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Abstract Since the 1980s the rise of so-called ‘populist parties’ has given rise to thousands of books, articles, columns and editorials. This article aims to make a threefold contribution to the current debate on populism in liberal democracies. First, a clear and new definition of populism is presented. Second, the normal-pathology thesis is rejected; instead it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies. Indeed, one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist. Third, it is argued that the explanations of and reactions to the current populist Zeitgeist are seriously flawed and might actually strengthen rather than weaken it.

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... Scholars seeking to understand political populism usually begin from a common starting point: the people (Akkerman et al. 2014), who usually constitute a silent but often ignored majority (Canovan 1981;Mény and Surel 2002;Mudde 2004). The people are not simply all citizens, but rather those with a higher moral claim to have their will respected. ...
... Since "the people" are the ultimate authority of political will, popular sovereignty must be defended, according to populists, against and protected from unaccountable elites whose interests are divorced from those of the "real people" (Spruyt et al. 2016, p. 336). The allegations of systematic programmatic misrepresentation (Mudde 2004) are key to populist calls for radical change (Canovan 2002;Abts and Rummens 2007;Barr 2009;van Kessel 2015) and provide the justification for an urgent and radical action. ...
... Although elites are generally seen as "arrogant, self-serving, incompetent and often corrupt" (Rooduijn 2015, p. 4), they represent a much wider variety of groups. These range from the political establishment to business leaders, international figures, representatives of civil society organizations, intellectuals and academics, and writers (Mudde 2004;Jagers and Walgrave 2007;Brubaker 2017;Blokker 2019), as well as certain outgroups and "dangerous others" (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, p. 3). ...
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This study seeks to understand the political discourse of Javier Milei and to determine which concept of populism best captures his approach. Although perceived by many as a populist, Milei is unusual in that he sees himself as a liberal libertarian and defender of the West against collectivist policies. To this end, this study analyzes selected speeches by Milei from three different periods during and after the 2024 presidential election campaign and applies a deductive coding scheme designed to identify ideational populism, populist discursive framing, populism as strategy, and populism as crisis performance. The analysis confirms that Milei is at best a partial populist, as he fails to define the core populist concept of "the people". It concludes that the concept of crisis performance emerges as the most apt theoretical framework to classify Milei's type of populism. By rhetorically transforming the crisis not only into an existential economic issue but also into a moral tale of corruption and failure at the highest levels, he can appeal for radical change and offer himself as the national political savior. Milei's discourse also illustrates that, unlike ideological populism or discursive populist framing, in the performative turn, the victims of the crisis, the people, often remain a vague signifier defined by their suffering at the hands of elites.
... Sie bedienens ich populistischer Kommunikationsstrategien (N. Ernst et al. , 2019Khoiri et al. 2021), um das sogenannte Mainstreaming radikaler Diskurse zu fördern (Cammaerts 2018;Mudde 2004). ...
... Als dünneI deologie gibt Populismus selbst keine Antworten auf gesellschaftspolitische Fragen. Er ist daher mit jeglicher politischer oder religiöser Weltanschauung kombinierbar (Gidron/Bonikowski 2013;Mudde 2004). Welche ideologischen Merkmale Populismus letztlich anhaften, hängt somit vom gesellschaftspolitischen Kontext und der politischen Agenda der jeweiligen populistischen Akteur:innen ab (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2011). ...
... B. N. Gidron/Bonikowski 2013;Wirth et al. 2016), der im Fokus des vorliegenden Artikels stehen soll. Populistische Rhetorik erschaffte ine illusorische Erzählung vom tugendhaften "Vo lk" (Vo lkszentrismus)u nd konstruiert dabei einen Antagonismus zur moralischen Verderbtheit der Elitenakteure (Anti-Elitismus)(siehe auch Mudde 2004). Zentral ist zudemdie Betonung der Vo lkssouveränität mit dem Ziel der Einrichtung einer "Vo lksherrschaft",i n welcher dem Vo lk diea lleinige Macht zukommt und in der der vermeintliche inheitliche Vo lkswille ungebrochenz um Ausdruck kommt (Souveränitätsforderung) ( Abts/Rummens 2007;Schellenberg 2018;Wirth et al. 2016). ...
Article
Populistische und extremistische Akteur:innen gewinnen unabhängig von ihrer ideologischen Verortung stetig an Popularität. Digitale Medien spielen dabei eine zentrale Rolle. Obwohl in Medienberichten spekuliert wird, dass das von Populist:innen geschaffene einfache Weltbild zu extremeren Positionen beiträgt, gibt es bisher keine Untersuchungen dazu, inwiefern Extremist:innen in ihren Mitteilungen auf populistische Kommunikationsmuster zurückgreifen. Außerdem gibt es keine Studie, welche unterschiedliche Ideologien diesbezüglich gegenüberstellt. Die vorliegende Studie schließt diese Lücke und präsentiert eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse von N=51 extremistischen YouTube-Videos (n=25 rechtsextremistisch, n=26 islamistisch extremistisch). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 30 Prozent der Videos die drei zentralen Elemente des Populismus aufweisen (Volkszentrismus, Anti-Elitismus und Wiederherstellung der Souveränität). Zudem unterscheiden sich rechtsextremistische und islamistische Videos nur geringfügig hinsichtlich der verwendeten populistischen Kommunikationsmuster.
... Addressed as a political phenomenon, populism has been argued to influence several aspects of democratic regimes (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017;Urbinati 2019). To date, academic research has been devoted to studying political aspects related to populism, mainly focusing on parties and leaders' ideological positioning (e.g., Mudde 2004;Stanley 2008), voters' attitudes and preferences for populist parties (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014;Hameleers and de Vreese 2020;Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012;Norris and Inglehart 2019;Tsatsanis, Andreadis, and Teperoglou 2018), as well as communication strategies enacted by populist parties and leaders (Cranmer 2011;Engesser et al. 2017;Hawkins 2009;Jagers and Walgrave 2007;Meijers and Zaslove 2021;Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). When treated as a form of topdown political communication, populism has been shown to affect citizens' behaviors, such as political mobilization and online engagement (Blassnig et al. 2019a) and voters' attitudes as well (Hameleers and Fawzi 2020). ...
... Although being per se a contentious concept (see Hunger and Paxton 2022), most scholars agree on a minimal definition of the concept of populism (with few exceptions, see Müller 2016; Urbinati 2019): populist discourse relies on the clear-cut juxtaposition between the "pure people", meant as a homogeneous and virtuous community (Mudde 2004), and the "corrupt elites" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Populism combines the positive characteristics of the people with the denigration of their enemies, "the elites", who are depicted as incompetent, self-interested, and assumed to conspire behind the people's backs (Panizza 2005, 16-17). ...
... Populism combines the positive characteristics of the people with the denigration of their enemies, "the elites", who are depicted as incompetent, self-interested, and assumed to conspire behind the people's backs (Panizza 2005, 16-17). A further aspect of populism, argued by part of the literature, is the exclusion of the outgroups: people's values, identities, and rights are considered to be endangered also by the action of a series of "outgroups" that would receive preferential treatment by the elites (immigrants, LGBT+ people, welfare recipients, Roma communities and other specific social groups not considered as "part of the people", see Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015;Canovan 1999;Kriesi 2014;Mudde 2004;Taggart 2000). Building on this general conceptualization, the literature is rather aconsensual when it comes to the definition of right-wing populis; a commonly accepted framework for identifying right-wing populist movements and rhetoric is characterized by the emphasis on nativism, authoritarianism and exclusion (Betz 1994;Rydgren 2007;Mudde 2004). ...
