly, negotiation scholarship does not appear to consider them seriously as phenomena worth explaining. A review of negotiation tasks to study impasses reveals that they bias negotiators toward agreement. We systematically organize past findings on impasses and integrate them in the impasse type, cause, and resolution model (ITCR model). Our fundamental assumption is that a positive bargaining zone does not imply symmetric preferences for an agreement. One or both negotiators may prefer an impasse over an agreement despite a positive bargaining zone. We argue that it is beneficial for management research to distinguish between three impasse types: If both negotiators perceive benefit from an impasse, they are wanted; if one negotiator perceives benefits from an impasse, they are forced; and if both do not perceive benefits from the impasse, they are unwanted. We review structural (e.g., bargaining zone, communication channels), interpersonal (e.g., tough tactics, emotions), and intrapersonal (e.g., biases, available information, and framing) factors as the likely antecedents of the three impasse types. We also examine evidence that suggests that wanted impasses can be resolved by changing the negotiation structure for both parties, forced impasses can be resolved through persuasion, and unwanted impasses can be overcome by debiasing both parties. Finally, we review current methodological guidance and provide updated recommendations on how scholars should deal with impasses in both study designs and data analyses.
... Fisher and Ury (1981), in their classic and best-selling book on negotiation, contended that parties in any bargaining would be wise to invest resources in enhancing their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) which is their fallback option in case they fail to reach an agreement. This recommendation is supported by ample robust empirical evidence in negotiation and business administration literatures, showing that the more attractive is a party's best alternative to a negotiated agreement, the better is her fallback payo and bargaining power (see Pinkley, Neale, andBennett, 1994, andPinkley, 1995, for instance). Further, Mahotna and Gino (2011) have recently illustrated in a experiment how attempts aimed at enhancing one's fallback payo can allow parties to obtain gains in their negotiations, even after controlling for the leverage provided by the outside options. ...
... Fisher and Ury (1981), in their classic and best-selling book on negotiation, contended that parties in any bargaining would be wise to invest resources in enhancing their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) which is their fallback option in case they fail to reach an agreement. This recommendation is supported by ample robust empirical evidence in negotiation and business administration literatures, showing that the more attractive is a party's best alternative to a negotiated agreement, the better is her fallback payo and bargaining power (see Pinkley, Neale, andBennett, 1994, andPinkley, 1995, for instance). Further, Mahotna and Gino (2011) have recently illustrated in a experiment how attempts aimed at enhancing one's fallback payo can allow parties to obtain gains in their negotiations, even after controlling for the leverage provided by the outside options. ...
We consider an ultimatum-game setup, which has two key non-standard features: (1) The responder has an initial fallback position, which is her private information (except for the complete-information case), and (2) she can improve her initial fallback position further by means of a costly investment, which does not improve the joint surplus and thus is a deadweight loss. There are two sources of inefficiency: disagreement possibility and the deadweight-loss investment. The proposer ends up either making a counter offer to the responder after finding out the responder's type as well as her best outside offer or makes a particular preemptive offer before her investment and thus before the uncertainty about her type is not resolved (except for the incomplete-information case). Thus, any preemptive offer aims for agreement before investment, which, if accepted, avoids the deadweight-loss investment, and thus inefficiency; if rejected, it always leads to inefficiency as players receive their fallback payoffs. A counter offer, on the other hand, always guarantees agreement, but only after investment cost is incurred, and thus it is inefficient. We consider the complete-information as well as the no-and noisy-information cases. We find that in the complete-information case the unique equilibrium offer is a preemptive offer which always achieves efficiency and leads to agreement. In the other cases, if the proposer's (prior or posterior) belief about the responder's type is not precise enough, he might prefer to wait to make a counter offer until after the responder makes her investment and receives outside offers. It turns out that more precise information reduces both types of inefficiency by leading to preemptive offers which are accepted with higher probability. We also show that our results are robust to various extensions such as risk aversion by players, multiple offers by the proposer, continuum of responder types and type-dependent investment costs.
... Power is a psychological state -has been explained as the influencing capability (Bugental & Lewis, 1999;Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), and it is the capacity to control one's own and others' resources and outcomes (Fiske, 1993;Keltner et al., 2003;Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). It has been understood that a negotiator who has an attractive BATNA, experiences greater power than the counterparty, and is less dependent on the focal negotiation, which can be instrumental in obtaining better outcomes from negotiations (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Empirical studies have also provided evidence on the effects of BATNA to generate power asymmetries in negotiation situations (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005;Mannix & Neale, 1993). ...
... Results highlight the action orientation of a negotiator (Galinsky et al., 2003;Magee et al., 2007) is driven by an inflated sense of control which is activated by the positive illusion of the power of attractive BATNA. It has already been acknowledged that BATNA influences the behavior of negotiators in terms of identifying reference points in negotiation (Pinkley et al., 1994). Similarly, the perceived leverage using BATNA (illusion) can influence negotiator's behaviors in terms of identifying first offers, targets, and last offers which play a significant role in negotiation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). ...
