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Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighborhoods
Abstract
The debate on causes and consequences of social capital has recently been complemented by an investigation into factors that erode it. Various scholars concluded that diversity, and racial heterogeneity in particular, is damaging for the sense of community, interpersonal trust and formal and informal interactions. However, most of this research does not adequately account for the negative effect of a community's low socio-economic status on neighbourhood interactions and attitudes. This article is to date the first empirical examination of the impact of racial context on various dimensions of social capital in British neighbourhoods. Findings show that low neighbourhood status is the key element undermining all dimensions of social capital, while the eroding effect of racial diversity is limited.
... Thereby, for a better cross-cultural comparison, Jensen (2010) proposes to include not only successes such as wealth or its proxies but also the gaps such as poverty, unemployment, and income inequality, as well as institutional performance of a society in delivering social cohesion, such as the effectiveness of democracy, state, and market. Additionally, from a methodological point of view, the concept of social capital is problematic since it measures personal networks, which are mainly based on intragroup-level relation obtained from individual-level data (i.e., micro-level), while being used to infer country-level social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006;Fonseca et al. 2018;Jensen 2010;Putnam 2007;Letki 2008). ...
... It found its echo even in Canada, such that multiculturalism started to be questioned, giving way to an era of "the retreat from multiculturalism" (page 7). Since then, however, many researchers have challenged the hunker-down assumption and provided compelling evidence against it, which is still growing (Ariely 2014;Kesler and Bloemraad 2010;Letki 2008;Savelkoul et al. 2011;Zetter et al. 2006). ...
... One of the first reactions to the hunker-down assumption was to find confounding and contextual variables to explain the negative relationship between diversity and social capital. For instance, Letki (2008) found that it was not the quality of social networks, but their quantity that was at risk of decreasing due to diversity, albeit only in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods in the UK. ...
Despite the fact that it offers clarification, the available literature on social cohesion is crowded with conceptual confusion due to its position at the crossroads of scientific empiricism and political idealism. We intend to review empirically established components of social cohesion to scrutinize theoretical underpinnings of the concept in relation to diversity, focusing particularly on European societies where minorities struggle to have an influence in every facet of social and political life. Informed predominantly by social psychological accounts, we argue that the assumption of incompatibility between diversity and social cohesion is not well grounded, either theoretically or empirically. Rather, scientific efforts to maximize the coherence of operational definition of the concept exclude one crucial aspect of the phenomenon, namely the social dimension that corresponds to the multiplicity of perspectives in society. In our endeavor to critically review the operationalization of social cohesion, we highlight this social dimension of the concept and discuss pitfalls and dangers of available definitions relating to people, communities, and society in general.
... The relationship between diversity and trust varies across countries and regions and can be influenced by different contextual factors (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Letki (2008) claims that socioeconomic deprivation is more important than diversity in determining the trust in neighbourhoods. Trust may be low in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods only because the people who live in these neighbourhoods belong to socially and economically disadvantaged groups of the society (Gijsberts et al. 2012). ...
... Drawing upon our discussion in the preceding section, the conceptual framework used in this study is based upon the notion that lower levels of trust do not necessarily stem from ethnic diversity as it is argued by diversity thesis (McPherson et al. 2001). Trustfulness and trustworthiness in a society may actually be dependent upon different contextual specific factors such as socioeconomic inequalities and deprivations of societies (Letki 2008), ability of societies to manage diversity (Putnam 2007) and to provide an inclusive environment for all segments of the society (van Staveren and Pervaiz 2017). Thus, institutions and policies of social inclusion can be crucial to foster trust. ...
... However, the insignificance of this effect in the fixed effects model contradicts these findings (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018), emphasizing the complex nature of the diversity-trust relationship. The insignificant effects of diversity on trust supports the view that lower levels of trust do not necessary stem from higher ethnic diversity but can actually be result of socioeconomic inequalities (Letki 2008;Pervaiz et al. 2013). ...
This study has explored the potential role of institutional quality and social inclusion in trust building. By utilizing the panel data spanning over thirty five years and for one hundred and twenty four countries of the world, we have applied Fixed Effects as well as Quintile Regression Models to explore the empirical relationship of our interest. The findings reveal that social inclusion is an important and key factor in trust building. The effects of social inclusion on trust are robust as the coefficient of social inclusion is positive and significant across all of our estimated models. Institutional quality also has positive and significant effects on trust building except at medial level of distribution of trust where it has positive but insignificant effect on trust. Income inequality has negative and significant effects whereas the effects of ethnolinguistic diversity on trust are contextual specific as these effects vary across different quintiles of trust distribution. Diversity has negative and significant effects on trust at 10th percentile and positive and significant effects at 90th percentile of trust distribution. Our findings are important for policymakers who can formulate strategies to foster inclusive environment which can be conducive to enhance trust in the society.
... Such theories have been instrumentalised to advance agendas in favour of assimilating the 'other' into the mainstream (i.e. assimilationism), abandoning multiculturalist and pluralist approaches in the realm of policy and shifting public opinion (Letki, 2008). However, while assimilationist tendencies in theory and policy prevail, we have also witnessed the emergence of a wave of counter-theories grounded in the belief that diversity is positive and must be embraced as a trait that can bolster social cohesion (among other things). ...
... Research increasingly shows that low neighbourhood status, poverty, stigmatisation of lower income areas with high concentrations of ethnic minority households, and racial discrimination have a great impact on how inhabitants of an area perceive and interact with one another (Li et al., 2005;Oliver and Mandelberg, 2000;Oliver and Wong, 2003). The framing or priming of racial attitudes and interracial relations, the presence of explicit information and implicit cues about racial relations, and the racial coding of crime and welfare in the minds of citizens all significantly influence attitudes towards diversity (Letki, 2008). Moreover, there is evidence for the fact that socio-economic polarization and segregation often develop geographically along racial lines. ...
... The definitions of social cohesion provided by the literature generally remain at an abstract level, such as, 'the glue that holds society together' (Tolsma, van der Meer & Gesthuizen, 2009;Maloutas & Pantelidou Malouta, 2004), or what makes a society 'hang together so as to ensure that all the component parts of society fit together and contribute to its collective objectives and well-being, and eradicate conflict and disruptive behaviour' (Kearns and Forrest, 2000). Detailed elaborations of the concept have often included the breaking down of cohesion into its constituent elements, most commonly outlined as social contacts and social networks, social solidarity, social order, shared values and norms, place attachment and a shared identity (Forrest and Kearns, 2001;Tasan-Kok, van Kempen, Raco, & Bolt, 2013;Letki, 2008). Moreover, some scholars have emphasised the conceptual and operational similarities between social cohesion and social capital, and some have used the two concepts interchangeably as a result (Letki, 2008;Laurence, 2009;Osberg, 2003). ...
Diversity has increasingly emerged as the core focus of many studies concerning factors impacting on social cohesion. Various scholars have concluded that diversity is detrimental to cohesion. Most of this research, however, draws generalisations based upon quantitative data and fails to account for the impact of inequality, segregation and discrimination, and their interconnectedness to diversity. This research provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of the perceptions of inhabitants of a diverse Toronto neighbourhood regarding formal and informal interactions, common values and attachment. The findings suggest that the internalisation of gendered and class-based racism by inhabitants plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions and interactions.
... Manifestations shed light on the way different individuals interact with each other and live adjacently and the social, economic, cultural and physical consequences that might arise because of these interactions. Three basic different theories have been introduced in this regard entitled contact, conflict and constrict theories, which constitute the main roots of diversity's manifestations and the dispute among scholars, simultaneously (Putnam, 2007;Letki, 2008). These theories explain whether differences' juxtapositions lead to intergroup and/or ingroup relationships or give rise to individualism or hunkering down as Putnam (2007) named it. ...
... Nevertheless, Letki (2008) challenges the negative manifestations of diversity and states that what erodes social cohesion in neighbourhoods inhabited by different races is their concentrated poverty, which is usually typical of these contexts. Arapoglou (2012) and Algan et al. (2016) suggest that differences in ethnicities enhance the levels of poverty, deprivation, vandalism and unemployment rate, reduce buildings' preservation rate and endanger creativity in numerically diverse neighbourhoods, which are prone to gentrification (Sager, 2013). ...
... Although Letki (2008), through studying diversity in British contexts, considers the concentration of poverty in diverse neighbourhoods as the primary origin of negative manifestations of differences' adjacency, we purport that the concentration of wealth, economic homogeneity and indifference to differences are the main components which make individuals' hunkering down or conflicts. Bolt and Van Kempen (2013), who explored Dutch contexts, considered differences as the primary source of individuals' unwillingness for working to improve their neighbourhoods, but we believe that it is the concentration of wealth and/or homogeneity that reduces individuals' inclinations. ...
