ArticlePDF Available

Abstract

This paper explores the consequences of cognitive dissonance, coupled with time-inconsistent preferences, in an intertemporal decision problem with two distinct goals: acting decisively on early information (vision) and adjusting flexibly to late information (flexibility). The decision maker considered here is capable of manipulating information to serve her self-interests, but a tradeoff between distorted beliefs and distorted actions constrains the extent of information manipulation. Building on this tradeoff, the present model provides a unified framework to account for the conformity bias (excessive reliance on precedents) and the confirmatory bias (excessive attachment to initial perceptions).
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Vol. 39 (1999) 41–58
Explaining how preferences change across joint versus
separate evaluation
Max H. Bazermana, Don A. Moorea,, Ann E. Tenbrunsel b,
Kimberly A. Wade-Benzonia, Sally Blountc
aJ. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston
60208, IL, USA
bCollege of Business Administration, Notre Dame University, South Bend IN, USA
cGraduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago IL, USA
Received 21 August 1997; received in revised form 14 July 1998; accepted 20 July 1998
Abstract
Thispaperexamineshowpreferences foroutcomes changeacross jointversus separate evaluation
ofalternatives.Injoint evaluation,two (or more)options are presentedand evaluatedsimultaneously.
In separate evaluation, each option is presented and evaluated separately. We review a growing body
of evidence demonstrating this type of preference shift and discuss how it is different from existing
biases and preference reversals documented in the literature. We then review and integrate three
competing explanations for this type of preferential inconsistency. ©1999 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
JEL classification: Experimental; Theoretical treatment [9130]; Organizational behavior [2500]
Keywords: Decision making; Preference reversals; Preferences
1. Introduction
A central tenet within economics is that the individual acts to maximize expected util-
ity (von Neumann and Morganstern, 1947). An on-going aim within cognitive psychol-
ogy is to study and document how utility is actually constructed in decision making and
bargaining. Consider, for example, research on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) and preference reversals (Tversky et al., 1990), along with numerous other studies
that have shown that subtle differences in elicitation can have a profound effect on stated
preferences (e.g. Slovic and Macphillamy, 1974; Slovic et al., 1990; Hershey et al., 1982).
Corresponding author.
0167-2681/99/$ – see front matter ©1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0167-2681(99)00025-6
42 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
These differences can change people from being risk-averse to risk-seeking (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), from positive time discounting to negative time discounting (Loewenstein
andPrelec, 1993),and reversingtheirpreferences across anarray ofmulti-attribute prospects
(Tversky et al., 1988).
This paper reviews recent psychological findings regarding a new elicitation effect,
namely, preference shifts between joint evaluation and separate evaluation. Joint evalu-
ation, as we use the term, refers to situations in which two concrete options are evaluated
simultaneously, while separate evaluation refers to situations in which the options are pre-
sented and evaluated one option at a time (Bazerman et al., 1992; Hsee et al., 1997).
The original demonstration of changes in preference across joint versus separate evalua-
tion was provided by Bazerman et al. (1992), and focused on the choice between absolute
and relative payoffs. Participants read a description of a dispute between two neighbors and
then evaluated different potential resolutions of the dispute. The dispute involved splitting
either sales revenue or a tax liability associated with the ownership of a vacant lot between
the neighbors’ houses. Participants were asked to take the perspective of one homeowner
and to evaluate five possible settlements associated with receiving revenue and five possible
settlementsassociated with payingtaxes. Each settlement was expressedin terms ofa payoff
(or liability) to oneself and a payoff (or liability) to the neighbor. Across outcomes, the au-
thorsvaried boththe absolute payoffto oneself and whether the neighbor wouldbe receiving
thesame as or morethan the respondent.As an example, consider the followingtwo options:
Money Option: $600 for self and $800 for neighbor
Fair Option: $500 for self and $500 for neighbor
Note: we have labeled the options in the text (e.g. money and fair). Participants did not see
these labels.
In joint evaluation, participants were presented with pairs of options, such as the one
listed above and were asked to indicate which of the two options was more acceptable or
more satisfying. In separate evaluation,1participants were presented with these options
one at a time and were asked to indicate on a rating scale how acceptable or how satisfying
each option was. In joint evaluation, 75 percent of the participants preferred the Money
Option. In separate evaluation, 71 percent preferred the Fair Option.
Many other demonstrations of preference shifts across joint versus separate evaluation
have been documented. We review these in the next section. Following our review of recent
empirical evidence, we present three competing explanations for these results, which have
been offered by psychologists. In our final section, we develop an integrated framework for
conceptualizing preference shifts across joint versus separate evaluation.
Our goal in presenting this evidence and integration to an economics audience is to
contribute to a dialog with those who model decision making and game theory. Our findings
suggest structural elicitation effects, which emanate from the way that related decisions are
1In this study, we employed a within-subjects design—the same subjects assessed the different options one-at-
a-time in the separate condition. In other studies reported in this paper, different subjects were used for the two
different separate decisions. For example, participants in the Blount and Bazerman (1996) study that follows only
made one choice each. Since our main purpose in this paper is to provide a conceptual integration, we will not
provide a methodological discussion of the merits of different procedures.
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 43
temporally sequenced and/or combined. While prior work has shown that some of these
shiftsin preferencescan be predictedby mathematicalmodels of individualdecision making
(see e.g. appendix of Bazerman et al., 1992), not all of the evidence is adequately explained
by such an approach. The fact that the temporal sequencing of decisions may inconsistently
change preferences across outcomes creates several questions for economists. We discuss
these questions further in our integration section.
2. The evidence
Building off of the work of Bazerman et al. (1992) and Bazerman et al. (1994) sought
to demonstrate joint versus separate preference shifts in a context that was more familiar
to participants. In their study, MBA students were presented with a series of potential job
offers and asked whether they would accept the offers. Similar to the Bazerman et al. (1992)
study, in joint evaluation, participants were presented with a pair of hypothetical job offers,
and asked which offer, if either, they would accept. In separate evaluation, participants were
presented with offers separately and asked on a case-by-case basis whether they would
accept each offer. Typical offers included:
Percent selecting job, by evaluation mode2
Separate Joint
Money Job: $85,000 for self and
$95,000 for other MBAs 55% 64%
Fair Job: $75,000 for self and
$75,000 for other MBAs 69% 13%
In joint evaluation, participants tended to select the Money Job. In separate evaluation,
however, participants preferred the Fair Job. As predicted, the disparity in compensation
and the resulting social comparison effects were more powerful when jobs were evaluated
separately and the actual levels of compensation were more powerful when participants
could compare job offers.
The power of social comparison effects was demonstrated again by Blount and Baz-
erman (1996), in an experiment in which subjects were recruited for a colleague’s study
and measured rates of volunteering. Participants in the joint evaluation condition had the
option of participating in the Fair Study that included equal payments of $7 for all subjects
or the Money Study that paid $8 and paid other subjects $10. Participants in the separate
evaluation condition were only presented with one of the studies (either the Fair Study or
the Money Study) and were asked whether or not they would be interested in participating
in that particular experiment.
2Note that percents will not add to 100. In the joint condition, 64 percent of participants chose the Money job,
13 percent chose the Fair Job, and 23 percent chose to accept neither job. Also, in the separate condition, where
participants reviewed each job on its own and reported whether they would accept it, 12 percent chose the Money
job only, 26 percent chose the Fair job only, 43 percent chose to accept both jobs, and 19 percent chose to accept
neither job.