The paper explores the influence of a positive illusion of power (to control) in resolving a buyer-seller conflict. Here, the positive illusion is the negotiator’s perception about the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) as attractive, when it is not really so. The paper explores a buyer-seller conflict and explores the impact of positive illusion on buyers and sell-ers, behavior and their negotiation outcome. Postgraduates took part in a negotiation role-play and their responses were collected and analyzed. The findings revealed that the presence of the perceived positive illusion about BATNA could benefit negotiators to overcome a stressful conflict situation of having a weaker BATNA, and strike a final deal which is better than otherwise. It held true for both buyers and sellers, whether they offer first or not, in their negotiation. Findings, in the case of Indian negotiators, present that positive illusion of power influenced negotiators’ perceived leverage using BATNA, anchor points, reference points, outcome (agreement), along with their satisfaction with the outcome. The paper supports that positive illusion can prove to be more advantageous. It also attempts to fill the gap owing to the lack of empirical evidence regarding positive illusion about one of the most important sources of power i.e., strong BATNA. The paper also discusses the implications of this research for other conflict studies such as dip-lomatic conflicts, WTO disputes, and other organizational and social conflicts, etc., and discusses future research implications.
... Research on power in negotiations has mainly focused on alternatives to a negotiated agreement to measure individual-level power; all the reviewed studies agree that higher alternatives lead to more significant individual outcomes and that high-power negotiators tend to employ distributive strategies resulting in lower joint gains (Agndal et al., 2017;Brett et al., 1996;Butt & Choi, 2010;De Dreu, 2005;Giebels et al., 2000;Jäger et al., 2017;Kim et al., 2005;Pinkley et al., 1994;Pinkley, 1995;Wolfe & McGinn, 2005;Zahariadis, 2017). Conversely, research diverges on the impact of power balance on negotiation outcomes (Schaerer et al., 2020). ...
... Likewise, the findings of the study complement existing literature (Alavoine, 2012;Alavoine and Estieu, 2015;Brett et al., 1996;Butt & Choi, 2010;De Dreu, 2005;Giebels et al., 2000;Jäger et al., 2017;Kim et al., 2005;Lopez-Fresno et al., 2018;Pinkley et al., 1994;Pinkley, 1995;Wolfe & McGinn, 2005) indicating that the influence of power on negotiation outcomes is also contingent to the negotiator's role. Among the six powerrelated variables included in the simulation's analysis, only the seller's difference in power perception between after and before the negotiation influences negotiation outcomes, precisely the final negotiated price. ...
... An important factor that impacts the relative attractiveness and the willingness to comply with a request is a negotiator's power. Indeed, negotiators who have a lot of power (i.e., have an attractive outside offer) tend to have higher reservation prices than negotiators who have less power (Galinsky, Schaerer, & Magee, 2017;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994;Schaerer, Teo, Madan, & Swaab, 2020) and tend to be less affected by the opponent's influence tactics (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). Thus, in Study 3 we manipulated whether offer recipients had a very weak or very strong reservation price and predicted that strategic offer framing would be less effective when offer recipients have a lot of power because this would direct their focus on a relatively strong reservation price. ...
In distributive negotiations, people often feel that they have to choose between maximizing their economic outcomes (claiming more value) or improving their relational outcomes (having a satisfied opponent). The present research proposes a conversational strategy that can help negotiators achieve both. Specifically, we show that using an offer framing strategy that shifts offer recipients’ attention to their reservation price (e.g., “How does my offer compare to your minimum price?”) leads to both (a) an assimilation effect whereby recipients make more favorable counteroffers (economic benefit) as well as (b) a contrast effect whereby recipients feel more satisfied with the negotiation (relational benefit). We find evidence for the effectiveness of this conversational strategy across four experiments (N=1,522) involving different negotiation contexts (real estate, restaurant sale) and participant samples (MBAs, sales agents, online participants), and also document negotiator power as an important boundary condition. Overall, our research suggests that economic and relational benefits do not have to be mutually exclusive in distributive negotiations, that the perceived extremity of an offer is subjective and can be strategically influenced, and that assimilation and contrast effects can operate simultaneously when they relate to separate outcomes.
... More testing will help to flesh out this conclusion. That noted, the BATNA manipulation independently affected our dependent measures, further demonstrating the power of having a strong BATNA (Galinsky, Schaerer, & Magee, 2017;Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). ...
