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Institutionalists, Neoclassicals and Team Production
Abstract
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... The seeds of team production theory sprang from microeconomics when Alchian and Demsetz sought to explain cooperative behavior of individuals in work teams vis-a-vis opportunism and shirking, and the emergence of hierarchies in response to team production problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972;Blair & Stout, 1999). While the microeconomists provided the basic tenets, it was the later contributions from other disciplines, including law and sociology, that fleshed out team production theory (Blair & Stout, 1999;Blair, 2005). In the contemporary team production perspective, firms are conceptualized as a nexus of team-specific assets, invested by shareholders, board members, managers, employees, and other stakeholders who hope to profit from team production (Blair & Stout, 1999;Kaufman & Englander, 2005). ...
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: Boards' involvement in strategy is generally seen to be an indicator of board effectiveness, but less is known about the relationship between board leadership and strategy involvement, especially in small firms. This study analyzes board leadership from a team production perspective as an antecedent to board strategy involvement in small firms.
Research Findings/Insights: Using survey data from 140 small firms in Norway collected in two different time periods, we demonstrate that leadership behaviors and processes have a greater impact on boards' strategy involvement than structural leadership characteristics alone.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The study provides empirical support for a team production perspective on boards. Our data show that (1) board members' knowledge, board development, and board chairperson leadership efficacy positively influence boards' strategy involvement, and (2) chairperson leadership efficacy enhances boards' strategy involvement under structural conditions of combined CEO/chairperson leadership and changes in board composition. These findings expand the traditional understanding of structural leadership conditions.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study offers insights to small business owners and managers on how to improve the strategy involvement of boards. For policy makers, the study has implications for the content of codes of good governance practice relevant to small firms, specifically in relation to board development initiatives and board evaluations.
Terms such as 'Social Europe' and 'European Social Model' have long resided in the political and regulatory lexicon of European integration. But in recent years, and in spite of the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU social profile has entered a profound period of crisis. The ECJ judgments of Viking and Laval exemplify the unresolved tension between the EU's strong market imperatives and its fragile social aspirations while the ongoing economic crisis, while the various 'bail out' packages are producing a constant retrenchment of social rights. The status quo is one in which workers appear to shoulder most of the risks attendant on making and executing arrangements for the doing of work. Chapters in this book advocate a reversal of this trend in favour of fair mutualization, so as to disperse these risks and share them more equitably between employers, the state, and society at large.
The European labour law debate – and the broader issue of ‘resocialising Europe’ – is concerned with the social dimension of European integration. This is not a neutral terrain. Labour law scholarship has been struggling for a long time with the notion of the ‘European Social Model’ and the role and position of labour law in the European Union context. In the present times characterised by globalisation, economic competitiveness agendas, financial market volatility and European labour market or welfare system reform, the debate on ‘resocialising Europe’ will only intensify. Although European integration was originally viewed as focusing on the realisation of the internal market (for economic purposes), it has become widely accepted that economic and social integration go hand in hand. This double bind of European integration is enshrined in the Treaties and has been politically accepted since the 1972Paris Declaration. However, the question of how the balance between economic and social integration should exactly be considered remains a matter of (high) debate. This tension, which some have called a ‘schism’ between the ‘economic’ and the ‘social’ dimension, ultimately affects the role and understanding of labour law at the level of the EU.
Aufbauend auf den Ergebnissen einer für die VDV-Akademie im Jahr 2005 durchgeführten Literaturrecherche werden im Folgenden Daten und Einschätzungen zur Verbreitung und zu den Effekten moderner arbeitsorganisatorischer Modelle in Deutschland dargestellt. Diese Recherche, die vom Autor gemeinsam mit Frau Dr. Monika Labes, TU München – Lehrstuhl für Psychologie, durchgeführt wurde, hatte den Auftrag insbesondere Modelle von Gruppenarbeit im produzierenden Gewerbe und im Dienstleistungsbereich zu evaluieren, sowie Ergebnisse und Erfahrungen aus Fallstudien zusammenzufassen, und unter 3 Fragestellungen
auszuwerten:
1. Wie hoch ist der wirtschaftliche Output solcher Modelle und wie ist er gemessen worden?
2. Haben die Modelle zu einem Plus an Arbeitsqualität für die Beschäftigten geführt? Hat sich deren Arbeitssituation z.B. durch weniger Arbeitsverdichtung oder bessere Aufgaben- und Prozessorganisation tatsächlich verbessert?