... Studies show that populist attitudes are positively associated with conspiracy beliefs, whether measured as a conspiracy mentality or the belief in specific CTs (Castanho Silva et al. 2017;Christner 2022;Eberl et al. 2021;Stecula and Pickup 2021;Van Prooijen et al. 2022;Mehl et al. 2024). But as Mudde (2004) suggests, populism is considered a thin-centered ideology, with no ideological core, and can be found both on the left as well as on the right. When it comes to the concept of radical right-wing populism, the ideological core further includes authoritarian and nativist attitudes (Mudde 2004;Sawyer 2022;Rooduijn 2014). ...
... But as Mudde (2004) suggests, populism is considered a thin-centered ideology, with no ideological core, and can be found both on the left as well as on the right. When it comes to the concept of radical right-wing populism, the ideological core further includes authoritarian and nativist attitudes (Mudde 2004;Sawyer 2022;Rooduijn 2014). While some find no empirically unique effect of conspiracy thinking on (right-wing) authoritarianism isolated from other "unwarranted epistemic beliefs" (Smallpage et al. 2023, p. 2), other research suggests a positive relationship between (right-wing) authoritarianism as well as views on democracy and conspiracy beliefs (Grzesiak-Feldman 2015;Richey 2017;Pantazi et al. 2022;Papaioannou et al. 2023a), as people holding more pronounced authoritarian views may also be more inclined to see the world in conspiratorial terms. ...
... Including interaction terms allows us to delve deeper into the interplay between variables, and, in this case, it may help to better understand the potential interaction between the three main components of radical right-wing populism. This is also consistent with the view that populism, as a thin-centered ideology, is often combined with other ideological components, and that radical right-wing populism is then the combination of populism with nativist and authoritarian views (Mudde 2004). In the Austrian context specifically, I suspect an amplifying relationship between the variables in addition to the direct effects of radical right-wing populism. ...
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(1) Background: Populist radical right-wing parties and politicians have used conspiracy theories to perpetuate the antagonism between an evil elite conspiring against the good and unknowing people. Yet, less is known about whether and to what extent radical right-wing populism at the individual level is associated with different conspiracy beliefs. This analysis explores how the main components of radical right-wing populism—populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes—relate to both a general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy theories prevalent in political discourse. (2) Methods: Using data from an original 2023 online survey conducted in Austria, a stronghold of the populist radical right, this study includes new questions on immigration, COVID-19, and climate change, as well as a conspiracy mentality scale. (3) Results: The analyses reveal that all the main components are positively associated with different conspiracy beliefs, albeit to varying degrees. Across models, the strongest predictor is populism, followed by nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism varies the most across different conspiracy beliefs and is particularly associated with the belief in conspiracy theories related to immigration and climate change. (4) Conclusions: The results highlight the prevalence of radical right-wing populist attitudes across various conspiracy beliefs, reflecting how populist radical right-wing actors leverage conspiracy theories in their political discourse.
... The core characteristics of PRRPs include populism and a radical right-wing ideology, both influencing their conceptualization of an ideal political system (Heinisch & Wegscheider, 2020). PRRPs promote a specific understanding of democracy shaped by anti-pluralism and nativism (Canovan, 2002;Mudde, 2004;Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). They advocate for a political system where "the will of the people," as the ultimate Our study aims to address this gap in the literature. ...
... They also convey a strong people-centered view about how political decisions should be made. In their understanding, there exists just one volonté générale (general will) of the people which should be expressed and implemented as directly as possible (Mudde, 2004). Yet, the definition of the people is rather abstract, and its boundaries are not clearly defined. ...
... They push for the immediate implementation of the will of the people without being blurred by opposing demands (Mohrenberg et al., 2021;Mudde, 2004;Urbinati, 2019). ...
Article
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The “radical right gender gap” is an established finding in contemporary research, indicating that women support populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in significantly lower numbers than men. Despite substantial literature dedicated to uncovering the reasons behind this gap, significant questions remain unanswered. This article examines the nature of the radical right gender gap in greater detail, focusing on Switzerland—a country with one of the most established PRRPs in Western Europe, the SVP/SPP (Schweizer Volkspartei/Swiss People’s Party), making it a representative case. A defining feature of PRRPs that sets them apart from other parties is their clear distinction between in-groups and out-groups in society, coupled with the propagation of nativist and anti-pluralist values. While PRRPs emphasize caring for the in-group, they often advocate excluding the out-group from rights and privileges. This article argues that the preferences of PRRPs and female voters are in stark contrast regarding these issues. Building on empirical evidence that women place more importance on certain features of a democratic system than men do, we propose that this discrepancy may help explain the gender gap in support for these parties. Utilizing data from the European Social Survey 2020, which includes detailed questions on various understandings of democracy, we find robust support for our hypotheses within the Swiss context. Compared to men, women consider protecting the rights of minorities and safeguarding all citizens from poverty as especially important for a functioning democracy. These preferences emerge as influential factors contributing to women’s reluctance to support PRRPs.
... There are two terms extremism and radicalism, which are nowadays often interchangeably used in everyday life as well as in the scientific literature (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). This is not a surprise in an age dominated by the populist Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004) in which a dualist understanding prevails over in conceptualizing and understanding social, economic and political phenomena. Scientific thinking is not also free from this myopic and reductionist inclination. ...
... In Europe, right-wing populists define 'the people' largely in ethno-religious terms while more or less openly rejecting the principle of equality. Despite national variations, populist parties are characterised by their opposition to immigration; a concern for the protection of national culture and European civilisation; adamant criticisms of globalisation, multiculturalism, the EU, representative democracy, and mainstream political parties; and the exploitation of a discourse of essentialised cultural difference, which is often conflated with religious and national difference (Mudde, 2004). ...
Research
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This work aims to compile the works produced in the last decade as well as the classical works that are related to the elaboration of the concepts discussed in PLEDGE research such as emotions, ressentiment, resentment, grievances, democratic governance, trust, mattering, nostalgia, heritage, populism, polarisation, radicalism, and spaces of encounter. The literature covered in the compilation mainly consists of works taken from politics, sociology, political psychology, anthropology, history, cultural studies, philosophy, and economics.
... Benedek (2024b) nyomán megközelítésünk másik pillére a populizmusra épít, amelyet az előzőekben röviden felvázolt választási autokráciával kapcsolunk össze. Bár elismerjük a populizmus stratégiai, szociokulturális, diskurzuselméleti és kommunikációs értelmezéseinek hasznosságát (áttekintéshez lásd: Kaltwasser et al. 2017), tanulmányunkban a populizmus ideológiai megközelítését (Mudde, 2004;Mudde-Kaltwasser, 2017) vesszük alapul és a populista vezetők antipluralista és kirekesztő politikáját hangsúlyozzuk. ...
... A népközpontúság (people-centrism) -túllépve a hétköznapi nemzeti-állami integratív szimbólumok szintjén -a homogénnek tételezett nép akara tának az abszolutizálására és ellentmondást nem tűrő érvényesítésének igényére utal (Mudde, 2004;Laclau, 2005). Ez a -jellemzően Carl Schmitt de mok ráciafelfogásával rokonságba hozott -populista logika a népet egységes entitásnak tekinti, nem pedig különböző értékekkel, véleményekkel és szükségletekkel rendelkező egyének és társadalmi csoportok heterogén közösségének (Abst-Rummens, 2007: 408-409.). ...
