Content uploaded by Óliver Williamson
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Óliver Williamson on Nov 25, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
Visible and Invisible Governance.
... Commons (1931), Coase (1937), and years later Williamson (1985), are some of the most quoted authors for the development of this theory. One of the main premises of TCT is that management structures must align with transactions in order to minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 1994). Thus, we see the emergence of organizations focused on the management and coordination of transactions and mechanisms, to reduce the costs associated with these transactions (Li, Arditi, & Wang, 2013). ...
The oil and gas industry in Brazil is going through a huge transformation since the discovery of extensive oil reserves in 2007. Oil companies turned their attention to Brazil, and so did the Brazilian government. Hence, this stimulates economic trade that is associated with significant transaction costs linked to these projects. This paper examines the impact of the predictability of the project owner's behavior, the predictability of the contractor's behavior, project management efficiency , and uncertainties in the transaction environment on transaction costs, in oil and gas projects in Brazil. To do so, we employed a survey method, by sending questionnaires to 1,500 project managers of major oil & gas companies that operate in Brazil. Data analysis using a PLS technique was applied to 235 usable responses. We discuss the implications of these findings.
... In management studies, these issues have been of continuous concern, especially in organizational and strategic management disciplines. Bowen and Siehl [38] recognized the profitability and comfort of movement as important antecedents for turnover while building their proposition based on Willamson [39]. Also, Jackofsky & Peters [40] has enumerated the tradeoff between the profitability of movement in the sensed job option and feeling of gratification as a push to a decision for turnover or retention [41]. ...
The context of China fosters different contextual factors, which influences the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure in comparison to firms across the rest of the world. Political ties at a corporate level are one of these vital factors. This paper studies the influence of firm-level political ties (PT) and executive turnover (ET) on the quality of CSR disclosure in the context of shareholding status of departing executive in Chinese listed A-share firms. Stakeholder and Agency theories are applied to the dissemination of CSR disclosures in Chinese firms whereby we used 20,578 firm-years interpretations of Chinese registered companies between 2012 and 2019. The results foster a negative link between executive turnover and quality of CSR disclosures. In addition, a negative relationship has been found between political ties and the quality of CSR disclosure. The findings disclose that the shareholding status of departing executive moderate the relationship between the impact of political ties and executive turnover on firms quality of CSR disclosure , whilst the effect of executive turnover on the quality of CSR disclosure was found more pronounced for firms whose departing executive held larger shareholding (SH). This study contributed to the literature on the quality of CSR disclosure while recognizing the negative effect of executive turnover on a firm's quality of CSR disclosure for politically tied firms with a reinforcing moderating role of the shareholding status of departing executive.
... de recursos y capacidades. Bajo la premisa de la motivación-expectativas, del impulso de capacidades y del acceso a recursos (Westerlund, 2009), la teoría de los costes de transacción posibilita un enfoque para abordar formas de gobernanza alternativas entre jerarquía y mercados (Williamson, 1994), mientras que la teoría de redes sociales interpreta la ontología y la posición en la red, fundamentalmente mediante tipos de lazo, intermediación, densidad y centralidad (Tichy, Tushman y Fombrun, 1979). En definitiva, se trata de analizar cómo a la luz de estas teorías puede interpretarse y resolverse la gobernanza en red, las expectativas de los grupos de investigación que participan en redes de investigación y el rendimiento del conjunto de la red (Jones, Hesterly y Borgatti, 1997;Westerlund, 2009;Zaheer, Gözübüyük y Milanov, 2010). ...
As redes rexionais de investigación teñen un papel destacado na creación de coñecemento científico e na innovación, actividades clave na realidade económica moderna. Este artigo analiza as expectativas dos grupos de investigación e explora a incidencia da gobernanza no rendemento das redes de investigación mediante unha análise que inclúe datos de once redes públicas de investiga-ción, integradas por 83 grupos de investigación en Galicia. A investigación mostra que as redes satis-fán as expectativas dos grupos que nelas participan, especialmente en termos de resultados, e que existe unha serie de factores de gobernanza asociados positivamente ao rendemento. Entre as impli-cacións derivadas destes achados destacan a necesidade de impulsar lazos fortes entre os grupos de investigación na rede, a articulación de acordos de equidade e o establecemento de mecanismos de avaliación na rede. Aínda que tamén se identifican outros factores que inflúen de forma negativa no rendemento da rede, fundamentalmente a excesiva centralidade e a intermediación duns grupos de investigación sobre outros.
