Available via license: CC BY-ND 3.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
Africa
Spectrum
Amadi, Henry (2009),
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government – Another Obstacle to Urgent Constitutional
Reform?, in:
Africa Spectrum
,
44, 3, 149-164.
ISSN: 1868-6869 (online), ISSN: 0002-0397 (print)
The online version of this and the other articles can be found at:
<www.africa-spectrum.org>
Published by
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs
in co-operation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Uppsala and Hamburg
University Press.
Africa Spectrum
is an Open Access publication.
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
To subscribe to the print edition: <iaa@giga-hamburg.de>
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.africa-spectrum.org>
Africa Spectrum
is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes:
Africa Spectrum • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs • Journal of Current Southeast
Asian Affairs • Journal of Politics in Latin America • <www.giga-journal-family.org>
Africa Spectrum 3/2009: 149-164
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government –
Another Obstacle to Urgent Constitutional
Reform?
Henry Amadi
Abstract: Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government was formed in the after-
math of a serious post-electoral crisis including widespread violence. No
political progress has been recorded; in striking contrast to all expectations
for more moderation and consensual preparation of a constitutional reform.
Based on secondary data from textbooks, newspapers, journals, and docu-
ments from both governmental and non-governmental organisations, the
author finds that the continuing wrangles within the Grand Coalition Gov-
ernment, the fear of the debilitating effects of a constitutional referendum
and the hard-line positions on the contentious issues pose a big threat to the
achievement of a new constitution before the 2012 Elections.
Manuscript received November 2, 2009; accepted December 15, 2009
Keywords: Kenya; Government; Constitutional amendments/constitutional
reform
Henry Amadi teaches Political Science at the University of Nairobi, De-
partment of Political Science and Public Administration. He has also partici-
pated in a variety of workshops on democracy, electoral systems, conflict
management and development in Africa. He is currently a PhD Candidate at
Leipzig University, Germany. His current research interests are in security
governance.
150
Henry Amadi
The formation of Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government, following the
dispute over the December 2007 presidential election results, was largely
based on the conviction that such a government has the potential to pro-
mote compromise and conciliation between adversarial factions and hence,
more scope for bringing about consensus on how to address the long-term
causes of the 2007-2008 post-election violence, including far-reaching politi-
cal, economic, administrative and social reforms (Republic of Kenya,
2008a: 6). Constitutional reform has been on the Kenyan political agenda
for decades and expectations were that it should be boosted by the Grand
Coalition. The puzzling question is why this does not seem to be happening.
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which Kenya’s
Grand Coalition Government has succeeded in addressing the long-term
causes of the 2007-2008 post-election violence with specific reference to
comprehensive constitutional review.
1
The article presents the argument
that Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government’s ability to address the issue of
comprehensive constitutional review has been undermined by the unending
wrangles among the coalition partners over the distribution of power; lead-
ing to their inability to reach consensus on the contentious issues on the one
hand and the general fear of the debilitating effects of the campaigns in the
run-up to constitutional referendum on the other.
The author basically assumes that, contrary to the underlying assump-
tions for the establishment of the Grand Coalition Government in 2008,
Kenya’s politicians continue to be guided, not by the over-riding national
interest in a peaceful general election in 2012, but by their narrow interests
in safeguarding their respective power positions, both now and in the fore-
seeable future
(Spears 2002: 127).
Although the colonial regime had been for the most part oppressive,
Kenya attained independence under a fairly democratic system.
2
However,
the new government soon set in motion a series of constitutional amend-
ments that had weakened the existing checks and balances leading to the
emergence of an “imperial presidency” (Omollo 2002: 11-34). By 1991,
Kenya’s post-independent constitution had been amended more than 32
times (Republic of Kenya 2008b: 28). In this process the country had trans-
1 A comprehensive review of Kenya’s current constitution before 2012 was given a
top priority at the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee negotiations
(Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 2008).
2 The post-independence constitution provided for a parliamentary system with the
Prime Minister as the Head of Government and the Governor-General (acting on
behalf of the Queen of England) as the Head of State. The system also had some
democratic safety-valves, including a bi-cameral legislature, multi-party system and
quasi-federal system known as majimbo.
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 151
formed itself from a British dominion to a republic, from a parliamentary
system to a predominantly presidential system, from a quasi-federal system
to a unitary system and from a multi-party system to a de-jure one-party state
(Law Society of Kenya 2006: 13).
3
It has been argued that this series of
fundamental constitutional amendments has helped to breed a culture of
impunity, which was already apparent in the electoral violence of the 1990s
and ultimately gave way to 2007-2008 post-election violence (Republic of
Kenya 2008b: 24-36). As a consequence, by the early 1990s public opinion
was slowly converging on the need to completely overhaul the constitution
as one way of restoring good governance and economic development in the
country. In the wake of the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya
in 1991, however, most aspects of the already flawed constitutional dispen-
sation were left intact.