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SSZEFOGLALÓ Tanulmányunkban az 1989 utáni magyar politikai rendszer átalakulását az Orbán-rezsim létrejöttének és működésének megragadása céljából a rezsimklasszifikációs megközelíté-sek és a populizmuskutatás erősségeinek szintetizálásával értelmezzük. A politikai ver-sengés polity és politics szempontjait együttesen szemlélő megközelítésünkkel a mainstream politikatudományi (2010), illetve alkotmányjogi és közjogi (2012/13) szemlélettel szemben két, ezektől eltérő kritikus fordulópontot azonosítottunk. Az első a liberális demokrácia válságba kerülése a 2000-es évek második felében, a második pedig az Orbán-rezsim po-pulista választási autokráciaként (PVA) történt megszilárdulása a 2010-es évek közepén. Az utóbbi időszakot lezáró 2018-as választások egyúttal az Orbán-rezsim autokratikus konszolidációjának kezdetét jelöli. A tágabb összehasonlító politikatudomány számára a magyar eset arra szolgál példával, hogy a populista polarizáció időben megelőzi és inten-zitásában túlszárnyalja az autokratizációt, később pedig azzal összefonódva az autokrati-kus átmenethez vezet. Kulcsszavak: választási autokrácia  populizmus  kritikus fordulópont  Orbán-rezsim Tanulmányunk két szempontból is újdonsággal szolgál a jelenlegi hazai poli-tikai rendszer értelmezése és magyarázata kapcsán. Az egyik nóvum az Or-bán-rezsim működésének leírása kapcsán használatos legjellemzőbb megkö-zelítések, a rezsimklasszifikációs szemlélet és a populizmuskutatás erőssége-inek ötvözése a populista autokratizáció és a populista választási autokrácia (PVA)
... There are an increasing number of studies exploring the possible causes of this phenomenon and its potential impact on different contexts and publics (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015;Amengay and Stockemer, 2019;Norris and Inglehart, 2019;Gidron and Hall, 2020;Gomez and Ramiro 2023). Studies focusing on populist radical parties usually distinguish between their 'thin' (Mudde, 2004;Stanley, 2008) and 'thick' (Pirro et al., 2018;Taggart, 2017) ideological features. While the latter refers to specific positions associated with host ideologies, such as anti-immigration, anti-globalization or pro-redistribution stances, the former is based on the ideas of people-centrism and anti-elitism (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018: 3;Katsambekis, 2022;Zaslove and Meijers, 2024). ...
... Assuming that these theses are partially correct and complementary, a recent advance in populism research seeks to go beyond this approach and concentrates on the relation between the supply features of populist parties and the characteristics of voters (i.e. the demand side). In terms of the supply dimension, populism comprises thin core elements that can be combined with various thick or 'host' ideologies (Mudde, 2004;Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013;Stanley, 2008). Two thin elements stand out: people-centrism and anti-elitism. ...
Article
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Generation Z is the most educated and yet pessimistic about the future. At the same time, populist parties have much support among young voters. Do they find an answer to their discouraging socio-economic situation in populist appeals? In this article, we analyse how pessimistic economic expectations shape the preference for populist parties among the young in Spain. By using conjoint experiments, we explore which specific features of populist parties (‘thin’ or ‘thick’ characteristics) are decisive in attracting young and pessimistic voters. Unlike older generations, for whom immigration is the most relevant factor, Generation Z, especially the pessimistic, focuses more on the thin ideological elements of populism. This finding contradicts previous experimental studies, which argue that thin populist characteristics are irrelevant in explaining the general population’s voting behaviour. Ideology plays a significant mediating role, as young pessimists on the left tend to be attracted by anti-elitism, while those on the centre-right by people-centrism.
... Blame attribution is often discussed in connection with populism (Canovan, 1999;Hameleers et al., 2017;Mudde, 2004). Attributing responsibility for negative outcomes, which is the essence of blaming, to the corrupt elites for causing the people's problems is thought to be inherent in populism . ...
... If we follow the original concept, then populism assumes the opposition of the pure People and the corrupt Elite (Mudde, 2004;Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In political communication, a populist will be inclined to morally devalue the Elite, and idealise the People. ...
Book
This book explores how to identify and understand moral emotions—shame, guilt, pride, and hubris—in political messages and news media. Recognizing these emotions is crucial for assessing morality's role in public discourse, particularly as moral debates have deepened public divides on issues like abortion, migration, LGBTQ+ rights, and freedom of speech. These debates fuel political struggles between groups with different social values and moral intuitions, especially during election campaigns where moral conflicts are used to distinguish opposing forces. In these moral conflicts, each ideological camp seeks to affirm its legitimacy while questioning its opponents' reputations. Thus, understanding morality is vital for those interested in contemporary public discourses in divided nations. This book stimulates discussion on emotion-based morality, moral language, and discursive moral regulation in politics. It offers innovative analytical frameworks to study how political communication contributes to public moralization. The book combines descriptive, explorative, and comparative approaches to summarize findings from mixed-method analyses (qualitative and quantitative, textual and visual, content and survey) of moral emotional messages and media portrayals of prime minister candidates during Hungary's 2022 General Election Campaigns. Hungary serves as an illustrative case due to increasing concerns about the moral status of its political elite and extreme hostility between political blocs, leading to polarized views on governance. This book will be of interest to academics specializing in empirical moral studies and investigating public discussions in contentious and polarized societies.
... This absence is problematic for the functioning of democracy. It causes a deficit in issue representation that undercuts the democratic system's ability to address distributional conflicts between social classes (Carnes 2020;Carnes and Lupu 2015a;Hemingway 2020; O'Grady 2019). 1 It also undermines government legitimacy and raises the risk of populist countermovements (Barnes and Saxton 2019;Mudde 2004). Studies indicate that the numerical underrepresentation of workers is larger than the underrepresentation of other political minorities (e.g., Best and Cotta 2000;Esaiasson and Holmberg 2017). ...
Article
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Prior studies have documented that working-class individuals rarely become parliamentarians. We know less about when in the career pipeline to parliament workers disappear, and why. We study these questions using detailed data on the universe of Swedish politicians’ careers over a 50-year period. We find roughly equal-sized declines in the proportion of workers on various rungs of the political career ladder ranging from local to national office. We reject the potential explanations that workers lack political ambition, public service motivation, honesty, or voter support. And while workers’ average high school grades and cognitive test scores are lower, this cannot explain their large promotion disadvantage, a situation that we label a class ceiling. Organizational ties to blue-collar unions help workers advance, but only to lower-level positions in left-leaning parties. We conclude that efforts to improve workers’ numerical representation should apply throughout the career ladder and focus on intra-party processes.
... și "elita coruptă" (Mudde, 2004 (Stoica, 2023). ...
Book
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Această lucrare se dorește a fi un instrument util pentru cei interesați de modul în care funcționează Parlamentul European, de la mecanismele sale interne până la dinamica electorală. Fără a emite concluzii definitive, volumul oferă o serie de reflecții asupra unui moment de răscruce pentru viitorul democratic al Uniunii Europene.
... Beyond candidates' experience, we expect that the ideology of movement parties also has an influence on the support they receive from voters. Building on the idea of populism as a "thin ideology" (Mudde 2004;Stanley 2008;Urbinati 2019), observers have highlighted the antielitism of some movement parties. The M5S vote was depicted as a "protest vote" insofar as it represented the electoral expression of dissatisfaction with mainstream parties and, as such, was an anti-elitist vote (Passarelli and Tuorto 2018). ...