The tension that negotiators face between claiming and creating value is particularly apparent when exchanging offers. We tested whether presenting a choice among first offers (Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers; MESOs) reduces this negotiator dilemma and increases economic and relational outcomes. Six experiments comparing MESOs to a single package-offer revealed three effects. First, MESOs produced stronger anchors and better outcomes for the offerer because recipients perceived MESOs as a more sincere attempt at reaching an agreement (agreement sincerity). Second, MESOs yielded greater joint outcomes because they were probabilistically more likely to include an economically attractive starting point for recipients (initial recipient-value). Third, MESOs allowed the offerer to secure a cooperative reputation and created a more cooperative negotiation climate. Negotiators who offered MESOs were able to claim and create more economic and relational value. MESOs reduced the negotiator dilemma for offerers by also reducing it for recipients. Weblinks in the appendix give access to supplementary materials, analyses, and data.
... When deciding on a wholesale price to charge buyers in a B2B setting, a supplier's most pivotal consideration is the buyer's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). BATNA refers to the most advantageous alternative action that the buyer can take if the negotiation reaches an impasse (Fisher and Ury, 1981;Fisher et al., 2011;Pinkley et al., 1994). Consequently, the buyers' BATNA determines the suppliers' pricing strategy: buyers with a stronger BATNA have better outside options, and in turn, they have a lower reservation price and a lower willingness to pay (Korobkin, 2014), which results in a lower wholesale price charged by suppliers. ...
... In negotiations, parties anchor on self-generated or externally provided information (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996;Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004;Epley & Gilovich, 2006;Schaerer et al., 2016). Negotiators typically generate their own reservation prices (Raiffa, 1982), comparison levels of alternatives (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; BATNA: Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, see Fisher & Ury, 1981;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), and target prices (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002;Huber & Neale, 1986;Pruitt, 1981). In addition to self-generated reference points (Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, Shah, Schroth, & Bazerman, 1996;Ritov, 1996), negotiators can also be anchored by externally provided information, such as previous precedents of a negotiation (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999;Lehr, Vyrastekova, Akkerman, & Torenvlied, 2016) or, importantly, opening proposals from the opponent (Yukl, 1974). ...
Abundant research has established that first proposals can anchor negotiations and
lead to a first-mover advantage. The current research developed and tested a
motivated anchor adjustment hypothesis that integrates the literatures on framing and
anchoring and highlights how anchoring in negotiations differs in significant ways from
standard decision-making contexts. Our research begins with the premise that first
proposals can be framed as either an offer of resources (e.g., I am offering my A for
your B) that highlights gains versus a request for resources (e.g., I am requesting your
B for my A) that highlights losses to a responder. We propose that this framing would
affect the concession aversion of responders and ultimately the negotiated outcomes.
We predicted that when a first proposal is framed as an offer, the well-documented
anchoring and first-mover advantage effect would emerge because offers do not create
high levels of concession aversion. In contrast, because requests highlight what the
responder has to give up, we predicted that opening requests would produce
concession aversion and eliminate and even reverse the first-mover advantage. Across
five experiments, the classic first-mover advantage in negotiations was moderated by
the framing of proposals because anchor framing affected concession aversion. The
studies highlight how motivational forces (i.e., concession aversion) play an important
role in producing anchoring effects, which has been predominantly viewed through a
purely cognitive lens. Overall, the findings highlight when and how motivational
processes play a key role in both judgmental heuristics and mixed-motive decisionmaking.
... This type of power is called Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA; Fisher et al., 2011), and it is rather unstable as negotiators' alternatives can vary across time. Negotiators with attractive BATNAs are more likely to use competitive strategies such as threats (Lawler, 1992) or manipulation to achieve their own goals (Pinkley et al., 1994). In contrast, negotiators with fewer or less attractive alternatives (no BATNA) are more dependent on their counterpart Stevens and Fiske, 2000;Weber et al., 2004) and are more likely to use collaborative strategies and engage in problemsolving , 2006. ...
The literature regarding the effect of power on negotiation strategies remains scattered and inconsistent. We propose that the effect of power on negotiation strategies is contingent on contextual variables but also on individual differences among negotiators. Specifically, we hypothesize that creativity moderates the effect of power such that low-power, as compared to high-power negotiators, use more collaborative and less competitive strategies and further report lower fixed-pie perception (i.e., perception of a counterpart’s goals and interests as diametrically opposite to one’s own goals and interests) when they can be creative. Moreover, we hypothesize that negotiators’ age buffers the moderated effect of power. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 played a negotiation game in dyads. Study 1 manipulated power as status, whereas Study 2 as
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (i.e., power to exit the negotiation without a deal). Study 3 (preregistered) was a field study. Across the three studies we found support for most of our hypotheses. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
... Previous research has focused on different PLOS dimensions of the negotiation process which may lead to different outcomes, such as the first offer and the way it affects the counteroffer (e.g. [5]), alternatives within the negotiation process [6], cultural differences [7], politeness [8], and reference points, such as the current market data [9]. The current research focuses on the role of language in the context of negotiations, acknowledging its potential as a tool for promoting successful negotiation outcomes. ...