3. Wie sind die Rahmenbedingungen für die Implementierung von Gruppenarbeitssystemen vor Ort? Welche Beeinflussungsfaktoren gibt es?
Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit flossen in die folgenden Darstellungen ein. Dabei werden zunächst die betrieblichen und konzeptionellen Bedingungen für die angesprochenen organisatorischen Veränderungen erläutert, und zudem präzisiert, was unter ‚modernen’ Organisationsmodellen in Produktions- und Dienstleistungsbranchen verstanden werden kann. Im anschließenden Teil geht es dann um die Verbreitung dieser Modelle in Deutschland, die anhand ausgewählter Daten aus Unternehmensbefragungen dargestellt werden. Die ökonomischen Effekte
dieser Modelle wurden in den vergangenen Jahren ebenfalls untersucht, wobei hier auf die Messprobleme eingegangen werden muss, um die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchungen einschätzen zu können. Anhand ausgewählter Fallbeispiele bzw. Zusammenstellungen von Ergebnissen werden diese Befunde weiter differenziert, und abschließend werden Einschätzungen und Erläuterungen dargestellt.
This chapter presents the idea of employee participation in decision-making as an effective way in which employees can reduce their exposure to the risks associated with corporate restructuring. This approach may appear to be less promising than traditional forms of employment protection such as reliance on implicit contracts or collective bargaining, but it is precisely the indeterminate and dynamic nature of participation in corporate governance that makes it adaptable and responsive to fluid and fast-changing economic conditions. The chapter explores the challenges facing stakeholder-oriented corporate governance as a vehicle for employment protection. Acknowledging that this may not be the most straightforward path to take in mutualising the risks that workers face in modern labour markets. The chapter engages with the dominant political economy of the corporation in which ‘the presumption is that workers will not participate in the making of important decisions, including many which directly and dramatically affect their interests’. It is true that despite legal rules allowing occasional deviations from the presumptive exclusion of worker participation, the underlying principle of exclusive shareholder ownership and control remains deeply embedded as ‘a paradigmatic assumption…so fundamental as to be almost beyond retrieval and, consequently, beyond reconsideration’. Nevertheless, the framework of reflexive self-regulation opens up new avenues to reassess employee participation in ownership and control as a viable mechanism of employment protection, by relying on the role of employee representatives and based on evolving forms of solidarity and partnership.
The depiction of the firm in neoclassical theory in terms of a production function is widely recognised as unsatisfactory.
Economists have sought to provide more realistic theories of the firm through attributing to them functions of minimisation
of transaction costs, accommodation of bounded rationality, assembly of information, etc. These functions are seen as supplementary
to their role as participants in a broadly neoclassical market framework. This paper suggests that the theories do nothing
to increase the understanding of the firm; rather, they deepen the misconceptions that arise from the neoclassical model.
The paper proposes a theory of companies as bargaining agencies meeting a viability condition in the context of situation-related
consumer demand. The proposed concept integrates the important phenomena of technological innovation and distance fully into
the concept of company operations.
As corporate governance is more driven by shareholder-oriented principles, managers are expected to adopt new attitudes and to be more accountable to shareholders in terms of their strategies and decisions. Yet, when governance is seen primarily as a 'corporate matter', it exclusively concerns the coalition of shareholders. This convergence towards the model of the public corporation raises major questions as it leaves aside collective activities and their value creation processes. Coordination, capabilities development and innovation are omitted in the prevalent representation of the corporation. This omission is symptomatic of the confusion between the legal corporate model and the actual activities of the firm. In their own ways, both shareholders' and stakeholders' approaches of the firm refer to the legal framework of the public corporation. This article argues that the concept of the firm should be distinguished from its corporate forms. Going back to the basic nature of the firm, it suggests that a firm is a collective endeavour whose activities are directed by management to create new potentials. By challenging the public corporation as a relevant model for the governance of the firm, it indicates new possible and pluralist norms of governance.
This essay surveys economic thought in Britain and the United States to assess the influence that economists have had on developments in the marketplace and in government (and also to show reverse causation; economic thinking is less free of historical circumstances than economists appreciate). Next it examines whether recent Anglo-American developments are reproducing themselves in other parts of the world, that is, whether we see synchronous swings from status to contract in continental Europe and Japan. Finally, the essay asks what the future holds in store for labor and employment policy: will we see a continued pulsing of Polanyi's double movement or a triumph of the liberal Anglo-American model?