4
Indeed, it was the apparent incompatibility between
the emerging multi-party system and the retention of the already flawed
constitutional dispensation that triggered calls for a comprehensive review
of the country’s constitution in the early 1990s (Oloo and Mitullah 2002:
45).
However, despite repeated promises by the subsequent governments, a
new constitution is yet to be attained. This is partly because the current
constitution confers enormous privileges on the incumbents. Even winning
opposition parties have frequently given lukewarm support to a comprehen-
sive review of the constitution in the belief that it stands to benefit them in
3 Among the amendments that were made to Kenya’s post-independence constitu-
tion are: that which unified the offices of the head of state and the head of gov-
ernment in 1964; that which removed the constitutional protection against the re-
drawing of regional and district boundaries or the creation of new regions or dis-
tricts in 1964; that which reduced the percentage required for parliament to ap-
prove a state of emergency from 65 per cent to simple majority in 1965; that which
removed the time limitations on state of emergencies in 1966; that which required
Members of Parliament who defect or start a new party, to seek a fresh mandate
from their constituents in 1966; that which gave the President the authority to ap-
point the 12 nominated Members of Parliament in 1968; that which allowed the
President to waive the penalty (i.e., being banned from contesting elections for five
years) on persons found guilty of an election offence in1975, and that which made
Kenya a de-jure one party state in 1982 (see Law Society of Kenya 2006).
4 With the exception of the repeal of Section 2 (A), by which opposition parties had
been outlawed (Amendment Act No. 2, 1992), and the limitation of the tenure of
the sitting president to two five-year terms (Amendment Act No. 6, 1992). The
latter amendment also contains a controversial clause, which required a winning
president to attain at least 25 per cent of the popular vote in at least five of the
country’s eight provinces. This clause has been associated with a series of ethnic
cleansing that has accompanied General Elections in Kenya since 1992 (Republic
of Kenya 2008b: 24-28).
152
Henry Amadi
future. Thus, even though the calls for a new constitution were evident prior
to the introduction of a multi-party system, these calls plummeted after the
introduction of the multi-party system giving the, then opposition move-
ment, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy’s (FORD) high hopes of
winning the December 1992 Elections. It was only following its subsequent
electoral defeat that it renewed its demands for a new constitution (Republic
of Kenya 2006: 29).
Thus, during Moi’s subsequent two five-year terms in office, he only
managed to deliver a “minimum reform package,” whose main purpose was
officially to level the political playing field prior to the December 1997 Gen-
eral Elections (Cowen and Kanyinga 2002: 129 and 155).
5
In the meantime,
the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (1997) was enacted to pave the way
for a comprehensive constitutional review process after the elections (Re-
public of Kenya 1998). The subsequent turn of events, however, revealed
that these were simply well-orchestrated attempts by Moi to delay the con-
stitutional review process during his two terms in office. Not only did the
reform package fail to level the political playing field (Cowen and Kanyinga
2002: 164-165),
6
but it also had no legal effect as it was not integrated into
the country’s constitution by the subsequent parliaments (The Standard Sun-
day, 18 December 2005: 1-4, 18).
7
Moreover, the failure of the Constitution
of Kenya Review Act (1997) to cater for the participation of civil society in
the constitutional review process, led to a lot of time being squandered on
negotiations for its amendment and subsequent implementation. By the time
these disagreements were finally resolved in 2001,
8
the December 2002
5 The minimum reform package was the culmination of negotiations between the
Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the opposition under the aegis of the
Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG). It included a consensus by a cross section
of political parties on: the repeal of detention act, the repeal of public order act,
registration of all political parties, non-partisan broadcast by the media, wide con-
sultations in all public appointments and an end to the government’s interference in
the running of political parties, among others.
6 This is borne out by the allegations of fraud that accompanied the December 1997
elections.
7 Indeed, it simply amounted to a “gentleman’s agreement,” as indicated by Kibaki’s
unilateral appointment of opposition KANU and Ford People Party MPs to his
Cabinet in 2004, contrary to the IPPG consensus that this would in future only be
done with the collective consent of the MP’s respective parties.
8 Disagreement over the implementation of the Constitution of Kenya Review
(Amendment) Act, 1998 led to the formation of a parallel constitutional review ini-
tiative by the Ufungamano group (a religious-led organisation) in 1999. It took two
further amendments to the review act for the parallel constitutional review process
to be re-integrated into the mainstream process, namely in 2000 (by which the con-
stitution review team was reduced from 25 to 15 commissioners) and 2001 (by
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 153
elections (ending Moi’s second term in office) had come too close to allow
for a constructive constitutional review process.