Article
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Across the world, political parties are incorporating social movement strategies and frames. In this study, we pivot from the dominant focus on party characteristics to analyze drivers of support for movement parties in six European countries. We report results from a choice-based conjoint survey experiment showing that contrary to previous research, movement party voters favor neither candidates who are institutional outsiders nor those who actively participate in protests. Candidate policy positions are the most important driver of the vote for movement parties. Movement party voters, additionally, prefer candidates who either display anti-elitist sentiments or who want to ensure the smooth running of the current political system. These insights invite renewed attention to movement parties as an electoral vehicle whose voters prioritize decisive policy change.
... Bu yaklaşım popülizmi toplumda temel olarak halk ve elitler arasındaki çatışma olarak tanımlar ve halkın bozulmamış ahlaki niteliğini merkeze alır (Hawkins, 2019: 58). Daha çağdaş döneme gelindiğinde ise popülizmi ideoloji olarak tanımlayan önemli teorisyen ve çalışmalarla (Canovan, 2002;Albertazzi ve McDonnel, 2008;Mudde, 2004;Hawkins, 2019; karşılaşılmaktadır. Biskamp'ın (2019: 93) çalışmasında olduğu gibi daha yakın tarihli çalışmalarda ise ideolojik yaklaşıma otoriteryenlik ve yerlicilik unsurları da eklenerek sağ kanat popülizminin ideolojik unsurları bu şekilde tanımlanmaktadır. ...
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The aim of this study is to provide the reader with an overview of the different populism approaches in the literature and to offer a comprehensive discussion and comparison of these approaches. To this end, this study provides a theoretical review of the different and most widely used populism approaches in the literature and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each of them in a comparative manner. In this context, it should be noted that although each approach has methodological advantages, none of them can explain a particular populism phenomenon in its entirety. Therefore, rather than adopting a fixed approach in explaining a particular populism phenomenon, utilizing the explanatory qualities of different approaches together will provide comprehensive analytical evaluation opportunities and reduce the risk of overlooking different dimensions of the phenomenon under scrutiny by focusing on a single approach. In conclusion, the approaches to explain populism, which have been frequently used in recent years, are far from being perfect on their own. For this reason, adopting an eclectic approach when trying to explain phenomena will be in line with the flexible nature of populism and will increase the capacity to explain as many dimensions of the phenomenon as possible, rather than focusing only on certain aspects of the phenomenon being analyzed.
... It is important to discuss the remaining key concepts referred to in this article. We define populism as a thin ideology, following Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology that sees society as divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite". A populist party uses populist ideology to maximise its vote share. ...
... Popülizm çalışmalarının birçoğu literatürü ele aldığı kısımda popülizmin farklı tanımlarına ve muğlaklığına değiniyor. En görünür şekilde popülizm, "ince-merkezli ideoloji" (Mudde, 2004;Albertazzi ve McDonnell, 2008;Rooduijn ve Pauwels, 2011), "strateji" (Weyland 2001;Barr 2009;Weyland 2021;Custodi, 2021), "söylem ve tarz" (Taguief, 1995;Panizza, 2005) olarak ele alınmaktadır. Moffitt (2016) ise, siyasal tarz ve söylemsel yaklaşım farklılıklarını ele alarak popülist aktörlerin performans özelliklerini de belirtir. ...
... O populismo foi uma das armas utilizadas para a formação das alianças e ainda que o termo sofra quanto sua variedade de interpretações, encontra-se uma unanimidade na literatura em definilo como um estilo político que se apropria de lutas contra 'grupos dominantes' (Funke et al., 2021), defende-se como um movimento antissistema para alcançar a 'vontade do povo' (Mudde, 2004), com estilo discursivo que provoca um 'nós' contra 'eles' como forma de manipulação e divisão identitárias da sociedade (Velasco, 2020). ...
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... People-centrism focuses on prioritizing the interests of "the people" as a homogeneous in-group, while anti-elitism is characterized by distrust and opposition toward an immoral and privileged out-group (Aalberg et al., 2018). Together, people-centrism and anti-elitism form the essence of populism, which views politics as a moral struggle between the virtuous common people and a corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). To investigate value frames focused on inand out-group dynamics, we ask: ...
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... 30). In the populist discourse, however, its meaning generally rests on its normative distinction and moralistic opposition to the elite (Mudde, 2004). To Laclau, the formation of the people involves the accumulation of demands over time. ...
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It is sometimes suggested that even democratic politicians need to dirty their hands in ways that render hypocrisy, lying and deception unavoidable and even justified. By contrast, we draw on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism to argue that the ‘reasonable disagreements’ occasioned by the ‘fact of pluralism’ that make democratic politics necessary can only be resolved in ways congruent with democratic norms if politicians are truthful in Bernard Williams’ sense, and adhere to the related virtues of ‘sincerity’ and ‘accuracy’. Supplementing Eric Beerbohm’s ‘relational model’ of campaign ethics with Suzanne Dovi’s account of the ‘good representative’, we argue that these both entail the virtues of truthfulness. We contend the contemporary crisis of representation associated with the rise of technocracy and populism can be linked to the ways both undermine these virtues through their common rejection of pluralism and the related need for truthfulness. Consequently, both involve deformations of ‘good’ democratic representation.
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In this paper I dig deep down along the slope of what touches me deeply – a democratic decline in climate politics with increasing use of hateful and threatening rhetoric – nasty rhetoric. I follow the course of critical researchers in management and organization studies, striving to move away from traditional, horizontal norms of academic writing that elision the author from the text, to-wards a more vertical writing incorporating the voice of the author. Embodying and resonating with my own emotional experiences of far-right hate and threat campaigns, I qualitatively analyze written, spoken and visual material from newspapers, magazines, blogs, podcasts, photos, vid-eos, television, radio and social media, to understand the nature of nasty rhetoric in Swedish climate politics, and the implications thereof for democracy. A far-right populist nativist party is currently holding tangible powers, dictating the ambitions, content and process of Swedish cli-mate politics. In less than two years, Swedish climate politics have turned into an antidemocratic divisive politics portraying climate science as “a point of view”, female climate journalists as “moron hags” that should be “fired” and “raped”, and the climate justice movement as “terror-ists” and “a threat to Swedish democracy” that should be “sent to prison” and “executed”. Nasty rhetoric is used not only by anonymous trolls in social media, but openly by the prime minister, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians. Their use of nasty rhetoric aims to silence the opponents to the current paradigm shift in Swedish climate policy, breaching democratic norms such as le-gitimacy, accountability and justice, but also to mobilize followers and expand they hate and threats. The opposition is also using nasty rhetoric, but of a less aggressive nature, to reveal far-right populist climate policy and politicians as a naked emperor. Nasty rhetoric is a powerful tactic to mobilize more offenders, while leaving its targets with fear and anxiety and a need for disappearance from public debate. Many targets resign or stay silent, negatively affecting plu-ralistic debates and the scrutiny of power in democracies. I chose to break the silence and write differently to increase our knowledge of the phenomenon of nasty rhetoric.