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights. When residual rights are purchased by one party, they are lost by a second party, and this inevitably creates distortions. Firm 1 purchases firm 2 when firm 1's control increases the productivity of its management more than the loss of control decreases the productivity of firm 2's management.
The potential of post-contractural apportunistic behavior for improving market efficiency through intrafirm rather than interfirm transactions is examined under the assumption that vertical costs will increase less than contracting costs as specialized assets and appropriable quasi rents increase. Vertical integration protects against the risk of contract cancellation and can create market power which is not generally referred to as monopoly. Contracts used as a alternative provide economically enforceable protection against opportunistic behavior. Solutions to opportunistic behavior problems can include joint ownership of common assets and condominium ownership of services. Economies of scale are major factors in some businesses, such as insurance. The complexities of ownership relations makes it difficult to assign higher costs to either the contract or vertical-integration approach. This suggests that economic analysis should be used to identify which is most advantageous for specific kinds of activities.
The mark of a capitalistic society is that resources are owned and allocated by such nongovernmental organizations as firms, households, and markets. Resource owners increase productivity through cooperative specialization and this leads to the demand for economic organizations which facilitate cooperation. When a lumber mill employs a cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across markets (or between firms). Two important problems face a theory of economic organization – to explain the conditions that determine whether the gains from specialization and cooperative production can better be obtained within an organization like the firm, or across markets, and to explain the structure of the organization. It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional market. This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people. I can “punish” you only by withholding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all that any employer can do. He can fire or sue, just as I can fire my grocer by stopping purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty products.
The new international economy is today the single most important factor shaping relations between employers, unions, and governments in the world's advanced industrial societies. While companies compete in global markets with firms around the world, workers remain fixed in each country and are influenced by local the customs and mores. This book explores how globalization affects the contemporary workplace and how workplace policies can make nations more internationally competitive. Unlike other country-by-country treatments of the subject, this analysis compares and contrasts the experiences of different nations around important developments, such as the labor market consequences of regional trading pacts, the international diffusion of new forms of work organization, and the strategies that nations are pursuing to keep their work systems competitive. The contributors come from a variety of disciplines but all bear expertise in international industrial relations.
Cambridge Core - Economic Thought, Philosophy and Methodology - Economic Theory in Retrospect - by Mark Blaug
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the 'separation and control' issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears the costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.
In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature, such as the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness-of-markets problem.
One can view workers from the perspective of the portfolios they hold. For most workers, this portfolio, broadly defined, evinces a heavy concentration of assets in the firm that employs them. They stand to incur wage reductions if they move to some other company midway in the contract because much of the human capital that they hold is not fully transferable. In many cases, they also stand to lose substantial pension value, and may lose other benefits as well, such as health insurance, longer vacation periods earned through seniority and so on. This just means that they are party to a risky venture, where the downside outcome poses substantial losses. It turns out that the broad implications of bankruptcy for workers are well indexed by pension losses, which means that an understanding of the pension implications of bankruptcy also conveys the thrust of non-pension losses as well. Risk is not a free good. As in standard models of finance, firms are expected to pay for the risks they impose on workers, and indeed, are expected to pay premia in excess of those implied in financial models if they expose workers to non-diversified risks. The latter premium makes sense only if firms believe that heavily exposed workers are more likely to work hard to ensure the continued viability of their employer. If this incentive is sufficiently strong then higher productivity finances the additional risk premia. Workers can choose jobs among employers that pose different levels of bankruptcy risks, and those least willing to undertake risk take jobs with relatively low levels of it, and receive commensurately lower pay., As such, there is no reason to believe that workers’ losses in some bankrupt companies raise special public policy concerns. Most workers at risk experience the upside potential; a small percentage experiences the downside. There is no reason to believe that the contracts ex ante are inefficient. But if the government may have to assume responsibility for near destitute older workers, then this prospect might give rise to various mandatory insurance schemes. Even if these insurances are not market priced, the participants at least have to pay some of the costs of the exposure they incur. This may be one reason why institutions like unemployment compensation and pension insurance arise. The compensating differential model used to explain the risk-reward tradeoff inherent in defined benefit pension plans also can explain their demise. Beginning in the mid 1980s, the federal government altered its traditional bonding role in the contract and, instead, permitted firms to unilaterally terminate defined benefit plans and take excess assets (those in excess of termination benefits) into corporate profits. This had the result of exogenously increasing the probability of termination far greater than bankruptcy risks. Workers were (justifiably) more leery of the pension promise, which reduced the amount that they were willing to pay for it. The plans, therefore, are valued by less than it cost the companies to provide them, which creates the incentive to move towards pension plans that are self-bonded, such as 401k plans. 401k plans have dominated pension growth for the past twenty years and are fast becoming the pension plan of choice in the (non-union) private sector. While they eliminate the bankruptcy risks inherent in defined benefit plans, they create their own set of bankruptcy exposures. While most workers covered by these plans do not invest in company stock, about one in ten have at least half their account balances concentrated in the securities issued by the firm that employs them. In many large companies, 401k plans are heavily invested in company stock. These investment patterns can give rise to the potential for catastrophic losses for workers late in their career. In order to protect themselves from ex post bailouts, taxpayers may want to give some thought to enforcing some set of minimum diversification rules in these plans. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