In the same way, Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) gov-
ernment saw the watering down of the proposed new constitution (Bomas
draft) into what became known as the Wako draft, which was rejected in a
popular referendum in November 2005 (Republic of Kenya 2006: 29). Ap-
parently, Kibaki’s allies (mainly drawn from the National Alliance Party of
Kenya (NAK) wing of NARC) reneged on their earlier support for an ex-
ecutive Prime Minister’s position which had been based on the pre-election
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between them and the members of
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Murunga and Nasong’o 2006: 16-19).
Not only was the Wako draft increasingly associated with the interests of the
people from the Mt. Kenya region (Republic of Kenya 2006: 64-65; Repub-
lic of Kenya 2008b: 28-30), but it also generated many contentious issues
that failed to be resolved (Republic of Kenya 2006: 72)
9
leading to its rejec-
tion.
However, the alliances that were formed in the run-up to the 2005 ref-
erendum were largely sustained (with slight modifications) up to the De-
cember 2007 elections (Republic of Kenya 2008b: 29-30).
10
In the run-up to
the December 2007 elections, the renewed fear that the incumbent govern-
ment had an electoral advantage prompted demands for “minimum consti-
tutional reforms” by the civil society and the opposition. These demands
were, once again, scuttled by the Kibaki administration under the pretext
that they were aimed at delaying comprehensive constitutional review efforts
by the government (Daily Nation, 30 May 2007: 59).
The Grand Coalition Government and the Quest
for a New Constitution
On 30 December 2007, violence broke out in several parts of the country
following the announcement of the results of the presidential elections. In a
bid to contain the situation, a power-sharing deal was brokered between Mr.
Kibaki and Mr. Odinga by the former United Nations Secretary-General
which twelve more commissioners from the Ufungamano group were added to the
constitution review team).
9 These include: the executive, devolution, land ownership and use, the legislature,
the Kadhi courts, the Provincial administration, the right to abortion and the en-
actment of the new constitution, among others.
10 The LDP and KANU, which teamed up against the draft constitution, finally
formed the Orange Democratic Party (ODM), while the NAK, which supported
the draft Constitution, formed the Party of National Unity (PNU).
154
Henry Amadi
Kofi Annan, leading to the formation of the Grand Coalition Government
(Republic of Kenya 2008a: 9). Apart from ending the spiralling violence, the
power-sharing agreement sought to address a wide range of institutional
defects considered to be responsible for the recurrence of conflict in post-
independence Kenya. The defects included a flawed constitutional dispensa-
tion, unfair distribution of land, unemployment and the culture of impunity
(Republic of Kenya 2008a: Preamble; Dialogue Africa Foundation, 2009:
viii).
11
Based on the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee’s
agreement, two commissions – the Independent Review Commission
(IREC) on the 2007 Elections and the Commission of Inquiry on Post-
Election Violence (CIPEV) – were formed to investigate and report on
different aspects of the crisis. It was expected that their subsequent recom-
mendations for sweeping electoral and institutional reforms should form the
basis for a comprehensive constitutional review before the 2012 elections.
In late 2008, a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on Constitutional
Review was named and two review statutes (the Constitution of Kenya
Amendment Act, 2008
12
and the Constitution Review Act, 2008) were en-
acted by parliament. These paved the way inter alia for the subsequent crea-
tion of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC), Interim
Independent Boundary Review Commission (IIBRC)
13
and the Committee
of Experts (CoEs) on constitutional review.
However, there has been evidence of foot-dragging by the Grand Coa-
lition Government in the execution of the reform measures agreed upon by
the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee. This is evidenced by
the time lapse between the signing by Mr. Kibaki and Mr. Odinga of the
11 The National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee agreed on four main agenda
items that would help resolve the crisis, including: immediate action to stop vio-
lence and restore fundamental rights and liberties; immediate measures to address
the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, healing and restoration; how to
over-come crisis: and, addressing long-standing issues and their solutions, including
constitutional reform and inequalities in the country (see Dialogue Africa Founda-
tion 2009: viii).
12 By this Constitutional Amendment Act, Article 47 of the constitution which
empowers the Kenyan Parliament was amended to pave the way for the forthcom-
ing referendum. It is noteworthy that this Article has remained contentious
throughout the constitutional review process and was partly responsible for the re-
jection of the proposed New Constitution in 2005.
13 Both the IIEC and the IIBRC were formed following the recommendation by the
Independent Review Commission on the 2007 Elections that the already discred-
ited Kivuitu-led Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) be replaced by two elec-
toral bodies to spearhead both electoral reforms and boundary review ahead of the
2012 elections (Republic of Kenya 2008c: 8-10, 153-163).