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Chapter
This chapter introduces a framework elucidating the role of moral emotions in political communication, aiming to contribute to interdisciplinary understanding. It outlines research question of the volume regarding moral emotions in public discourse, particularly during the 2022 Hungarian election campaigns. Defining morality as societal codes of conduct, it explores moralising in politics and advocates a functionalist perspective emphasising moral pluralism. While acknowledging morality’s normative nature in political rhetoric, it explores its instrumentalisation and cultivation, for example, management, for persuasion and voter appeal. The chapter also discusses the use of moral language to elevate political conflicts and emphasises the collective, emotive, and discursive nature of political moralising, often aimed at bolstering one’s status and disparaging opponents.
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This chapter examines how PM Viktor Orbán instrumentalised two subjectively positive self-evaluative emotions, pride and hubris, to expand the camp of his supporters. In relation to which developments and whose performance did Orbán show pride, recommending the same emotion to his potential supporters, when was pride replaced by hubris: by uncritical pride and showing-off? Whether the relationship of moral communication to populism as well as the escalation of the war in Ukraine contributed to the success of the political right. The results show the prime minister’s communication may be classified as techno-populist, and the war created the opportunity to recall his experiences in averting threats instead of merely listing specific achievements and promises in his communication.
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Chapter
“Democratic regression”, the “retreat of western liberalism”, the “return” or “renaissance” of authoritarianism, or the “third wave of autocratization”—these are some the many labels for diverse phenomena—or problems of authority—that are plaguing societies in the Global North and South. Commonly, such problems of authority are labelled as pathological practices of corruption or institutional defects, deviant forms of governance, or pathological symptoms of representation and participation. Their semantic specification and interpretive framework are delivered by three camps—with contested, porous borders, and considerable intersections and agreements—under the signifier of illiberalism, populism, or authoritarianism. All of them claim—each camp speaking from its peculiar vantage point—the authority to interpret the phenomena mentioned above. This chapter discusses the “properties”—advantages and failures—of these three frameworks and brings them into dialogue with one another.
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For populist leaders, naming is an important political tool, helping them to consolidate their leadership while harming the legitimacy of their opponents. The article offers a theoretical framework explaining populist tactical uses of naming; how they name and misname their opponents. The explanation locates the naming tactics within the overall populist framework as a thin-centered ideology. The following three naming tactics are described and analyzed: (1) coining ridiculing nicknames, (2) appropriating existing nicknames, and (3) avoiding the opponent’s name. To substantiate the theoretical arguments, we discursively analyze these three tactics, as were employed by the former US president, Donald Trump, the prime minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu, and the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.
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Populist parties place the people at the centre of polity and politics. Such parties refer to direct democracy as a suitable avenue to involve people in the decision-making process but much less is known about their approaches towards deliberation. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature and analyses how populist parties talk about deliberation in their election manifestos. It tests empirically how much they speak about deliberation and whether they have a generic discourse as opposed to specific references to forms of deliberation and levels of implementation. Our qualitative content analysis draws on the election manifestos of 84 political parties from the Manifesto Project Dataset in 23 European democracies in the national elections between 1996 and 2021. The results indicate that populists talk considerably less and use vague language about the levels of implementation compared to non-populists.
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Can civil servants protect the administrative state from illiberal populism? We argue that bureaucratic success in fending off illiberal populism necessitates both a supportive institutional environment and overcoming populist rhetoric meant to undermine public confidence in policy expertise. The Covid-19 pandemic in Brazil is a case study of populist antipathy toward a professional public health service. Brazil's public health officials were able to defy Jair Bolsonaro's obstruction of a Covid-19 mass vaccination program thanks to institutions characterised by insulation from executive reprisal, decentralised health care provision, and an independent judiciary. However, civil servant resistance was less effective in nullifying Bolsonaro's anti-vaccine rhetoric: Even as most Brazilians received Covid-19 vaccines, vaccination rates remained associated with electoral support for Bolsonaro and overall vaccine hesitancy increased. The Brazilian case suggests the power of populist rhetoric to undermine pluralist public administration by attacking its epistemic foundation, even in a context favorable to bureaucratic resistance.
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Populism is often assumed to undermine the liberal world order, but this claim has never been tested systematically. In this study, we do so for the first time. Based on an understanding of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” entailing anti-elitism and people-centrism, we expect populist governments to have foreign policy preferences opposed to the core features of the US-led liberal international order. Our empirical analysis assesses government preferences on the liberal international order as expressed through UN General Assembly votes. Our findings support the expectation that populism has a strong and statistically significant negative impact on foreign policy preferences related to the core norms of the liberal international order. Moreover, we find that populists with a left-wing ideology and those in less democratic countries tend to be more opposed to the US-led liberal international order. However, populist governments do not reject the UNGA as such, as they are not more likely to be absent from UNGA votes than other states. Thereby, this study makes a contribution both to the burgeoning literature on the international implications of populism and to debates on the crisis of the liberal order.
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This special issue offers an up-to-date overview of the democratization of candidate selection, while giving attention to causes and cases from both past and present. The focus is on the consequences of internal democratization for the overall functioning of political parties. The contributions show that there are many forms of democratizing candidate selection. These differences mainly concern the inclusiveness of the selectorate that controls the candidate selection process and the degree of centralization of the selection methods, of which the role and composition of the selectorate are the most vital and defining criteria. The types of consequences and their impact on the functioning of parties are not univocal because there are different degrees of democratization. The empirical evidence presented by the contributions shows that moderate forms of democratization can have beneficial effects on party organizations - such as higher levels of membership participation - but that this effect is not certain. Radical forms, on the other hand, are more likely to distort party cohesiveness, and consequently weaken the quality of representative democracy.
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This paper attempts to explain the appeal direct democratic instruments hold for contemporary right-populist parties by drawing on recent experience in Canada. Our thesis is that a particular approach to direct democracy - which we label `plebiscitarianism' - complements right-populist parties' broader ideological commitment to a scaling back of the welfare state, and of public life more generally. Starting with a theoretical approximation of plebiscitarianism, we trace this complementarity with reference to the democratic ideas and practices of right-populists in Canada, both historically and in the present context.
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On the basis of an extensive analysis of the party literature of three extreme-right parties, the paradox of the anti-party party is studied. Two types of anti-party sentiments are distinguished: extremist and populist. The first type holds a rejection of the political party per se and seems to have gone out of vogue. The second type holds a critique of certain parties either on the basis of their policies or their behaviour. It is these sentiments that are (omni)present, in different interlinked themes, in the literature of extreme-right parties. They serve, on the one hand, to help them to profit from the existing anti-party sentiments at the mass level and, on the other hand, to help them present themselves in a positive manner, by self-defining the party as the opposite of the other parties. It is thus that the paradox of the anti-party parties can exist.
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Drawing on a conceptual distinction between traditional right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties, this article examines the performance of the latter in public office. The central argument is that the specific populist aspects of such parties allow them to succeed in opposition and to do well at the game of elections. Once in government, their unique strengths turn into disadvantages. Significant structural weaknesses inherent in populist parties pose nearly insurmountable problems that make their long-term success in government questionable. The analysis also shows that the rise of right-wing populism has substantially increased the opportunity structures of conservative parties. Following the theoretical discussion, the article examines the case of the Austrian Freedom Party and draws parallels with the Italian and Dutch cases.