This paper explores the individuals' lived experiences of living next to different others. Its main focus is on diversity which signifies possible ways of working with differences. Hence, the analysis aims to explore individuals’ perceptions of diverse neighbourhoods, manifestations of differences’ co-existence and the procedure called planning for diversity. To these aims, a qualitative study encompassing interviewing 95 individuals in five neighbourhoods of Tehran, which is one of the most diverse cities in the middle east, is conducted through a phenomenographic approach. Results indicate that individuals' perceptions of diversity are location-based and related to structural inequity or welfare they experienced. Managerial, functional, sociological and physical aspects are the four main perceived pillars of a diverse neighbourhood, which as a spatial unit not only sets the scene for numerical and hierarchical representations of differences but is tolerant of differences. Nevertheless, residents’ lived experiences suggest that diverse populations in Tehran caused individuals' hunkering down – rooted in constrict theory – in general, although intergroup contacts – rooted in contact theory – are also frequent in neighbourhoods where diversity exists in all of its dimensions. Economic diversity is introduced as a catalyst for social diversity that can let outgroup interactions emerge whereas wealth concentration and indifference to differences are two primary components for the emergence of individualism in Tehran. Moreover, Conscious efforts through planning for diversity, which is people-oriented and procedural and looks for a reorientation of power relations, could let differences work, intergroup interactions form and interest-based identities, which introduce neighbourhood as ends, not means, emerge. Therefore, planning for diversity is more based on becoming ontology and is rooted in radical planning theory. Differences, which have always been run through a bottom-up approach, take the initiative and voice policy, set interest-based identities and try to reach them; that is how differences find the opportunity to be reunited.
... Guest and Wierzbicki (1999) and Völker et al. (2006) observed a progressive decline in interpersonal ties in urban residential neighbourhoods. Although Wirth (2009Wirth ( ) [1938, a member of the famed Chicago School, argued that impersonality was an inevitable outcome of adaptation to urban life, more recent studies attribute the declining interpersonal ties in urban neighbourhoods to neighbourhood context (Guest et al. 2006;Bwalya and Seethal 2016), lack of rational investment in the neighbourhood (Völker and Flap 2007;Guest et al. 2008;Letki 2008), a low sense of trust and safety (Letki 2008), and racial diversity (Putnam 2000(Putnam , 2007Guest et al. 2006;Donnelly and Majka 1996;Guest et al. 2008;Cheung and Leung 2011). Filipović (2008: 720) defined a sense of neighbourhood as ' … a feeling of attachment to one's neighbourhood, having social relations in the neighbourhood, and a trusting relationship with one's neighbours'. ...
... Guest and Wierzbicki (1999) and Völker et al. (2006) observed a progressive decline in interpersonal ties in urban residential neighbourhoods. Although Wirth (2009Wirth ( ) [1938, a member of the famed Chicago School, argued that impersonality was an inevitable outcome of adaptation to urban life, more recent studies attribute the declining interpersonal ties in urban neighbourhoods to neighbourhood context (Guest et al. 2006;Bwalya and Seethal 2016), lack of rational investment in the neighbourhood (Völker and Flap 2007;Guest et al. 2008;Letki 2008), a low sense of trust and safety (Letki 2008), and racial diversity (Putnam 2000(Putnam , 2007Guest et al. 2006;Donnelly and Majka 1996;Guest et al. 2008;Cheung and Leung 2011). Filipović (2008: 720) defined a sense of neighbourhood as ' … a feeling of attachment to one's neighbourhood, having social relations in the neighbourhood, and a trusting relationship with one's neighbours'. ...
... Neighbouring, casual social encounters, community participation and social support constituted neighbourhood social interactions. Guest and Wierzbicki (1999), Guest et al. (2006), Filipović (2008) and Letki (2008) used more individual-level attributes to analyse determinants of neighbourhood-based social interactions. These included age, income, education, family composition, homeownership and length of residence. ...
The nature of the unfolding social cohesion in previously racially
segregated residential spaces has attracted attention since the
collapse of apartheid in South Africa and the subsequent
transition to democracy in 1994. This paper uses sense of
neighbourhood to investigate the emerging social interactions in
Cambridge, a former whites-only residential suburb in East
London, South Africa. Fitting a binary logistic regression on
survey data from a sample of residents of Cambridge, the paper
tests the likelihood of race and gender influencing three
indicators of the sense of neighbourhood: the sense of safety,
trust and norms of reciprocity. The results show that relational
dimensions of the sense of neighbourhood differed along racial
lines, with low levels of interracial trust mirroring studies
elsewhere in the country, and the national-level South African
Reconciliation Barometer survey reports. Due to the voluntaristic
nature of relational ties, social integration will remain elusive, and
regardless of the extent of racial changes, variations in the sense
of neighbourhood will characterise the urban residential spaces.
... Naast haar indirecte effecten via de gewijzigde sociale mix, zou gentrificatie de sociale cohesie eveneens kunnen beïnvloeden door het verhogen van de sociaaleconomische status van de buurt. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat arme of sociaal gedepriveerde buurten over het algemeen lagere maten van sociale cohesie kennen dan meer welvarende buurten (Berger-Schmitt, 2000;Forrest & Kearns, 2001;Letki, 2008;Verhaeghe, 2013). Als gentrificatie inderdaad zorgt voor een opwaardering van de buurt, voor betere voorzieningen en voor een hogere socio-economische positie van de buurt ( Atkinson, 2004), kan de sociale cohesie eventueel wel toenemen. ...
... Leeftijd. Oudere personen zullen vaak meer sociale netwerken in de buurt opbouwen en meer gehecht zijn aan hun buurt (Dekker & Bolt, 2005;Letki, 2008), ook bij controle voor duur van het verblijf (Bailey et al., 2012). Daarentegen kunnen zij wel lagere maten van vertrouwen rapporteren dan jongere personen, mogelijks door generatieeffecten (Dekker & Bolt, 2005;Letki, 2008). ...
... Oudere personen zullen vaak meer sociale netwerken in de buurt opbouwen en meer gehecht zijn aan hun buurt (Dekker & Bolt, 2005;Letki, 2008), ook bij controle voor duur van het verblijf (Bailey et al., 2012). Daarentegen kunnen zij wel lagere maten van vertrouwen rapporteren dan jongere personen, mogelijks door generatieeffecten (Dekker & Bolt, 2005;Letki, 2008). ...
As in many other cities, the Belgian city of Ghent regularly carries out urban redevelopment projects to attract middle class inhabitants and investors to its urban core. This urban renewal can cause gentrification, the revival of socially deprived neighbourhoods combined with a population shift from primarily low income to mainly middle class households. This article aims to examine which Ghent neighbourhoods have experienced gentrification between 2005 and 2012 and whether this shift has influenced the social cohesion within the area. Through the use of multilevel modelling, two possible indirect effects of gentrification are explored: the first through increased neighbourhood social mix, the second through improved neighbourhood socioeconomic status (data retrieved from the Ghent Liveability Monitor 2013 and the Ghent Neighbourhood Monitor). Social cohesion is measured as social capital and neighbourhood attachment. Results show that age, income and type of residency are key determinants of social cohesion at the individual level. At the neighbourhood level, gentrification is found to have a positive effect on both social capital and neighbourhood attachment. No indirect effect of social mix is found, neither can the effect of gentrification be ascribed solely to diminished neighbourhood deprivation. Rather, deprivation suppresses the positive effect of gentrification. This study concludes that many policy makers correctly assume that gentrification will benefit social cohesion, but mistakenly ascribe this effect to increased social mix or fully to enhanced SES of the neighbourhood. Gentrification in Ghent also shows a direct effect on social cohesion which has not yet been explained in previous studies.
... In particular, public housing, as a central starting point of state-led social cohesion, becomes the object of great competition and concomitant expansion at the expense of downsizing (Ortiga, 2015). However, findings from the UK show that spatially experienced cultural difference is less an aspect of eroding social cohesion than socio-economic inequality (Letki, 2008). Kathiravelu (2017) sees hostility to immigration in Singapore as an empirical foundation for the theoretical assumption of a collapse of the ideologicalfactual CIMO classification. ...
... Consequently, Singapore as a city-state is challenged to promote social cohesion in the city through local measures (Tan and Teng, 2020). The weak effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on cohesion revealed in the regression analyses indicates a latent effectiveness of policy support measures in Singapore, which appear to perpetuate trust in neighbourhoods among people and thus promote cohesion (Letki, 2008). Thus, the measurable rejection of migrants in Singapore hardly threatens the ideology of social cohesion. ...
This paper analyses the impact of anti-immigrant attitudes on social cohesion in Singapore. The OLS regression models show that anti-immigrant attitudes have a negative influence on social cohesion in all analyses, but this influence is weak and falls behind the ambiguous influence of patriotism. In some of the data, there is a significant difference in social cohesion between the centre and the peripheral districts of Singapore, which can only be attributed to a small extent to composition effects. The results of the analyses thus show that the partially state-led measures for social cohesion in a post-colonial society are indeed effective. However, the multicultural Singaporean society obviously also reacts to cohesion policy measures in a group-specific manner. It is noticeable that social cohesion and an open culture for newcomers cannot be thought of separately. These policies should therefore focus even more strongly than before on social cohesion as societal cohesion.
