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The Unheeded Cry : Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science
Abstract
Repr Bibliogr. s. 287 - 299
... "Pain is a more terrible lord of mankind than even death"-Albert Schweitzer, 1922. The history of veterinary medicine reflects a failure to address companion animals' acute pain, as witnessed by early textbooks [1,2]. For instance, the early use of anesthesia in animals was for the purpose of restraint, not to relieve pain [2]. ...
... Clifford Wolf, MD, updated the conception of pain as a spectrum from adaptive/"good" pain to maladaptive/"bad" pain [14]. Predictable acute pain (e.g., surgery) provides an opportunity for pain prevention and mitigation [1,7,[15][16][17][18][19]. Post-operative pain, if untreated or undertreated, can evolve into chronic maladaptive pain [14,[20][21][22]. ...
... When practitioners manage acute pain appropriately, it prevents permanent anatomic changes in the nervous system that shift the landscape toward chronic maladaptive pain [21,22]. It is easier to prevent pain than to "chase" it once it takes hold in the body [1,7,[14][15][16][17][18][20][21][22][23]. ...
Animals do not speak a language humans understand, making it easy to believe that they do not experience pain the way humans do. Despite data affirming that companion animals can and do experience pain much as do humans, there remains a gap between companion animal acute pain management knowledge and its execution. Companion animal pain is not simply a physiological issue. Veterinary clinicians can and should embrace the foundational principles of clinical bioethics—respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice—translated from human medicine for the benefit of their patients. By reframing companion animal pain as a bioethical issue, as described in this paper, veterinarians affirm their commitment to closing the gap between what is known and what is done for painful companion animals. This takes pet pain beyond physiology.
... I agree with so much of the material in The Inevitable Bond that my review is more of an appeal for an increased willingness on the part of those who use animals in research to recognize that bonding exists, and for an attempt to use this to the mutual advantage of the scientists and the animals they use. This is not what all scientists believe, however, nor has this view enjoyed a lot of popularity for a long time; many still operate on the basis of what Rollin (1989) calls the "common sense of science," according to which science is a value-free, objective enterprise. ...
... Scientists also show different attitudes toward animals of the same species depending on whether they are encountered in the laboratory or at home. Rollin (1989) and others have noted that many scientists who name and praise the cognitive abilities of the companion animals with whom they share their home are likely to leave this sort of baggage at home when they enter their laboratories to do research with members of the same species. ...
... In addition, there are those who inform their laboratory research using anecdotes that stem from observations of their companion animals, with whom they are freely anthropomorphic (Rollin 1989). Based on a series of interviews, Phillips (1993) reported that many scientists socially construct a "distinct category of animal, the 'laboratory animal,' that contrasts with nameable animals (e.g., pets) across every salient dimension... the cat or dog in the laboratory is perceived by researchers as ontologically different from the pet dog or cat at home." ...
... However, agreement is lacking about whether people, on average, overestimate or underestimate animal minds. Some have expressed concern both about the tendency to overestimate animal minds (i.e., anthropomorphism; Burghardt, 1991aBurghardt, , 1991bBurghardt, , 2004Wynne, 2004Wynne, , 2007 and others about the tendency to underestimate animal minds (i.e., mind-denial; Rollin, 1989;Singer, 1975). It is currently unclear which of these perspectives is correct because beliefs about animal minds have yet to be investigated in ways that afford claims about accuracy. ...
... The primary contribution of the work is its ability to speak to longstanding claims about whether we over-or underestimate animals' minds (Burghardt, 1991a(Burghardt, , 1991b(Burghardt, , 2004de Waal, 2016;Rollin, 1989;Singer, 1975;Wynne, 2004Wynne, , 2007. By employing a task that provides a normative benchmark (Hill, 2017;Tappin et al., 2020), we were able to examine the accuracy of a wide set of beliefs about animals' mental capacities and about genuine scientific evidence that one might come across in popular media (e.g., de Waal, 2016). ...
Our relationships with other animals are governed by how we view their capacity for sentience and suffering. However, there is currently little agreement as to whether people's beliefs about animal minds are largely accurate or inaccurate. We used an innovative task to examine how people update their beliefs in response to noisy but informative clues about animal minds. This allowed us to compare participants' posterior beliefs to what a normative participant ought to believe if they conform to Bayes' theorem. Five studies (four pre-registered; n = 2417) found that participants shifted their beliefs too far in response to clues that suggested animals do not have minds (i.e., overshooting what a normative participant ought to believe), but not far enough in response to clues that suggested animals have minds (i.e., falling short of what a normative participant ought to believe). A final study demonstrated that this effect was attenuated when humans were the targets of belief. The findings demonstrate that people underestimate animal minds in a way that can be said to be inaccurate and highlight the role of belief updating in downplaying evidence of animal minds. The findings are discussed in relation to speciesist beliefs about the supremacy of humans over animals.
... Beispiele für traditionelle Positionen des moralischen Individualismus finden sich z. B. in den Arbeiten von Bernard E. Rollin (2017), James Rachels (1999) oder Gary Francione (2008). Bernard E. Rollin ( 3 2006, 99-101;2017, 145, 255-256) spricht von einem evolvierten Telos, einem Zweck jedes tierlichen Individuums in sich selbst, der dessen Bedürfnisse, Interessen und Schmerzverhalten definiert. ...