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The recent success of radical right-wing parties in Western democracies is quite amazing, given their unimpressive history in the post-war period. These new parties are sometimes referred to as ‘populist’ parties. It is not surprising then that this wave of populist politics has incited a renewed academic interest in populism as an empirical phenomenon and in populism as a concept. I will first look at the definitions of populism, as there is no consensus among the authors under review what parties are to be labelled populist. It is, for instance, not evident that the Dutch LPF is a populist party. Then I will discuss the explanations provided for the success of the new parties in Western democracies. I will argue that the focus is generally too confined to strictly social–economic and political factors. The role of the media and particularly of entrepreneurship should be taken into account in order to explain the success of populist parties. Finally, I will address the pros and cons of populism as an ideology. I will probe the arguments that populism is a challenge to democracy and conclude that the authors under review are too soft on populism.Acta Politica (2003) 38, 147–159. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500021
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In this article, we explain the puzzling continuous success of the far right wing parties in Europe by using micro-organizational factors such as charismatic leadership and cohesive party organization, contributing to the process of party institutionalization and demonstrating the success of the extreme right-wing parties. We attempt to solve what appears to be a paradox of the institutionalization of far right charismatic parties on the basis of theories of party leadership and party institutionalization, In this endeavour we first define the concept of charismatic parties, and then outline our argument regarding the paradox of charismatic institutionalization and present criteria for measuring institutionalization of charismatic parties. Finally, we outline a proposed theory of "hard charismatic parties' institutionalization. The French FN (Front National) and the Austrian FPO (Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs) serve as case studies to test our proposed model.
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Though the extreme right was not particularly successful in the 1999 European elections, it continues to be a major factor in the politics of Western Europe. This book, now available in paperback, provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the extreme right in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. On the basis of original research -- using party literature--the author concludes that though individual parties might stress different issues, the extreme right party family does share a core ideology of nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and law and order.
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The literature on populism used to depict the phenomenon as an alternative to the standard path from traditional to modern society; as a way to enfranchise the underclass; or as an anomaly vis-à-vis class politics and liberal institutions. More recently, the debate has shifted into something of a terra incognita as a result of the growing interest in the connection between populism and democratic politics. One of the more intriguing contributions to this debate is an article by Margaret Canovan, if only because it makes this unknown territory less confusing. Her argument draws from Michael Oakeshott's claim that political modernity is characterised by the interplay of two distinct styles – the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. She renames them the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy and suggests that populism arises in the gap between them. This establishes a relation of interiority between populism and democracy. The former will follow democracy like a shadow. At times, however, the theoretical status of the gap is somewhat uncertain, as it seems more appropriate for thinking politics (particularly radical politics) in general. The political valence of the shadow could also be specified further to show the undecidability between the democratic aspect of the phenomenon and its possible ominous tones. This paper looks into this in some detail to engage in a friendly interrogation of Canovan's claims.
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Unless discussion is focused specifically on the People’s Party of the late nineteenth century, American populism proves to be a curiously elusive subject. From one perspective, many aspects of American politics can be described, broadly, as populist in character. However, once particular instances of alleged populism are subjected to analysis, it appears that much that might otherwise be identified as populist can be incorporated within some other tradition of politics in the United States. Populism is everywhere, and nowhere. In trying to understand this, perhaps the best starting point is the concept of populism itself.
Chapter
Although populist1 movements are usually sparked off by specific social and economic problems, their common feature is a political appeal to the people, and a claim to legitimacy that rests on the democratic ideology of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Analyses of populism often point to the tension within western democracy between this populist tradition and liberal constitutionalism. Certainly, there are difficulties in reconciling the project of giving power to the people with the drive to restrain power within constitutional limits, but concentration on this particular problem leaves unexplained the enduring strength of populist-democratic ideology and the ways in which it sustains populist movements. In this chapter I will argue that in order to understand populism we need to be aware of a complex and elusive paradox that lies at the heart of modern democracy. Crudely stated, the paradox is that democratic politics does not and cannot make sense to most of the people it aims to empower. The most inclusive and accessible form of politics ever achieved is also the most opaque. Precisely because it is the most inclusive form of politics, democracy needs the transparency that ideology can supply, and yet the ideology that should communicate politics to the people cannot avoid being systematically misleading.
Chapter
Has the Weberian disenchantment with the world finally freed people from the illusion that democracy is a panacea? For the past decade, once the glory and triumph of the western model over the socialist regimes had evaporated, we have been able to observe the numerous manifestations of popular misgivings about political participation and democratic institutions. Democratic malaise (Dahl 1998), the politics of resentment (Betz 1994, 1998a, b), political anomie, and protest movements are among the most frequent manifestations of this disillusion in many western democracies. Both electoral turnout and opinion polls testify to the endurance and extension of the problem. Nor have the new democracies which emerged from the collapse of the socialist systems escaped this general phenomenon of disillusion as shown by the return to power—in sheep’s clothing—of former communist party officials. These challenges to democratic governance vary according to the specificity of each national polity, but share some common features such as the decline of electoral support for political incumbents, a marked increase in electoral abstentionism, the volatility of the electorate, the growing fragmentation of the party system, the emergence of ad hoc social movements unrepresented by traditional political organisations, and the emergence of single-issue and/or radical parties.
Article
Charisma has often been seen as an important factor in the rise of extreme Right parties, both in the inter-war era and more recently. However, empirical case studies of the two men who have been arguably the most-cited recent 'charismatic' leaders - Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovsky - reveal little evidence for a Weber-like emotional mass bond, largely unconcerned with rational economic issues. Nevertheless, charisma remains a useful analytical concept if it is reconceptualised to refer to: (a) a coterie of affective core supporters rather than mass support; and (b) the way in which some leaders become, especially for less politically-concerned voters, the personification of politics.
Article
Populism has traditionally been defined as a cumulative concept, characterized by the simultaneous presence of political, economic, social, and discursive attributes. Radial concepts of populism offer a looser way of spanning different domains. Criticism of modernization and dependency theory, which assumed tight connections between different domains, and the emergence of new types of personalistic leadership that lack some traditional attributes of populism have made cumulative and radial concepts of populism problematic. Populism can be reconceptualized as a classical concept located in a single domain, politics. Populism can be defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power through direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of followers.
Article
Article
uch contemporary analysis of the limits of social democracy in Europe focuses upon the role of external factors (Cerny 1995, Moses 1997). In particular, the idea that globalization has »changed everything« has gained a great deal of currency. Specifically, it is held by both academics and pol- iticians that external global constraints, capital account openness, in- creased trade dependence etc., have narrowed policy options for social democratic governments to such an extent that left parties are no longer able to govern as left parties (Scharpf 1991, Blair and Schroeder 1998). In- stead, a new supply-side social democracy based around skill formation is seen as the only way forward for progressive politics (Giddens 1998). Another development of note in contemporary Europe is the rise of neo-populist movements and right-wing fringe parties, some of which have either gained power or have come close to doing so. Le Pen's per- formance in the last French presidential elections, the emergence and consolidation of Haider's Freedom party in Austria; and the explosion and subsequent implosion of the Fortuyn list in Holland are but the most obvious examples. Interestingly, these two seemingly discrete phenom- ena may have much in common. Those European social democratic parties that regained power in the 1990s have in many cases failed to produce traditional social democratic policies. Instead, with explicit reference to the external constraints of glo- balization, social democratic politicians have told their constituents that the policies of the past have no place in the present. Yet there is good. This »globalization« is nothing to be feared; rather, it should be embraced. As a result, welfare reforms long associated with the right are actively pro-
Article
In March 1994, the Italian electorate voted to power an alliance of parties of the New Right that had never been in office before: Forza Italia, the Alleanza Nazionale, and the Lega Nord. Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of Forza Italia, became the prime minister but retained a monopoly holding of national television and media resources, and Gianfranco Fini's Alleanza Nazionale became the first political party with a fascist heritage to assume governmental office in postwar Europe. This article examines how the control and use of communications resources has contributed to making Forza Italia and the Alleanza Nazionale members of the political establishment of the Italian Second Republic.