... determinants, it includes sociodemographic characteristics (Li, 2020;McCaa, 1989;Tian et al., 2019;Wuthnow & Hackett, 2003;Yue et al., 2013), mobility attributes (Chen & Wang, 2015;Robinson, 2010), language assimilation (Musgrave & Bradshaw, 2014;Naveed & Wang, 2021;Remennick, 2003), social relationship (Letki, 2008;Luan et al., 2013;Schwarzweller, 1964;Wang et al., 2016) and residential segregation (Bolt et al., 2010;Checa & Nel·lo, 2021). Recently, some ...
... High-frequency interaction with parents may reduce migrant social integration as they abandon interaction with local people (Schwarzweller, 1964). However, social trust between different groups can strengthen the integration of migrants (Laurence, 2011;Letki, 2008). Meanwhile, establishing good social relationships with local residents can promote migrants' social integration (Yue et al., 2013). ...
While rural migrants living in different housing tenures present significantly variegated levels of social integration, little is known about how land tenure in their place of origin affects their integration into the host cities. Using the 2017 China Migrants Dynamic Survey, we identified three dimensions of social integration: (1) permanent settlement intention, (2) cultural integration and (3) psychological integration. We find that migrants do not feel psychological isolation; their settlement intention is lower as a more realistic judgement of prospects. Their cultural integration is even lower, indicating it is a long‐term process. Migrants with land farming by relatives and friends and land subleasing to private are more socially integrated, while hiring someone to cultivate the land, leaving land uncultivated and other land disposal methods reduces migrants' social integration. Furthermore, land subleasing led to stronger psychological integration, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity issue. It weakens their attachment to their hometowns and increases their income to achieve stronger integration. The effect is more salient in the migrants of the new generation, in second‐tier cities and in the digital economy sector.
... Conceptualizing their framework as social disorganization theory, they argued places will experience more crime when they have a demographic makeup that impedes trust among residents and thus limits their ability to engage in collective action that can prevent crime (Shaw and McKay 1969). While contemporary research has provided strong evidence that neighborhoodlevel poverty and residential instability break down social trust in ways that allow crime problems to manifest (Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001;Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997;Sampson 2006), analytic results suggest racial heterogeneity among residents has a less salient effect on social disorganization and crime than originally theorized (Letki 2008;Taylor, Twigg and Mohan 2010;Twigg, Taylor and Mohan 2010). ...
... While the collective efficacy perspective has been influential across the social sciences, empirical evidence for the role of racial heterogeneity is murky because heterogeneity is strongly correlated to poverty, a second neighborhood contextual feature shown to drive crime. As such, several studies have argued that the linkage between racial heterogeneity and crime dissipates once economic disadvantage is properly modeled (Letki 2008;Taylor, Twigg and Mohan 2010;Twigg, Taylor and Mohan 2010). Furthermore, many of the key studies on collective efficacy neglect to measure racial heterogeneity (Browning and Cagney 2002;Browning, Dietz and Feinberg 2004;Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999), leaving an open question about whether racial heterogeneity truly shapes propensity for social control above and beyond the effects of poverty and residential instability. ...
... Van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) state that the effect of diversity on social cohesion could be seen at a neighbourhood level. Letki (2008) ensured the previous proposal by suggesting that there is no evidence of a negative relationship between diversity and social cohesion at the national or municipal level. This means that the effects of diversity can be felt at the neighbourhood level. ...
Local governments around the world are devising novel strategies to address societal issues. To come up with the poverty concentration, the Dutch local governments encouraged social mix policies which aim to refresh prevented neighbourhood. Gentrification, which is frequently accompanied by such policies, has the potential to change the economic and cultural composition of neighbourhoods, as well as how its residents interact with one another and with their surroundings. So, this study focuses on explaining the effect of changes in sociocultural diversity on horizontal social cohesion in Feijenoord, Rotterdam. I identified horizontal social cohesion (general trust, civic engagement, and a sense of belonging) and sociocultural diversity change dimensions through a literature review (Socioeconomic and cultural heterogeneity). The socio-cultural diversity of Feijenoord shifted, affecting its social cohesion. When it comes to the ethnic composition of the feijenoord neighbourhood, the main recent ethnicities are Turkish, Suriname, Dutch Antilles, Moroccans, Syrians, and Dutch. Moroccans, Syrians, and Dutch are the bigger ethnicities in newcomers. Longstanding residents now have more education than ten years ago. The newcomers to Feijenoord are well-educated. The income inequalities between longstanding low-income residents and wealthy newcomers have grown over the last decade. The neighbourhood is spatially divided based on socioeconomic classes. Many people in the area speak Arabic and Turkish, which has created a new way of communicating and fostering friendships. The community has embraced religious practices such as Islamic cultural practices. As more restaurants serve a variety of cuisines, the area has become more culturally diverse. Because of the changing ethnic composition of the neighbourhood, celebrations such as King's Day now have a new and exciting vitality. The cultural practices spread over the neighbourhood over the past decade. Weddings incorporate elements from the cultures of newcomers, particularly singing and dancing. These changes may have an impact on social cohesion. Some residents felt unwelcome, and they were less likely to volunteer or attend cultural events. Weak ties, and a lack of belonging among some newcomers; and the perception that some newcomers are unwelcome are some of the negative effects on social cohesion links. Because of the growing income inequality in feijenoord, some low-income residents have stopped attending cultural events and working to earn money as an alternative. On the other hand, changes in sociocultural diversity have positive effects ike inspiring some longstanding Muslims to volunteer, which increases meeting opportunities in feijenoord neighbourhood. Longstanding residents in feijenoord, particularly those with children, reported a stronger sense of belonging.
... For example, the Council of Europe defines social cohesion "as the capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its members-minimizing disparities and avoiding marginalization-to manage differences and divisions and ensure the means of achieving welfare for all members" (20). At times, the term has, problematically, been used to refer to the sense of identification and emotional ties among people who share the same characteristics (21), but this notion of homogeneity as a variable in social cohesion has since been recognized to be linked to economic deprivation (22). More current definitions emphasize . ...
Arts and cultural strategies have increasingly been engaged by the public health sector to enhance community health and wellbeing, as well as to address the significant health risks posed by social isolation and loneliness. While increasing studies document relationships between arts participation, social cohesion, and wellbeing uniquely, few studies have investigated the relationships between all three and, to date, no evidence synthesis has been conducted on this topic. To address this gap, this integrative review aimed to identify, describe, and synthesize research on arts participation, social cohesion, and wellbeing in a community context by addressing the question: what is the evidence base regarding relationships between arts participation, social cohesion, and well-being?? Literature searches were conducted using 10 databases, and 18 articles met inclusion criteria – 16 original research articles and two reviews. Results provide insights on modes and forms of arts participation, along four themes that articulate dimensions of and relationships between arts participation, social cohesion, and well-being, as distilled from the studies. Further, this review offers a conceptual model derived from these themes. The model depicts the relationships found between these concepts in the articles, and highlights specific components of these relationships that may help to guide future practice, research, and policy that seeks to leverage the power of the arts to build social cohesion and wellbeing in communities. Prospective studies are needed to test these relationships as well as the potential role of social cohesion as a mechanism for building well-being in communities.
... Intercultural diversity in educational settings needs to be understood with the context of policies of inclusion or exclusion since they can impact on how people engage with social difference (Letki 2008). Speaking in a general way, Atkinson (1998) points out that "people are excluded not just because they are currently without a job or income, but because they have little prospects for the future" (14). ...
Education set-ups across different age cohorts and countries often pride themselves on having students from various nations. The objective of this paper is to understand how, within a Maltese context, lecturers at sixth form level understand and consider intercultural diversity when implementing the curriculum. It also studies how lecturers’ personal experiences with race and culture inform their thinking on a meta-reflective level. Previous research has shown the importance of the use of reflection in teacher education (Davis 2006) and the use of portfolios for learning and assessment (Chetcuti et al. 2006) but little research has been carried out on teachers’ perspectives of teaching intercultural classes at a sixth form level. The study aims to fill in this lacuna in the literature by exploring what lecturers believe influences their ideas and practices of intercultural education in the classes they teach. There are clear implications of this study for policy, particularly showing that good will and having the best of intentions need to be augmented by a curriculum that is flexible enough to accommodate for students from different cultural groups if student learning is to be optimised across the board.
... The author concludes that provision of equal opportunities enhances tolerance social cohesion. Letki (2008) finds that socioeconomic deprivations, instead of diversity, erode social cohesion in the neighbourhoods of Britain. Using socioeconomic factors such as poverty and unemployment in Indonesia, Nazara et al. (2019) concluded that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are responsible for enhancing conflict. ...