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 155
“Agreement on Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government” on
28 February, 2008 and the naming of the bodies that are crucial to the con-
stitutional review process, including the IIEC, IIBRC and CoEs, all of which
were sworn-in well into the year 2009 (Daily Nation, 9 January 2009: 1-2).
Moreover, following their swearing in, these bodies have had to contend not
only with delays in allocation of funds by the government (The Standard
Sunday, 31 May 2009) but also with the inadequacy of the same (The Standard
Sunday, 7 June 2009: 8).
Furthermore, a new constitution can only be expected in late 2010
since in last year’s budget no money was allocated to the national referen-
dum that is expected to midwife a new constitution (Daily Nation, 19 June
2009: 4).
14
As a result, there are clear indications of loss of confidence in the
Grand Coalition Government’s ability to deliver the required reforms, in-
cluding a new constitution, before the 2012 elections (Kenya National Dia-
logue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2009: 26, 29).
15
According to the findings of the CoEs, three main contentious issues
have arisen from the preceding efforts at constitutional review, namely: the
executive and the legislature, the devolution of powers and bringing the
transitional clauses of the constitution into effect (CoEs 2009).
16
In the
following paragraphs, an attempt is made to assess the extent to which the
14 This is as per the report of the current Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and
Constitutional Affairs Mutula Kilonzo.
15 In a National Baseline Survey conducted from 17-24 December 2008, the Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project found that 72 of the re-
spondents were of the opinion that the Grand Coalition Government must give
Kenyans a new constitution. However, only 10 per cent felt that the Grand Coali-
tion Government was very likely to deliver a new constitution by the year 2009,
compared to 40 per cent, 30 per cent and 15 per cent, who felt that it was more or
less likely, more or less unlikely and very unlikely, respectively.
16 It is important to note that the Committee of Expert’s list of contentious issues has
itself become contentious based on allegations that it has left out many contentious
issues. For example, the clause that seeks to anchor the Kadhis’ courts in the con-
stitution continues to generate heated debate despite having been left out of the list
of contentious issues. Actually, Kadhis’ courts have been in Kenya’s constitution
since independence, (article 66, 8), when they were charged with the responsibility
of determining questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, di-
vorce and inheritance among people professing Islamic faith (article 66, 12). The
trouble began with an attempt by the NARC government to please other religious
groups by allowing them to anchor their courts in the constitution (Wako draft, ar-
ticle 195, 1) in the run-up to the November 2005 referendum. It currently appears
as if the issue of the Kadhis’ courts poses one of the most serious threats to the at-
tainment of a new constitution under the Grand Coalition Government. For de-
tails, see the report of the national survey done by Transparency International from
19-26 April 2009 (Transparency International Kenya 2009: 12-13).
156
Henry Amadi
constitutional review process is threatened by an apparent hardening of
stand by both politicians and citizens alike.
Disputed Elements of the Constitutional Review
Process
The Executive and the Legislature
With reference to the executive and the legislature, the members of the
CoEs have noted that the main areas of contention pertain to whether or
not the country should adopt a presidential, parliamentary or hybrid (mixed)
system with executive power shared between the President and the Prime
Minister. With specific reference to the legislature, there is still no agreement
on what should be the name and role of the Second House and how this
house should relate to the other house on the one hand and to the executive
on the other.
Barely two weeks after the CoEs asked Kenyans to submit their views
on contentious issues (Daily Nation, 19 June 2009: 16), the ODM and PNU
came up with diametrically opposed views, indicating that the two Grand
Coalition Partners have not softened their hard-line stands since the 2005
National Referendum. According to the ODM,
17
a parliamentary system
providing for an executive Prime Minister is still the most preferred system
of government. This stand by the ODM may be closely linked to the fact
that it mainly inherited the regions that had been strong-holds of KANU,
whose constituencies were deliberately split so as to yield a parliamentary
majority for the party despite its lack of a popular majority (The Standard
Sunday, 8 March 2009: 16).
On the other hand, the PNU, led by its Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru
Kenyatta
18
made clear its preference for a mixed system of government
(where the President holds the ultimate executive authority) arguing that a
parliamentary system such as that proposed by the ODM has the potential
to divide the country in that it creates two centres of power. Nonetheless,
17 This is as reflected in statements by, among others, its leader Prime Minister Raila
Odinga and MPs Otieno Kajwang’ (the Minister for Immigration) and Jakoyo
Midiwo (also doubling as party whip).