The wording negotiators use shapes the emotions of their counterparts. These emotions, in turn, influence their counterparts’ economic decisions. Building on this rationale, we examined how the language used during negotiation affects discount rate and willingness to engage in future deals. In three studies, participants assumed the role of retailers. Alleged counterparts (actually a computerized program) asked for a discount under three conditions: request, want, and demand. Results show that less extreme language (request/want) resulted in better outcomes than demanding a discount. Moreover, while the language used by the customer had an effect on experienced emotions, the positive emotions (sympathy and empathy) participants felt toward the customer mediated the relationship between the linguistic cue and the negotiation outcome. Our results inform both psycholinguistic research and negotiation research by demonstrating the causal role of linguistic cues in activating concept-knowledge relevant to different emotional experiences, and point to the down-the-line impact on shaping negotiation preferences.
... Because negotiators are motivated to understand their counterpart's reservation price but are typically unable to obtain such information directly, they are likely to rely on other sources of data to form an estimate of the other party's reservation price. However, prior research does not provide a clear answer as to how negotiators come to understand their counterpart's reservation price because it focused predominantly on negotiators' own reservation price and/or treated the reservation price as a static value that does not change (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;Kim & Fragale, 2005;Larrick & Wu, 2007;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994;White et al., 1994;Wolfe & Mcginn, 2005). For example, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) instructed negotiators to enter their negotiation with an exogenously imposed and fixed reservation price. ...
... Because negotiators are motivated to form an accurate perception of their counterparts' reservation prices but are typically unable to obtain such information, they rely on other cues to infer their counterparts' reservation prices. Although most research to date has treated the reservation price as fixed (Blount et al., 1996;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;Kim & Fragale, 2005;Larrick & Wu, 2007;Pinkley et al., 1994;White et al., 1994), more recent research suggests that negotiators gradually form an understanding of their counterparts' reservation prices throughout the negotiation, for example as a function of the counterparts' emotional expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2004) or the type of offers they receive (Ames & Mason, 2015). Building on this research, we argue that perceptions of counterparts' reservation prices are malleable and can be affected by contextual cues that negotiators are exposed to during the negotiation. ...
We propose that making a series of decreasing concessions (e.g., $1,500-1,210-1,180-1,170) signals that negotiators are reaching their limit and that this results in a negotiation disadvantage for offer recipients. Although we find that most negotiators do not use this strategy naturally, seven studies (N=2,311) demonstrate that decreasing concessions causes recipients to make less ambitious counteroffers (Studies 1-5) and reach worse deals (Study 2) in distributive negotiations. We find that this disadvantage occurs because decreasing concessions shape recipients’ expectations of the subsequent offers that will be made, which results in inflated perceptions of the counterparts’ reservation price relative to the other concession strategies (Study 3). In addition, we find that this disadvantage is particularly large when concessions decrease at a moderate rate (Study 4a) and when decreasing concessions takes place over more (vs. fewer) rounds (Study 4b). Finally, we find that recipients can protect themselves against the deleterious effects of decreasing concession by thinking of a target before they enter the negotiation (Study 5).
... At this point, they have a choice. They can, as conventional wisdom about reservation points (and so alternatives, BATNAs, and bargaining zones) indicates, walk away (Pinkley et al. 1994). But that conventional wisdom presumes reservation points are fixed aspects of the situation. ...
Effective negotiation rests in part on generating integrative agreements, or agreements advancing parties’ interests through generating joint gains. Theorists have outlined multiple possibilities to achieve integrative agreements (Pruitt in Negotiation behaviour, Academic Press, New York, 1981; Carnevale in: Deutsch, Coleman, Marcus (eds) Handbook of conflict resolution: theory and practice, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2006), but negotiation research relies disproportionately on studies of one method of integration—making efficient tradeoffs on existing issues. The current studies examine integration through redefinition—modifying the issues under discussion. Doing so encourages revisiting the role goals play in negotiation. Study 1 found that positive and negative bargaining zones are not just indicators of agreement rates, but also cues to consider redefining issues. Specifically, negative bargaining zones spurred attempts to create value that positive bargaining zones did not. Study 2 found that focusing on interests was useful for redefining issues, whereas focusing on ambitious targets was no better than focusing on reservation points. Implications for negotiation theory are discussed.
... When deciding on a wholesale price to charge buyers in a B2B setting, a supplier's most pivotal consideration is the buyer's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). BATNA refers to the most advantageous alternative action that the buyer can take if the negotiation reaches an impasse (Fisher and Ury, 1981;Fisher et al., 2011;Pinkley et al., 1994). Consequently, the buyers' BATNA determines the suppliers' pricing strategy: buyers with a stronger BATNA have better outside options, and in turn, they have a lower reservation price and a lower willingness to pay (Korobkin, 2014), which results in a lower wholesale price charged by suppliers. ...