... Distributive fairness might also reduce the minority partner's need to implement ex post controls for reducing opportunism. Williamson (1994) notes that many partners attempt to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by supplementing ex ante controls, such as prequalification of prospective partners and incentive designs, in addition to ex post controls such as on-going monitoring. However, when partners have the assurance of a fair division of the outcomes, they may be less likely to impose intrusive ex post controls such as monitoring because these controls may be less necessary and may create a sense of suspicion or distrust that could damage the collaboration. ...
This research examines the value of developing procedural and distributive fairness under a variety of favorable and adverse transacting conditions in R&D collaborations. The parties in these collaborations have symmetrical power and make significant investments in joint activities. A survey of approximately 300 R&D collaborations indicates that while procedural and distributive fairness facilitates performance outcomes, these forms of fairness are also able to improve performance under favorable transacting conditions (e.g., knowledge of the transformation process) and mitigate the negative effects of adverse transacting conditions (e.g., asymmetric inputs and transacting hazards). Interestingly, we also find evidence that the development of fairness can undermine performance, particularly when credible commitments of collaboration (e.g., joint transaction-specific investments) are in place. Implications for the development of interorganizational relationships and the management of complex collaborations are also discussed.
... Formal decision-making structures and procedures are thus likely to be set up in a way that enables the stakeholder organization to claim that the decisions taken, especially concerning positions on certain issues and actions towards policy-makers, reflect the interests of the members. However, the formal and informal side of internal governance of stakeholder organizations should not be considered to match a priori (Williamson, 1994); rather, the extent to which the decisions and actions of stakeholder organizations really reflect the interest of their members is an empirical matter. ...
... These findings connect well with the relational governance approach discussed by Poppo et al. (2008), where exchange is governed by cooperative norms and collaborative activities. Organizational economics also acknowledges informal social relationships as governance tools, often in the form of trust (Williamson, 1994;Woolthius, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom, 2005). Hierarchical governance can sometimes be substituted by or complemented with relational arrangements (Woolthius et al., 2005); in the current framework, this translates as subsidiaries' governing knowledge. ...
This article examines the utilization of knowledge transferred between sending and receiving subsidiaries within multinational enterprises. A model was developed and tested on 169 specific knowledge transfer projects. The model explains the utilization of knowledge subject to transfer in terms of hierarchical governance tool efficacy and lateral relationships within the multinational enterprise. The results show that headquarters' involvement during knowledge development does not have any significant impact on subsequent knowledge utilization in the receiving units and, in fact, hierarchical governance forms have a negative impact on knowl- edge utilization. However, lateral relationships are positive stimuli to building subsidiary capabilities in the knowledge transfer process that enhance receiving unit knowledge utilization.
This chapter offers a synopsis mapping of the recent and significant advances in the research of systemsSystem and governanceGovernance concepts; highlighting any conceptual synergies of one to the other, and altogether strengthening any other obvious emergent themes resulting from the confluence of ideas across several disciplinary fields and/or problem domainsProblem domain. This synthesis is designed to establish the current state of the field, to provide a scholarly critique of the literature and to present relevant research gaps in need of further exploration, elaboration, or confirmation. An additional goal of this chapter was to establish the position and fit of the current research within the larger body of knowledge for which it will become an original contribution.
Most of the research on the relationship or channel performance between the franchise headquarters and the distribution channel control structure and channel performance was conducted in advance, and there was no comprehensive study on the impact of relational norms on opportunistic behavior and contract compliance. This study examined and analyzed which contract mechanisms of franchise headquarters for long-term relationship between franchise headquarters and franchisee for shared growth increase partnership of opportunistic behavior and contract compliance behavior. Specifically, the detailed variables from a formal contract perspective and the impact of each detail from a relational exchange perspective on opportunistic behavior and the contract compliance are analyzed and the impact it leads to long-term performance of the franchisee. It also examined to reveal whether Franchisee's confidence in Franchise headquarters plays a controlling role in opportunistic behavior and long-term performance of franchisee.