44 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
Percent choosing to participate, by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Money Study: $8 for self and
$10 for others 54% 56%
Fair Study: $7 for self
$7 for others 72% 16%
The results were consistent with prior evidence (Bazerman et al., 1992, 1994): the partici-
pation rate was higher for the Fair Study than the Money Study in separate evaluation, but
this pattern was reversed in joint evaluation.
Bazermanet al. (1994) extendedthese findings beyondthe scope of comparisonsbetween
absolute and relative payoffs. Here, MBA students were again asked to report their interest
in accepting various job offers. However, in this experiment, participants were presented
with jobs that varied in salary and the extent to which the organizational culture was de-
scribed as democratic or hierarchical. Again there were two unlabeled offers in each pair.
We label these here the Fair Culture Job and the Money Job. The Fair Culture Job offered a
corporate culture in which the junior staff had a voice in their assignments and in important
organizational decisions. At the Money Job, junior hires were offered a higher salary but
were not encouraged to participate in important decisions and were assigned to jobs and
projects by senior management.
Percent selecting job, by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Money Job: $75,000 salary/
hierarchical culture 33% 55%
Fair Culture Job: $60,000 salary/
democratic culture 48% 41%
The results, like those shown here, found that culture was weighted more heavily in separate
than in joint evaluation. Separately, more participants said that they would take the Fair
Culture Job but, in joint evaluation, the Money Job was preferred.
In another job context study, Hsee (1994) asked his undergraduate participants to report
how likely they would be to accept different 4-year jobs after graduating from college. The
following two job offers were presented:
Year
1234
Money Option: $27K $26K $25K $24K
Increasing Pay Option: $23K $24K $25K $26K
In separate evaluations, participants were asked to report how likely it would be that they
would accept each of the offers. Here, the Increasing Pay Option received more favorable
ratings. However, in the joint condition, participants tended to favor the Money Option.
Shifts in preference across joint and separate evaluation have been extended to a number
of other decisions and stimulus items. A number of these studies have asked participants to
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 45
evaluate consumer products. Hsee (1996, 1998), for example, asked participants in both the
separate and joint evaluation conditions to report their willingness-to-pay (WTP) price for
various products. By holding constant the nature of the responses, this measure addresses
thecriticism that the nature of thequestion in previous researchwas different inthe joint and
separate evaluation conditions. In the separate evaluation condition, participants reported
WTP for each of the two alternatives. In the joint evaluation condition, participants reported
WTP for the two alternatives presented simultaneously.
In Hsee’s (1998) third experiment, participants were asked to report WTP for two dif-
ferent servings of ice cream. Participants received drawings of the ice cream servings with
the sizes of the servings and containers marked on the drawings. One alternative, which
we label here the Overfilled Portion, was depicted pictorially in a small 5 ounce container
which was overfilled, almost overflowing, with 7 ounces of ice cream. The other alternative,
whichwe label the Large Portion, offered8 ounces of ice cream,but it was depicted asbeing
served in a 10 ounce container that was not filled to capacity. Hsee found a clear shift in
preferences across joint versus separate evaluation:
Willingness-to-pay for servings of ice
cream, by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Large Portion: 8 ounces of ice cream in a
10 ounce container $1.80 $2.02
Overfilled Portion: 7 ounces of ice cream in a
5 ounce container $2.23 $1.81
Similarly, in Hsee’s (1998) fourth experiment, participants were asked to evaluate two sets
of dinnerware for sale in a store that was having a clearance sale. Participants reported their
WTP for the following sets, either separately or together:
Large Set Unbroken Set
includes 40 PCs includes 24 PCs
dinner plates: 8, in good condition 8, in good condition
soup/salad bowls: 8, in good condition 8, in good condition
dessert plates: 8, in good condition 8, in good condition
cups: 8, 2 of them are broken
saucers: 8, 7 of them are broken
Note that the Large Set includes all the items of the Unbroken Set, plus more. Nevertheless,
WTP reports indicated a shift: Willingness-to-pay for dinnerware,
by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Large Set: 31 pieces plus 9 broken pieces $23.25 $32.03
Unbroken Set: 24 pieces $32.69 $29.70
Forboth ofthese experiments,Hsee (1998) arguedthat inseparate evaluation,the dominated
alternative was rated lower because it fell short of the reference standard that it evoked. For
46 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
the ice cream, the underfilled container was judged against the same container, overfilled.
For the dinnerware, the large set was judged against a complete, unbroken large set.
Hsee (1996) found similar reversals in WTP for music dictionaries. Participants were
asked to imagine that they were in the market for a music dictionary. The options presented
and reported WTP are as follows: Willingness-to-pay for music dictionaries,
by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Large Dictionary: 20,000 entries
and a torn cover $20 $27
Intact Dictionary: 10,000 entries
and an intact cover $24 $19
Theresults areconsistent withthe twostudies from Hsee(1998) discussedabove.In separate
evaluation, the torn cover is overweighted. This weighting reverses itself in joint evaluation,
where the number of entries becomes more important.
Nowlis and Simonson (1997) also asked participants to rate various consumer prod-
ucts, such as toasters, microwave ovens, and batteries. They found that brand names were
weighted heavily in separate evaluation, but that price became more important when partic-
ipants could compare different products. They found a significant shift in reported intention
to purchase for the following pair of products:
Percent preferring each, by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Cheap Phone: Cobra brand/$49 price tag 26% 42%
Quality Phone: Sony brand/$69 price tag 74% 58%
Nowlis and Simonson (1997) were also able to demonstrate a shift in preference between
price and number of features, such that reported intention to purchase was driven by the
number of features in the separate evaluation condition, but that price was more important
in the joint evaluation condition.
Irwin et al. (1993) demonstrated strong shifts in preferences between consumer products
andenvironmental improvements.They mailed surveysto residents inthe Denver,Colorado
metro area. Participants in the separate evaluation condition were asked to reportWTP for
improvementsin Denverair quality and a newVCR. Participants in the joint evaluation con-
dition were asked to choose between air quality improvements and the VCR by identifying
the one for which they would be willing to pay more. The results were as follows:
Percent willing to pay more,
by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Better Environment: Improved air quality 22% 58%
Better Possessions: Get a new VCR 70% 21%
It is interesting to note that unlike other experiments where participants in the separate
condition only rate one of the two alternatives, participants in this study all saw the same
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 47
set of stimulus items. That is, participants in the separate condition rated their WTP for air
quality and the VCR. Despite being presented with the same option set, individuals in the
separate condition indicated a preference for better possessions, and individuals in the joint
condition indicated a preference for a better environment.
In a similar vein, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) were able to show preferential inconsisten-
cies for different types of environmental or social issues. They presented participants with
various headlines that highlighted specific problems, and asked the participants to either
report their support for government intervention for such a cause (separate condition), or
choose between causes by indicating the one they would support more (joint condition).
The results of one were as follows:
Percent reporting greater support,
by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Human Issue: Skin cancer in farm workers 29% 70%
Attractive Issue: Australian mammal species 32% 30%
threatened
In separate evaluations, people leaned toward ‘attractive’ causes such as spotted owls, coral
reefs, and toxic spills. When choosing between causes, however, participants tended to
prefer human causes such as skin cancer, multiple myeloma, and lead-based paint.
Hsee (1996) also found reversals in WTP when he presented participants with a hiring
decision. Each participant was asked to assume that he or she was the owner of a consulting
firm and was looking for a computer programmer. Participants were asked how much they
wouldbe willing topay to hirea programmer towrite programs in anew computerlanguage.
Like Hsee’s other studies using WTP (Hsee, 1998), this experiment held response mode
constant by having participants in both joint and separate evaluation conditions report WTP.
A shift was revealed, demonstrating that individuals were willing to pay more for the smart
candidate than the experienced candidate in separate evaluation but that this pattern was
reversed in joint evaluation.