This study aims to explore the relationship of inequality of opportunities, social cohesion and economic growth. For this purpose, multi level analysis has been conducted by utilizing the cross country data spanning over the period of thirty years i.e. 1998 to 2017. Data of the variables and indices used in our analysis is from different data sources and is not available with same time intervals. Some data is available on yearly basis, some data is available with five years gaps and some data is available with irregular time intervals. In any case, averages of the variables over the period of ten years have been used to construct variables for our analysis. Thus, the data becomes available at three points of time. Averages of 1988-1997, 1998-2007 and 2008- 2017 are used for the construction of variables for first, second and third point of time respectively. However, the number of countries for which data is available at these three points of time is not same. It makes our data an unbalanced panel data. Similarly, the number of countries in different regression models are different. Depending upon the availability of data, the number of countries included in different regression models vary between 87 to 162 countries of the world In first step, we have constructed different indices of inequality of opportunities. In doing so, inequality of income has been decomposed into inequality of efforts and inequality of circumstances. The decomposition has been done by regressing income inequality on six different indices along with other control variables in six different regressions alternatively. These six indices are related with opportunities of intergenerational mobility in a country and social exclusion based upon socioeconomic conditions, gender, geographical location/region, political affiliation and parental socioeconomic background. The estimated values of income inequality obtained from above mentioned six regressions have been treated/termed as indices of inequality of opportunities based upon circumstances or simply inequality of circumstances. The residuals of above mentioned six regressions have been treated/termed as indices of inequality of opportunities based upon efforts or simply inequality of efforts. The values of our indices of inequality of opportunities show that sources of income inequality are different in different countries. It is also evident from these indices that there are no notable changes of inequality of opportunities over the time. In next step, we have explored two channels through which inequality of opportunities can be an important determinant of economic growth across the countries of the world. For this purpose, Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) method has been used. The first explored channel suggests that inequality of x opportunities affects social cohesion which, in turn, affects economic growth. In second channel, inequality of opportunities affects social cohesion; which affects economic growth through its effects on investment. In both channels, inequality of opportunities has been found to be detrimental to social cohesion which has direct as well as indirect effects on economic growth. Its indirect effects on economic growth run through its positive and significant effects on investment. It implies that countries with high inequality of opportunities have lower social cohesion, lower investment and hence lower economic growth. Compensatory public policies are suggested as an option to tackle the negative effects of inequality of opportunities on social cohesion and economic growth.
... The author concludes that provision of equal opportunities enhances tolerance social cohesion. Letki (2008) finds that socioeconomic deprivations, instead of diversity, erode social cohesion in the neighbourhoods of Britain. Using socioeconomic factors such as poverty and unemployment in Indonesia, Nazara et al. (2019) concluded that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are responsible for enhancing conflict. ...
his study aims to explore the relationship of inequality of opportunities, social cohesion and economic growth. For this purpose, multi level analysis has been conducted by utilizing the cross country data spanning over the period of thirty years i.e. 1998 to 2017. Data of the variables and indices used in our analysis is from different data sources and is not available with same time intervals. Some data is available on yearly basis, some data is available with five years gaps and some data is available with irregular time intervals. In any case, averages of the variables over the period of ten years have been used to construct variables for our analysis. Thus, the data becomes available at three points of time. Averages of 1988-1997, 1998-2007 and 2008- 2017 are used for the construction of variables for first, second and third point of time respectively. However, the number of countries for which data is available at these three points of time is not same. It makes our data an unbalanced panel data. Similarly, the number of countries in different regression models are different. Depending upon the availability of data, the number of countries included in different regression models vary between 87 to 162 countries of the world In first step, we have constructed different indices of inequality of opportunities. In doing so, inequality of income has been decomposed into inequality of efforts and inequality of circumstances. The decomposition has been done by regressing income inequality on six different indices along with other control variables in six different regressions alternatively. These six indices are related with opportunities of intergenerational mobility in a country and social exclusion based upon socioeconomic conditions, gender, geographical location/region, political affiliation and parental socioeconomic background. The estimated values of income inequality obtained from above mentioned six regressions have been treated/termed as indices of inequality of opportunities based upon circumstances or simply inequality of circumstances. The residuals of above mentioned six regressions have been treated/termed as indices of inequality of opportunities based upon efforts or simply inequality of efforts. The values of our indices of inequality of opportunities show that sources of income inequality are different in different countries. It is also evident from these indices that there are no notable changes of inequality of opportunities over the time. In next step, we have explored two channels through which inequality of opportunities can be an important determinant of economic growth across the countries of the world. For this purpose, Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) method has been used. The first explored channel suggests that inequality of x opportunities affects social cohesion which, in turn, affects economic growth. In second channel, inequality of opportunities affects social cohesion; which affects economic growth through its effects on investment. In both channels, inequality of opportunities has been found to be detrimental to social cohesion which has direct as well as indirect effects on economic growth. Its indirect effects on economic growth run through its positive and significant effects on investment. It implies that countries with high inequality of opportunities have lower social cohesion, lower investment and hence lower economic growth. Compensatory public policies are suggested as an option to tackle the negative effects of inequality of opportunities on social cohesion and economic growth.
... The author concludes that provision of equal opportunities enhances tolerance social cohesion. Letki (2008) finds that socioeconomic deprivations, instead of diversity, erode social cohesion in the neighbourhoods of Britain. Using socioeconomic factors such as poverty and unemployment in Indonesia, Nazara et al. (2019) concluded that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are responsible for enhancing conflict. ...
... One such cost of homophily, for example, would be the creation of echo chambers, where beliefs are reinforced and amplified by communication and repetition inside a closed system that is shielded from rebuttal (Jamieson and Cappella 2008). "Like" networks have also been shown to insulate participants from opportunities to engage with difference, thus making them and their networks less resilience to alternative forms of information and ways of life (Laurence & Bentley 2015;Letki 2008). Consequently, individuals lacking exposure to heterogeneous networks, and the diverse exchange of values and opinions such networks make possible, are far more likely to reject out-of-hand opposing viewpoints and experience high levels of discomfort when such exposure occurs (e.g., Boutyline and Willer 2017). ...
This paper draws from data collected from 500+ surveys, distributed twice from the same respondents (2020 and 2021), and forty-five face-to-face interviews (2022). The location studied is a metropolitan county in Colorado (USA). The research examined the discourses and practices having to do with organic and natural food consumption—note, too, the data were collected at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings upend conventional understandings of, and frameworks used to explain, consumer behavior. What are often presented as motivations in prior studies are shown, instead, to be justifications; rationalizations after-the-fact. The paper troubles decision-making frameworks that cast motivations, attitudes, and intentions as “antecedents” to consumer behavior. Rather, the findings point to the significance of social networks, and in particular network diversity, for understanding and explaining the sayings (discourses) and doings (practices) of “individual” consumers. Discourses linked to health are also shown to be salient variables, though when situated within social networks those discourses are shown to have politics. Particular attention is devoted to explaining dietary shifts among those who reported the largest increases in the consumption of organic and natural foods between 2020 and 2021/22. The paper concludes discussing what the data mean from the standpoint of envisioning just and inclusive food system futures and agrifood policy that delivers on those ends.
... Social cohesion, defined as "the degree of connectedness among groups in society" (Manca, 2014, p. 20), is commonly regarded as a quintessential building block of a stable and harmonious society. A plethora of studies have empirically corroborated this laymen's premise, linking social cohesion to lower crime rates (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000;Letki, 2008), more effective democracy and governance (e.g., Putnam, 1993), better individual and public health (e.g., Kawachi and Berkman, 2000;Chuang et al., 2013) and enhanced wellbeing (e.g., Elands et al., 2018;Florez et al., 2020). Bearing these observations in mind, it can be deemed alarming that recent research is showing a steady decline in social cohesion (Putnam, 2000(Putnam, , 2007Council of Europe, 2005;Schmeets and te Riele, 2014;Borkowska and Laurence, 2021). ...
Recent research describes how procedural fairness can be used to resolve issues related to ethnic-cultural matters. The central finding in this strand of literature is that when minority members experience procedurally fair treatment by societal actors regarding ethnic-cultural issues, this will lead to a range of outcomes that are beneficial for social cohesion. Although these results are promising, it remains yet to be shown that such group-specific treatment fairness does not hamper social cohesion by inciting misapprehension among members of non-recipient groups. Therefore, the present study set out to examine two central questions. First, how would minority group members respond to treatment fairness of citizens belonging to another minority group? Second, how would majority group members respond to treatment fairness of citizens belonging to minority groups? Two experimental studies (total N = 908) examined these questions. In Study 1, we compared ethnic-cultural minorities’ reactions to procedurally (un)fair treatment of their own versus a different minority group. In Study 2, we compared minority and majority group members’ responses to procedurally (un)fair treatment of minority group members. Results show that minority group member reactions to ethnic-cultural procedural fairness emanate from a shared bond with the fairness recipient(s) of the other minority group. Conversely, majority group members’ reactions are driven primarily by a perceived moral obligation to act rightfully toward members of disadvantaged groups. Taken together, our results suggest that ethnic-cultural procedural fairness enactment fosters societal unity among different groups, possibly strengthening social cohesion for well-being and prosperity among members of these groups.
... Research by various authors suggests that for sound social capital to emerge, a high degree of homogeneity is required. Communities with high levels of racial and cultural diversity seem to have lower levels of interpersonal trust and of formal and informal networks (Letki, 2008). This is observed in Nigeria where there is ethnicity and religious differences. ...