Anthropocentrism and the fact that some animals are just considered a means to an end while others are loved are often subject to criticism in animal ethics. Drawing on the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan, the author examines how the apparent ambivalence in human–animal relationships is based on different forms of enjoyment. Referring to the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, which according to Lacan define human reality, the author shows how enjoyment and its limits shape, for example, how we think about pets, farm animals or wild animals. This alternative perspective will contribute to a better understanding of the challenges in human–animal relationships.
Animals, like humans, suffer and die from natural causes. This is particularly true of animals living in the wild, given their high exposure to, and low capacity to cope with, harmful natural processes. Most wild animals likely have short lives, full of suffering, usually ending in terrible deaths. This book argues that on the assumption that we have reasons to assist others in need, we should intervene in nature to prevent or reduce the harms wild animals suffer, provided that it is feasible and that the expected result is positive overall. It is of the utmost importance that academics from different disciplines as well as animal advocates begin to confront this issue. The more people are concerned with wild animal suffering, the more probable it is that safe and effective solutions to the plight of wild animals will be implemented in the future.
The level of priority and resource given to the care of organisms is influenced by beliefs and understanding about their capacities for conscious awareness. Variation in attitudes to animal welfare around the world today is partly a reflection of this. Improved understanding of the range of phenomena of which animals may be conscious is likely to lead to greater global consensus about the importance of high standards of animal welfare. This is a matter of current relevance. In the global free market there is a danger that efforts in one country to raise standards for farm or laboratory animals will be compromised by competition from others which employ cheaper, less welfare-friendly systems. Scientific developments which inform us about animals’ capacities for pleasant and unpleasant feelings will play an important role in the development of global agreement about animal welfare standards. Deciding which animals might have the capacity for consciousness, and thus for suffering, and of what they might be conscious, are fundamental issues which set boundaries to the ranges of species to be given basic or special forms of welfare protection. In practice, such lines have to be drawn and it is crucial that they are drawn in the right place. This is a difficult but essential task and society looks to scientists for guidance on the matter. There have been many developments in recent years in scientific approaches to the study of consciousness in animals which are pertinent to this debate.
To be able to assess animal welfare the researcher must presuppose a number of background assumptions that cannot be tested by means of ordinary empirical data collection. In order to substantiate these assumptions two sorts of inferences have to be relied upon, which the authors designate by the terms ‘analogies’ and ‘homologies’. Analogies are evaluative, philosophical reflections by means of which it is made clear what provisions or states constitute the welfare of humans and other animals. By means of analogies it may, for example be argued that animal welfare consists of subjective experiences such as pain, boredom, pleasure and expectation. Also by means of analogies the relative ‘weight’ of these states can be decided. Homologies are part of theoretical science. They serve to clarify how the relevant experiences are linked to measurable anatomical, physiological and behavioural parameters.
An account is given of the steps which have to be taken to give a full answer to a question concerning the welfare of animals. In the account only farm animals are mentioned, but the same steps, of course, also have to be taken to answer questions concerning the welfare of other kinds of animals be they companion, laboratory, zoo or wild. Eight steps are described, and it is argued that both analogies and homologies are needed at very fundamental levels. Therefore, if animal welfare science is to provide relevant, rational and reliable answers to questions concerning animal welfare, it must be an interdisciplinary inquiry involving philosophical reflections and theoretical biology.
Anthropocentrism and the fact that some animals are just considered a means to an end while others are loved are often subject to criticism in animal ethics. Drawing on the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan, the author examines how the apparent ambivalence in human–animal relationships is based on different forms of enjoyment. Referring to the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, which according to Lacan define human reality, the author shows how enjoyment and its limits shape, for example, how we think about pets, farm animals or wild animals. This alternative perspective will contribute to a better understanding of the challenges in human–animal relationships.
Sentience is scientifically established in mammals including animals farmed for their fur. By sentience we mean (in philosophical terms) the capacity to experience pain and pleasure. Even more, animals cannot just feel pain, but also suffer, and experience a wide range of mental and emotional capacities. There are rational grounds for including sentient animals within the sphere of moral solicitude. These include: (a) animals cannot give or withhold their consent; (b) they cannot represent or vocalise their own interests; (c) they are morally innocent or blameless, and (d) they are vulnerable and relatively defenceless. Some ethicists hold that deliberately causing animals suffering is intrinsically wrong. Others hold that the goods procured must be essential and that no alternative means are available. Some also hold that because humans are moral agents capable of knowing right and wrong, we should not be the kind of people to cause animal suffering. Such actions damage ourselves, inter alia, through desensitisation. Viewed from each of these perspectives it can be seen immediately that fur farming fails basic moral tests. The wearing of fur, while conceivably pleasant, fashionable, or even desirable, cannot reasonably be defined as essential. Fur is a luxury item.KeywordsEthical evaluationSentienceSufferingRational basisEthical theoriesMoral tests
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