18 In making this statement, Uhuru was accompanied by Energy Minister and Assis-
tant Minister Kiraitu Murungi and Mwangi Kiunjuri respectively, MPs Mithika
Linturi (Igembe South), George Thuo (Juja, also doubling as the party’s chief whip),
Ephraim Maina (Mathira), Lenny Kivuti (Siakago) and Mburi Muiru (Tharaka).
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 157
both office-holders would have to be elected by popular vote.
19
Indeed, the
respective parties’ perceived gains and losses entailed in the adoption of the
alternative systems of government are already threatening to undermine the
process of boundary review by IIBRC. The review itself has already been
politicised by two important changes that have occurred under the Kibaki
regime: the introduction of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in
2003 and the introduction of the office of Prime Minister following the
enactment of the National Accord in 2008.
The introduction of the CDF implies that the constituencies have to be
more or less equal in terms of population to avoid claims of discrimination,
especially by the more populous constituencies, most of which are in the
PNU strong-holds.
20
On the other hand, the introduction of the office of
Prime Minister in 2008 has significantly boosted the power of the majority
party in Parliament, which is only likely to be confirmed by the introduction
of a parliamentary system. Hence, IIBRC’s recommendations are only likely
to be received favourably by ODM if they either leave intact or do not re-
verse the current parliamentary majority enjoyed by it.
21
Devolution
According to the findings of the CoEs, the main areas of disagreement in
regard to devolution are on how many levels of government should be
adopted, what the powers of each level of government should be and how
much supervisory and regulatory power should be vested in the central gov-
ernment. According to a national survey that was carried out by Transpar-
ency International (TI) Kenya from 19-26 April 2009, 61 per cent of Ken-
yans support devolution of power (this consists of 64 per cent in Central
province, 58 per cent in Coast province, 45 per cent in Eastern province, 55
per cent in Nairobi, 81 per cent in North-Eastern province, 73 per cent in
Nyanza, 56 per cent in Rift Valley province and 74 per cent in Western
province) while 39 per cent do not (TI Kenya 2009: 8).
19 The insistence by PNU that both the position of the President and that of the
Prime Minister be elective is largely a reflection of PNU’s perceived weakness in
terms of seats in Parliament, and strength in terms of popular vote. With a share of
22 per cent of the total population, the Kikuyu Community is the largest ethnic
group in Kenya. However, it is also closely allied to the Embu and Meru communi-
ties, with whom it has in the past voted as a block.
20 For example, Juja Constituency in Central Province, with some 163,000 registered
voters has in the past been given the same CDF allocation as Budalang’i Constitu-
ency in Western Province with only 27,000 registered voters.
21 Conversely, its recommendations are only likely to be received favourably by PNU
if they seek to reverse ODM’s current parliamentary majority.
158
Henry Amadi
However, of those supporting devolution of power, only 34 per cent
believe that regional governments should be in charge of the allocation of
national/public resources, with the rest believing that the task should reside
with either Parliament (42 per cent), the President (7 per cent) or Provincial
Administration (15 per cent) (TI Kenya, 2009: 8). This confirms the persis-
tent lack of a clear understanding of the real meaning of devolution (com-
monly referred to in Kenya as majimbo), which appears to have been con-
firmed by further findings of the national survey. Only 33 per cent of Ken-
yans associate it with regional autonomy in terms of revenue collection and
expenditure (consisting of 27 per cent in Central province, 48 per cent in
Coast province, 24 per cent in Eastern province, 32 per cent in Nairobi, 32
per cent in North-Eastern province, 35 per cent in Nyanza province, 34 per
cent in Rift Valley province and 46 per cent in Western province) (TI Kenya
2009: 10).
22
The fact that both Central and Eastern provinces have the lowest sup-
port for regional autonomy in revenue collection and expenditure may be
linked to the campaign period that preceded the December 2007 elections.
PNU (whose strongholds were in these two regions) was pitted against
ODM (whose support was drawn from the rest of Kenya). The latter was in
support of a devolved system (in the above sense) whereas the former was
not.
Many a time, this notion of a devolved system of government has been
politicised (by way of associating it with balkanisation) as a means of gaining
a political edge over adversaries. This is what happened in the immediate
post-independence period when KANU dismantled the “majimbo system” in
its bid to create a single-party monolithic system (Oyugi 1994: 157). In the
wake of the struggle for the introduction of a multi-party system in 1991, the
majimbo debate was revived by a group of politicians allied to the former
President Moi. This was widely believed to be caused by fear on the part of
the smaller ethnic groups that the introduction of a multi-party system
would confer a disproportionate advantage to the larger ethnic groups, par-
ticularly the Kikuyus. The subsequent ethnic clashes seemed to justify
KANU’s decision to do away with the post-independence majimbo constitu-
tion in the 1960s (Republic of Kenya 2008b: 41-43). In the run-up to the
December 2007 Elections the issue of a devolved government was once
22 The survey found that only 33 per cent of Kenyans believe that it has to do with
regions retaining part of the revenue collected. This is as compared to 41 percent,
who believe that it refers to sharing of national resources across different regions,
and 23 per cent who believe that it refers to making different regions exclusive for
specific communities (3 per cent of the respondents are categorized as others).