This paper psychologically reviewed the changing African collectivistic value to individualistic value orientation. Collectivism implies the type of society which care and value the goals, norms, solidarity, and identity of group more than that of individuals while individualism is a type of society which care and value the individual's interest, goals and aspiration more than that of group, even at the detriment of the group. There seems to be observable progressive shift in traditional extended family orientation which strongly is the foundation of all values to the contemporarily small nuclear family system where every individual strongly seeks for autonomy or self-independence. Theoretically, relational models explored the types of socioeconomic relations found across cultures which bound people together and motivate collectivism. The inherent characteristics of colonial lifestyle, administration, business, and philosophy rooted individualism in Nigeria through formal education, knowledge and skill acquisition to the continual economic integration, competition, and globalization of culture and values. The level of drift in these value systems could have directly led to psychological feelings of loneliness, psychological distance, psychological disparity, psychological insecurity, individual rationalization of values, multiplication of mental stressors, and could have indirectly led to increase in psychological problems, crime rate, corruption, antisocial behaviours, and marriage problems that have bedevilled the African nations in the recent time. It may also have positively led to economic breakthrough, self-confidence, mental prioritization of goals, and fast reasoning. But Africa is not developed for individualistic value system. The condition demands that African developing countries should lean to imbibe their collectivistic value system in their countries developmental plan with the help of professionals and other explored system that encourage collectivism to achieve both economic and human development.
... Social capital, however, refers to social networks and can take two forms, bonding with the in-group and bridging with the out-group. Both group processes are considered to be components of social cohesion [12,42,44]. ...
As globalisation changes the sociocultural architecture of urban areas, adolescents increasingly interact with different sets of values and worldviews, which can be a potential cause of conflict and anxiety. To date, there is little empirical research on how adolescents perceive and experience social cohesion in a superdiverse metropolitan context such as the Brussels Capital Region. In this study, we elaborate on the relationship between social cohesion and ethnic diversity, using controversial topics as instruments to examine the erosion of social cohesion. To expose these processes, 34 in-depth interviews were conducted with pupils from Dutch-speaking secondary schools in Brussels. Through thematic analysis, the data revealed four overarching themes of controversies: Brussels, religion/philosophy, ethnicity/national belonging and political horizon, epitomising a paradox of conflict and consensus. Notably, during the interviews, the adolescents reported a climate shaped by actions of ‘silencing’, ‘avoiding’ and ‘voicing’ when discussing controversies in a heterogeneous classroom context. This analysis of adolescents’ perceptions of social cohesion hence corroborates the premise that conflict is not the opposite of cohesiveness, but rather an integral part of a pluralistic society.
... Consequently, they may lose faith in others and expect others to take advantage of the system to their misfortune. Using data obtained in a large-scale community survey in England and Wales, Letki (2008) found that when the degree of economic deprivation was taken into account, the negative effects of ethnic diversity on social interactions disappeared. ...
... van der Meer and Tolsma (2014),Koopmans et al. (2015), andDinesen et al. (2020).4 See, for example:Letki (2008),Phan (2008), andGijsberts et al. (2012).5 See Dinesen et al. (2020). ...
... van der Meer and Tolsma (2014),Koopmans et al. (2015), andDinesen et al. (2020).4 See, for example:Letki (2008),Phan (2008), andGijsberts et al. (2012).5 See Dinesen et al. (2020). ...
The Dutch government must pursue a more active policy to familiarize all new migrants with our society and to incorporate them into it as effectively as possible. That is the main message of this publication. In recent decades, policy in this area has been too variable and too reactive. An active policy is necessary because migration to the Netherlands is structural in nature. The Netherlands is now a dynamic migration society, attracting people from all parts of the world. As a result, its diversity by origin is increasing. In addition, we have to deal with more and more transient migration: many immigrants who come to the Netherlands are just ‘passing through’ and so eventually leave again.
... van der Meer and Tolsma (2014),Koopmans et al. (2015), andDinesen et al. (2020).4 See, for example:Letki (2008),Phan (2008), andGijsberts et al. (2012).5 See Dinesen et al. (2020). ...
This chapter examines the challenges facing Dutch society once migrants have settled here. Their great diversity by origin makes it complicated to live side by side in neighbourhoods or communities, which can lead to feelings of loss, unease and insecurity. In this chapter we outline the most important findings in this area from our previous empirical research, as well as presenting new ones concerning the local impact of high levels of transient migration. The nature and scale of these challenges, especially those around social cohesion and labour-market participation, differ substantially from place to place. We therefore pay particular attention to that variety.
... van der Meer and Tolsma (2014),Koopmans et al. (2015), andDinesen et al. (2020).4 See, for example:Letki (2008),Phan (2008), andGijsberts et al. (2012).5 See Dinesen et al. (2020). ...
Each year a wide variety of immigrants arrive in the Netherlands, from all parts of the world. Some move on after a short time, others shuttle back and forth to their homeland and others still stay permanently. All these new residents make a home somewhere in the country. For most labour migrants, that is a free choice. Family migrants usually move in with a partner, and asylum migrants are assigned permanent accommodation in a particular municipality once they have been granted official refugee status. For all, however, the local government is the primary authority charged with helping them find their way in Dutch society.
Anti-Black bias is a persistent issue in the United States. An increasingly influential view posits that pathogen stress may be a key driver, whilst experimental research suggests disease avoidance motives can increase bias. However, whether pathogen stress increases bias through increasing disease avoidance motives has not been demonstrated in population-based work. We use discrete measurements of prejudice and disease avoidance motives to test this relationship. Namely, we assess whether pathogen stress relates to anti-Black bias at the state and metropolitan level and whether this occurs through increasing disease avoidance motives. We first assess whether increased pathogen stress predicts Google searches for a common anti-Black slur and if this effect is mediated by disease avoidance motives. Results found such a mediation. We then test this relationship using implicit and explicit bias, seeing whether germ aversion mediates the effect of pathogen stress on both operationalisations of prejudice. Whilst results found germ aversion to be an important driver of explicit prejudice, the mediation relationship did not hold for most measures. Our work is the first to comprehensively test if disease avoidance motives may influence the relationship between pathogen stress and searching for anti-Black racial slurs and implicit and explicit bias. We discuss implications and directions for future work.
Residential communities, especially those in urban areas, face significant challenges due to rapid urban growth. Due to society’s continual shift toward a personalized, anonymous, and mobile one, one of these challenges is the disappearance of close-knit communities of family and friends. Neighborhoods nowadays are therefore multipurpose systems for creating localized social ties and networks. In light of the significance of social ties, this study investigates the relationship between localized social ties and residential satisfaction via the mediation of a sense of place. This study therefore has three main objectives: 1) to determine the relationship between localized social ties (LST) and residential satisfaction (RS); 2) to examine the relationship between LST and sense of place (SOP); and 3) to investigate the mediating role of SOP between LST and RS. To collect data for the study, self-filling paper questionnaires were distributed by door-to-door visits. The collected data from Rezvan complex residents in Shiraz, Iran (n = 400) were used then for analysis using a causal model. The causal model adopted revealed appropriate goodness of fit. The sense of place and residential satisfaction were positively related to localized social ties. We also found that SOP mediates the relationship between localized social ties and residential satisfaction.
This article investigates the complex interactions between local and national economic contexts and volunteering behavior. We examine three dimensions of local economic context—economic disadvantage (e.g., the percentage of families living in poverty), income inequality, and economic growth (e.g., the change in median household income)—and the impact of a national/global economic jolt—the Great Recession. Analysis of data from the Current Population Survey’s (CPS) Volunteering Supplement (2002–2015) reveals that individuals who live in places characterized by economic disadvantage and economic inequality are less likely to volunteer than individuals in more advantaged, equitable communities. The recession had a dampening effect on volunteering overall, but it had the largest dampening effect on individual volunteering in communities with above-average rates of income equality and higher rates of economic growth. While individuals living in rural communities were more likely to volunteer than their urban counterparts before the recession, rural/urban differences disappeared after the recession.
This article considers inequalities across racial and ethnic groups in the UK and finds that there is no single story of advantage or disadvantage. Racial and ethnic inequalities are complex and characterized simultaneously by continuity rooted in historical origins and conditions and rapid change fuelled by new and changing populations and opportunities. Continuity and change are also reflected in very different patterns of inequality across (and within) minority groups, generations and outcomes. Some groups are characterized by high levels of average qualifications, income and wealth, while others are persistently disadvantaged, faced with elevated levels of poverty and unemployment. Alongside different levels in outcomes are varied trajectories, both within and across generations. Within groups, there are less-explored, intersectional contours of difference, along the lines of gender, geography and class. Research and policy must acknowledge this diversity and complexity to inform effective policy prescriptions going forwards.