Problem definition: In this research, we study how buyers’ use of artificial intelligence (AI) affects suppliers’ price quoting strategies. Specifically, we study the impact of automation—that is, the buyer uses a chatbot to automatically inquire about prices instead of asking in person—and the impact of smartness—that is, the buyer signals the use of a smart AI algorithm in selecting the supplier. Academic/practical relevance: In a world advancing toward AI, we explore how AI creates and delivers value in procurement. AI has two unique abilities: automation and smartness, which are associated with physical machines or software that enable us to operate more efficiently and effectively. Methodology: We collaborate with a trading company to run a field experiment on an online platform in which we compare suppliers’ wholesale price quotes across female, male, and chatbot buyer types under AI and no recommendation conditions. Results: We find that, when not equipped with a smart control, there is price discrimination against chatbot buyers who receive a higher wholesale price quote than human buyers. In fact, without smartness, automation alone receives the highest quoted wholesale price. However, signaling the use of a smart recommendation system can effectively reduce suppliers’ price quote for chatbot buyers. We also show that AI delivers the most value when buyers adopt automation and smartness simultaneously in procurement. Managerial implications: Our results imply that automation is not very valuable when implemented without smartness, which in turn suggests that building smartness is necessary before considering high levels of autonomy. Our study unlocks the optimal steps that buyers could adopt to develop AI in procurement processes.
... A substantial literature describes a compensatory relationship between economic and relational outcomes: negotiators can achieve better economic outcomes by sacrificing relational outcomes or boost relational outcomes at the expense of economic outcomes. For example, by using competitive and aggressive tactics such as expressing anger, making an aggressive first offer, and exaggerating one's position, negotiators can improve their deal terms (Bazerman et al., 2000;Brett et al., 2007;De Dreu et al., 2007;Friedman et al., 2004;Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2015;Gunia et al., 2016;Pinkley et al., 1994;Raiffa, 1982;Thompson et al., 2010). Yet, these tactics may harm negotiators' relationships and impressions (Bhatia & Gunia, 2018;Bottom et al., 2006;Campagna et al., 2016;Mislin et al., 2011;Schweitzer et al., 2002;White et al., 2004). ...
When should negotiators care relatively more about their relationships with their counterparts than about the deal terms? We introduce a new dimension to characterize negotiation contexts to answer this question: the Economic Relevance of Relational Outcomes (ERRO). ERRO reflects the extent to which the total economic value of a negotiation hinges on the strength of a negotiator’s post-negotiation relationship with their counterpart. For example, in hiring a tutor, a student may derive economic value from both the wage and the quality of the tutor’s post-agreement service; if the student’s post-negotiation relationship with the tutor influences the quality of the service, this negotiation context is high ERRO. Importantly, although ERRO is an objective feature of the negotiation context for each negotiator, individuals may perceive their negotiation context to have higher or lower ERRO than it actually does. Across four experiments (N = 1601), we identify ERRO as a fundamental dimension of negotiation contexts. We find that in high ERRO contexts (e.g., many services, such as hiring a tutor) compared to low ERRO contexts (e.g., buying a couch), individuals negotiate more collaboratively, are more likely to privilege relational concerns over favorable deal terms, or may even forgo negotiating altogether. Compared to negotiators who build poor relationships, negotiators who build positive relationships with their counterparts attain better economic outcomes in high ERRO contexts because their counterparts invest greater effort following the negotiation. By introducing ERRO, our work underscores the importance of post-negotiation behavior and identifies when, how, and why relational outcomes influence economic outcomes.
... More testing will help to flesh out this conclusion. That noted, the BATNA manipulation independently affected our dependent measures, further demonstrating the power of having a strong BATNA (Galinsky, Schaerer, & Magee, 2017;Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007;Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). ...
Cambridge Core - Strategic Management - Frontiers of Strategic Alliance Research - edited by Farok J. Contractor
Frontiers of Strategic Alliance Research - edited by Farok J. Contractor March 2019
In this article, we examined the effect of external cues on first offers in negotiation. Specifically, we present the results of three experiments and an internal meta-analysis through which we investigated the relations between buyers' external characteristics, which serve as cues of economic wealth, including their clothes, cars and country of origin, and sellers' first offers in negotiation. We found that when external cues indicated wealth, counteroffers were less beneficial to those communicating the cues, resulting in higher first offers by their counterparts. We suggest, and provide empirical evidence, that these effects will emerge as long as the wealth signal is salient and perceived as an indication for the counterpart's 'deep pockets', or ability to pay.