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 159
more politicised by PNU for selfish political gains.
23
Given the power strug-
gle that has been going on in the Grand Coalition Government, a replay of
what happened in the run-up to the December 2007 elections cannot be
totally ruled-out should the proposed new constitution provide for a really
devolved system of government.
Constitutional Referendum
According to the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008 (Section 30, 3), a
referendum shall be held by the Electoral Commission 60 days after publi-
cation of the draft constitution by the Attorney General. In the meantime,
the CoEs have already expressed fear that the forthcoming referendum is
likely to divide the country along ethnic lines, as happened in the run-up to
the November 2005 referendum. This fear, which is shared by the legal
experts of various institutions in the country, is not totally unfounded, given
the contentious issues discussed above and the experience of 2007-2008
post-election violence (The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009: 4).
24
According
to them, a referendum is not mandatory since it is not based on any written
law, but on a High Court ruling following a court challenge by a clergyman
(Bishop Njoya and six others) of the National Constitutional Conference at
the Bomas of Kenya, Nairobi (National Council for Law Reporting 2008;
The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009: 4).
Moreover, it opens the door to all manner of political interference in
the constitutional review process, including: the possibility of politicians
using the process to settle their political differences; the possibility of
political parties aggrieved by the process poisoning people’s minds against
the draft document regardless of its merits; and the possibility of a protest
vote by Kenyans, regardless of a political consensus. They further note
that, as used elsewhere, a referendum is only necessary when a constitu-
tional making process has not been participatory (The Saturday Nation, 22
August 2009: 4).
Based on the foregoing observations, the current Justice, National Co-
hesion and Constitutional Affairs Minister Mutula Kilonzo promised to
advise the government (and the country for that matter) to avoid a referen-
23 Indeed, the polarising nature of the majimbo debate in the run-up to the December
2007 Elections is partly responsible for the outbreak of the post-election violence.
24 Among those who have already indicated their fear of the referendum are: the
chairman of the CoEs Mr. Nzamba Kitonga, Justice, National Cohesion and Con-
stitutional Affairs Minister Mutula Kilonzo, the IIEC Chairman Issack Hassan, the
former CKRC chairman Prof. Yash Pal Ghai, the Political Advisor at the Steadman
Synovate Dr. Tom Wolf and the Head of Department of Public Law Dr. Kindiki
Kithure.
160
Henry Amadi
dum. At the same time, he has tasked the Law Reform Commission (LRC),
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) to
devise a referendum law that spells out issues that should be taken to the
referendum (The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009: 4). According to the experts,
therefore, there is a serious need to re-think the provisions for the referendum
in the constitutional review process (The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009: 5).
Among their recommendations are: that the Constitution of Kenya Re-
view Act, 2008 be amended to provide for a “Yes-Yes” referendum in place
of the current provision for a “Yes-No” referendum
25
and that the Govern-
ment be empowered to come up with a brief and a general constitution with
agreed minimums (as was the case in post-apartheid South Africa), in case it
is unable to resolve the contentious issues (The Saturday Nation, 22 August
2009: 5). It is far from clear if Kenyans will receive these proposals for re-
vising the review act favourably. Indications are, therefore, that the consti-
tutional review process is becoming more and more complicated with the
possibilities of political interference becoming greater.
Conclusion
From the arguments presented in this paper, several conclusions can be
drawn. First, successive ruling coalitions in the multi-party era have had an
incentive to retain the current Constitution in their bid to maintain the
status quo as it has been profitable to those in power. Secondly, it is this
pre-occupation with status quo maintenance by the ruling elite, among other
factors, that worked against the endorsement of the Draft Constitution in
the 2005 referendum, paving the way for the 2007-2008 post-election vio-
lence. Thirdly, this pre-occupation with status quo maintenance by the ruling
elite has continued under the Grand Coalition Government, contrary to the
underlying assumption that its creation would pave the way for a consensual
attainment of a new Constitution. This is evidenced by differences among
the coalition partners regarding the direction that the constitutional reform
should take, as indicated by their hardening of stands on the contentious
issues and their fear of the debilitating consequences of a referendum. As a
result, the chances of Kenyans getting a new constitution before the 2012
25 Under the “Yes-Yes” referendum, the voters are faced with two alternative texts
out of which they can choose one instead of only one text, which they can approve
or reject (a “Yes-No” referendum). This implies that under a “Yes-Yes” referen-
dum, a new Constitution is guaranteed.