We use data from a large‐scale and nationally representative survey to examine whether there is in Britain a trade‐off between social diversity and social cohesion. Using six separate measures of social cohesion (generalised trust, volunteering, giving to charity, inter‐ethnic friendship, and two neighbourhood cohesion scales) and four measures of social diversity (ethnic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, percentage Muslim, and percentage foreign‐born), we show that, net of individual covariates, there is a negative association between social diversity and most measures of social cohesion. But these associations largely disappear when neighbourhood deprivation is taken into account. These results are robust to alternative definitions of neighbourhood. We also investigate the possibility that the diversity‐‐cohesion trade‐off is found in more segregated neighbourhoods. But we find very little evidence to support that claim. Overall, it is material deprivation, not diversity, that undermines social cohesion.
Sosyal kaynaşma, bir yerleşimde birlikte yaşayan toplulukları ortak değerler çerçevesinde yapılandırmayı, servet ve gelirdeki eşitsizlikleri azaltmayı ve genel olarak insanların ortak bir girişimde bulunma, ortak zorluklarla mücadele etme ve içinde yer aldıkları topluluğun bir parçası oldukları hissine sahip olma davranış ve duygularını ifade eder. Ülkelerin sosyal barış ve refahı için sosyal kaynaşma önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışma, göçmenlerin ve dezavantajlı grupların yoğun olarak bulunduğu Türkiye’de sosyal kaynaşma sorununa bilimsel bir çözüm önerisi geliştirmeyi amaç edinmiştir. Çalışmada, göçmen bireylerin sosyal kaynaşma düzeyleri ve sosyal kaynaşmada sosyal sermaye, pozitif psikolojik sermaye, sosyal umut ve ekonomik beklenti arasındaki ilişki hipotetik bir model oluşturularak analiz edilmiştir. Ampirik analizlerde Yapısal Eşitlik Modeli metodu kullanılmıştır. Yapısal Eşitlik Modeli sonucu: Sosyal Kaynaşma ile Pozitif Psikolojik Sermaye, Ekonomik Beklenti, Umut ve Sosyal Sermaye arasında çok yüksek oranda pozitif yönlü ilişki bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir. Çalışmada, Ukrayna’dan Türkiye’ye zorunlu göç eden Ahıska Türklerinin bölge halkıyla yüksek düzeyde kaynaşma içerisinde olduğu görülmüştür. Çalışma, Üzümlü İlçesi’ne yerleşmiş Ahıska Türküyle yürütülmüştür ve sosyal kaynaşma kapsamında, bölgesel veya ulusal düzeyde araştırmalar için bir perspektif sunmaktadır.
Scholarship claims that diversity undermines trust and cooperation. Critiques focus on studies’ inability to discern diversity’s causal effects. In fact, most studies are unable to distinguish diversity (i.e., mixture) and marginalized group share (e.g., percentage Black). The authors argue for preserving this distinction and identify obstacles to doing so. First, homogeneously disadvantaged communities are acutely underrepresented in North America and Europe, the settings of most diversity research. The second issue, a case of the ecological fallacy, concerns our inability to infer associations between individual outcomes and diversity from associations between macro-level outcomes and diversity. Much diversity research would be better served by using group share measures that align with the in-group/out-group theories they draw on to motivate research and explain findings. The authors clarify the data and analytic requirements for research that seeks to draw conclusions about diversity per se. Practically, the distinction between diversity and marginalized group share is also relevant for policy.
A considerable body of literature suggests that immigration undermines voluntary contributions to public goods because it leads to ethnic diversity, which erodes social trust. This article posits that the effect of immigration outweighs that of ethnic diversity, so that immigration may explain why ethnic diversity is negatively associated with social trust and public goods provisioning. I also highlight a need to emphasize the moderating influence of transaction costs when analyzing provisioning problems associated with immigration and ethnic diversity. To examine my hypotheses, I use a mixed-method research design to study public goods management in randomly selected communities in rural Uganda whose rates of immigration and levels of ethnic diversity vary. I analyze community-level attempts at collective action that involve substantially different costs; that is, contributing to toilet construction and participating in litter pickup programs. The findings suggest that socio-political barriers to collective action for public goods provisioning may have less to do with the stock of demographic diversity than the flow rate of demographic change. The same findings suggest a more micro-level explanation that transcends the erosive effects (of immigration and ethnic diversity) on social trust to emphasize the moderating influence of transaction costs.
With the growing success of right-wing populism, there has been an explosion of debates on polarization and social cohesion. In part, social cohesion is seen as being disrupted by right-wing populists and those who blame migration for this alleged disruption of cohesion. The developing polarization is not only social, but also political, so that in some cases there is already talk of a new cleavage. On the one hand, there are right-wing populists, people who do not want any major changes or who have problems with globalization; on the other hand, there are those who want to push through a transformation towards a ‘truly’ pluralistic society. Two issues in particular serve as bridges for this polarization: Muslim migration and the expansion of sexual and gender diversity. Positions on these two issues mark the content that facilitates the consolidation of opposing group identities. As a result, debates about values and identity dominate, leading to a polarization that reaches far into society.
A.Н. ФГАОУ ВО «Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (ФГАОУ ВО «НИУ ВШЭ»), г. Москва, Российская Федерация ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7557-9107, e-mail: tatarko@yandex.ru Цель. Рассмотрение ключевых теоретических наработок концепции социального капитала, обзор социально-психологических взглядов на природу социального капитала и обсуждение с опо-рой на существующие исследования проблемы социального капитала поликультурного общества. Контекст и актуальность. Несмотря на большое количество эмпирических исследований, в настоящее время не существует единых взглядов на структуру социального капитала, а также общепринятых методик его измерения. Феноменология социального капитала рассматривает-ся на трех уровнях: макро-, мезо-и микроуровень. Объединяет эти явления на всех трех уров-нях то, что они являются нематериальным ресурсом общества, группы или индивида. В статье рассматриваются не только различные теоретические подходы к феномену социального капи-тала, но также и преимущества обладания обществом данным социально-психологическим ре-сурсом. Особое внимание уделяется обзору исследований социального капитала в поликультур-ном обществе. Обсуждается влияние этнической гетерогенности общества на его социальный капитал, а также особенности влияния различных аспектов интеграционной иммиграционной политики на социальный капитал общества, что представляет особый интерес и актуаль-ность для поликультурной России. Используемая методология. Системный подход, метод сравнительного анализа. Основные выводы. Понятие социального капитала остается скорее «зонтичным», объеди-няя набор ряда явлений, удовлетворяющих определенным характеристикам. Показатели со-циального капитала на групповом и индивидуальном уровнях различны. Социальный капитал в поликультурном обществе является одним из ресурсов взаимной адаптации этнических групп. Что касается связи этнического разнообразия с социальным капиталом, то, хотя большинство зарубежных исследований говорят о снижении социального капитала в условиях этнического разнообразия, на примере России мы этого не обнаружили. Связь этнического разнообразия с социальным капиталом сильно зависит от контекста. Ключевые слова: социальный капитал, доверие, социально-психологический капитал лич-ности, поликультурное общество. Финансирование. Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке Российского фонда фундамен-тальных исследований (РФФИ) в рамках научного проекта № 20-113-50191. Для цитаты: Татарко А.Н. Исследования социального капитала в поликультурном обществе: теорети-ко-методологические проблемы и важнейшие результаты // Социальная психология и общество. 2021.
The core sociological subject of ‘social cohesion’ (hereafter SC) has re-emerged as a key concept in the social sciences. On the one hand, SC is thought to be influenced by a society’s degree of inequalities and the quality of its welfare state. On the other hand, SC is thought to be instrumental in its own right to other factors such as economic growth, institutional quality, and individual well-being. In recent years, a few attempts have been made to measure SC empirically. Many current indices have not been sufficiently theoretically substantiated, and do not consider the importance of different ‘social levels’ when explaining and measuring SC as both cause and effect of other correlates. Very often, SC is simply defined as a ‘social quality’ or a quality of a collective. As a result, measures are often aggregate macro-indices leading to a loss of the information base of any social ‘units’ below the macro-societal-level. Contributing to this important methodological debate, this paper provides a conceptual reformulation of SC. Hence, when assessing SC based on a multi-dimensional index, it is insightful and feasible to evaluate both its internal variation as well as its holistic validity. In fact, it is proposed that these two aspects of measurement stand in direct relationship to one-another. The paper starts out with a discussion of SC as a ‘social fact’ in the Durkheimian sense. In addition, three bridging propositions on the measurement of SC are advanced: (a) SC as outcome or consequence at the level of individual attitudes and orientations (‘micro’); (b) SC as degree of dissimilarity and presence of latent conflict within a society at the level of salient social categories (‘meso’), and (c) SC as predictor, social determinant and hence antecedent at the societal-level (‘macro’). Using all rounds of the European Social Survey with a very large sample size, the advantages of this approach are illustrated by singling-out the important link between socio-economic inequalities, social cohesion and individual subjective well-being in a path of action.