Insincere negotiations involve at least one negotiator who deceptively professes the objective of reaching an agreement, but has ulterior motives or who never intends to honor the negotiated agreement. Insincere negotiations are prevalent and consequential in many contexts, from diplomacy to modern-day professional interactions. Yet, the literature has largely ignored the possibility and impact of insincere negotiations, often defining negotiations as involving people who want to reach an agreement. In this article, I expand the definition of negotiations to include insincere negotiations. Understanding insincere negotiations is important because insincere negotiations can facilitate the exploitation of counterparts during negotiations (stalling or wasting time, stealing proprietary information) and after negotiations (violating agreements). Future work should examine how this exploitation can be prevented.
In two studies, we examine how objective complexity—in terms of numbers of negotiable issues—affects negotiators’ aspirations, perceptions, actions, and ultimately, the quality of agreements they reach. We hypothesized and found that when negotiators had a greater number of issues to resolve, they were less ambitious for their own outcomes and developed less accurate insights into their partners’ interests.
To seek an alternative paradigm to liberal peacebuilding, this Bangsamoro case study explores how a transformative relationship in the mid-space could be nurtured between rebel groups in a conflict-affected society. Based on ground data collected first-hand in the southern Philippines, this case study focuses on rebel gatekeepers as bridge-builders. What roles do rebel gatekeepers play to mitigate a local armed conflict in vertical and horizontal gaps? What are the elements and conditions that obstruct or enhance a transformative relationship among gatekeepers across different communities? Why do some rebel gatekeepers split and become spoilers? This case study illustrates that ‘hybridity’ in peacebuilding is not only about alternative players and roles in the mid-space but also about their strategy against political violence. One practical way forward can involve harnessing transformative relationships and creating relational dialogue platforms among mid-space gatekeepers. By so doing, they serve as bridge-builders.
Cambridge Core - Arbitration, Dispute Resolution and Mediation - Effective Negotiation - by Ray Fells
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new agent-based simulation model of bilateral negotiation based on a synthesis of established theories and empirical studies of negotiation research. The central units of the model are negotiators who pursue goals, have attributes (trust, assertiveness, cooperativeness, creativity, time, etc.) and perform actions (proposing and accepting offers, exchanging information, creating value, etc).
Design/methodology/approach
Methodologically, the model follows the agent-based approach to modeling. This approach is chosen because negotiations can be described as complex, non-linear systems involving autonomous agents (i.e. the negotiators), who interact with each other, pursue goals and perform actions aimed at achieving their goals.
Findings
This paper illustrates how the model can simulate experiments involving variables such as negotiation strategy, creativity, reservation value or time in negotiation. An example simulation is presented which investigates the main and interaction effects of negotiators’ reservation value and their time available for a negotiation. A software implementation of the model is freely accessible at https://tinyurl.com/y7oj6jo8 .
Research limitations/implications
The model, as developed at this point, provides the basis for future research projects. One project could address the representation of emotions and their impact on the process and outcome of negotiations. Another project could extend the model by allowing negotiators to convey false information (i.e. to bluff). Yet another project could be aimed at refining the routines used for making and accepting offers with a view to allow parties to reach partial settlements during a negotiation.
Practical implications
Due to its broad scope and wide applicability, the model can be used by practitioners and researchers alike. As a decision-support system, the model allows users to simulate negotiation situations and estimate the likelihood of negotiation outcomes. As a research platform, it can generate simulation data in a cost- and time-effective way, allowing researchers to simulate complex, large-N studies at no cost or time.
Originality/value
The model presented in this paper synthesizes in a novel way a comprehensive range of concepts and theories of current negotiation research. It complements other computational models, in that it can simulate a more diverse range of negotiation strategies (distributive, integrative and compromise) and is applicable to a greater variety of negotiation scenarios.
Negotiation scholars have assumed that participants enter negotiations with the intent to reach an agreement. In addition, negotiation scholars have assumed that negotiators cannot be significantly harmed by the negotiation process itself. We challenge both of these assumptions and identify important implications. We introduce the term insincere negotiations to characterize negotiations that involve one or more negotiators who feign interest in seeking an agreement and enter negotiations to pursue non-agreement motives, such as stalling for time, gaining information, or blocking a competitor from reaching an agreement. We explore how this broader conceptualization of negotiations changes both negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes and makes the decisions to enter and to persist in a negotiation risky and strategic.
This paper explores the extent to which bargaining power asymmetries among supply chain members moderate the effect that the delay costs of the setting exert on negotiation outcomes. First, we propose that the influence of delay costs on the initial gap between the bargaining demands of sellers and buyers (i.e., initial bargaining gap) decreases when buyers have a bargaining power advantage over sellers. Second, we posit that this moderation effect reduces the indirect effect that the delay costs have on negotiation outcomes (via the initial bargaining gap). To test these notions, we conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with undergraduate students from a large European university in which we manipulate the relative bargaining power and delay costs of the setting. We conduct our analysis with 292 observations. Our findings support our theoretical predictions. Specifically, results indicate that bargaining power moderates (i.e., reduces) the effect of the delay costs on negotiation processes by reducing their influence on the initial bargaining gap. Likewise, our analysis shows that because more powerful buyers are less likely to modify their behavior as a result of the delay costs, they face a higher risk of obtaining suboptimal bargaining profits.