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 161
General Elections are not any greater than they were prior to the 2007 Gen-
eral Elections.
This apparent lack of commitment to constitutional reform on the part
of the coalition partners arises from the fact that individuals in both parties
harbour presidential ambitions and are therefore (together with their lieu-
tenants) unwilling to see a drastic reduction of the powers of a president
(The Standard Sunday, 8 March 2009: 13).
26
In general, however, ODM ap-
pears to be more committed to comprehensive constitutional reforms than
PNU. This is best indicated by the latter’s admission (through its Secretary-
General Kiraitu Murungi’) that it is contemplating “minimum reforms,”
which to ODM (through its Chairman Henry Kosgey), betrays its scheme to
delay comprehensive constitutional reforms (The Standard Sunday, 31 May
2009: 20).
27
Moreover, it is also backed by findings from a national survey
that 60 percent of Kenyans think that the ODM is committed to the con-
stitutional review process, compared to only 38 per cent who think that the
PNU is committed to the same (National Dialogue and Reconciliation
Monitoring Project 2009: 28).
28
The discussion about the merits and shortcomings of power-sharing
agreements has only recently focused on the level of detailed arrangements
during the negotiation phase. Kenya may become an example of negotiators
failing to get enough guarantees from the disputing parties to proceed with
one crucial aspect of the crisis: constitutional reform. The negotiated intro-
duction, after the agreement, of a number of commissions and expert com-
mittees to deal with important issues has so far proved of limited utility. In
contrast to post-war power-sharing the post-crisis power-sharing experi-
enced in Kenya comes with no provisions for the third-party guarantees or
enforcement capacities usually ensured by the presence of a military force.
In Kenya, many citizens place their hope on increased donor pressure on
the Grand Coalition Government to deliver on constitutional reform. Al-
ready, heightened pressure from the donor community has yielded positive
results as indicated by parliament’s renewed initiatives to pass the law estab-
26 In ODM for example, the biggest problem between Mr. Odinga and Mr. Ruto has
to do with their respective presidential ambitions come 2012. The same applies to
the problem in PNU between Mrs. Karua (who is already campaigning for presi-
dency ahead of 1012) and Mr. Kibaki (who has a different succession plan for him-
self).
27 In the past, minimum and comprehensive reforms have been considered mutually
exclusive in the sense that demands for the former have been seen as schemes to
delay the latter and vice-versa (how the debate was played in the run-up to 1997
and 2007 elections, see above).
28 The survey interviewed 4,021 households, selected through a nationwide multistage
cluster sampling, from 17-24 December 2008.
162
Henry Amadi
lishing a local Tribunal to try the suspects of the post-election violence (the
Imanyara Bill) (The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009: Back page)
29
. This fol-
lowed successive failures at both the parliamentary (Daily Nation, 13 Febru-
ary 2009: 1, 4) and cabinet levels (Daily Nation, 15 July 2009: 1, 4). The in-
trinsic will of the Grand Coalition Government to pursue constitutional
reform zealously is low, given the uncertainties that are associated with a
new constitution. Indeed, pressure from the international community has
been crucial to Kenya’s democratisation process since the late 1980s, either
directly through the withdrawal of donor aid, or indirectly through the spon-
sorship of civil society organisations. In most cases, such pressure has been
complementary to, rather than opposed to the demands of civil society
organisations.
Bibliography
Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (2009), An Invitation for
Proposals on Contentious Issues, Delta House, Westlands.
Cowen, Michael and Karuti Kanyinga (2002), The 1997 Elections in Kenya:
The Politics of Communality and Locality, in: Michael Cowen and Liisa
Laakso (eds.), Multi-Party Elections in Africa, Oxford: James Currey.
Dialogue Africa Foundation (2009), Kriegler and Waki Reports: Summarized
Versions, Revised Edn., Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project (2009),
National Baseline Survey, January.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (2008), Statement of Principles on
Long-term Issues and Solutions (signed on 23 May 2008), online: <http://
www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/S_of_P_with_Matrix.pdf>.
Law Society of Kenya (LSK), Standing Committee on Constitutional Review
(2006), Final Report, Nairobi.
Murunga, Godwin R. and Shadrack W. Nasong’o (2006), Bent on Self-De-
struction: The Kibaki Regime in Kenya, in: Journal of Contemporary Afri-
can Studies, 24, 1, 1-28.
National Council for Law Reporting (2008), Njoya & 6 others v Attorney
General & three others, Kenya Law Reports (Election Petitions), 2 KLR
(EP).