An outsider to the field of economics would probably take it for granted that economists have a highly developed theory of the firm. After all, firms are the engines of growth of modern capitalistic economies, and so economists must surely have fairly sophisticated views of how they behave. In fact, little could be further from the truth. Most formal models of the firm are extremely rudimentary, capable only of portraying hypothetical firms that bear little relation to the complex organizations we see in the world. Furthermore, theories that attempt to incorporate real-world features of corporations, partnerships, and the like often lack precision and rigor and have therefore failed, by and large, to be accepted by the theoretical mainstream. This article attempts to give lawyers a sense of how economists think about firms. It does not pretend to offer a systematic survey of the area; rather, it highlights several ideas of particular importance, and then explores an alternative theoretical perspective from which to view the firm. Part I introduces various established economic theories of the firm. Part II turns to a newer theory of the firm, based not upon human capital structures, but rather upon property rights. Part III synthesizes this property rights-based theory of the firm with more established theories. Established theories Transaction cost economics While the neoclassical paradigm, modified by principal–agent theory, progressed along the above lines, a very different approach to the theory of the firm developed under the heading of transaction cost economics.
This study is based on the belief that economic organization is shaped by transaction cost economizing decisions. It sets out the basic principles of transaction cost economics, applies the basic arguments to economic institutions, and develops public policy implications. Any issue that arises, or can be recast as a matter of contracting, is usefully examined in terms of transaction costs. Transaction cost economics maintains that governance of contractual relations is mainly achieved through institutions of private ordering instead of legal centralism. This approach is based on behavioral assumptions of bounded rationalism and opportunism, which reflect actual human nature. These assumptions underlie the problem of economic organization: to create contract and governance structures that economize on bounded rationality while safeguarding transactions against the hazards of opportunism. The book first summarizes the transaction cost economics approach to the study of economic organization. It develops the underlying behavioral assumptions and the types of transactions; alternative approaches to the world of contracts are presented. Assuming that firms are best regarded as a governance structure, a comparative institutional approach to the governance of contractual relations is set out. The evidence, theory, and policy of vertical integration are discussed, on the basis that the decision to integrate is paradigmatic to transaction cost analysis. The incentives and bureaucratic limits of internal organization are presented, including the dilemma of why a large firm can't do everything a collection of small firms can do. The economics of organization in presented in terms of transaction costs, showing that hierarchy also serves efficiency and permits a variety of predictions about the organization of work. Efficient labor organization is explored; on the assumption that an authority relation prevails between workers and managers, what governance structure supports will be made in response to various types of job attributes are discussed, and implications for union organization are developed. Considering antitrust ramifications of transaction cost economics, the book summarizes transaction cost issues that arise in the context of contracting, merger, and strategic behavior, and challenges earlier antitrust preoccupation with monopoly. (TNM)
This Article argues that corporate status became popular in the nineteenth century as a way to organize production because of the unique manner in which incorporation permitted organizers to lock in financial capital. Unlike participants in a partnership, shareholders in an incorporated enterprise could not extract capital from the firm without explicit approval of a board of directors charged with representing the interests of the incorporated entity, even when that interest might sometimes conflict with the interests of individual shareholders. While this ability to lock in capital has occasionally led to abuses, the ability to commit capital generally helped promote and protect the interests of shareholders as a group by making it possible for the entity to invest in long-term, highly specific investments. It also helped protect a wide range of enterprise participants who made specialized investments in reliance on the continued existence and financial viability of the corporation. The ability to lock in capital grew out of the fact that a corporate charter created a separate legal entity, whose existence and governance were separate from any of its participants. Although the idea that the law creates a separate legal person when a corporation is formed has been played down in the legal scholarship of the last two decades in favor of the view that a corporation is simply a nexus through which natural persons interact, recent legal scholarship has begun to reconsider the importance of entity status. Entity status under the law, and the associated separation of governance from contribution of financial capital through the formation of a corporation, allowed corporate participants to do something more than engage in a series of business transactions, or relationships, or even projects. It made it possible to build lasting institutions. Investments could be made in long-lived and specialized physical assets, in information and control systems, in specialized knowledge and routines, and in reputation and relationships, all of which could be sustained even as individual participants in the enterprise came and went. And these business institutions, in turn, could accomplish more toward the improvement of the wealth and standard of living of their participants in the long run than the same individuals could by holding separate property claims on business assets and engaging in a series of separate contracts with each other.