This study examined negotiation outcomes following a distributive bargaining task where individuals communicated in dyads for the purchase a hypothetical product. We used an experimental manipulation to examine the impact of sharing one’s alternative on bargainers’ final negotiated price both directly and indirectly through their partners’ one-sided negotiation tactics. After negotiating, participants in 92 dyads reported their results and provided information about their communication behaviors while bargaining. Using a dyadic mediation model, results revealed that when Buyers shared their alternatives with Sellers, they settled for higher prices compared to when Buyers did not. This outcome was the function of a direct effect of sharing on the final price, and an indirect effect through Sellers’ use of one-sided bargaining tactics.
The revolution in information availability and the advances in novel interaction technologies have ushered in two major shifts that call into question the traditional assumptions of buyer–seller interactions. First, buyer–seller information asymmetry has greatly decreased in many interactions. Second, face-to-face communication is no longer the main format of buyer–seller interactions. In this article, the authors review empirical research on how these shifts have changed buyer–seller negotiations, an important type of buyer–seller interactions. Several insights arise from this review. First, the shifts have caused fundamental changes in buyers’ and sellers’ roles, power, and aspirations and information processing. Second, the shifts and these fundamental changes together cause major changes in buyer–seller interactional processes and outcomes, including (1) change in buyers’ attitude and behavior, (2) change in sellers’ effectiveness in interacting with buyers, and (3) change in buyer–seller interactional processes. Based on these insights, the authors develop a research agenda to guide the reexamination of existing theories and the development of new theories of buyer–seller interactions.
The number of alternative suppliers is widely considered to be the most important source of power in supply chains. It is common knowledge that a buying company benefits from an increasing number of suppliers until a marginalization effect occurs. Consequently, a cost-benefit optimum must exist but has not been analyzed in a sufficiently differentiated manner in the literature. Particularly, research has not taken the variety of product groups, which is reflected by the degree of innovation, into account. Using a two-way analysis of variance, this study identifies the cost-benefit optimum for the number of suppliers and analyzes the moderating role of the degree of innovation. The analysis is based on real automotive business-to-business negotiation data. The results reveal that a cost-benefit optimum is reached at a number of three suppliers at the most. Furthermore, the impact of the number of suppliers is higher for innovative products than for more functional products. Purchasing managers can use the findings to determine the optimal size of their supplier choice set.
This research takes a new perspective on the long-standing mystery of personality in negotiation, which has seen decades of null and inconsistent findings. Grounded in interactionist theories defining personality as consistency in behaviors when placed multiple times in the same situation, the investigation examines consistency in individuals’ behavioral profiles across negotiation partners. Such consistency supports efforts to identify enduring dispositions that can predict objective and subjective outcomes. A comprehensive set of behaviors related to negotiation was coded in a round-robin study using groups of four negotiators who each took turns working with each other person. Analysis using Kenny’s Social Relations Model revealed evidence for extensive actor effects (indicating consistency in negotiators’ behavior), as well as moderate partner effects (indicating consistency in counterparts’ behavior) and dyadic reciprocity (indicating similarity in the behavior of negotiators and counterparts). We conclude with optimism for investigating the effects of personality in negotiation.
The purpose of a project is to create the preconditions for other activities. Yet the main focus of project research and much of practice is on the project itself, namely project characteristics and the means to execute projects. This conceptual paper addresses the purpose, and specifically creating the preconditions for other activities in use; an overlooked issue in research and practice. The delivery of valuable projects that fulfil their purpose is central to a thriving economy and society, and therefore creating the preconditions requires a great deal more attention.
Project provision cannot be compared with other standardized production and routinized service activities. Indeed, the standardization and routinization of other activities is made possible by the delivery and value realization of projects once put to use for sponsors, owners and end-users.
Preconditions come in several forms. An initial and indicative taxonomy of six categories of preconditions are proposed. The taxonomy provides a basis for understanding the preconditions as a first step for more detailed assessment of delivering projects with valuable outcomes. Such an approach links to other theoretical lenses, such as learning, service design and the service-dominant logic, to provide the conceptual means to evaluate creating the preconditions for other activities.