Article
Many recent discussions of the decline of party are predicated on the assumption that the Duverger/socialist mass-party model is the only model for parties. We contend that this assumption is misconceived, that the mass-party model is only one, temporally limited and contingent model, and that it is necessary to differentiate notions of adaptation and change from notions of decline or failure. Following an analysis of how various models of party can be located in terms of the relationship between civil society and the state, we contend that the recent period has witnessed the emergence of a new model of party, the cartel party, in which colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival. Finally, we suggest that the recent challenge to party is in fact a challenge to the cartel that the established parties have created for themselves.
Article
ROBERT A. DAHL poses the paradox that in many democracies citizens possess little confidence in their key democratic institutions yet believe in the desirability of democracy. He offers an explanation.
Article
The term ‘political class’ on the European continent became a populist battle cry to express Politikverdrossenheit. The author of this contribution tries to assess the usefulness of the concept by empirical analysis. The decision‐making aspect continues to be treated under the term ‘political elite’. Political class makes sense only in those aspects by which the ruling groups stabilise their organisations (the party state) and their income as a group. The tendency to lose ground is, however, compensated by increasing responsiveness. Political class as a notion is wider than the term elite because it includes also the backbenchers. On the other hand it is narrower because the political elite comprises actors beyond government and parliament, such as administrators, media agents and interest group leaders.
Article
1. Einleitung Die Parteienforschung gehört, wie regelmäßig selbst von führenden Vertretern der Disziplin beklagt wird (Mintzel 1987: 221), zu den unüberschaubarsten Feldern der internationalen Politikwissenschaft. Die besondere Komplexität des Forschungsfeldes ist dabei zum großen Teil lediglich Abbild der „Allgegenwärtigkeit“ der politischen Parteien in der modernen Demokratie. Innerhalb der Forschung kommt diese zuweilen nur schwer zu bewältigende Komplexität auch in dem Umstand zum Ausdruck, dass es, gemessen an der Vielzahl einschlägiger Sammelbände und Zeitschriftenpublikationen, nur wenige solide Monographien gibt. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße für Arbeiten, die über die Analyse von Parteien und Parteiensystem eines Landes hinausreichen. Auf in Alleinautorschaft verfasste komparative Studien trifft man innerhalb der jüngeren deutschsprachigen Parteienforschung noch am ehesten im Bereich der Erforschung einzelner „Parteifamilien“ (vgl. etwa Müller-Rommel 1992; Merkel 1993; Minkenberg 1998; Decker 2000), deutlich seltener hingegen auf dem Feld empirisch-vergleichend angelegter „comprehensive studies“ (von Beyme 1984, 2000) oder im Bereich der Parteientheorie (Wiesendahl 1998). Gemessen an der Situation in der empirisch ausgerichteten Forschung, welche von jeher durch ein Meer unterschiedlichster Detailbefunde und eine allenfalls mäßig ausgeprägte Kommunikation zwischen den einzelnen Autoren gekennzeichnet ist (Mintzel 1987: 226‐227), lassen sich im Bereich der theoretisch orientierten Parteienforschung in viel stärkerem Maße „Klassiker“ ausmachen, welche ‐ wie etwa die Schriften Robert Michels’, Moisei Ostrogorskis oder Maurice Duvergers ‐ über lange Zeit hinweg die Diskussion maßgeblich prägen (Panebianco 1988; Ware 1996). Zu ebendieser Gruppe weit überdurchschnittlich einflussreicher Schriften der Parteienforschung verdient auch der 1995 veröffentlichte Beitrag aus der Feder des amerikanischen Parteienforschers Richard S. Katz und dessen niederländischem Ko-Autor Peter Mair gezählt zu werden, in dem diese die Herausbildung eines neuen Parteientypus ‐ der „Kartellpartei“ („cartel party“) ‐ und grundlegend veränderte Bedingungen des Parteienwettbewerbs in den westlichen Ländern konstatieren (Katz/Mair 1995). In einigen Überblicksdarstellungen wurde der Forschungsbeitrag von Katz und Mair schon vor Jahren als den „klassischen“ Werken der Parteientheorie ebenbürtiger Entwurf klassifiziert (Maor 1997: Kap. 4). Der Anspruch dieses Beitrags ist vergleichsweise bescheiden. Ausgehend von einer kurzen Vorstellung des Konzepts von Katz und Mair geht es darum, eine erste Zwischenbilanz der einschlägigen Forschungsdiskussion zu ziehen, welche auch als „Anstoß“ für die deutsche Parteienforschung gedacht ist. Denn während sich mittlerweile selbst ein beträchtlicher Teil der international beachteten politikwissenschaftlichen Diskussion über Fragen deutscher Politik in englischsprachigen Fachzeitschriften abspielt,
Article
Promotional cultures, to use Wernick’s expression, have transformed communication as the ideology of the market seeps into every facet of social life. Promotional tests, whether verbal, written or visual, now have great impact upon cultural formation and are contributing to a reflexive transformation of both individual and collective political identities. Much commentary on political change (and especially electoral change) is exercised by a powerfully normative concern with the alleged death of modernist forms of politics and political discourse. This paper goes beyond metaphorical hand-wringing to examine changes in the cultural currents which are transforming the politics of many post-historical societies, and which are conveniently summarised in the changing character of electoral politics and campaign discourses. Although frequently discussed as a kind of anti-politics, these currents, and their phenomenal appearance in the guise of media parties and forms of lifestyle marketing are producing a highly self-referential style of electoral discourse, and better understood as intimations of postmodern populism, where that involves: (I) a growing reliance on the techniques and outputs of culture industries to provide sites where meaning is constituted, (II) a de-centring of ideas about authentic forms of publicness and (III) the side-lining of palpable modern forms of politics, like mass political parties. Recent and current developments in campaigns in the USA, Italy and the UK are extracted for detailed comment. ©
Article
A specter is haunting contemporary party politics: the specter of anti-political-establishment parties. In old as well as in new democracies, fears run high and the literature is booming. Specters are evasive, however. Political scientists have tried to get hold of this one under labels like protest, populist or extremist parties. Yet the `anti-political' ideology which is central for many of these outsider parties has not received the systematic attention it deserves. The present piece of discourse analysis pretends to fill this gap. It argues that anti-political-establishment parties construct two specific cleavages. They contrapose the political elite against citizens, on the one hand, and against themselves, on the other. In its main part, the article analyzes the symbolic strategies anti-political-establishment parties employ in constructing this double conflict. It proceeds to describe their dilemmatic position in between normal and anti-democratic opposition, sketches the possible career paths of anti-political-establishment parties, and concludes with some notes on available counter-strategies.