Willingness-to-pay for computer
programmers, by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Experienced Candidate: 70 programs/
3.0 out of 5.0 GPA $26,800 $33,200
Smart Candidate: 10 programs/
4.9 out of 5.0 GPA $32,700 $31,200
Finally, Lowenthal (1993) applied joint versus separate evaluation to the arena of political
science. She found that separate evaluations of individual candidates reversed themselves
when it came to pairwise evaluations and to voting behavior.
48 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
Voters’ preferences,
by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Jobs Candidate: would bring 10,000 new jobs/
followed by tax evasion rumor 14% 56%
Clean Candidate: would bring 5,000 new jobs/
no rumors of misconduct 61% 31%
Participantsrated theJobs Candidate worsethan the CleanCandidate in separateevaluations
but better than the Clean Candidate in joint evaluation. Consistent with their joint evaluation
of the candidates, when asked how they would vote, 62% of participants reported that they
would vote for the Jobs Candidate.
3. Alternative explanations
The above examples document a growing body of evidence which demonstrates incon-
sistencies in expressed preferences across joint versus separate evaluation. In interpreting
these examples, we begin by noting their shared structure. They all involve outcome pairs,
which are distinguished along two prominent attributes. (It is generally implied that they
are equivalent across all other undescribed attributes.) One of these attributes is preferred
in separate evaluation, and the other attribute is preferred in joint evaluation. Observing
this structure, researchers have provided three different explanations for the joint versus
separate shifts reviewed above. These include: norm theory, the want/should proposition,
and the evaluability hypothesis. Below, we briefly review each.
3.1. Norm theory
Ritov and Kahneman (1997) suggest that these reversals can be explained by norm theory
(Kahnemanand Miller,1986). Accordingto thisperspective,when individualsare presented
with a single item to evaluate, they struggle to make sense of it. To do so, they evoke a
set of available, internal referents for comparison and evaluate the item in the context of
these referents. When individuals are presented with more than one item to evaluate, the
alternatives themselves provide the comparison set for evaluation. Ritov and Kahneman
argue that, in joint evaluation, if there are differences in category membership across the
two alternatives, reconciling these category differences will dominate assessment.
For example, when asked to report support for governmental intervention to remedy
threatened extinction of Australian mammal species, people generate a set of other dying
speciesas theirinternally evokedcomparisoncategory.Theythen decidewhether thecurrent
itemrates favorablyorunfavorablywithinthis category.Typically,cuteAustralian mammals
compare favorably with less attractive species like condors, reptiles, or plants, and the
prospect of saving them from extinction will be positively valued. In contrast, skin cancer
in farm workers evokes a comparison category of other human health crises, on which
skin cancer might rate comparatively low, relative to heart disease, AIDS, or famine. Thus,
under separate evaluation, the prospect of preventing skin cancer may not be highly valued.
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 49
However, when confronted with Australian mammals and farm workers simultaneously,
the individual must evaluate across categories, rather than within categories. Here, human
health problems will typically be valued higher than animal extinctions.
Thus,Ritovand Kahnemanexplain inconsistenciesacross jointversus separateevaluation
based on the contrast between within category versus across category assessments. The
rating of the alternative within its category and the rating of the overall category are both
prominentattributes across the outcomes.In separate evaluation,the rating of thealternative
within its category is more salient than the rating of the overall category. In joint evaluation,
the rating of the overall category is more salient. Ritov and Kahneman’s theory is consistent
with their data. It also accounts nicely for Irwin et al.’s finding that people value private
goods over public goods in separate evaluation, but select public goods over private goods
in joint evaluation. Yet, while insightful and compelling, little direct evidence exists at this
point in research development in favor of norm theory as an explanation for the broader set
of findings.
3.2. The want/should proposition
The want/should proposition offered by Bazerman et al. (1998) sees a tension between
what an individual wants to do versus what the individual thinks that he or she should
do. They argue that we often have an emotional desire to engage in behaviors that are
inconsistent with the behaviors in which we believe we should engage. Under separate
evaluation, lacking a counterbalancing alternative, we lean toward what we ‘want’ to do.
However, in joint evaluation, we tend to select the most justifiable option—the one that we
think that we ‘should’ choose. Thus, the direct comparison between options puts the ‘want’
self in check, in favor of the ‘should’ self.
For example, people want the consumer good over the environmental public good but
believe that they should select the environmental public good. Similarly, cute Australian
animals are more vivid and create a greater desire (want) to help than does the problem of
skincancer, yet peoplebelieve that humans should be valued overanimals. Thus, in separate
evaluation, the emotional aspect of the ‘want’ attribute overshadows the pragmatism of the
‘should’ attribute. In joint evaluation, the tradeoff costs of wanting the ‘want’ are brought
to light, and greater reason prevails. This explanation is compatible with Schelling’s (1984)
discussion of the multiple self problem, Thaler and Shefrin’s (1981) model of internal
competition between a planner and a doer, and Loewenstein’s (1996) assessment of the role
of transient preferences.
Recent empirical evidence supports the viability of the want/should proposition (Ten-
brunsel et al., 1998). Using similar and sometimes identical materials used in earlier re-
search, these researchers asked participants to predict how a fellow student would rate the
alternative behaviors or options in terms of the want/should distinction. The evidence was
overwhelmingly consistent: the alternative preferred in separate evaluation was the one
people wanted to choose and the alternative preferred in joint evaluation was the one that
people felt should be chosen. For example, consistent with expectations, Kahneman and
Ritov’s (1994) headlines were rated differently on the want and should dimensions. When
participants were asked how fellow students would feel that they should donate $10, human
50 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
health issues tended to be rated higher than wildlife causes. The same respondents indicated
thatothers, however,would wantto donate the $10 to the wildlife cause.Similar adaptations
were made of the stimuli used in studies by Irwin et al. (1993) concerning public goods
versus consumer goods and Hsee’s (1994) work on job choice.
A related study by O’Connor et al. (1998) lends some insight into the difference between
want and should. In their study, participants were asked to retrospectively think about a
real situation where they had been involved in conflict. Post hoc, participants were asked
to report what they wanted to do in that situation, what they thought they should do, and
what they actually did. Most participants reported that they did what they wanted to do,
rather than what they should have done. This pattern existed, even though in many cases,
the participants were aware that they would have been better off overall had they done
what they should have. Further, the actions that participants reported having wanted to
do were often more emotional and more volatile in the context of the conflict. Consistent
with Loewenstein’s (1996) hypotheses regarding the immediacy of visceral motivators,
participants reported that they were more emotional when they were in the middle of a
conflict than when they were either looking forward toward a conflict or looking back at
one. Thus, the degree of emotional involvement appears to be a key element differentiating
want versus should behaviors.
Bazerman et al. (1998) offer the want/should explanation to account for joint–separate
PRsin which people prefer jobsin which they are treatedfairly over jobs that pay them more
onlyin the separate condition(Bazerman et al., 1994). Toapply the want/shouldexplanation
here, one has to argue that somehow participants want to be treated fairly but believe that
theyshould select the job with higherpay.This reasoning runscounter to thecommonly held
opinionthat the selection ofjobs based onmoney is ahedonistic and self-indulgent decision.
We would argue that the subject population in which this finding was obtained resolves this
apparentinconsistency: MBAstudents are likely to sharea consensus that maximizingone’s
own economic well-being is the rational course of action. Other, less quantifiable factors
like fairness constitute reasons that may be more important to the individual, but may be
more difficult to justify or explain.