A MODIFIED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME WITH THE INCLUSION OF A 3RD CHOICE WAS USED IN 2 RELATED EXPERIMENTS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF 2 VARIABLES ON COOPERATIVE CHOICE: (1) POWER TO PUNISH UNDER UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL CONDITIONS, AND (2) HOW THE POWER IS USED. IN BOTH EXPERIMENTS THE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION CONSISTED OF FALSE FEEDBACK TO SS DESIGNED TO COMMUNICATE DIFFERENT INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF A SIMULATED OTHER. IN EXP. I INVOLVING UNILATERAL POWER, ALL SS WERE ASSIGNED TO THE WEAKER POSITION, AND 3 EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS WERE EMPLOYED: BENEVOLENT, MALEVOLENT, AND PASSIVE (NONUSE OF POWER). THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR WAS OBTAINED IN THE BENEVOLENT CONDITION; LEAST IN THE MALEVOLENT CONDITION. IN EXP. II, INVOLVING BILATERAL POWER, 4 EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS WERE EMPLOYED: BENEVOLENT, PASSIVE, MATCHING, AND A CONTROL WHERE SS ACTUALLY PLAYED EACH OTHER. THE BENEVOLENT CONDITION RESULTED IN THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF COOPERATIVE CHOICE; THE CONTROL CONDITION PRODUCED THE LEAST.
The authors investigate the use of a moderately high externally set profitability constraint as a goal-setting mechanism for controlling channel negotiators. Equal and high power channel members are shown to be made more profitable by the constraint. Low power channel members are shown to be made less profitable by the same constraint. The analysis is done in the context of an experimental market simulation that reveals the impact of the constraint and power variables on both quantity and quality of transactions completed as well as dynamics of negotiations over time.
Studied the status positions of both source and target in a conflict situation in which the source uses threats as a means of coercing the target's compliance. The Prisoner's Dilemma game was modified to permit sending an occasional threat from a simulated source to target Ss. 120 ROTC cadets of varying ranks (status) assumed the position of targets and allegedly played other cadets. 4 source-target conditions were used: low-high, high-low, low-low, and high-high. The source's threats were 10, 50, or 90% credible and carried either high or low punishment for noncompliance. The major findings of this study were: (a) target Ss, irrespective of own status, complied more often to the threats of a high-status source than to threats issued by a low-status source; (b) as credibility of threats increased, the degree of compliance obtained increased; (c) as punishment magnitude associated with threats increased, compliance increased; (d) high-status Ss exploited the low-status simulated player more often in the game than did Ss in the other 3 status conditions; and (e) the perceived potency of the threatener was directly related to the credibility of his threats. (17 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Many negotiations provide opportunities for integrative agreements in which parties can maximize joint gains without competing for resources in a direct win-lose fashion. However, negotiators often settle for suboptimal compromise agreements rather than search for mutually beneficial, or integrative, agreements. We hypothesized that misperceptions of the other party's interests are a primary cause of suboptimal outcomes. Two studies examined the role of social perception in negotiation and the relationship between judgment accuracy and negotiation performance. Results indicated that: most negotiators enter negotiation expecting the other party's interests to be completely opposed to their own; negotiators learn about the potential for joint gain during negotiation; most learning occurs within the first few minutes of interaction; accurate perception of the other party's interests leads to better negotiation performance; negotiators who learn about the other party's interests in the early stages of negotiation earn higher payoffs than do those who learn during the later stages of negotiation; a substantial number of negotiators fail to realize when they have interests that are completely compatible with those of the other party and settle for suboptimal agreements; and the two types of judgment error, Fixed Sum Error and Incompatibility Error, appear to be unrelated, distinct judgment errors. We discuss the role of social judgment in negotiation and the generalizability of the results to real world negotiations.
Subjects were presented a series of decomposed games that permitted them to select alternatives that maximize one or more of the following motivational dispositions: (1) own gain (individualism), (2) joint gain (cooperation), (3) relative gain (competition), or (4) minimization of other's gain (aggression). There were two types (cases) of games. Case 1 games permitted the S the same or a greater number of points than the other player across all alternatives; Case 2 games afforded the same or fewer points than the other player across all alternatives. It was found: (1) the motive of minimization of other's gain was negligibly reflected in Ss' choices; (2) the other motives were present and affecting Ss' choices; (3) more competitive and fewer cooperative choices occurred in Case 2 than in Case 1 games; (4) sex of subject affected choice behavior in only one game, where males tended to be more cooperative and females more individualistic; and (5) though information on choice and outcome of others was highly limited, some behavioral imitation occurred within dyads.
It is commonly expected that individuals will reverse decisions or change behaviors which result in negative consequences. Yet, within investment decision contexts, negative consequences may actually cause decision makers to increase the commitment of resources and undergo the risk of further negative consequences. The research presented here examined this process of escalating commitment through the simulation of a business investment decision. Specifically, 240 business school students participated in a role-playing exercise in which personal responsibility and decision consequences were the manipulated independent variables. Results showed that persons committed the greatest amount of resources to a previously chosen course of action when they were personally responsible for negative consequences.
2 experiments were conducted to test the proposition that once someone has agreed to a small request he is more likely to comply with a larger request. Exp. I demonstrated this effect when the same person made both requests; Exp. II extended this to the situation in which different people made the 2 requests. Several experimental groups were run in an effort to explain these results, and possible explanations are discussed.