Hypothesis 1 is that flexibility, information exchange, and collegiate problem-solving in a relational contract will have a positive effect on contract compliance behavior (Hypothesis 1a, 1b, 1c). And, the contractual specification, contract violations regulations, and extra-contractual incentives would have a positive effect on contract compliance behavior (Hypothesis 2a, 2b, 2c). Hypothesis 3 is a hypothesis about the impact of relational contracts on opportunistic behavior, which hypothesizes that flexibility, information exchange, and collegiate problem-solving in relational contracts will have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 3a, 3b, 3c). Hypothesis 4 is that the contractual specification, contract violations regulations, and extra-contractual incentives will have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 4a, 4b, 4c). Next, hypothesis 5 was established that contract compliance behavior would have a positive effect on the franchisee’s long-term performance and hypothesis 6 was that the opportunistic behavior would have a negative effect on the franchisee’s long-term performance. Finally, Hypothesis 7 was established that trust in the franchise headquarters of franchisee will play a controlling role between the opportunistic behavior and the long-term performance of franchisees.
To verify the established research theory and research model, the first 305 questionnaires were distributed to franchisees located in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, and 217 questionnaires were retrieved, and 153 questions recorded as valid answers were finally used for analysis. Verifiable factor analysis shows that the model fit is χ2=1177.029, df=726, χ2/df=1.621, and the other goodness-of-fit index, IFI=.938, TLI=.929, CFI=.937 indicates overall good. Furthermore, the mean variance extraction (AVE) is greater than 0.50 for all variables and the synthetic reliability (CR) value calculated as the value of standardized factor load and error variance is more than 0.70, indicating that concentration validity is obtained. Correlation analysis was performed on scales with proven concentration validity to evaluate law validity and discriminant validity. The analysis showed that the direction of the hypothesis and the direction of the correlation coefficient set in the study matched the law validity, and that the AVE square root of all latent variables was greater than the correlation coefficient, confirming that the discrimination validity between theoretical variables was also obtained. The verification results of the hypothesis are as Table 2~3. First, the 1a hypothesis that the flexibility would have a positive effect on contract compliance behavior was rejected. However, information exchange and collegiate problem-solving have a significant impact on contract compliance behavior, supported hypotheses 1b and 1c, and that relational contracts will consequently affect contract compliance behavior. Hypotheses 2a and 2c were then supported, as the contractual specification and contract violations regulations, among the effects of the formal contract on the contract compliance behavior. However, the 2b hypothesis that extra-contractual incentives would affect contract compliance behavior was not statistically significant, and the hypothesis that formal contracts would affect contract compliance behavior was partially supported. Third, for the influence of relational contracts on opportunistic behavior, only information exchange was found to have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior with significant statistical implications, and only the hypothesis of 3b was supported. Flexibility and collegiate problem-solving by the Franchise Headquarters were not statistically significant, and hypotheses 3a and 3c were rejected, and the hypothesis that relational contracts would have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior was partially supported. Hypothesis 4a was supported by hypothesis 4a as it was found that only the contractual specification had a negative effect with statistically meaningful outcome values. contract violations regulations, and extra-contractual incentives were not statistically significant and hypotheses 4b and 4c were rejected. Consequently, the hypothesis that 26 유통연구 제26권 제3호formal contracts would have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior was partially supported. In the relationship between partnership and franchisee’s performance, hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 were both supported by the franchisee’s performance, “The contract compliance behavior will have positive (+) effect on franchisee’s performance” and “opportunistic behavior will have negative effect on franchisee’s performance”. Finally, it has become clear that Franchisee’s confidence in franchise headquarters has the effect of reducing the negative impact of franchisee’s opportunistic behavior on franchisee’s performance.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.