3.3. The evaluability hypothesis
The evaluability hypothesis (Bazerman et al., 1992; Hsee, 1996; Hsee et al., 1998)
offers another cognitive explanation of separate versus joint preference reversals. Namely,
it suggests that these reversals are driven by differences in the ‘evaluability’ of attributes. It
argues that when two options involve trading off between a hard-to-evaluate attribute and
an easy-to-evaluate attribute, the hard-to-evaluate attribute will have less impact in separate
evaluation than in joint evaluation. Whether an attribute is hard or easy to evaluate can be
measured empirically by asking people whether they have an idea of how good a given
value is on that attribute (Hsee, 1998).
The evaluability hypothesis argues that in separate evaluation people have difficulty
assessing the desirability of an option on the hard-to-evaluate attribute, which means that
thehard-to-evaluate attribute has littleinfluence on decision making.For example, inHsee’s
(1994) hiring study, those assessing only one of the two candidates would not know how
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 51
to judge the candidate’s KY programming experience. With no available internal metric
for this attribute, people would tend to base their evaluation on the candidate’s GPA, for
which a familiar metric is available. In joint evaluation, however, the two options’ values
on the hard-to-evaluate attribute provide additional information, increasing the attribute’s
evaluability. Having written 70 programs is clearly much better than having written 10. As a
result, the ‘experienced’ candidate receives a substantial boost in desirability on the basis of
this comparison. In this sense, joint evaluation increases the evaluability of hard-to-evaluate
attributes, but does not increase the evaluability of easy-to-evaluate attributes.
Hsee (1996) demonstrated the power of evaluability with two direct studies. In the first
study, participants were given a choice between descriptions of two CD players. The two
players varied in the number of CDs they could hold and in the sound quality they produced,
as measured by total harmonic distortion (THD):
Willingness-to-pay for CD players,
by evaluation mode
Separate Joint
Fidelity Player: 5 CDs, THD of 0.003% $212 $228
Capacity Player: 20 CDs, THD of 0.01% $256 $204
These items generated a shift in joint versus separate evaluation. In separate evaluation,
measures of THD are not meaningful for most people and thus CD capacity was more
important. When choosing between the two, it becomes clear that the one has 3 times the
harmonic distortion of the other, and the impact of this difference carries more weight.
However, the reversal of preference was eliminated when subjects were provided with
information that made harmonic distortion evaluable in separate evaluation. Subjects who
were informed that harmonic distortion ranged between 0.002% for the best CD players
and 0.012% for the worst did not demonstrate a shift across joint versus separate evaluation
on this item. Essentially, the range information made the information easy to evaluate under
both separate and joint assessments.
Hsee et al. (1997) provided similarly compelling evidence that hard-to-evaluate informa-
tion will only be underweighted in separate assessments when no other external information
is available to make sense of this data. In the context of eyeglasses, Hsee et al. showed that
when additional information was provided to make the hard-to-evaluate attribute evaluable,
two concrete options were not necessary for the hard-to-evaluate attribute to influence the
decision process.
From an economic perspective, the evaluability hypothesis can be thought of as an infor-
mational effect. When more information about the value of an attribute is available in joint
evaluation, people weight that information more heavily. What the evaluability hypothesis
adds to an economics of information explanation is a directional prediction, which suggests
a systematic cognitive bias. When insufficient information is available about an attribute
in separate evaluation, that attribute does not, on average, receive a randomized weighting
in assessment. Instead, the evaluability hypothesis predicts that it will systematically be
underweighted. This is because in the presence of ambiguous or confusing information the
decision maker will always overweight familiar information; that is, the relatively more
evaluable attribute value.
52 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
3.4. Comparison of accounts
Table 1 provides an overview of experimental findings and the theoretical explanations
account for them. The three theories are: (1) Norm theory; (2) Want/should proposition; and
(3) Evaluability hypothesis. The three theoretical accounts have been given credit conserva-
tively in Table 1. That is, X’s only appear where, in our opinion, the theoretical explanation
did such a good job at explaining the result that it could have been used to predict it. We
expect others to disagree with our Xs, since definitive data are not yet available. However,
we provide this information to clarify our view of the current literature.
The evaluability hypothesis has been credited elsewhere (Hsee, 1996) with explaining
more than we give it credit for here. The limitation of the evaluability hypothesis is that it
is sometimes difficult to identify the relative evaluability of two attributes. For example, in
Blount and Bazerman’s (1996) subject recruitment study, to apply evaluability, one must
make the argument that a $8 payoffs is not evaluable on its own and becomes evaluable only
when contrasted with the $7 alternative. Certainly it is the case that $8 looks better when
compared with $7. However, it is more difficult to make the argument that participants were
unable to evaluate how much $8 was, in the same way that they were unable to evaluate
what 0.003% THD was. Further, in Bazerman et al. (1992), this explanation was explicitly
ruled out. Prior to assessment of any outcomes, participants were given explicit information
about the range of possible values that absolute payoffs could take, and the reversals still
occurred. Thus, the evaluability hypothesis appears to explain only a subset of results.
Similarly, Ritov and Kahneman’s (1997) norm theory has been credited only with the
reversals it explains cleanly. It is possible to extend the theory and argue, for instance, that
Lowenthal’s (1993) selection of political candidates can be accounted for by the category
of alternatives to which candidates were compared. That is, the Tax-evading Jobs Candidate
is mentally compared within a category of referent candidates who are not tax evaders, and
is therefore rated lower in separate evaluation. The Tax-evading Jobs Candidate fares better
when compared against the Clean Candidate who only brings 5000 jobs to the district.
However, to apply norm theory in this way, one must be able to articulate ex ante which
dimensions will evoke within category comparisons and which will evoke across category
comparisons.
Finally, while we believe that the want/should proposition is descriptively useful, we do
not believe that it describes all the data equally well either. For example, to use want/should
to account for Hsee’s (1998) ice cream choice, one would have to make the awkward
argument that somehow participants wanted overfilled containers but felt they should take
the container with more ice cream. That explanation is clearly not fluid. Thus, as with the
other accounts, the want/should proposition offers insight, but not complete explanation.
4. Integration
In this section, we develop a framework which integrates the three theoretical accounts
discussed above. We begin by reviewing how individuals cognitively process outcomes
when assessing preferences in decision making, and show how that process differs across
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 53
Table 1
Experimental findings and the theoretical explanations that account for them. Theories: (1) Norm theory, (2)
Want/should proposition, (3) Evaluability hypothesis. The alternative listed first is always the one preferred in
joint evaluation
Authors Stimuli 1 2 3
Bazerman et al. (1992) Dispute with neighbor. Resolution: X
Money Option: $600 for self, $800 for neighbor
Fair Option: $500 for self, $500 for neighbor
Irwin et al. (1993) Better Environment: Improve the air quality in Denver X X
Better Possessions: Get a new VCR
Lowenthal (1993) Choosing between political candidates: X
Jobs Candidate: Brings 10,000 jobs to district, dogged by rumors of
tax evasion
Clean Candidate: Brings 5,000 jobs to district, no rumors of misconduct
Bazerman et al. (1994) MBA job offers: X
Money Job: $85K for self, $95K for other MBA hires
Fair Job: $75K for self, $75K for other MBA hires
Bazerman (1994) MBA job offers: X
Money Job: $75K salary, low procedural justice
Fair Job: $60K salary, high procedural justice
Kahneman and Ritov (1994) Measured willingness to pay for modern problems: X X
Human Issue: Skin cancer among farm workers
Attractive Issue: Extinction threatens Australian mammals
Hsee (1994) Salary options for a 4-year job: X
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Money Option: $27K $26K $25K $24K
Increasing Pay Option: $23K $24K $25K $26K
Blount and Bazerman (1996) Recruiting participants for an experiment: X
Money Option: $8 for self, $10 for other subjects
Fair Option: $7 for self, $7 for other subjects
Hsee (1996) Selecting music dictionaries: X X
Big Dictionary: 20,000 entries, torn cover
Torn Dictionary: 10,000 entries, intact cover
Hsee (1996) Selecting candidates for a computer programming job: X
Experienced Candidate: 70 programs written, GPA of 3.0
Smart Candidate: 10 programs written, GPA of 4.9
Nowlis and Simonson (1997) Price Brand
Cheap phone: $49 Cobra X
Quality phone: $69 Sony
Hsee (1997) Choosing between servings of ice cream: X
Bigger Serving: More ice cream in large container
Overfilled Serving: Less ice cream overfilled in small container
Hsee (1997) Picking sets of dinnerware: X X
Large Set: 31 intact pieces, 9 broken pieces
Unbroken Set: 24 intact pieces
54 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
jointversus separateevaluation. Next,we integratethe three theoreticalaccounts into amore
detailed study of how individuals perform separate evaluation, suggesting that it is incon-
sistencies in this process, rather than joint evaluation, that drives preference shifts across
joint versus separate evaluation. Finally, we discuss the implications of recent empirical
findings and this model for economic research.