A persistent question for social scientists is the extent to which societal levels of ethnic diversity, and rates of immigration, make collective action difficult to achieve (or maintain). Here I examine whether immigration can explain why ethnic diversity is negatively associated with collective action. The focus is on two aspects of collective action for common property management (that is, voluntary contributions to toilet construction and voluntary compliance with forestry regulations) among Ugandan communities whose levels of ethnic diversity and rates of immigration vary. Preliminary evidence suggests that communities with lower rates of immigration are more supportive of common property management, irrespective of their levels of ethnic diversity. By implication, socio-political impediments to collective action may have less to do with the stock of demographic diversity than the flow rate of demographic change.
The inter-group contact hypothesis states that interactions between individuals belonging to different groups will influence the attitudes and behavior between members of these different groups. The two dominant measures of inter-group contact are context (i.e., size of a minority group within a specified geographic area) and individual behavior (i.e., personal contact between members of the majority and minority groups). The contextual and behavioral measures of contact produce divergent findings. The contextual contact literature finds that whites residing in areas with high concentrations of minority populations have significantly more negative attitudes toward minorities and minority-based public policies than whites residing in areas with low concentrations of minority populations. The behavioral contact literature finds that inter-group contacting among majority and minority populations significantly reduces prejudicial attitudes and opinions about minorities and minority-based policies. In this article we examine both contextual and behavioral measures of the contact hypothesis as they influence white attitudes toward immigrant populations (i.e., Hispanics) and white policy positions toward immigration policies. We offer and test an explanation for the literature's divergent findings.
Research has uncovered many mechanisms that exacerbate racial inequalities in achievement. Due to specialization within the
field, however, little focus has been devoted to the multitiered and often interconnected institutional nature of these processes.
Matching data from the restricted-use National Educational Longitudinal Survey and the Common Core of Data, I hierarchically
model the influence of family/peer and educational institutional processes simultaneously on the black-white gap in achievement.
The modeling strategy used offers a more comprehensive understanding of the reproductive interinstitutional dynamics at work,
suggesting strong linkages between family/peer group attributes and access to educational resources. I conclude by suggesting
the need to extend this line of inquiry a step further still, developing a theoretically driven contextual and spatial understanding
of educational opportunity and achievement.
In 1989 Sampson and Groves proposed a model of social disorganization. In this model, neighborhoods with low socioeconomic status, high residential mobility, racial heterogeneity, and family disruption were predicted to have sparse local friendship networks, low organizational participation, and unsupervised youth groups. These, in turn, were predicted to increase neighborhood crime rates. Although Sampson and Groves' work represents the most complete model of social disorganization to date, it has only been tested twice and then on the same data set. Using data from 36 neighborhoods from 7 U.S. cities, this study examines extensions of Samps on and Groves' model suggested by past research findings. The results indicate that Sampson and Groves' model is modestly supported by the data. Social disorganization variables are more effective in transmitting the effects of neighborhood structural characteristics on assault than on robbery. Implications of the study and directions for future research are discussed.
Although membership in voluntary associations has been presumed to be a central element in the building of social capital, micro-level knowledge about whether and how voluntary associations make their members more trusting and cooperative has been lacking. The link between trust and involvement in associations in Germany and Sweden was explored by means of a questionnaire concerning traits of individuals and of the associational groups to which they belong. The analysis of the resulting data set considered the extent to which various group characteristics (such as demographic diversity, in-group trust, and engagement level) are related to the generalized trust of the members. The results indicate that more diverse, more engaged voluntary associations, and those with weak ties, indeed accommodate more trusting people. In particular, time spent in groups with foreigners, or in groups with weaker ties, affects the generalized trust levels of the members.
In recent years, there has been an intense public and policy debate about ethnic diversity, community cohesion, and immigration in Britain and other societies worldwide. In addition, there has been a growing preoccupation with the possible dangers to social cohesion represented by growing immigration flows and ethnic diversity. This paper proposes a critical framework for assessing the links between immigration, social cohesion, and social capital. It argues that the concept of social capital is episodic, socially constructed and value-based, depending on the prevailing ideological climate. Considerations of social capital as a public policy tool to achieve social cohesion need to incorporate an appreciation of alternative conceptions of social capital rooted in a textured under-standing of immigrant processes and migration contexts.
The debate over social capital and civil society has focused largely on broad-brush assess ments of participation in America and on what various measures of involvement in social and political life indicate aboutAmericans. This study moves beyond general interpretations of societal trends to a detailed analysis of minorities in city politics. Drawing on data gathered from a study of participation in large American cities, the authors break partici pation down by neighborhood and ask what kinds of political organizations are most effective in mobilizing minorities in city politics. This study compares the participation of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics in neighborhood associations, citywide issue organizations, crime watch groups, and social service/self-help organizations. The data are further analyzed on the basis of the socioeconomic and racial makeup of neighborhoods. The neighborhood associations stand out as the most successful of the four types of organizations for mobilizing African Americans and bringing them into the political process.
During the spring and early summer of 2001, there were a number of disturbances in towns and cities in England involving large numbers of people from different cultural backgrounds and which resulted in the destruction of property and attacks on the police.
This report, prepared by an independent panel chaired by Ted Cantle, found that communities lived in 'parallel lives' with little or no contact between them and with no opportunity to disconfirm the stereotypes and prejudices. The report advocated contact and meaningful interaction and led to the development a new approach to race and community relations.
Few social scientists ever generate the attention or controversy that Robert Putnam has since he first made his social capital argument in 1993.1 In Making Democracy Work, Putnam argued that political differences between northern and southern Italy could be explained by differences in political culture, particularly social capital, between the two regions. In recent work, Putnam applies this social capital model to the United States; he argues that declines in social capital go a long way toward explaining increasing voter apathy and decreasing civic engagement among Americans. This article raised a stream of contro-versy and political debate, much of which Putnam responded to with his book, Bowling Alone.2 While Putnam addresses his critics in this work, the central argument remains the same: since the mid-1960s political trust, social connectedness, and civic activity has declined precipitously in the United States, and that the root explanation for this decline lies in the generational differences between Americans born after World War II and those born before.
Surveys suggest an erosion of trust in government, among individuals, and between groups. Although these trends are often thought to be bad for democracy, the relationship between democracy and trust is paradoxical. Trust can develop where interests converge, but in politics interests conflict. Democracy recognizes that politics does not provide a natural terrain for robust trust relations, and so includes a healthy distrust of the interests of others, especially the powerful. Democratic systems institutionalize distrust by providing many opportunities for citizens to oversee those empowered with the public trust. At the same time, trust is a generic social building block of collective action, and for this reason alone democracy cannot do without trust. At a minimum, democratic institutions depend on a trust among citizens sufficient for representation, resistance, and alternative forms of governance. Bringing together social science and political theory, this book provides a valuable exploration of these central issues.
Recent discussion about the role of civil society in democratic governance around the world and the decline of social capital in the US has raised pressing theoretical and empirical questions about the character of contemporary societies and the social and institutional correlates of sound and dynamic democracies. This debate has reached a North American and European audience that extends well beyond academia. The predominant refrain in the debate, following Alexis de Tocqueville's 160-year-old analysis of democracy in America, attaches tremendous importance to the role of voluntary associations in contemporary democracies. Participation in such groups is said to produce social capital, often linked to high levels of social trust. Social capital in turn is conceived as a crucial national resource for promoting collective action for the common good. Beyond Tocqueville presents 21 varied essays on how civic engagement and political and economic cooperation are generated in contemporary societies, linking theoretical discourse with public policy and actual behaviors.
Social capital is the web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitates resolution of collection action problems (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993). Although normally conceived as a property of communities, the reciprocal relationship between community involvement and trust in others is a demonstration of social capital in individual behavior and attitudes. Variation in social capital can be explained by citizens' psychological involvement with their communities, cognitive abilities, economic resources, and general life satisfaction. This variation affects citizens' confidence in national institutions, beyond specific controls for measures of actual performance. We analyze the pooled General Social Surveys from 1972 to 1994 in a latent variables framework incorporating aggregate contextual data. Civic engagement and interpersonal trust are in a tight reciprocal relationship, where the connection is stronger from participation to interpersonal trust, rather than the reverse.
Why are there liberal and conservative eras in Americans' policy preferences about race? In answering this question, I first develop a time-series measure of aggregate racial policy preferences by compiling multiple indicators of racial policy preferences into a single composite measure. Next, I propose a new model in which shifts in the tenor of media coverage of race-focusing on the core values of egalitarianism and individualism at different times-leads the public to prefer more or less active government policies on race. I test the model using data from Newsweek magazine and include appropriate controls for potentially confounding factors, such as generational replacement, policy mood, feedback from the policy process, and economic sentiment.
As the "structural linchpin" of American race relations, residential segregation has important implications for blacks' and whites' thinking about race. Considered here is the impact of residential context--living in predominantly black or racially heterogeneous neighborhoods in the city or the suburbs--on feelings of racial solidarity among black Americans. The social density hypothesis predicts stronger racial solidarity among blacks who live in the city and in predominantly black neighborhoods. The social salience hypothesis predicts stronger solidarity among suburbanites and residents of racially mixed neighborhoods. The identity supremacy hypothesis predicts no relationship between residence and sense of racial solidarity. Regression analysis of survey data for a subsample of black urbanites and suburbanites in the Detroit metropolitan area. The statistical results are most consistent with the social density hypothesis. The conclusion centers on the possible implications of black suburbanization and changing levels of racial solidarity among blacks.