29 The renewed efforts at the establishment of a local tribunal to try the suspects of
the 2007-2008 post-election violence came in the wake of threats by the European
Community to withdraw financial assistance (The Standard, 20 July 2009: 7) and by
the US to issue visa bans to top government officials who were frustrating the re-
forms process (Daily Nation, 29 October 2009: 4).
Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government 163
Oloo, Adams and Winnie Mitullah (2002), The Legislature and Constitu-
tionalism in Kenya, in: Lawrence Murugu Mute and Smoking Wanjala
(eds.), When the Constitution Blossoms, Vol. 1: Paradigms for Constitutional
Change in Kenya, Nairobi: Claripress, 35-57.
Omollo, Kennedy (2002), The Constitution and the Executive, in: Lawrence
Murugu Mute and Smoking Wanjala (eds.), When the Constitution Blos-
soms, Vol. 1: Paradigms for Constitutional Change in Kenya, Nairobi:
Claripress, 11-34.
Oyugi, Walter O. (1994), Uneasy Alliance: Party-State Relations in Kenya, in:
Walter O. Oyugi (ed.), Politics and Administration in East Africa, Nairobi:
East African Educational Publishers, 153-192.
Republic of Kenya (1998), Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 1997, Kenya
Gazette Supplement, No. 73 (Acts No. 7), Government Printer.
Republic of Kenya (2006), Report of the Committee of Eminent Persons (CEP),
Nairobi: Government Printer.
Republic of Kenya (2008a), The National Accord and Reconciliation Bill,
2008, Kenya Gazette Supplement, Nairobi: Government Printer.
Republic of Kenya (2008b), Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election
Violence (CIPEV), Nairobi: Government Printer.
Republic of Kenya (2008c), Report of the Independent Review Commission on the
General Elections Held on 27December 2007, Nairobi: Government Printer.
Spears, Ian S. (2002), Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing, in: Journal of
Democracy, 13, 3, 123-136.
Transparency International Kenya (TI Kenya) (2009), Opinion Poll on Consti-
tution of Kenya Review, Nairobi, Kenya.
Articles in Kenyan Newspapers
Daily Nation, 30 May 2007, Essential Reforms Meeting Flops.
Daily Nation, 19 June 2009, Team Set Time-table on Constitution.
Daily Nation, 19 June 2009, Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review:
Invitation for proposals on Contentious Issues.
Daily Nation, 15 July 2009, Cabinet Rejects Draft Law on Local Tribunal.
Daily Nation, 29 October 2009, We will hit Back, Says Wetang’ula: Minister
Calls US Move to Impose a Visa Ban on Kenyan Official Intrusive.
Daily Nation, 13 February 2009, It’s the Hague.
The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009, Ruto Rallies 15 MPs Against Local
Tribunal.
The Saturday Nation, 22 August 2009, Referendum on New Constitution
Likely to Yield to Political Whims and Ethnicity.
The Standard, 20 July 2009, Donors Criticized over Aid Threat.
164
Henry Amadi
The Standard Sunday, 18 December 2005, Not Yet Multi-Party Democracy
(Kanjama, Charles).
The Standard Sunday, 8 March 2009, Its Time for Kenyans to Insulate Law
Review Panel from Partisan Interests (Ahmednassir, Abdullahi).
The Standard Sunday, 8 March 2009, Boundary Review Remains a Thorny
Issue.
The Standard Sunday, 8 March 2009, Lack of Electoral Body puts Kenya on
Precipice.
The Standard Sunday, 31 May 2009, Reforms Far From Being Realized.
The Standard Sunday, 7 June 2009, Reform Teams in Budget Row with Mu-
tula: Commissioners Say They Are Consulting with the Treasury to
Unlock the Stalemate.
Die Große Koalition in Kenia – ein weiteres Hindernis für die drän-
gende Verfassungsreform?
Zusammenfassung: Die Große Koalition in Kenia wurde im Anschluss an
eine heftige, gewaltsam ausgetragene Nachwahlkrise gebildet. Entgegen aller
Erwartung, jetzt werde eine moderate und gemeinsam abgestimmte Vorbe-
reitung der Verfassungsreform möglich, wurden keine politischen Fort-
schritte erzielt. Der Autor analysiert Sekundärdaten aus Monografien, Zei-
tungs- und Zeitschriftenartikeln sowie Dokumenten von Regierungs- und
Nichtregierungsorganisationen und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass der fortge-
setzte Streit innerhalb der Koalitionsregierung, die Furcht vor den Unweg-
samkeiten eines Verfassungsreferendums und die verhärteten Positionen zu
den umstrittenen Fragen die Realisierung einer neuen Verfassung vor den
Wahlen 2012 wenig wahrscheinlich machen.
Schlagwörter: Kenya; Regierung; Verfassungsänderung/Verfassungsreform