4.1. Cognitive processes in decision making
The decision making process is typically modeled in three stages (e.g. Goldstein and
Einhorn, 1987). In the first stage, the individual sees and encodes the relevant stimuli for
each potential outcome, including all salient attributes and their values. In the second stage,
theindividual performsa combinatorialprocess on theencoded data toassess utility.Finally,
the individual transforms that perceived utility into a behavioral expression of utility, such
as accepting/rejecting or stating a price.
In separate evaluation, one alternative is encoded, then evaluated. Preferences are ex-
pressed in absolute terms. In joint evaluation, the individual encodes and evaluates two
alternatives simultaneously, and preferences are expressed in relative terms. Comparatively,
separate evaluation is the more difficult cognitive task. The individual must both generate
a decision model and calculate an absolute assessment of preference. The individual may
struggle to make sense of this task, asking ‘How do I know if outcome A is a good one?’
Joint evaluation is more straightforward. The presence of a second alternative frames and
anchors the entire decision process; the decision maker simply enacts it. ‘Which do I like
better—A or B?’
4.2. Biases in separate evaluation
Here,we suggest thatin separate evaluation,there area number ofpotential biases thatthe
decision maker may become susceptible to while performing this more difficult task. These
emanate from both cognitive and motivational influences. Integrating the explanations from
above, we describe three below. These include (1) generating inconsistent referents, and
overweighting attributes that are (2) easy-to-evaluate or (3) appeal to our more visceral
wants.
4.3. Generating inconsistent referents
One way to perform separate evaluation is to evoke an internal norm or referent for
comparison. To do this, this individual generates a counterfactual. ‘Let’s imagine that there
was another option, similar to A, except that it differed on one or two attributes. Then
how would I feel about A?’ Then a comparative process, similar to joint evaluation, can be
used for assessment. Consistent with Ritov and Kahneman (1997), we suggest that while
this is a reasonable approach, it may be prone to error. This is because individuals may
be inconsistent when selecting and evaluating referents in this type of processing. These
inconsistencies may lead to intransitive preferences across alternatives.
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 55
To make this concrete, imagine two outcomes A and B, which are differentiated on at-
tributes 1 and 2. Here, A1<B1 and A2 >B2. In joint evaluation, Attribute 1 is weighted
more heavily, and B is preferred. Now imagine that in separate evaluation of A, the deci-
sion maker generates referent A0, differentiated on attributes 1 and 3, where A1=A01 and
A3>A03. The individual determines that A is better than A0, in light of Attribute 3. He or
she expresses a utility value of xfor A based on that comparison. Now imagine that the same
decision maker later assesses outcome B and generates referent B0for comparison, which
is differentiated along Attributes 2 and 4. Here, B2=B02, but B4 << B04. Here, in light
of Attribute 4, B0is strongly preferred. The decision maker then generates a utility value
of yfor B, where y<x, because he anchors his assessment of Outcome B on its relatively
impoverished value on Attribute 4. Thus, A is preferred to A0leading to a utility assessment
of x, and B is perceived as disadvantaged relative to B0, suggesting an inferior utility value
of y; when A and B are compared directly, B may still be preferred to A. This is because
different referents were selected for comparison in separate evaluation of A and B, and
these different referents biased how utilities were assigned under separate evaluation.
Regarding how different norms or referents might be generated across outcomes in sepa-
rate evaluation, certain features of the decision environment, such as category membership,
may be less salient. For example, in separate evaluation, the cross-category attribute of
species; that is, furry mammals versus humans, may not be salient to the decision maker.
However, in joint evaluation involving outcomes which cross species, this cross-category
attribute may dominate the decision. Other factors such as evaluability might also affect
whichattributes are salient whengenerating referents.It iscognitively easierto self-generate
a referent along dimensions which are familiar than on dimensions that are less familiar
and/or more difficult to evaluate.
4.4. Cognitive short cuts
As we mentioned above, the task of separate evaluation is complex. The decision maker
must not only struggle to make sense of an option in isolation, then he must translate this
assessment into an absolute measure of utility, such as willingness-to-pay. The difficulty
occurs when weights across attributes must be assigned spontaneously without the benefit
of another concrete option for comparison. For example, the decision maker may have to
reconcile how important fairness is compared to money, or how important a torn dictio-
nary cover is compared to number of word entries. Rather than generate a full range of
counterfactuals, decision makers may be tempted to simplify this awkward task in several
predictable ways. First, drawing from Hsee (1996), they may tend to ignore attribute data
that is hard to evaluate and compensate by overweighting easy-to-evaluate data. However,
since the evaluability of an attribute may not coincide with its importance to the decision
maker, this method could lead to undesirable inconsistencies.
Second, decision makers may rely on intuitive ‘gut-level’ responses that avoid reflection
or analysis for single options. By taking this short cut the individual can avoid some of the
workrequired to contrast andreconcile what one wantson a visceral leveland with whatone
feels that one should do on a normative level (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984;
Bazerman et al., 1998). However, this process is likely to result in the overweighting of
56 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
‘want’ attributes (Bazerman et al., 1998). Avoiding the immediate discomfort of resolving
internal conflicts does not always coincide with the longer term consequences of outcomes
for the decision maker. Thus, this tendency, too, could lead to undesirable inconsistencies
across decisions. The choices made by an alcoholic or food addict to indulge are examples
of this phenomenon.
5. Implications for an economic model of behavior
We have reviewed a broad body of evidence which suggests that the temporal structure
of elicitation can inconsistently affect preferences. We suggest that these effects occur be-
cause of differences in processing that occur across separate versus joint evaluation. Some
effects can be explained within a ‘rational’ or informational framework, but others appear
to emanate from more complex psychological processes. Central to these differences is how
the individual makes sense of options in isolation, which we argue may be biased by both
cognitive and motivational factors. For example, we suggest that individuals may be incon-
sistent when self-generating internal referents for comparison. In constructing referents,
they will tend to anchor on more available and evaluable attributes. The relative weight-
ing of the focal outcome on these attributes will, in turn, anchor how utility is assessed
and expressed. Further, we suggest that individuals are not well-calibrated or consistent in
assessing inter-attribute trade-offs. Sometimes the evaluability or ‘want’ appeal of certain
attributes will be overweighted, relative to the true value of those attributes to the decision
maker. These responses can lead to cross-decision inconsistencies.