Article
Winner of the American Political Science Association's 1996 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award. The rise of new political competitors on the radical right is a central feature of many contemporary European party systems. The first study of its kind based on a wide array of comparative survey data, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis provides a unifying framework to explain why rightist parties are electorally powerful in some countries but not in others. The book argues that changes in social structure and the economy do not by themselves adequately explain the success of extremist parties. Instead we must look to the competitive struggles among parties, their internal organizational patterns, and their long-term ideological traditions to understand the principles governing their success. Radical right authoritarian parties tend to emerge when moderate parties converge toward the median voter. But the success of these parties depends on the strategy employed by the right-wing political actors. Herbert Kitschelt's in-depth analysis, based on the experiences of rightist parties in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Britain, reveals that the broadest appeal is enjoyed by parties that couple a fierce commitment to free markets with authoritarian, ethnocentric--or even racist--messages. The author also shows how a country's particular political constituency or its intellectual and organizational legacies may allow right-wing parties to diverge from these norms and still find electoral success. The book concludes by exploring the interaction between the development of the welfare state, cultural pluralization through immigrants, and the growth of the extreme right. Herbert Kitschelt is Professor of Political Science at both Duke University and Humboldt University, Berlin. Anthony McGann is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Duke University.
Article
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Essex, 1978.
Article
Populism, understood as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values, should not be dismissed as a pathological form of politics of no interest to the political theorist, for its democratic pretensions raise important issues. Adapting Michael Oakeshott's distinction between ‘the politics of faith’ and ‘the politics of scepticism’, the paper offers an analysis of democracy in terms of two opposing faces, one ‘pragmatic’ and the other ‘redemptive’, and argues that it is the inescapable tension between them that makes populism a perennial possibility.
Article
Whether or not nationalism is an ideology is a question that can be illuminated by a study of its conceptual structure. Core and adjacent concepts of nationalism are examined within the context of liberal, conservative and fascist ideologies, contexts that respectively encourage particular ideational paths within nationalist argument, while discouraging others. Employing a morphological analysis of ideological configurations, it is argued that various nationalisms may appear as distinct thin-centred ideologies, but are more readily understood as embellishments of, and sustainers of, the features of their host ideologies.
Haider, Le Pen & Co Parteien unter Druck, op. cit. 34 On the link between nationalism and populism, and the concept of 'national populism,' see Taguieff, 'Political Science Confronts Populism
  • Michael Jungwirth
Michael Jungwirth (ed.), Haider, Le Pen & Co. Europas Rechtspopulisten, Graz, Styria, 2002; Decker, Parteien unter Druck, op. cit. 34 On the link between nationalism and populism, and the concept of 'national populism,' see Taguieff, 'Political Science Confronts Populism', op. cit., pp. 9–43;
Structures de représentation et
  • Hassenteufel
Hassenteufel, 'Structures de représentation et " appel au peuple ". Le populisme en Autriche', Politix, 14: 2 (1991), pp. 95–101.
The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies Volkes Stimme? Rechtspopulismus in Europa, op. cit. 33 Cf. Reinhard Heinisch, 'Success in Opposition – Failure in Government: Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office
  • See
32 See, inter alia, Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall (eds), The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, New York, St Martin's Press, 1998; Pfahl-Traughber, Volkes Stimme? Rechtspopulismus in Europa, op. cit. 33 Cf. Reinhard Heinisch, 'Success in Opposition – Failure in Government: Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office', West European Politics, 26: 3 (2003), pp. 91–130;
Ideological Trends in Western Political Parties
  • © Government
  • Opposition Ltd
© Government and Opposition Ltd 2004 57 For example, John Clayton Thomas, 'Ideological Trends in Western Political Parties', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.), Western European Party Systems, New York, Free Press, 1980, pp. 348–66;
Leninism is essentially populist, while Ernesto Laclau called socialism 'the highest form of populism'. See Simon Clarke, 'Was Lenin a Marxist? The Populist Roots of Marxism-Leninism What is to Be Done? Leninism, Anti-Leninist Marxism and the Question of Revolution Today
  • Simon Clarke Indeed
Indeed, Simon Clarke has argued that Marxism–Leninism is essentially populist, while Ernesto Laclau called socialism 'the highest form of populism'. See Simon Clarke, 'Was Lenin a Marxist? The Populist Roots of Marxism-Leninism', in Werner Bonefeld and Sergio Tischler (eds), What is to Be Done? Leninism, Anti-Leninist Marxism and the Question of Revolution Today, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, pp. 44–75;
Anti-Political-Establishment Parties', Party PoliticsPolitical Corruption, Democracy, and Governance in Western EuropeThe Concept of Political Class: A New Dimension of Research on ElitesChanging Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party
  • Paul Heywood Amir
also Amir Abedi, Anti-Political Establishment Parties, London, Routledge, 2004. © Government and Opposition Ltd 2004 44 Andreas Schedler, 'Anti-Political-Establishment Parties', Party Politics, 2: 3 (1996), p. 297. 45 Paul Heywood et al., 'Political Corruption, Democracy, and Governance in Western Europe', in Heywood et al., Developments in West European Politics 2, op. cit., pp. 196–7. See also F. F. Ridley and Alan Doig (eds), Sleaze: Politicians, Private Interests & Public Reaction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. 46 See Klaus von Beyme, 'The Concept of Political Class: A New Dimension of Research on Elites?', West European Politics, 19: 1 (1996), p. 84. 47 For the original thesis, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics, 1: 1 (1995), pp. 5–28.
Vrijheid der onvolwassenen', De Groene Amsterdammer
  • Milo Anstadt
Milo Anstadt, 'Vrijheid der onvolwassenen', De Groene Amsterdammer, 126: 49 (2002), pp. 30–3.
Is Nederland een democratie?', De Helling
  • Kees Van Kersbergen
Kees van Kersbergen, 'Is Nederland een democratie?', De Helling, 15: 3 (2002), pp. 23–5.
Western European Party Systems Decline of Ideology? 58 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis
  • John Clayton For Example
  • Thomas
57 For example, John Clayton Thomas, 'Ideological Trends in Western Political Parties', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.), Western European Party Systems, New York, Free Press, 1980, pp. 348–66; Mostefa Rejai (ed.), Decline of Ideology?, Chicago, Aldine/Atherton, 1971. 58 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968. 59 Lothar Probst, 'Die Erzeugung " vorwärtsgerichteter Unruhe ". Überlegungen zum Charisma von Jörg Haider', Vorgänge, 41: 4 (2002), p. 39. 60 See, inter alia, Herbert Kitschelt (in collaboration with Anthony McGann), The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995; Russell J. Dalton et al. (eds), Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994. 61 For example, Mark Blyth, 'Globalization and the Limits of Democratic Choice.
77 See Sandra Seubert Ron van Dooren, Messengers from the Promised Land. An Interactive Theory of Charisma The Power Elite 80 For a more philosophical and elaborate argumentation about the compatibility of populism and representative democracy, see Benjamín Arditi
  • Populism Gellner
Gellner, Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics, op. cit., pp. 62–96. 76 Taggart, Populism, op. cit., p. 1. 77 See Sandra Seubert, 'Paradoxien des Charisma. Max Weber und die Politik des Vertrauens', Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 12: 3 (2002), pp. 1123–48; Ron van Dooren, Messengers from the Promised Land. An Interactive Theory of Charisma, Leiden, DSWO-Press, 1994. 78 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957. 79 See, inter alia, Yves Mény and Yves Surel, Par le people, pour le people. Le populisme et les démocraties, Paris, Fayard, 2000; Taggart, Populism, op. cit.; Urbinati, 'Democracy and Populism', op. cit., pp. 110–24. 80 For a more philosophical and elaborate argumentation about the compatibility of populism and representative democracy, see Benjamín Arditi, 'Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan', Political Studies, 52: 1 (2004), pp. 135–43.