"Putnam's work shows how social bonds are the most powerful predictor of life satisfaction. For example, he reports that getting married is the equivalent of quadrupling your income and attending a club meeting regularly is the equivalent of doubling your income. The loss of social capital is felt in critical ways: Communities with less social capital have lower educational performance and more teen pregnancy, child suicide, low birth weight, and prenatal mortality. Social capital is also a strong predictor of crime rates and other measures of neighborhood quality of life, as it is of our health: In quantitative terms, if you both smoke and belong to no groups, it's a close call as to which is the riskier behavior."-BOOK JACKET.
A theory of trust is developed and tested. The theory posits that mistrust develops in neighborhoods where resources are scarce and threat is common, and among individuals with few resources and who feel powerless to avoid or manage the threat. Perceived neighborhood disorder, common in disadvantaged neighborhoods where disadvantaged individuals live, influences mistrust directly and indirectly by increasing residents' perceptions of powerlessness which in turn amplify disorder's effect on mistrust. The hypotheses are examined using the Community, Crime, and Health data, a 1995 survey of a representative sample of 2,482 Illinois residents with linked data on neighborhoods. Net of individual disadvantage, residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods have low levels of trust as a result of high levels of disorder in their neighborhoods: People who report living in neighborhoods with high levels of crime, vandalism, graffiti, danger, noise, and drugs are more mistrusting. The sense of powerlessness, which is common in such neighborhoods, amplifies the effect of neighborhood disorder on mistrust.
This review evaluates the most recent studies of social capital in political science and argues that they have strayed considerably from the original treatment of social capital, which casts it as endogenous. Recent treatments have recast social capital as a feature of political culture and thereby treat values as exogenous. These two approaches emanate from incompatible premises and have fundamentally different implications. Thus, efforts to combine the two approaches are rendered unproductive by inevitable inconsistencies of internal logic. Moreover, empirical tests of the exogenous social capital approach are deficient: They are selective in their use of data and employ ad hoc procedures at crucial junctures. We therefore urge a return to the treatment of social capital as endogenous.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy).
The inter-group contact hypothesis states that intera ctions between individuals belonging to different groups will influence the attitudes and behavior between members of these different groups. The two dominant measures of inter-group contact are context (i.e., size of a minority group within a specified geographic area) and individual behavior (i.e., personal contact between members of the majority and minority groups). The contextual and behavioral measures of contact produce divergent finings. The contextual contact literature finds that whites residing in areas with high concentrations of minority populations have significantly more negative attitudes toward minorities and minority-based public policies than whites residing in areas with low concentrations of minority poplations. The behavioral contact literature finds that inter-group contacing among majority and minority populations significantly reduces preudicial attitudes and opinions about minorities and minority-based policies. In this article we examine both contextual and behavioral meaures of the contact hypothesis as they influence white attitudes toward immigrant populations (i.e., Hispanics) and white policy positions toward immigration policies. We offer and test an explanation for the lierature's divergent findings.
Despite a great deal of interest in a possible decline of social capital in the United States, scholars have not reached a consensus on the trend. This article improves upon previous research by providing a model of social capital that has explicit links to theories of social capital and that analyzes multiple indicators of social capital over a 20-year period. The results do not consistently support Putnam's claim of a decline in social capital, showing instead some decline in a general measure of social capital, a decline in trust in individuals, no general decline in trust in institutions, and no decline in associations.
For many years, there has been an intense debate over the importance of social class as a basis of political partisanship and ideological divisions in advanced industrial societies. The arguments of postmodernists and disillusioned socialists have been combined with those of numerous empirical researchers on both sides of the Atlantic—and in both sociology and political science—who have claimed that class inequality has lost its political importance. Yet at the same time, the class politics proselytizers—whether Marxist or otherwise—have remained unpersuaded. This book presents a state‐of‐the‐art analysis of the changing nature of class voting and the salience of class politics in advanced industrial societies. It combines broad ranging cross‐national comparison with detailed country studies and empirical tests of key theoretical and methodological explanations of changing levels of class voting. The final section includes commentaries from distinguished scholars from the fields of social stratification, political science, and political sociology, followed by a general discussion.
The strengths of the book are the following: (1)a combination of breadth and depth, which uses both comparative analysis of up to 16 countries and detailed analyses of several of the more critical cases; (2) methodological sophistication: a particularly high quality is attained in the measurement of class and voting, and in the statistical analysis of their relations through time; (3) an interchange of skills and knowledge from political science, social stratification research, and the sociology of politics; and (4) an international collection of established and in some cases extremely eminent contributors.
On the basis of the evidence presented, it is argued that in many cases class divisions in voting have not declined. Much of current orthodoxy among both political scientists and sociologists with regard to the declining class basis of politics is brought into question by the ’The End of Class Politics?’. This should enable it to serve as a major reference point for future work and discussion on the social bases of political divisions.
The readership includes both sociologists, primarily in the areas of political sociology and stratification and political scientists. As an authoritative research statement it would appeal to practitioners, graduate classes, and advanced undergraduate courses. It would also be useful for advanced research methods teaching, as it would provide a more effective demonstration of the relation between methods and substance than do texts that teach methods per se. The inclusion of three chapters looking at the US, both as a case study and in cross‐national context, make it relevant to an American as well as European audience.
Introduction The Sociologist's Chimera The Shifting Sands of Structure Fickle Formations Subsiding Economic Foundations Crumbling Communities of Fate Cultural Revolutions Choice Politics Life After Class
Both civil society and social capital have proven useful heuristics for drawing attention to neglected nonmarket aspects of social reality and constitute a needed corrective to narrowly economistic models. However, both break down, although in different ways, when treated as the basis for elaborating testable hypotheses and further theory. Civil society is most useful in polemical or normative contexts, but attempts to distinguish it from other sectors of society typically break down in unresolvable boundary disputes over just what constitutes civil society and what differentiates it from “state” and “market.” Work by Robert Putnam and others has assimilated social capital to the civic culture model, using it as just another label for the norms and values of the empirical democratic theory of the 1950s. This strategy undermines the empirical value of James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu's useful social relational concept.
This research focuses on whites' reactions to the racial composition of the local population. Multilevel modeling is applied to a micro/macro data file that links 1990 General Social Survey responses to census information about respondents' localities. On summary scales representing traditional prejudice, opposition to race-targeting, and policy-related beliefs, white negativity swells as the local black population share expands. Among non-Southern whites, a 10-point rise in the local percentage of blacks brings an increase in traditional prejudice greater than the decrease in prejudice that comes with three additional years of education. South/non-South differences in whites' views about blacks are generally reduced to about one-half of their original size and fall short of statistical significance when local racial composition is controlled. Interestingly, concentrations of local Asian American and Latino populations do not engender white antipathy toward these groups. If whites' reactions To the presence of blacks is a threat response, the specific dynamics of this threat await description.
A causal model of relationships between structural properties of states, civic culture attitudes of the general public, and change in level of democracy is tested with cross-national data. The model permits inferences about the possibility of unidirectional or reciprocal causation between civic culture attitudes and democracy, controlling for macrosocietal variables such as economic development, income inequality, and subcultural pluralism. Most civic culture attitudes do not have any significant impact on change in democracy. One of them, interpersonal trust, appears clearly to be an effect rather than a cause of democracy. The exception is the percentage of the general public that prefers gradual reform of society instead of revolutionary change or intransigent defense of the status quo. Support for gradual reform has a positive impact on change in democracy, and it is unrelated to a country's years of continuous democracy—findings that support the hypothesis of a unidirectional civic culture effect on democracy.
THIS STUDY of the political culture of democracy had its inspiration some thirty years ago in the Social Science Division of the University of Chicago. Much of what now goes under the name of the behavioral approach to the study of politics originated there in the period between the wars. It is a tribute to the vision of the men who created this leaven that it has taken three or four decades for their conception of political science to become a common possession. In particular, this study owes its inspiration to the work of Charles E. Merriam. His Civic Training series formulated many of the problems with which this study is concerned, and his New Aspects of Politics suggested the methods that have been used in its execution.
Most research on the environmental determinants of whites' racial attitudes focuses on the "threat" hypothesis, i.e., that white racism increases with the competition posed by a larger black population. We argue that in the segregated United States, contextual effects are more complicated than this, involving both race and socio-economic status. Cross-level data on individual racial attitudes and the environment's racial and education composition, constructed from the 1991 Race and Politics Survey and the 1990 Census, support this assertion. Living amongst more uneducated whites has a greater impact on whites' racial attitudes than does living amongst more blacks. Further analysis shows that the sources of this effect come less from interracial competition and more from a psychological response of out-group hostility generated by low status contexts. We also find that whites' views on racially targeted policies are shaped by racial contexts but only where the contextual parameter coincides with the policy outcome. Our findings suggest specific limitations to the threat thesis and highlight other ways that social contexts shape racial attitudes.