Together thesefindings suggestthat howrelated decisions aretemporally combined ornot
may have large effects on preferences. Thus, it is not only the options themselves and how
they are verbally presented (e.g. framed as gains versus losses), but also whether they are
sequentially or simultaneously presented, that determines preferences. This effect appears
to be driven by inconsistencies in inter-attribute trade-offs across time. This occurs not nec-
essarilybecause preferences change, butbecause people displaypredictable patterns in their
cognitive processing across time. In joint evaluation, the decision maker temporally groups
similar decisions within a single context and time period, resulting in greater consistency.
For economics, these findings suggest that in both individual and game contexts, the
sequencing of decision nodes is integral to how utility is assigned. Thus, to adequately
model what people actually do, economists must not only consider the full array of alter-
natives, but also a full array of how those alternatives might be sequenced, and the effects
of alternative sequencing on payoff matrices. Specifically, these results suggest that strate-
gically inconsequential transformations of extensive form games can have real behavioral
consequences.
The psychological study of how preferences are constructed provides a critical bridge
between psychology and economics. This paper overviews relatively new findings in psy-
chology on how temporal grouping of alternatives can affect preferences. Like most new
phenomena, multiple theoretical contenders have been generated to account for these
effects. Here, we have developed a framework through which the contributions from each
can be usefully integrated and communicated to an economics audience. Future research
is clearly needed to specify when different biases are likely to operate, in particular, the
M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58 57
conditions under which decision makers generate internal referents in separate evaluation.
Ourgoal in this paper wasto offer an integration of variousconceptual explanations for joint
versus separate evaluation. We hope that our theoretical contribution can help pave the way
for future thought regarding the practical and theoretical implications of these experimental
findings.
Acknowledgements
This paper was supported by National Science Foundation Grant no. SBR-9511977 and
the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management
at Northwestern University. The authors benefited from many discussions with George
Loewenstein and Chris Hsee, in addition to critical comments by Richard Day, Keith
Murnighan, Tom Ross, and three anonymous reviewers.
References
Bazerman, M.H., Loewenstein, G.F., Blount White, S., 1992. Reversals of preference in allocation decisions:
Judging an alternative vs. choosing among alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 37, 220–240.
Bazerman, M.H., Schroth, H., Shah, P.P., Diekmann, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., 1994. The inconsistent role of
comparison others and procedural justice in reactions to hypothetical job descriptions: Implications for job
acceptance decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 60, 326–352.
Bazerman, M.H., Tenbrunsel, A.E., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., 1998. Negotiating with yourself and losing:
Understanding and managing competing internal preferences. Academy of Management Review 23, 225–241.
Blount, S., Bazerman, M.H., 1996. Inconsistencies in valuing comparative payoffs: Implications for bargaining
and trade. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 891, 1–14.
Goldstein, W.M., Einhorn, H.J., 1987. Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena. Psychological
Review 94, 236–254.
Hershey, J., Kunreuther, H., Schoemaker, P., 1982. Sources of bias in assessment procedures for utility functions.
Management Science 28, 936–954.
Hsee, C.K., 1994. When trends of monetary outcome matter: Individual vs. joint presentation and judgment of
feelings vs. choice, unpublished manuscript.
Hsee, C.K., 1996. The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals between joint and separate
evaluations of alternatives. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 67, 247–257.
Hsee, C.K., 1998. Less is better: When low-value options are valued more highly than high-value options. Journal
of Behavioral Decision Making 11, 107–121.
Hsee, C.K., Blount, S., Loewenstein, G.F., Bazerman, M.H., 1998. Preference reversals between joint and separate
evaluations of options: A review and theoretical analysis, in press.
Irwin, J.R., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., McClelland, G.H., 1993. Preference reversals and the measurement of
environmental values. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 6, 5–18.
Kahneman, D., Miller, D.T., 1986. Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review 93,
136–153.
Kahneman, D., Ritov, I., 1994. Determinants of stated willingness to pay for public goods: A study in the headline
method. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 9, 5–38.
Kahneman,D., Tversky,A., 1979. Prospect theory:An analysis of decision underrisk. Econometrica 47, 263–291.
Loewenstein, G.F., 1996. Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 65, 272–292.
Loewenstein, G.F., Prelec, D., 1993. Preferences for sequences of outcomes. Psychological Review 100, 91–108.
Lowenthal, D.J., 1993. What voters care about: How electoral context influences issue salience in campaigns?
unpublished dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.
58 M.H. Bazerman et al. /J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 39 (1999) 41–58
Nowlis, S.M., Simonson, I., 1997. Attribute-task compatibility as a determinant of consumer preference reversals.
Journal of Marketing Research 34, 205–218.
O’Connor, K., De Dreu, C., Schroth, H., Barry, B., Lituchy, T., Bazerman, M.H., 1998. Intrapersonal conflict
across time, unpublished manuscript.
Ritov, I., Kahneman, D., 1997. How people value the environment? In: Bazerman, M.H., Messick, D.M.,
Tenbrunsel, A.E., Wade-Benzoni, K.A. (Eds.), Environment, Ethics, and Behavior, New Lexington Press,
San Francisco, CA
Schelling, T.C., 1984. Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Slovic, P., Macphillamy, D., 1974. Dimensional commensurability and cue utilization in comparative judgment.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 11, 172–194.
Slovic, P., Griffin, D., Tversky, A., 1990. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice. In: Hogarth, R.M. (Ed.),
Insights in Decision Making: Theory and Applications, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Tenbrunsel,A.E.,Wade-Benzoni,K.A.,Bazerman,M.H., 1998. Empirical support for the want/should explanation
for separate versus joint preference reversals, unpublished manuscript.
Thaler, R., Shefrin, H.M., 1981. An economic theory of self control. Journal of Political Economy 89, 392–406.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., Slovie, P., 1988. Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psychological Review
95, 371–384.
Tversky, A., Slovic, P., Kahneman, D., 1990. The causes of preference reversal. American Economic Review 80,
203–217.
von Neumann, J., Morganstern, O., 1947. Theory of Games and Economic behavior, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
... In study 7, we examined whether participants mis perceived a win-win equality-enhancing policy as harmful to the advantaged ingroup's chances of receiving money compared to a loselose inequality-enhancing policy and whether these misperceptions predicted voting against greater equality. Finally in study 8, we explored whether established means of improving deliberative decision-making [i.e., joint evaluation (36)] would help advantaged group members perceive an equality-enhancing policy more favorably. ...
... Past work suggests that simultaneously presenting unharmful equality-enhancing policies alongside truly harmful ones (i.e., joint evaluation) might produce more accurate perceptions compared to considering a single unharmful policy by itself (i.e., separate evaluation). This intervention strategy has been shown to activate more deliberative decision-making processes (36,57). While separate evaluation often leads people to focus on whether the ingroup or outgroup receives more, joint evaluation encourages people to focus on whether each option makes their ingroup better or worse off. ...
Article
Nine preregistered studies ( n = 4197) demonstrate that advantaged group members misperceive equality as necessarily harming their access to resources and inequality as necessarily benefitting them. Only when equality is increased within their ingroup, instead of between groups, do advantaged group members accurately perceive it as unharmful. Misperceptions persist when equality-enhancing policies offer broad benefits to society or when resources, and resource access, are unlimited. A longitudinal survey of the 2020 U.S. voters reveals that harm perceptions predict voting against actual equality-enhancing policies, more so than voters’ political and egalitarian beliefs. Finally two novel-groups experiments experiments reveal that advantaged participants’ harm misperceptions predict voting for inequality-enhancing policies that financially hurt them and against equality-enhancing policies that financially benefit them. Misperceptions persist even after an intervention to improve decision-making. This misperception that equality is necessarily zero-sum may explain why inequality prevails even as it incurs societal costs that harm everyone.