This is a history of economic thought from Adam Smith to John Maynard Keynes - but it is a history with a difference. Firstly, it is a history of economic theory, not of economic doctrines, that is, it is consistently focused on theoretical analysis, undiluted by entertaining historical digressions or biological colouring. Secondly, it includes detailed Reader’s Guides to nine of the major texts of economics, namely the works of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marx, Marshall, Wickstead, Wicksell, Walras and Keynes, in the effort to encourage students to become acquainted at first hand with the writings of all the great economists. This fifth edition adds new Reader’s Guides to Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics (1871–74) and Keynes’ General Theory to the previous seven Reader’s Guides of other great books in economics. There are significant and major additions to six chapters.
A diverse array of factors may influence both earnings and consumption; however, this work primarily focuses on the impact of investments in human capital upon an individual's potential earnings and psychic income. For this study, investments in human capital include such factors as educational level, on-the-job skills training, health care, migration, and consideration of issues regarding regional prices and income. Taking into account varying cultures and political regimes, the research indicates that economic earnings tend to be positively correlated to education and skill level. Additionally, studies indicate an inverse correlation between education and unemployment. Presents a theoretical overview of the types of human capital and the impact of investment in human capital on earnings and rates of return. Then utilizes empirical data and research to analyze the theoretical issues related to investment in human capital, specifically formal education. Considered are such issues as costs and returns of investments, and social and private gains of individuals. The research compares and contrasts these factors based upon both education and skill level. Areas of future research are identified, including further analysis of issues regarding social gains and differing levels of success across different regions and countries. (AKP)
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears these costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776, Cannan Edition(Modern Library, New York, 1937) p. 700.
Human Capital is Becker's classic study of how investment in an individual's education and training is similar to business investments in equipment. Recipient of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, Gary S. Becker is a pioneer of applying economic analysis to human behavior in such areas as discrimination, marriage, family relations, and education. Becker's research on human capital was considered by the Nobel committee to be his most noteworthy contribution to economics. This expanded edition includes four new chapters, covering recent ideas about human capital, fertility and economic growth, the division of labor, economic considerations within the family, and inequality in earnings. "Critics have charged that Mr. Becker's style of thinking reduces humans to economic entities. Nothing could be further from the truth. Mr. Becker gives people credit for having the power to reason and seek out their own best destiny."âWall Street Journal
This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (nonintegration) is that, under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2), whereas under nonintegration he can "fire" (i.e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets. We use this idea to study how changes in ownership affect the incentives of employees as well as those of owner-managers. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.
This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.
Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers agents who make specific investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the firm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this literature, we identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources. Access can be better than ownership because: i) the power agents get from access is more contingent on them making the right investment
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The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and Employment Relations in Japan and the United StatesSticky stories: economic explanations of employment and wage rigidity
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found that there is no contractual solution to this problem in which all of the output is distributed to all of the team members
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Holmstrom (1982) found that there is no contractual solution to this problem in which all of the output is distributed to all of the team members.
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American Employers, 1850–1950. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Blair M.