... Specifically, when they are presented with a single item to evaluate, they find it hard to make sense of it and thus evoke a set of available, internal referents for comparison and evaluation. Instead, when they are presented with more items to evaluate, the alternatives themselves provide the comparison set for evaluation (Bazerman et al., 1999). The want/should proposition offered by Bazerman et al. (1998) relies upon a tension between what consumers want to do versus what they think that they should do. ...
... The evaluability hypothesis (Bazerman et al., 1992;Hsee, 1996;Hsee, 1998) suggests that preference reversals due to joint versus separate evaluation are driven by differences in the evaluability of attributes. A hard-toevaluate attribute will have less impact in separate evaluation than in joint evaluation, since in separate evaluation people have difficulty assessing the desirability of an option on the hard-toevaluate attribute (Bazerman et al., 1999). ...
Article
Full-text available
Findings from behavioural research are gaining increased interest in EU legislation, specifically in the area of unfair commercial practices. Prior research on the Mars case (Purnhagen and van Herpen 2017) has left open whether empirical evidence can provide an indication that this practice of using oversized indications of additional volume alters the transactional decision of consumers. This, however, is required to determine the “misleadingness” of such a practice in the legal sense as stipulated by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC. The current paper closes this gap by illustrating how behavioural research can inform legal interpretation. In particular, it extends the previous research in two important ways: first, by examining the actual choice that people make; second, by investigating whether the effects remain present in a context where a comparison product is available. Yet, while supporting and extending the findings of the study from Purnhagen and van Herpen (2017) on deceptiveness, the current study could not produce empirical evidence of a clear influence on the transactional decision of consumers, in the way ‘UCPD’ requires.
... Specifically, when they are presented with a single item to evaluate, they find it hard to make sense of it and thus evoke a set of available, internal referents for comparison and evaluation. Instead, when they are presented with more items to evaluate, the alternatives themselves provide the comparison set for evaluation (Bazerman et al., 1999). The want/should proposition offered by Bazerman et al. (1998) relies upon a tension between what consumers want to do versus what they think that they should do. ...
... The evaluability hypothesis (Bazerman et al., 1992;Hsee, 1996;Hsee, 1998) suggests that preference reversals due to joint versus separate evaluation are driven by differences in the evaluability of attributes. A hard-toevaluate attribute will have less impact in separate evaluation than in joint evaluation, since in separate evaluation people have difficulty assessing the desirability of an option on the hard-toevaluate attribute (Bazerman et al., 1999). ...
Article
Full-text available
Findings from behavioural research are gaining increased interest in EU legislation, specifically in the area of unfair commercial practices. Prior research on the Mars case (Purnhagen and van Herpen 2017) has left open whether empirical evidence can provide an indication that this practice of using oversized indications of additional volume alters the transactional decision of consumers. This, however, is required to determine the “misleadingness” of such a practice in the legal sense as stipulated by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC. The current paper closes this gap by illustrating how behavioural research can inform legal interpretation. In particular, it extends the previous research in two important ways: first, by examining the actual choice that people make; and second, by investigating whether the effects remain present in a context where a comparison product is available. Yet, while supporting and extending the findings of the study from Purnhagen and van Herpen (2017) on deceptiveness, the current study could not produce empirical evidence of a clear influence on the transactional decision of consumers, in the way “UCPD” requires.
... Contrary as standard utility theory would predict, presenting joint alternatives concurrently changes decision making outcomes towards people becoming more likely to make more rational choices (Bazerman & Moore, 2009;Gourville & Soman, 2005;Tversky & Shafir, 1992). A natural tendency towards evaluating choices jointly rather than separately improves the quality of decisions as it alleviates complexity and allows to trade-off alternatives directly (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992;Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999;Irwin, Slovic, Lichtenstein & McClelland, 1993;Kahneman & Ritov, 1994). Decision making failures can thus be curbed when several choices are presented together (Milkman, Mazza, Shu, Tsay & Bazerman, 2012). ...
Article
Full-text available
Overall the following article innovatively paints a novel picture of the mass psychological underpinnings of business cycles based on information flows in order to recommend how certain communication strategies could counterweight and alleviate the building of disastrous financial market mass movements. Acknowledging that human beings are connected to and interact with each other in families, ties and larger networks of states, nations and intergovernmental institutions, studying the role of information in building socially-constructed economic correlates promises to explain how market outcomes are developed in the social compound and can be guided by media communication. Addressing problems of the neoclassical assumption of perfect information markets through the lens of ‘real competition,’ the following paper will specifically unravel how contemporary media communication produces certain types of price expectations that form consumption patterns leading to collectively-shared economic outcomes. An introduction to the history of economic cycles will lead to the analysis of the role of information in creating economic booms and busts in the age of globalization. Applying emergent risk theory onto economic fluctuations will serve as an innovative way to explain how and what information represented in the media creates economic ups and downs. Linguistic roots of news about the economy are aimed at shedding light on how media representations and temporal foci echo in economic correlates and shape market outcomes. As business cycles are a collective phenomenon, group interactions’ potential contribution to create business cycles will innovatively be outlined and the role of information flows among groups in creating price expectations unraveled. Business cycles will also be shown to obey some kind of natural complexity, as for being whimsically influenced by socio-historic and political trends. Recommendations how to create more stable economic systems by avoiding emergent risks and communicating market prospects more cautiously will be given in the discussion followed by a prospective future research outlook and conclusion.
... Adding instruments to a policy package alters this relative reference point by changing the salience and accessibility of underlying considerations at the time of decision-making (Chong and Druckman 2007b). This can alter preferences across joint and separate evaluations of alternatives (Bazerman et al. 1999;Milkman et al. 2012;Hsee 1998;Ritov and Baron 2011). It is also in line with the model of non-separable policy preferences proposed by Lacy (2001aLacy ( , 2001b which suggests that individuals often form their preferences about specific issues in connection with preferences and information about other issues. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Many important policy challenges like climate change, pandemics or digitalization require transformative policy responses that take the form of complex policy packages. Nevertheless, most public opinion research has studied public support for single policy instruments, while it remains unclear to what extent citizens evaluate isolated and combined policies differently. In this study, I argue that both the increased complexity of policy designs and the packaging of costly and compensatory measures can substantially affect public opinion. I employ a novel two-stage conjoint-based experimental approach in the United States and Germany to test this argument. In contrast to my expectations based on framing theory, the results show that policy packaging can increase support for climate policies, but that the complexity of policy designs per se does not substantially shift public opinion. Facing complex policy packages, respondents still make rational choices and compensatory policy designs are key to explaining shifts in public support.
Article
When people are given the opportunity to avoid unpleasant information about the possible negative consequences of their self-interested behavior on others, a significant number of people tend to avoid this information. Consequently, the choice to remain ignorant to the negative implications of one's actions has been shown to substantially reduce prosocial behavior when compared to situations in which people are aware of these consequences. Recent studies question the role of deliberate ignorance in environmental contexts. Participants did not avoid information regarding the negative consequence of their choices on a pro-environmental organization. In addition, the option to remain ignorant of this information did not affect their proenvironmental behavior. We argue that the procedure that should be followed in order to remain ignorant plays a critical role in shaping this decision. We employ a binary dictator game where the recipient is a nonprofit environmental organization, and manipulate the procedure that dictators have to follow to remain ignorant of the recipient's payment. We find a significant effect of the applied procedure on both the tendency to remain ignorant and the subsequent pro-environmental behavior.
Thesis
La distance psychologique est omniprésente dans l’esprit du consommateur et influence ses attitudes et son comportement envers les produits hédoniques. Cependant, des contradictions sont présentes dans la littérature quant à la direction (positive ou négative) des effets de la distance psychologique sur les réponses du consommateur envers les produits hédoniques. En effet, certaines recherches avancent que l’augmentation de la distance psychologique influence positivement les réponses du consommateur envers les produits hédoniques. Alors que d’autres suggèrent l’effet inverse, à savoir une influence négative de l’augmentation de la distance psychologique sur les réponses du consommateur envers les produits hédoniques. L’objectif de cette recherche est de réconcilier ces contradictions en examinant sous quelles conditions la distance peut avoir un effet positif ou négatif. Sur la base d’un état de l’art de la littérature et d’une étude qualitative, nous proposons que le degré de proéminence du besoin de justification (non saillant vs saillant) du consommateur au moment où il évalue le produit hédonique modère ses effets et constitue une condition sous laquelle la distance psychologique peut avoir un effet positif ou négatif sur les réponses du consommateur envers les produits hédoniques. Trois expérimentations ont été conduites pour le test de nos hypothèses. Les deux premières suggèrent qu’en condition de besoin de justification non saillant, l’augmentation de la distance psychologique a une influence négative sur les réponses attitudinales et comportementales du consommateur envers les produits hédoniques. La troisième expérimentation, quant à elle, propose qu’en condition de besoin de justification saillant, l’augmentation de la distance psychologique a un effet positif sur la réponse comportementale du consommateur envers le produit hédonique. Cette recherche contribue à la littérature sur le concept de distance psychologique en précisant sous quelles conditions (c.-à-d. besoin de justification saillant vs non saillant) la distance peut avoir un effet positif ou négatif sur les réponses des consommateurs envers les produits hédoniques.
Article
Full-text available
In ten studies (N = 9187), I systematically investigated the direction and size of seven helping effects (the identifiable-victim effect, proportion dominance effect, ingroup effect, existence effect, innocence effect, age effect and gender effect). All effects were tested in three decision modes (separate evaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice), and in their weak form (equal efficiency), or strong form (unequal efficiency). Participants read about one, or two, medical help projects and rated the attractiveness of and allocated resources to the project/projects, or choose which project to implement. The results show that the included help-situation attributes vary in their: (1) Evaluability-e.g., rescue proportion is the easiest to evaluate in separate evaluation. (2) Justifiability-e.g., people prefer to save fewer lives now rather than more lives in the future, but not fewer identified lives rather than more statistical lives. (3) Prominence-e.g., people express a preference to help females, but only when forced to choose.
Chapter
Full-text available
In an impressive line of experiments and field studies, the growing field of behavioral finance has offered behavioral insights on how markets deviate from rationality. Human actors are prone to base their investment choices on very many other factors than simply volatility and profit maximization opportunities. Most recently nudging has started using the emerging insights about human heuristics and biases to improve decision making in different domains ranging from health, wealth and prosperity, which are covered in the following chapters. The following part reviews some of the behavior insights gained in the last decades and shows ways how to profit from heuristics and biases.
Article
Full-text available
Behavioral Finance is one of the most novel developments in Behavioral Economics. Since the end of the 1970ies a wide range of psychological, economic and sociological laboratory and field experiments proved human beings deviating from rational choices. Standard neoclassical profit maximization axioms were outlined to fail to explain how human actually behave. Human beings were rather found to use heuristics in the day-to-day decision making. These mental short cuts enable to cope with information overload in a complex world. Behavioral economists proposed to nudge and wink citizens to make better choices for themwith many different applications in very many different domains. This paper reviews and proposes how to use mental heuristics, biases and nudges in the finance domain to profit from markets.
Article
Full-text available
The field of organizational behavior includes the study of how individuals organize and manage conflict among themselves. Less visible has been the study of conflicts occurring within individuals. We propose that one form of intrapersonal conflict is the result of tension between what people want to do versus what they think they should do. We argue that this want/should distinction helps to explain the "multiple-selves" phenomenon and a recently discovered group of preference reversals noted in behavioral decision and organizational behavior research. We develop ct history of knowledge on intrapersonal conflict, discuss how conflicts between what one wants to do and what one should do result in inconsistent behavior, connect this pattern of inconsistency to recent literature on joint versus separate preference reversals, and outline prescriptions for the management of intrapersonal conflict.
Article
Full-text available
Existing models of intertemporal choice normally assume that people are impatient, preferring valuable outcomes sooner rather than later, and that preferences satisfy the formal condition of independence, or separability, which states that the value of a sequence of outcomes equals the sum of the values of its component parts. The authors present empirical results that show both of these assumptions to be false when choices are framed as being explicitly defined sequences of outcomes. Without a proper sequential context, people may discount isolated outcomes in the conventional manner, but when the sequence context is highlighted, they claim to prefer utility levels that improve over time. The observed violations of additive separability follow, at least in part, from a desire to spread good outcomes evenly over time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Presents a theory of norms and normality and applies the theory to phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus is evaluated by comparing it with the norms that it evokes after the fact, rather than to precomputed expectations. Norm theory is applied in analyses of the enhanced emotional response to events that have abnormal causes, of the generation of predictions and inferences from observations of behavior, and of the role of norms in causal questions and answers. (3 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
This paper identifies a systematic instability in the weight that people place on interpersonal comparisons of outcomes. When evaluating the desirability of a single outcome consisting of a payoff for oneself and another person, people display great concern for relative payoffs. However, when they choose between two or more outcomes, their choices reflect greater concern with their own payoffs and less concern for relative payoffs. Modal subjects in our experiments rated the outcome of $500 for self/$500 for other as more desirable than the outcome $600 for self/$800 for other when both were evaluated independently, but they chose the latter outcome over the former when presented with the two options simultaneously. We offer a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon and demonstrate its robustness.
Article
The authors propose that consumers' preferences are systematically affected by whether they make direct comparisons between brands (e.g., a choice task) or evaluate brands individually (e.g., purchase likelihood ratings). In particular, "comparable" attributes, which produce precise and easy-to-compute comparisons (e.g., price), tend to be relatively more important in comparison-based tasks. Conversely, "enriched" attributes (e.g., brand name), which are more difficult to compare but are often more meaningful and informative when evaluated on their own, tend to receive relatively greater weight when preferences are formed on the basis of separate evaluations of individual options. Consistent with this analysis, systematic preference reversals were observed in a series of studies, which tested the proposed explanation on the basis of attribute-task compatibility, demonstrated that the findings generalize across preference elicitation tasks and attributes that have the characteristics prescribed by their theory, and examined rival accounts. The authors discuss the theoretical implications of this research and explore its consequences for the measurement of buyers' preferences and for marketers' pricing, merchandising, distribution, and communications strategies.
Article
Preference can be inferred from direct choice between options or from a matching procedure in which the decision maker adjusts one option to match another. Studies of preferences between two-dimensional options (e.g., public policies, job applicants, benefit plans) show that the more prominent dimension looms larger in choice than in matching. Thus, choice is more lexicographic than matching. This finding is viewed as an instance of a general principle of compatibility: The weighting of inputs is enhanced by their compatibility with the output. To account for such effects, we develop a hierarchy of models in which the trade-off between attributes is contingent on the nature of the response. The simplest theory of this type, called the contingent weighting model, is applied to the analysis of various compatibility effects, including the choice-matching discrepancy and the preference-reversal phenomenon. These results raise both conceptual and practical questions concerning the nature, the meaning and the assessment of preference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)